Yes, bb, we are lost in that music.
Andy-- There is a Russian psychological dictionary that might help, but so
would a number of the articles from the Aarhus conference.
Your entering point, like that of my better educated European colleagues, is
from philosophy with considerations of the (philosophical)
concept of labor, etc., as the starting pint. My entry point was from a
common sense encounter with people's whose life worlds were
radically different from mine (Liberian country people in the mid-1960's)
and a very common sense notion of activity as "what people do."
(The issue for me was to understand why they appeared to experience so much
difficulty with early school math). One can see this kind
of starting point in formulations such as Leontiev's invocation of a worker
at a potter's wheel, which is how I made the connections between
what I then thought of as context). But Leontiev never studied what potters
or bus drivers or anyone else "really does," nor, except under
very tight controls did any other of the activity theorists in Russia
(exceptions, what fighter pilots do, what train dispatcher's do, but under
conditions where the conditions of work themselves, the "large context" was
not open to investigation-- psychology cut off from culture and social life
engaged in by people for whom culture and social life were the philosophical
starting points).
One can see the gradual intermixing/internationalization of these ideas in
publications across the 1980's and 1990's as non-Soviets stuggled to
understand and appropriate the ideas of their Soviet colleagues. Another
good source for writings were are not sufficiently aware of is the last
few years of J. Russian East European Psych where Pentti Hakarainen and
colleagues have done a great job of broadening access to other and
new Russian writing.
All very relevant to issues of subjectivity of recent xmca vintage.
mike
On 1/8/06, bb <xmca-whoever@comcast.net> wrote:
>
> Is it not the case historically that in navigation it is the misguided who
> make new discoveries?
>
> bb
> -------------- Original message ----------------------
> From: Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> > Cultural psychology p. 139, bb. But ask any Russian and you will learn
> > that my understanding of the concept of activity is hopelessly
> misguided!
> > mike
> >
> > On 1/7/06, bb <xmca-whoever@comcast.net> wrote:
> > >
> > > From where does the following text come Mike, from CP? I'm away from
> my
> > > library, so i can't check personally.
> > >
> > > bb
> > >
> > >
> > > >
> > > > *Following the Activity Thread*
> > > >
> > > > Activity theory is anything but a monolithic enterprise. Within
> Russia
> > > there
> > > > are at least two schools of thought about how best to formulate
> Marx's
> > > ideas
> > > > in psychological terms (Brushlinsky, 1968; Zinchenko, 1985). There
> is a
> > > long
> > > > German tradition of activity theory research (Raeithel, 1994), a
> > > > Scandinavian/Nordic tradition ( Hydén, 1984; Engeström, 1993) and
> now,
> > > > perhaps, an American tradition (Goodwin and Goodwin, in press;
> Nardi,
> > > 1994;
> > > > Scribner, 1984). A good statement of general tenets of this approach
> is
> > > > provided by Engeström, who writes that an activity system,
> > > >
> > > > integrates the subject, the object, and the instruments (material
> tools
> > > as
> > > > well as signs and symbols) into a unified whole.
> > > >
> > > > An activity system incorporates both the object-oriented productive
> > > aspect
> > > > and the person-oriented communicative aspect of human conduct.
> > > Production
> > > > and communication are inseparable (Rossi-Landi, 1983). Actually a
> human
> > > > activity system always contains the subsystems of production,
> > > distribution,
> > > > exchange, and consumption (p. 67).
