Replying to self, here, I have snippeted a piece from ANL's The Problem
of Activity and Psychology to include operations in our discussion.
It's so easy to lay claim that an action is "conscious" and
goal-oriented, while an operation is "unconscious" while the conditions
remain constant, and to isolate the two. However, this snippet reminds
us of ANL's embedded nature of activity, actions and operations. My
interest here is in L2 learning, say a small group discussion in the
classroom about something, using the L2, when one of the learners, at
one point in time has a linguistic problem that temporarily halts the
development of discourse. The learner(s) attends to the field (topic
being discussed) in order to negotiate meaning through a focus on the
language that was just used in the discussion. SFL exchange analysis
might call this a dynamic perspective of the discourse as opposed to a
synoptic one; AT analysis might call this a change in the
object/motive/need/want (help me out here) of the activity that has
altered the conditions of the activity (assuming intersubjectivity),
therefore the perspective becomes one of action "as opposed to"
operation. [The binaries are this poor soul's history of dualism that
follow him around]. But the shift in goal-oriented activity creates an
opportunity for learning - a zpd - as the group collective (including
the teacher) potentially supports the learner in his/her use of the L2
as a tool for communicative activity in that particular slice of
discourse.
Well, it's Friday evening, almost 7, and time to change activity to one
of more pleasureable goals. As has been said in Australia,
aveagoodweegend, all.
Phil
[http://www.marxists.org/archive/leontev/works/1978/ch3.htm]
There is frequently no difference between the terms action and
operation. In the context of psychological analysis of activity,
however, distinguishing between them is absolutely necessary. Actions,
as has already been said, are related to goals, operations to
conditions. Let us assume that the goal remains the same; conditions in
which it is assigned, however, change. Then it is specifically and only
the operational content of the action that changes.
In especially visual form, the non coincidence of action and operation
appears in actions with tools. Obviously, a tool is a material object
in which are crystallized methods and operations, and not actions or
goals. For example, a material object may be physically taken apart by
means of various tools each of which determines the method of carrying
out the given action. Under certain conditions, let us say, an
operation of cutting will be more adequate, in others, an operation of
sawing; it is assumed here that man knows how to handle the
corresponding tools, the knife, the saw, etc. The matter is
essentially the same in more complex cases. Let us assume that a man
was confronted with the goal of graphically representing some kind of
dependences that he had discovered. In order to do this, he must apply
one method or another of constructing graphs — he must realize
specific operation, and for this he must know how to do them. In this
case it makes no difference how or under what circumstances or using
which material he learned how to do these operations; something else
is important — specifically, that the formulation of the operation
proceeds entirely differently from the formulation of the goal, that
is, the initiation of action.
Actions and operations have various origins, various dynamics, and
various fates. Their genesis lies in the relationships of exchange of
activities; every operation, however, is the result of a
transformation of action that takes place as a result of its inclusion
in another action and its subsequent “technization.” A simpler
illustration of this process may be the formation of an operation, the
performance of which, for example, requires driving a car. Initially
every operation, such as shifting gears, is formed as an action
subordinated specifically to this goal and has its own conscious
“orientational basis” (P. Ya. Gal’perin). Subsequently this action is
included in another action, which has a complex operational
composition in the action, for example, changing the speed of the car.
Now shifting gears becomes one of the methods of attaining the goal,
the operation that effects the change in speed, and shifting gears now
ceases to be accomplished as a specific goal-oriented process: Its
goal is not isolated. For the consciousness of the driver, shifting
gears in normal circumstances is as if it did not exist. He does
something else: He moves the car from a place, climbs steep grades,
drives the car fast, stops at a given place, etc. Actually this
operation may, as is known, be removed entirely from the activity of
the driver and be carried out automatically. Generally, the fate of
the operation sooner or later becomes the function of the machine.
Nonetheless, an operation does not in any way constitute any kind of
“separateness,” in relation to action, just as is the case with action
in relation to activity. Even when an operation is carried out by a
machine, it still realizes the action of the subject. In a man who
solves a problem with a calculator, the action is not interrupted at
this extracerebral link; it finds in it its realization just as. it
does in its other links. Only a “crazy” machine that has escaped from
man’s domination can carry out operations that do not realize any kind
of goal-directed action of the subject.
Thus in the total flow of activity that forms human life, in its
higher manifestations mediated by psychic reflection, analysis
isolates separate (specific) activities in the first place according
to the criterion of motives that elicit them. Then actions are
isolated — processes that are subordinated to conscious goals,
finally, operations that directly depend on the conditions of
attaining concrete goals.
