I am not sure I follow what the two ideas we are combining are. One of us is
tired, of
that I am sure (its me) , so I will back and look at this again later. But I
am pretty sure that your
conclusion is close to a statement of Davydov's approach to pedagogy. The
book by Markova
is an extended experiment using a curriculum that is theoretically driven
and which starts with
the utterance. (Markova, the teaching and learning of language. Sharpe.
1979.
I do not know the work of Gunter Kress, which may be why I do not entirely
understand what you
are saying.
mike
On 8/17/05, Shirley Franklin <s.franklin@dsl.pipex.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Ruqaiya, Mike, Gordon and interested others,
>
> Here's a viewpoint from the UK... in response to recent mailings from
> Ruqaiya.
>
> To me the main differences between what Vygotsky and what Halliday say
> are as follows:
>
> The notion of the person in thought and discourse.
> For Vygotsky the person and and their history and relationship with
> their social world is essential in terms of understanding thinking.
> However it seems to be that while Halliday talks in terms of "social
> context," discourse is treated like a picture, minus the artist. What
> is
> analysed is what is seen.
>
> I find the aspects of 'context of situation' really confusing. The
> language is there in the analysis- ideational, interpersonal and
> textual -
> and Ruqaiya writes of the mediator. And yet when texts are analysed
> it is only what is seen that is investigated, not what is known in
> terms of the historical and wider social context of the
> writer/mediator. Gunther Kress also
> takes this position when discussing his multimodallity in images. What
> have we here? What do you think it looks like.. etc. Not what does the
> child say it is, why have they produced this image, what other images
> has he/she produced, what other images have the class produced, what
> role does this image have on other images that they make.
>
> So this is where combining a Hallidayian approach with a Vygotskian
> analysis is useful. This is partly because the internalised sign,
> different from the external tool, actually becomes part of the thought
> process. Words, or small units of texts, which might be clauses, become
> the very tools which structure thought. Vygotsky did not analyse the
> langauge grammatically, but I think that he wasnt necessarily thinking
> of the sign as a word, but as the sense that someone makes. This sense
> then helps to make other senses.
>
> But if we combine the two ideas together, by teaching kids grammar
> conceptually, then the new constructs can become tools for thought,
> taking language and learning further.
>
> Does this make sense??? Or have I misinterpretated both?
>
> Shirley (Franklin)
>
> On 17 Aug 2005, at 03:57, Mike Cole wrote:
>
> > Thanks very much for the thoughtful reply, Ruqaiya.
> > I will be interested in what others who have been following this
> > thread have to say.
> > "see you" when you come back on line.
> > mike
> >
> > On 8/16/05, ruqaiya hasan <Ruqaiya.Hasan@ling.mq.edu.au> wrote:
> >>
> >> Hello Michael
> >>
> >> I really was glad to hear from you: for one thing it reassured me
> that
> >> there
> >> is some real interest in seeing the connections. I agree that the
> >> discussion
> >> has not been as 'concentrated' as the subject demanded. But perhaps
> >> that
> >> is
> >> the nature of modern day existence -- one moves around so much.
> After
> >> today
> >> I shall not be united with my notebook for at least another 14 days.
> >> So I
> >> must try and address as best as I can at least some of the issues
> you
> >> have
> >> raised. My interest too is not in debate as such but I do value
> >> discussion:
> >> it often allows one to view problems from a different perspective.
> >>
> >> As it happens I too have missed out on most of the discussion; in
> some
> >> cases
> >> I was a silent listener to writers who are very familiar with the
> >> field
> >> and
> >> I did not think that active participation in those debates would
> >> teach me
> >> more than simply listening to them. Concrete psychology is one such
> >> field.
> >> On Tools/signs I could have said something but again it would have
> >> interrupted the thinking of colleagues who are -- or at least appear
> >> to
> >> be -- very much more fluent. I do not see a difference between
> >> tool/sign:
> >> from my reading of Vygotsky and reflection on what scholars have
> said
> >> on
> >> vygotsky, it seems to me that the opposition is not here: sign is as
> >> much
> >> a
> >> tool as a non-sign ie Vygotsky's "concrete tool" -- as I understood,
> >> Vygotsky was using the funcitoning of concrete tool to bring home
> the
> >> functioning of abstract tool (ie sign as tool), which also enabled
> >> him to
> >> point out some important distinctions between concrete tools and
> >> semiotic
> >> tools. The discussion of meaning in Vygotsky seems (to me) to be
> very
> >> closely related to the specification of the semiotic, particularly,
> >> linguistic tool in the performance of mental activities.