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > The attractiveness of this formulation in light of the discussion of
> > > > artifact mediation at the beginning of this chapter should be
> apparent:
> > > > Engeström's formulation promises a way to incorporate ideas about
> the
> > > > duality of artifacts but does not privilege production over social
> > > cohesion.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Engeström represents his conception of activity in a manner that
> both
> > > > includes and enlarges upon the early cultural-historical
> psychologists'
> > > > notions of mediation as individual action. Once again we see a
> triangle,
> > > but
> > > > now it is a set of interconnected triangles (See Figure 5.3). At the
> top
> > > of
> > > > the figure is the basic subject-
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > [Insert Figure 5.3 about here]
> > > >
> > > > mediator-object relationship depicted in Figure 5.1. This is the
> level
> > > of
> > > > mediated action through which the subject transforms the object in
> the
> > > > process of acting upon it. But action exists "as such" only in
> relation
> > > to
> > > > the components at the bottom of the triangle. The *community* refers
> to
> > > > those who share the same general object; the *rules* refer to
> explicit
> > > norms
> > > > and conventions that constrain actions within the activity system;
> the
> > > > *division
> > > > of labor* refers to the division of object oriented actions among
> > > members of
> > > > the community. The various components of an activity system do not
> exist
> > > in
> > > > isolation from each other; rather, they are constantly being
> > > constructed,
> > > > renewed, and transformed as outcome and cause of human life.
> > > >
> > > > Engeström echoes contemporary dissatisfaction with conceptions that
> > > either
> > > > treat contexts as "containers" of behavior, untouched in themselves
> by
> > > human
> > > > actions or as contained within interpersonal interaction. Jean Lave
> > > nicely
> > > > summarized the shortcomings of these two conceptions by declaring
> that
> > > "one
> > > > has system without individual experience, the other experience
> without
> > > > system (Lave, 1988, p. 150)."
> > > >
> > > > In activity theory as summarized in Figure 5.3, contexts are
> activity
> > > > systems. The subsystem associated with the subject-mediator-object
> > > > relationships exists as such only in relationship to the other
> elements
> > > of
> > > > the system. This is a thoroughly relational view of context.
> > > >
> > > > Jean Lave (1993) provides a succinct summary of several themes
> uniting
> > > > scholars interested in activity and practice theory:
> > > >
> > > > 1. An emphasis on the dialectical character of the fundamental
> > > relations
> > > > constituting human experience (in Lave's terms, human agency is
> > > "partially
> > > > determined, partially determining").
> > > >
> > > > 2. A focus on experience in the world that rejects the structure and
> > > > dynamics of psychological test procedures as a universally
> appropriate
> > > > template.
> > > >
> > > > 3. A shift in the boundaries of cognition and the environment such
> that,
> > > in
> > > > Lave's phrasing, cognition "is stretched across mind, body, activity
> and
> > > > setting" (a perspective sometimes referred to as "distributed
> cognition"
> > > > (Hutchins, 1991; Norman, 1991; Salomon, 1993).
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On 1/7/06, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > Can anyone help me with a succinct (NB) definition of 'activity'
> as it
> > > is
> > > > > used in the CHAT literature.
> > > > > I am sure this is a hotly contested topic, but if there is any
> kind of
> > > > > lowest common denominator or consensus on this I would be very
> > > grateful.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Andy Blunden
> > > > >
> > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > xmca mailing list
> > > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > xmca mailing list
> > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >
> > >
> > >
> >
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> To: bb <xmca-whoever@comcast.net>
> Date: Sun, 8 Jan 2006 04:27:24 +0000
> Subject: Re: [xmca] definition of 'activity'
> Cultural psychology p. 139, bb. But ask any Russian and you will learn
> that my understanding of the concept of activity is hopelessly misguided!
> mike
>
> On 1/7/06, bb <xmca-whoever@comcast.net> wrote:
> >
> > From where does the following text come Mike, from CP? I'm away from my
> > library, so i can't check personally.
> >
> > bb
> >
> >
> > >
> > > *Following the Activity Thread*
> > >
> > > Activity theory is anything but a monolithic enterprise. Within Russia
> > there
> > > are at least two schools of thought about how best to formulate Marx's
> > ideas
> > > in psychological terms (Brushlinsky, 1968; Zinchenko, 1985). There is
> > a long
> > > German tradition of activity theory research (Raeithel, 1994), a
> > > Scandinavian/Nordic tradition ( Hydén, 1984; Engeström, 1993) and now,
> > > perhaps, an American tradition (Goodwin and Goodwin, in press; Nardi,
> > 1994;
> > > Scribner, 1984). A good statement of general tenets of this approach
> > is
> > > provided by Engeström, who writes that an activity system,
> > >
> > > integrates the subject, the object, and the instruments (material
> > tools as
> > > well as signs and symbols) into a unified whole.