The “units” of human activity also form its macrostructure. The
special feature of the analysis that serves to isolate them is that it
does so not by means of breaking human activity up into elements but
by disclosing its characteristic internal relations. These are the
relations that conceal transformations that occur as activity
develops. Objects themselves can become stimuli, goals, or tools only
in a system of human activity; deprived of connections within this
system they lose their existence as stimuli, goals, or tools. For
example, a tool considered apart from a goal becomes the same kind of
abstraction as an operation considered apart from the action that it
realizes.
On 08/07/2005, at 6:26 AM, Phil Chappell wrote:
> Hi Eric,
>
>
> If Steve is able to post the snippet on operations, it might be
> worthwhile re-thinking your pie-baking vignette vis-a-vis actions and
> operations ;-)
>
> Phil
>
>
> On Thursday, July 07, 2005, at 10:00PM, <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> wrote:
>
>>
>> <<Original Attached>>_______________________________________________
>> xmca mailing list
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>
>>
> Thank you much Steve upon the urging of Mike to provide more kernels
> for mulling over. I am sensing in the provided nuggets from Leontiev
> that there is a series of circles being studied. Actions would be the
> inside (when performing a task such as peeling apples for a pie one
> may perform this with a knife others may choose a special 'peeler').
> Operations would be of a greater level of importance and so of an
> outer more ring (when baking a pie it is important to put the crust in
> before the filling). Then outside of that would be the overall unit
> of activity (baking a pie). This specific unit of activity could beww
> analysed in the home setting, at a restaurant, or say at school in a
> home ec class. Depending on the location there may be more
> cirlces/levels for analysis.
>
>
>
> whadaya think?
>
> eric
> Steven Thorne <sthorne@psu.edu>
> Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> 07/07/2005 12:25 AM AST
> Please respond to xmca
>
> To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> cc:
> bcc:
> Subject: Re: [xmca] operation, action, activity
>
>
>
> hi all -- in response to Mike's request, here are statements from AN
> Leont'ev describing levels of activity.
>
>
> Leont'ev summarizes the hierarchy of activity this way:
>
> "in the general flow of activity that makes up higher, psychologically
> mediated aspects of human life, our analysis distinguishes, first,
> separate (particular) activities, using their energizing motives as
> the criterion. Second, we distinguish actions-the processes
> subordinated to conscious goals. Finally, we distinguish the
> operations, which depend directly on the conditions under which a
> concrete goal is attained."
> (A. N. Leont'ev 1981: 64-5).
>
>
> a few more quotations below -- levels in ALL CAPS.
>
>
> ACTIVITY
> 'Activity' is the broadest level process within the hierarchy and is
> always connected to a motive, though in some cases, the motive may not
> be consciously realized by the actor or actor-collective.
>
> "we always deal with specific activities Š and each Š answers to a
> specific need of the active agent. It moves toward the object of this
> need, and it terminates when it is satisfied. Š Various concrete
> activities can be classified according to whatever features are
> convenient, such as form, means of execution, emotional level,
> temporal and spatial characteristics, physiological mechanisms, etc.
> However, the main feature that distinguishes one activity from another
> is its object. After all, it is precisely an activity's object that
> gives it a specific direction. In accordance with the terminology I
> have proposed, an activity's object is its real motive. Of course, the
> motive can be either material or ideal. The main point is that some
> need always stands behind it."
> (A. N. Leont'ev 1981: 59)
>
>
> ACTION
>
>
> "The basic 'components' of various human activities are the actions
> that translate them into reality. We call a process an action when it
> is subordinated to the idea of achieving a result, i.e. a process that
> is subordinated to a conscious goal'.
> (A.N. Leont'ev 1981: 59-60)
>
> ... when a concrete process-internal or external-unfolds before us,
> from the point of view of its motive, it is a human activity, but in
> terms of subordination to a goal, it is an action or a chain of
> actions. At the same time, an activity and an action are genuinely
> different realities Š One and the same action can be instrumental in
> realizing different activities.
> (A. N. Leont'ev 1981: 61-2)
>
>
> all excerpts are from: Leont'ev, A.N. 1981. 'The problem of activity
> in psychology' in J. V. Wertsch (ed.). The Concept of Activity in
> Soviet Psychology. Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe.
>
> steve
>
>
>
> Does anyone have, from Engestrom's book or the Leontiev article in
> Wertsch, or....... a succinct statement of
> the three level struclture of activivity a la Leontiev and if so would
> you please post?
> mike
> On 7/6/05, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> wrote:
> Mike;
>
> That is quite a tidy little package to unpack. Those individual
> units of activity also combine to form the gestalt of the work goal.