> >>
> >> Yes, I agree with you that we must distinguish between
> >> 'misunderstanding'
> >> and 'real disagreement'. I am less interested though in disputing or
> >> establishing the 'credentials' of thinkers as belonging to this or
> >> that
> >> discipline. My interest in Vygotrsky, Bernstein, Halliday, G H Mead,
> >> Bateson
> >> and some other scholars is precisely because they have done their
> >> thinking
> >> in such a way as to leave routes open for connecting with other
> >> important
> >> issues which did not form their main focus. For example -- and you
> >> might
> >> have to point out to me if my thinking differs from yours at this
> >> point --
> >> Vygotsky's focus was on the development of specifically human mental
> >> functions. He believed that semiotic modalities, especially
> language,
> >> plays
> >> an important part in this process. His focus was not on the
> >> description of
> >> language as such, but he exploreds those aspects of language which
> >> seemed
> >> to
> >> him absolutely essential for mental development. Halliday's focus is
> >> on
> >> language; the claim he makes about a child learning languageis that
> >> learning
> >> a language involves learning language, learning about language and
> >> learning
> >> through language. The last I see as resonating strongly with
> >> Vygotsky's
> >> main
> >> hypothesis about the semiotic mediation of mental functions.
> Halliday
> >> does
> >> not then begin to move into the field of psychology any more than I
> >> believe
> >> Vygotsky moved to the field of linguistics: but through his case
> >> study of
> >> a
> >> child, Halliday shows that discourse -- social interaction -- is
> >> where the
> >> child finds the resources for shaping his/her language, ideas about
> >> that
> >> language, as well as learning through language. If this is a
> >> psychological
> >> claim then so be it. Then again there is another element of
> >> compatibility
> >> between LSV and MAKH: language in this perspective has to be a
> >> socio-historical phenomenon, not one which comes ready made in the
> >> folds
> >> of
> >> one's brain and accidentally gets linked to the world of one's
> >> experience.
> >> Thirdly, both Vygotsky and Halliday think of language as a meaning
> >> making
> >> system, not simply as a meaning expressing system: the difference
> >> between
> >> these positions is (speaking with oversimplification) the difference
> >> between
> >> meaning as socio-historical semiotic creation as opposed to meaning
> as
> >> naming: the latter concept refers to 'signalling' what is there
> >> present to
> >> the senses, the former (ie socio-historical base for semiosis) is
> >> truly
> >> symbolic, ie can only happen where there is a sign-system; in this
> >> view
> >> language is not a set/collection of individual signs: it is a system
> >> of
> >> signs wherein each sign has a value by virtue of its relation to
> other
> >> signs. Similar openings can be found between Halliday and Bernstein
> >> and
> >> between bernstein and Vygotsky. Bernstein certain makesw a
> >> psychological
> >> claim in the same way, when he says that the child's consciousness
> is
> >> shaped
> >> and his understanding of the social structure in which he is located
> >> becomes
> >> defined by the acts of his own voluntary acts of discursive
> >> participation.
> >> But his focus is on sociology: how is it that societies reproduce or
> >> change
> >> themselves. this "psychological" claim is simply one element that
> has
> >> significance in his system of explanations, the same way as
> Halliday's
> >> claim
> >> about children's language learning is an element in his
> specification
> >> of
> >> the
> >> nature of human language.
> >>
> >> Where I see complementarity is in explanations in the wider domain:
> >> to me
> >> it
> >> seems that if we wish to understand about how language works in the
> >> social
> >> life of human beings, and how patterns of social life permeate
> >> language
> >> function, and how language as we know it can only be spoken by a
> >> minded
> >> being -- when we want to understand this wider canvass, we have to
> >> attend
> >> to
> >> all three scholars: they complement each others' work. Not one of
> >> them by
> >> himself can address the wider canvass; their theories being
> exotropic,
> >> allow
> >> connections with other domains but they stay focused on either
> >> 'psychology'
> >> or 'linguistics' or 'sociology'.