> > >
> > > An activity system incorporates both the object-oriented productive
> > aspect
> > > and the person-oriented communicative aspect of human conduct.
> > Production
> > > and communication are inseparable (Rossi-Landi, 1983). Actually a
> > human
> > > activity system always contains the subsystems of production,
> > distribution,
> > > exchange, and consumption (p. 67).
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > The attractiveness of this formulation in light of the discussion of
> > > artifact mediation at the beginning of this chapter should be
> > apparent:
> > > Engeström's formulation promises a way to incorporate ideas about the
> > > duality of artifacts but does not privilege production over social
> > cohesion.
> > >
> > >
> > > Engeström represents his conception of activity in a manner that both
> > > includes and enlarges upon the early cultural-historical
> > psychologists'
> > > notions of mediation as individual action. Once again we see a
> > triangle, but
> > > now it is a set of interconnected triangles (See Figure 5.3). At the
> > top of
> > > the figure is the basic subject-
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > [Insert Figure 5.3 about here]
> > >
> > > mediator-object relationship depicted in Figure 5.1. This is the
> > level of
> > > mediated action through which the subject transforms the object in the
> > > process of acting upon it. But action exists "as such" only in
> > relation to
> > > the components at the bottom of the triangle. The *community* refers
> > to
> > > those who share the same general object; the *rules* refer to explicit
> > norms
> > > and conventions that constrain actions within the activity system; the
> > > *division
> > > of labor* refers to the division of object oriented actions among
> > members of
> > > the community. The various components of an activity system do not
> > exist in
> > > isolation from each other; rather, they are constantly being
> > constructed,
> > > renewed, and transformed as outcome and cause of human life.
> > >
> > > Engeström echoes contemporary dissatisfaction with conceptions that
> > either
> > > treat contexts as "containers" of behavior, untouched in themselves by
> > human
> > > actions or as contained within interpersonal interaction. Jean Lave
> > nicely
> > > summarized the shortcomings of these two conceptions by declaring that
> > "one
> > > has system without individual experience, the other experience without
> > > system (Lave, 1988, p. 150)."
> > >
> > > In activity theory as summarized in Figure 5.3, contexts are activity
> > > systems. The subsystem associated with the subject-mediator-object
> > > relationships exists as such only in relationship to the other
> > elements of
> > > the system. This is a thoroughly relational view of context.
> > >
> > > Jean Lave (1993) provides a succinct summary of several themes uniting
> > > scholars interested in activity and practice theory:
> > >
> > > 1. An emphasis on the dialectical character of the fundamental
> > relations
> > > constituting human experience (in Lave's terms, human agency is
> > "partially
> > > determined, partially determining").
> > >
> > > 2. A focus on experience in the world that rejects the structure and
> > > dynamics of psychological test procedures as a universally appropriate
> > > template.
> > >
> > > 3. A shift in the boundaries of cognition and the environment such
> > that, in
> > > Lave's phrasing, cognition "is stretched across mind, body, activity
> > and
> > > setting" (a perspective sometimes referred to as "distributed
> > cognition"
> > > (Hutchins, 1991; Norman, 1991; Salomon, 1993).
> > >
> > >
> > > On 1/7/06, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Can anyone help me with a succinct (NB) definition of 'activity' as
> > it is
> > > > used in the CHAT literature.
> > > > I am sure this is a hotly contested topic, but if there is any kind
> > of
> > > > lowest common denominator or consensus on this I would be very
> > grateful.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Andy Blunden
> > > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > xmca mailing list
> > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > xmca mailing list
> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
> >
>
>
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