Mary-- By Bollas do you mean this book by Christopher Bollas-- looks right
but perhaps you have something else in mind: *The shadow of the object :
psychoanalysis of the unthought known .
Peter-- There was a special issue of MCA a while back about
Scientific/Everyday concepts that Vera was guest editor of or had a paper
in.
mike
*
On 11/15/05, Peter Moxhay <moxhap@portlandschools.org> wrote:
>
> Anna (& Victor & Vera & all):
>
> Yes, I would very much like to read your (Anna's) paper on concepts in
> mathematics.
>
> Also, does anyone have the reference to Gordon's paper or chapter?
>
> Though perhaps this is off the main line of interest for most on the list,
> I think that the current discussion of Anna's paper has helped me start to
> resolve some difficulties I have had in understanding and correlating:
>
> - everday concepts vs. scientific concepts (Vygotsky)
> - theoretical concepts vs. empirical concepts (Davydov)
> - Ilyenkov's knowledge of the object vs. verbally expressed conceptions
>
> I would be most grateful if anyone could send me (perhaps off the list)
> references to any recent literature on this topic of concept formation.
> (Perhaps Anna and Eduardo's paper has comprehesive references?)
>
> Thanks,
>
> Peter
>
> >>> AStetsenko@gc.cuny.edu 11/15/05 10:41 AM >>>
> Peter,
>
> I find you points on concepts very much in tune with previous
> argumentation. Indeed, this can be seen as an important grounding for the
> more general points previously made (at the level of a worldview) in
> analysing conrete interactions of teaching-and-learning. Especially for the
> worldview level point about the centrality of contribution by each
> individual to the flow of social practice unfolding in history.
>
> Vygotsky's discussion of everyday and scientific concepts is very relevant
> here, I would think. Gordon Wells has an excellent paper (or was it
> chapter?) reflecting on this distinction.
>
> Knowing how important such grounding of general ideas in concrete concepts
> is, I have written a paper comparing various models of teaching-and-learning
> concepts in mathematics (Nunes and Cobb versus Davydov-Elkonin). With the
> notion of individual contribution to social practice at the center (also
> making an argument how worldview level ideas get chanelled into practice and
> vice versa). This paper was written together with Eduardo Vianna who is my
> doctoral student and of whom I am very proud -- he works precisely at the
> juncture of general ideas and practice -- in the context of a Group Home for
> boys (he presented in Seville). Could send you a paper, if you like - it's
> in press for Theory&Psychology.
>
> AStetsenko
>
> ________________________________
>
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Peter Moxhay
> Sent: Mon 11/14/2005 2:36 PM
> To: Activity eXtended Mind Culture
> Subject: Re: [xmca] concept as gambit
>
>
>
> Anna -- thanks for your comments on my query; I've finding it very
> useful in understanding your article to think in terms of concept
> formation .
>
> And Victor -- thanks so much for the references, especially for
> sending me to reread Chapter VI of Andy's "The Meaning of Hegel's
> Logic":
>
> http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/help/mean06.htm
>
> where I found this, in particular:
>
> > Even (or rather especially) when what we see sharply contradicts
> > what we know it to be, truth lies neither in abandoning our former
> > opinion nor in ignoring the evidence of the senses but in forming a
> > unity of the two: modifying our former opinion and seeing it in a
> > new light, finding in immediate perception what was formerly so but
> > now is not so.
>
> Andy gives the example of one's immediate perception of "the Moon"
> taken together with the accumulated human knowledge of the Moon:
>
> > When we look at "the Moon", we do not question the immediacy of
> > this perception. A murky cloud-covered view we would unhesitatingly
> > refer to as "the Moon" equally as the Moon on a clear night. The
> > Moon itself is inseparable from our concept of it, and has
> > reflected sunlight on to countless generations of people. And in
> > apprehending the Moon, we apprehend that which is referred to in
> > the word "lunacy" and the words "romantic moonlit night" and which
> > causes the tides.
>
> Now what this puts me in mind of is a conversation I had a few years
> ago with Sergei Gorbov, who is one of Davydov's co-authors of the
> Elkonin-Davydov mathematics curriculum for elementary schools. He
> told me that one of the most important moments of the teaching-
> learning process is when the children come forward and express their
> _subjective_ reactions to a given mathematical problem situation.
> That is, the children may have in common certain ways of acting when
> faced with a mathematical problem, but then they are confronted with
> some new problem situation where what they know so far doesn't work.
> A particular child will then tell what he or she thinks is the action
> to be performed to solve the problem. In some cases, the child's
> suggested action will not solve the problem, but even this "mistake"
> gets folded back into and enriches the socially-shared mathematical
> ways of acting. In other cases, the child's suggested action does
> solve the problem, and so is successful in pushing forward the
> collective knowledge of the classroom of children. The child takes a
> risk (gambit?) of suggesting some new action, and the class as a
> whole evaluates whether this new action solves the mathematical
> problem or not.