> >>
> >> Now, because (as Bernstein said) the language of description in all
> >> these
> >> fields is specific to that field (these are not vertical but
> >> horizontal
> >> knowledge structures), reading these scholars is problematic: each
> >> has a
> >> different language of description; unless one understands the
> >> theoretical
> >> structure, one might not fully understand the significance of their
> >> terms
> >> (theories too are systems, and theoretical concepts are like signs
> >> each
> >> deriving its meaning by its relation to other signs). So the
> >> likelihood of
> >> misunderstanding is pretty high. Besides our profession does not
> >> really
> >> pay
> >> us for investing in "understanding"; it pays us only for
> "producing":
> >> there
> >> is hardly enough time at one's disposal to try to understand so many
> >> different "theoretical languages". I would suggest that there will
> >> also be
> >> disagreements among these scholars. For example, for Bernstein and
> >> also
> >> for
> >> Halliday 'semiotic mediation' per se could not be a 'uniform'
> process
> >> (as
> >> it seems in Vygotsky): different forms of semiotic mediation will
> >> produce
> >> different sorts of mental orientations, different habits of mind (as
> >> Lave
> >> puts it). We talk a good deal about changing the education system,
> the
> >> educator and I am sure all of us are sincere, but I cannot help
> >> thinking
> >> that education is "for" already (at least partially) formed minds;
> >> unless
> >> we
> >> take the variation in habitual forms of mediation into account,
> there
> >> is
> >> no
> >> reason for us to feel sanguine that our so called reforms are going
> >> to do
> >> something incredibly marvellous by way of educating. Let me put it
> >> this
> >> way:
> >> if Vygotsky says semiotic mediation is the essence of education in
> the
> >> sense
> >> that it makes human minds, then Bernstein says (not against but with
> >> Vygotsky) every child brings a (partially) formed mind; speaking to
> >> that
> >> mind so as to get through is the essence of semiotic mediation in
> good
> >> education, and Halliday says in order to understand these complex
> >> facts
> >> and
> >> to fashion your semiosis effectively, you must understand how and
> why
> >> language works the way it does, and also how and why it gets learnt
> >> in the
> >> first place. These three scholars together solve a much bigger
> puzzle
> >> than
> >> any one of them solves by himself: in each individual case the story
> >> remains
> >> partial.
> >>
> >> I do not see this as a lack, a failure or something of that kind: I
> >> believe
> >> human social existence is complex and no one can tell the whole
> story.
> >> This
> >> is why we need to rethink our ideas about the nature of "optimal"
> >> theories
> >> (hence my great admiration of exotropic theories). Also we tend to
> >> judge
> >> theories in a way that is very much like the old "intelligence
> tests":
> >> lets
> >> see what they have done; rather than this, we do need to look (with
> >> apologies to Vygotsky) at the 'proximal zone of explanation'
> inherent
> >> in a
> >> theory: the question is not what did this/that theory achieve, but
> >> rather
> >> what CAN this/that theory achieve given the right theories to
> interact
> >> with.
> >>
> >> I am sure I have not addressed all the issues you raised but I do
> >> feel a
> >> little self-conscious writing all this -- so all I want to say in
> >> closing
> >> is
> >> this: I am very happy to have any opinions on the thoughts I have
> >> expressed,
> >> irrespective of whether they are in agreement or in disagreement
> with
> >> me.
> >> Also if people have time, correcting what they might see as errors
> of
> >> understanding on my part would be welcome.
> >>
> >> Ruqaiya
> >>
> >>
> >> ----- Original Message -----
> >> From: "Mike Cole" <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >> Sent: Sunday, August 14, 2005 7:30 AM
> >> Subject: Re: [xmca] RE: meaning and sense and has anyone any opinion
> >>
> >>
> >> H Ruqaiya-
> >> This time it was me who has been away where the internet cannot
> (yet)
> >> intrude. I write because I feel a distinct lack of closure in the
> >> discussion
> >> which really never got seriously to bernstein-- or I missed it.
> >> I have no particular interest in debate, but I am very interested in
> >> relationships
> >> between the followers of Vygotsky, Halliday, and Bernstein as well,
> as
> >> course
> >> of the ideas of those thinkers "themselves".
> >> I started late, so missed the discussion of "Concrete Psychology"
> and
> >> some
> >> of the
> >> "Tools/Signs" discussion.
> >> My question is: where the complimentarties? Where are there
> principled
> >> disagreements?
> >> I agree wholeheartedly that we are not looking for one-one matches.
> >> "Meaning is the most stabile zone of sense"
> >> does not mean that meaning is context-independent. Then entire
> >> concept of
> >> "context-independent" seems to give
> >> rise to as many misunderstandings as "object." Operating in at least
> >> two
> >> different ontological/epsitemological systems (e.g
> >> the difference associated with the systems we call psychology,
> >> lingustics,
> >> and sociology) its a real challenge to figure out
> >> the difference between misunderstandings and real disagreements. For
> >> the
> >> latter some frame, some "discipline" seems
> >> required.
> >> From what I have been able to make of the conversation, there is a
> >> good
> >> deal of overlap among the systems of ideas and the
> >> phenomena they relate to. It seems agreed, for example, that LSV was
> >> not a
> >> linguist and did not work from a highly elaborated
> >> linguistics, especially a linguistics informed by recent decades of
> >> research
> >> on grammar, thereby creating problems in relating sound,
> >> meaning, and grammar and their psychological implications.
> >> I come away completely unclear whether Halliday is making
> >> psychological
> >> claims (I think is does, but I am not a trained linguist so I
> >> am unsure "what counts."). I am pretty sure Bernstein does make
> >> psychological claims, but I may be wrong.
> >> I think, overall, the trio of lsv, halliday, and bernstein have
> >> provided a
> >> lot of food for thought.
> >> One place I tried to relate our theoretical discussion to its
> >> historical
> >> enviroment was when the discussion of education and democracy
> >> came up. Here I believe we commonly face a difficulty dilmma. The
> >> forms of
> >> interaction we tend to respond to as "good" ( we value
> >> them) privilege individual agency as essential to learning and
> >> development
> >> -- In the beginning was the DEED. But our social mechanisms
> >> are formed so that, overwhelmingly, the developing child is
> >> encouraged to
> >> believe that in the beginning was the WORD. "Take your seats"
> >> was here many millenia before I came along.
> >> I thought Kozulin's discussion of Davydov, although no one responded
> >> to
> >> it., particularly interesting because it was a case study of a
> person
> >> using CHAT, struggling to implement a set of ideas about education
> >> that
> >> look
> >> highly theoretical and perhaps only for the well-to-do but which
> >> a number of Russian researchers have used a method of critique not
> >> only of
> >> education, but of society as well. A presumably "neutral" curriculum
> >> is nothing of the sort. And ditto for us in our time(s) and place
> (s).
> >> And,
> >> of course, Davydov's colleagues and students, as well as others
> >> outside
> >> of Russia have made up curricula for the arts and history which it
> is
> >> very
> >> difficult to see as ideologically neutral.
> >> Still a lot of food for thought. But the food is strewn all 'round
> my
> >> study!
> >> mike
> >>
> >> On 8/6/05, ruqaiya hasan <Ruqaiya.Hasan@ling.mq.edu.au> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> Hi Gordon and everyone
> >>>
> >>> So much has been written on the topic of meaning and sense that it
> >>> seems
> >>> rash to pick it up once again, when people are perhaps just about
> >>> ready
> >> to
> >>> close the topic. (The whole debate unfortunately came at a bad time
> >>> for
> >> me
> >>> when I could read quickly but never manage to write back in a
> regular
> >>> fashion). But I do want to say a few things, and some of them
> relate
> >>> closely
> >>> to what you have said in this message.
> >>>
> >>> I would have said that in probing, say, Halliday and Vygotsky on
> the
> >>> question of meaning, sense etc the aim is not so much to find a
> >>> "correct
> >>> match": translating one theory into another is no less problematic
> >>> than
> >>> translating a text from one language into another. There is only
> the
> >>> possibility of 'approximation' acorss the two, not of 'replication'
> >>> in
> >> the
> >>> majority of cases. One thing that makes even approximation a little
> >>> problematic is the a-symmetry in the systemic relation between
> >>> meaning
> >> and
> >>> sense on the one hand and meaning, reference and sense on the
> other.
> >> When
> >>> roughly the same domain is seen in terms of three vectors of
> >>> differentiation, it presents a picture that is substantially
> >>> different
> >>> from
> >>> the picture presented by a two vector differentiation. Certain
> >>> distinctions
> >>> are made more explicit in the former, less so in the latter.