>
> So, it is an individual's "subjective image" of "how to act in the
> new situation" that drives forward the socially-shared body of
> knowledge. If we think of the "concept" not as the existing body of
> knowledge but as a kind of vector along which that knowledge
> increases, then the concept is intimately tied to individuals'
> subjective ways of acting. But it's a subjective suggestion for
> action that is socially (intersubjectively?) evaluated.
>
> Anna, Victor -- does this example make any sense? Is this the kind of
> subjectivity we've been talking about in the discussion of Anna's
> article?
>
> Peter
>
> > [Anna wrote]: Yes, Peter, you are right, this is critical indeed
> > and I was going to elaborate on this too as this agrees with my
> > position very much (and the readings Victor suggested are also
> > critical - but let me try to make some points already here).
> >
> >
> >
> > In my take on this issue, and in more Vygotskian terms, concepts
> > are TOOLS that are embedded within (in the sense of them coming out
> > and returning to) the reality they are meant to serve. Concepts are
> > saturated with this reality they serve and never break away from it
> > ((Of course, if twe are dealing with meaningful concepts)). The
> > reverse dependency is also true - this is as an upshot of the
> > argument in my paper.
> >
> >
> >
> > This reality often, and more immediately for many of those who do
> > theorizing, is the reality of theoretical debates, approaches and
> > so on. In this sense, concepts are inextricably dependent on the
> > whole theoretical system under consideration (hence the point about
> > each and every idea or principle making sense only within the whole
> > system) - and this is something readily acknowledged by many
> > (though certainly not all) who come to think about and work with
> > concepts. As, for example, reflected in the argument we all like
> > very much - about the importance of context. But then, as also
> > argued in my paper, behind this seemingly abstract theoretical
> > reality there are always practical engagements with some issues out
> > in the world, beyond the ivory tower of science - hence the
> > practical and ideological saturation of concepts and theories.
> >
> >
> >
> > This embedded nature of concepts comes through very clearly in
> > works on science as a social construction (the best in psychology
> > being by Danziger, I think, who was referred to before), and in
> > works by Sandra Harding on positionality and standpoint
> > epistemology, and in Morwaski and other feminist scholars (Mary has
> > mentioned some too in a different context).
> >
> >
> >
> > There are many renditions of this position - varying from extreme
> > views of social constructionism a la Gergen for whom constructs are
> > only instruments of social discourse (and are ephemeral, leading to
> > extreme relativism - in my view), to more dialectical views in
> > which concepts do reflect real practical contingences, at the same
> > time as they serve as tools within discourses (many in philosophy
> > of science, e.g. Young and in psychology - e.g., Ian Paker make
> > similar arguments). In history of science, it was Russian
> > philosopher Hessen who argued for this quite passionately in the
> > 1940s, shocking members of the then established positivistically
> > oriented community of historians of science. Young gives a
> > fascinating account of the storm Hessen caused at some
> > international congress on history of science with his presentation
> > on Newton. This is my very brief selection, but there are many many
> > more - as Victor points to readings in this direction. For me
> > personally, this social-practical and history-context embedded
> > nature of concepts was one of the first stark realizations that
> > helped me throughout all my subsequent work (being really one of
> > the threads of all my works, starting from early 1980s, I apologize
> > for making this allusions to earlier works - this is meant as
> > adding to context).
> >
> >
> >
> > My take on all of this, again, is about the importance of seeing -
> > and using - concepts as embedded within the flow of practical
> > activity/ engagements with the reality out in the world and its
> > challenges, as well as the reverse movements between concepts-
> > practice (the two being in unity but not in equivalence).
> >
> >
> >
> > I don't know if this agrees with what Victor meant (will read his
> > posting more closely now).
> >
> >
> >
> > Incidentally, this is the way to answer also Mike's question - why
> > subjectivity? Because the explanation has to do with the context. I
> > will refer to this in the next message.
> >
> >
> >
> > Thanks to all who are still following the discussion (if there are
> > some such people),
> >
> > A Stetsenko
> >
> >
> > ________________________________
> >
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Peter Moxhay
> > Sent: Thu 11/10/2005 12:25 PM
> > To: Activity eXtended Mind Culture
> > Subject: [xmca] concept as gambit
> >
> >
> >
> > Victor,
> >
> > You wrote:
> >
> >> the concept, is a gambit that is in fact a subjective challenge to
> >> objective social practice (the idea is Hegelian though Hegel as an
> >> idealist had a much more restricted concept of the negating effect
> >> of the concept than that implicit in Marxian dialectics).
> >
> > I find this comment extremely clarifying (with respect to the ongoing
> > discussion) and exciting. Could you perhaps provide references for
> > further reading on this? In what works/sections would you say Hegel
> > touches on this? Do you have any papers that expand on this comment?
> >
> > Also, I'm wondering whether this idea was really refused by _all_
> > Soviet dialecticians...
> >
> > Peter
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
> > <winmail.dat>
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Thu Dec 01 2005 - 01:00:08 PST