> >>>
> >>> You have suggested Gordon, "Halliday, as linguists, treat 'meaning'
> >>> as
> >>> comprised of 'sense' and 'reference'.However, when Vygotsky
> >>> contrasted
> >>> 'meaning' and 'sense', he was making a psychological distinction
> >>> rather
> >>> than a linguistic one." I don't quite understand in what sense you
> >>> use
> >> the
> >>> term "psychological" here. Are you suggesting that "sense and
> >>> meaning"
> >>> might
> >>> be in some way related to higher mental functions of the human
> >>> species;
> >> if
> >>> so, the question naturally arises how are such "psychological
> >>> concepts"
> >>> mediated; if they are not mediated then they must be bio-genetic;
> and
> >> this
> >>> in my understanding would go entirely against the Vygotskian
> >>> position.
> >> So
> >>> a
> >>> psychological concetualisation of meaning must be based on the
> >>> meaning
> >>> process we refer to as semiotic mediation -- this makes an
> >>> interesting
> >>> reading. Would you agree?
> >>>
> >>> You also suggested the following: " Linguists typically deal with
> >>> units
> >>> such
> >>> as word or clause in terms of their relationship to other units
> >>> within
> >> the
> >>> system of a language and to the entities, states, etc, in the world
> >>> to
> >>> which they may refer. On the other hand, although Vygotsky was
> >> discussing
> >>> his chosen unit 'word', it seems to me that he was thinking of its
> >>> contextualized utterance by a speaker in interaction with a
> discourse
> >>> partner or with himself. If this is correct, the distinction he was
> >> making
> >>> was between the 'meaning'of a word as it might appear in a
> dictionary
> >> and
> >>> the personal 'sense' it has for the speaker, as a result of the
> >>> contexts
> >>> is
> >>> which s/he has heard or used the word before, together
> >>> with the affective overtones it carries with it."
> >>>
> >>> It seems to me that SFL position on menaing is not the same as that
> >>> of
> >>> other
> >>> linguistic models that I am familiar with. As you know in SFL
> >>> meaning is
> >>> viewed in context -- both the context of situation in which the
> >>> interaction
> >>> is embedded and also the context of the text within which any unit
> of
> >>> language word, clause or clause complex is embedded. Besides in as
> >>> much
> >> as
> >>> speaker affect is realised linguistically, it is in SFL amenable to
> >>> linguistic analysis since meaning is not simply
> >>> "cognitive/referential"
> >>> but
> >>> "interactive/interpersonal" and is based in relevance since there
> is
> >> also
> >>> textuality aspect of meaning. Relevance has to be
> interactant-context
> >>> centred.
> >>>
> >>> What goes into the dictionary is not linguists' imagined 'word
> >>> meaning':
> >>> it
> >>> is typically a record of the default understanding and use of items
> >>> by
> >>> members of large segments of the speech community: this
> understanding
> >> they
> >>> derive from their interactions with others in the community.
> >>>
> >>> Ruqaiya
> >>>
> >>> ----- Original Message -----
> >>> From: "Gordon Wells" <gwells@ucsc.edu>
> >>> To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>> Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2005 1:31 AM
> >>> Subject: Re: [xmca] RE: meaning and sense and has anyone any
> opinion
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> Ruqaiya, Michael, Mike and Others,
> >>>>
> >>>> When I looked again at the message to which Ruqaiya replied as
> >>>> below,
> >>>> I realized it wasn't as clear as I had thought. But before I try
> to
> >>>> clarify my intended meaning, I want to suggest that there is
> perhaps
> >>>> an incommensurability at the heart of our problem in trying to
> >>>> decide
> >>>> the correct match between Vygotsky's 'meaning' and 'sense' and the
> >>>> comparable terms in SFL.
> >>>>
> >>>> I think the problem is that Ruqaiya and Halliday, as linguists,
> >>>> treat
> >>>> 'meaning' as comprised of 'sense' and 'reference'.However, when
> >>>> Vygotsky contrasted 'meaning' and 'sense', he was making a
> >>>> psychological distinction rather than a linguistic one. Linguists
> >>>> typically deal with units such as word or clause in terms of their
> >>>> relationship to other units within the system of a language and to
> >>>> the entities, states, etc, in the world to which they may refer.
> On
> >>>> the other hand, although Vygotsky was discussing his chosen unit
> >>>> 'word', it seems to me that he was thinking of its contextualized
> >>>> utterance by a speaker in interaction with a discourse partner or
> >>>> with himself. If this is correct, the distinction he was making
> was
> >>>> between the 'meaning'of a word as it might appear in a dictionary
> >>>> and
> >>>> the personal 'sense' it has for the speaker, as a result of the
> >>>> contexts is which s/he has heard or used the word before, together
> >>>> with the affective overtones it carries with it.This is how I
> >>>> interpret the following quote from Thinking and Speech.
> >>>>
> >>>> A word's sense is the aggregate of all the psychological facts
> that
> >>>> arise in our consciousness as a result of the word. Sense is a
> >>>> dynamic, fluid, and complex formation which has several zones that
> >>>> vary in their stability. . . . In different contexts, a word's
> sense
> >>>> changes. In contrast, meaning is a comparatively fixed and stable
> >>>> point, one that remains constant with all the changes of the
> word's
> >>>> sense that are associated with its use in various contexts. . . .
> >>>> The
> >>>> actual meaning of a word is inconstant. In one operation the word
> >>>> emerges with one meaning; in another, another is acquired. (1987,
> p.
> >>>> 276)
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> My previous message was somewhat off topic. But Halliday's (1984)
> >>>> paper, "Language as Code and language as Behavior", suggests that
> >>>> there is some overlap between his distinction between dynamic and
> >>>> synoptic and distinctions that both Vygotsky and Bruner have made.
> >>>> As
> >>>> I understand it, "dynamic" applies to registers that are informal
> >>>> and
> >>>> related to ongoing activity, whereas "synoptic" applies to
> registers
> >>>> that formulate relationships between events and states of affais,
> as
> >>>> seen from "above", as it were. This is quite close to Bruner's
> >>>> distinction between "narrative" and "paradigmatic" modes of
> meaning.
> >>>> So it seems to me that Vygotsky's distinction between "everyday"
> and
> >>>> "scientific" concepts maps quite closely on to the two former
> >>>> distinctions.
> >>>>
> >>>> But this is not the same issue as the distinction between meaning
> >>>> and
> >>>> sense. On that issue, I liked Michael's:
> >>>>
> >>>>> If I understand right, sense is tied to the relation of activity
> >>>>> (something collectively motivated) and action (something
> >>>>> individually realized). So sense arises from the dialectic
> relation
> >>>>> of self and other, individual and collective. Some writers use
> the
> >>>>> qualifier "personal" to situate "sense."
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Perhaps that gives us an entry point to understanding meaning,
> as a
> >>>>> generalized version of personal sense, that is, the possibilities
> >>>>> of
> >>>>> sense available at the collective level.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Gordon
> >>>>
> >>>>> Gordon hello
> >>>>> I am quite bemused by "dynamic/everyday/narrative v.
> >>>>> synoptic/scientific/paradigmatic modes of meaning-making." what
> do
> >> the
> >>>>> slashes indicate? Are they post-modenist or the conventional "or"
> >> sign.
> >>> I
> >>>>> really do not find it easy to interpret the lexical items of the
> >> second
> >>> set
> >>>>> in their present collocation.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> At one stage I had thought the issue was the conceptualisation of
> >>> meaning
> >>> in
> >>>>> language or meaning construed by language, but I must6 have got
> it
> >>> wrong.
> >>>>> H'm well -- perhaps its that I am just not used to "dynamic"
> >> discourse
> >>>>> online. I was even more lost with your comment which I quote
> below:
> >>>>> Similarly, Halliday's dynamic/ synoptic distinction might be
> >>>>> equated
> >>> with
> >>>>> narrative/syntagmatic - to some degree!!, while synoptic
> highlights
> >>>>> the paradigmatic relationship between alternative
> lexicogrammatical
> >>>>> realizations of the same event, with a focus on grammatical
> >>>>> metaphor
> >>>>> through nominalization.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I most probably do not have anything very sensible from the
> points
> >>>>> of
> >>> view
> >>>>> of the direction of the present disdcourse on sense and meaning.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Ruqaiya
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> --
> >>>> Gordon Wells
> >>>> Dept of Education, http://education.ucsc.edu/faculty/gwells
> >>>> UC Santa Cruz.
> >>>> gwells@ucsc.edu
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> ----
> >> --
> >>> ----
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> xmca mailing list
> >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> ------
> >> ----
> >>
> >>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> xmca mailing list
> >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
>
> Shirley Franklin
> St Martin's College,
> Tower Hamlets PDC,
> English Street,
> London
> E3 4TA
> Tel: 0207 364 6334
> Mob: 07958 745802
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Thu Sep 01 2005 - 01:00:09 PDT