> But I am still confused because in the quote Leontiev refers to
> actions and operations and then at the very end he is stating that
> analysis should revolve around the unit of activity. The units of
> activity that Leontiev refers to are indeed what need to be studied
> when analyzing the development of a person's work (insert academic)
> skills, but do operations and actions combine to form the unit of
> activity? And finally, how does the interplay of culture decide that
> new worker's competence?
>
> eric
>
> Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> 07/06/2005 08:28 AM MST
> Please respond to mcole
>
> To: Mike Cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>, "eXtended Mind, Culture, and Activity"
> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> cc:
> bcc:
> Subject: [xmca] operation, action, activity
> Eric-- I have been remiss in not finding a statement by Leontiev about
> levels. There may be better ones. I found thisat marxists.org where
> two Leontiev texts are available. There are probably better
> statements, but this is what I had
> time to grab. Others might do better. If you think about the example
> in this passage in terms of your last example.it might
> be helpful.
> mike
>
>
>
> There is frequently no difference between the terms action and
> operation. In the context of psychological analysis of activity,
> however, distinguishing between them is absolutely necessary. Actions,
> as has already been said, are related to goals, operations to
> conditions. Let us assume that the goal remains the same; conditions
> in which it is assigned, however, change. Then it is specifically and
> only the operational content of the action that changes.
>
> In especially visual form, the non coincidence of action and operation
> appears in actions with tools. Obviously, a tool is a material object
> in which are crystallized methods and operations, and not actions or
> goals. For example, a material object may be physically taken apart by
> means of various tools each of which determines the method of carrying
> out the given action. Under certain conditions, let us say, an
> operation of cutting will be more adequate, in others, an operation of
> sawing; it is assumed here that man knows how to handle the
> corresponding tools, the knife, the saw, etc. The matter is
> essentially the same in more complex cases. Let us assume that a man
> was confronted with the goal of graphically representing some kind of
> dependences that he had discovered. In order to do this, he must apply
> one method or another of constructing graphs - he must realize
> specific operation, and for this he must know how to do them. In this
> case it makes no difference how or under what circumstances or using
> which material he learned how to do these operations; something else
> is important - specifically, that the formulation of the operation
> proceeds entirely differently from the formulation of the goal, that
> is, the initiation of action.
>
> Actions and operations have various origins, various dynamics, and
> various fates. Their genesis lies in the relationships of exchange of
> activities; every operation, however, is the result of a
> transformation of action that takes place as a result of its inclusion
> in another action and its subsequent "technization." A simpler
> illustration of this process may be the formation of an operation, the
> performance of which, for example, requires driving a car. Initially
> every operation, such as shifting gears, is formed as an action
> subordinated specifically to this goal and has its own conscious
> "orientational basis" (P. Ya. Gal'perin). Subsequently this action is
> included in another action, which has a complex operational
> composition in the action, for example, changing the speed of the car.
> Now shifting gears becomes one of the methods of attaining the goal,
> the operation that effects the change in speed, and shifting gears now
> ceases to be accomplished as a specific goal-oriented process: Its
> goal is not isolated. For the consciousness of the driver, shifting
> gears in normal circumstances is as if it did not exist. He does
> something else: He moves the car from a place, climbs steep grades,
> drives the car fast, stops at a given place, etc. Actually this
> operation may, as is known, be removed entirely from the activity of
> the driver and be carried out automatically. Generally, the fate of
> the operation sooner or later becomes the function of the machine.
>
> Nonetheless, an operation does not in any way constitute any kind of
> "separateness," in relation to action, just as is the case with action
> in relation to activity. Even when an operation is carried out by a
> machine, it still realizes the action of the subject. In a man who
> solves a problem with a calculator, the action is not interrupted at
> this extracerebral link; it finds in it its realization just as. it
> does in its other links. Only a "crazy" machine that has escaped from
> man's domination can carry out operations that do not realize any kind
> of goal-directed action of the subject.
>
> Thus in the total flow of activity that forms human life, in its
> higher manifestations mediated by psychic reflection, analysis
> isolates separate (specific) activities in the first place according
> to the criterion of motives that elicit them. Then actions are
> isolated - processes that are subordinated to conscious goals,
> finally, operations that directly depend on the conditions of
> attaining concrete goals.
> The "units" of human activity also form its macrostructure. The
> special feature of the analysis that serves to isolate them is that it
> does so not by means of breaking human activity up into elements but
> by disclosing its characteristic internal relations. These are the
> relations that conceal transformations that occur as activity
> develops. Objects themselves can become stimuli, goals, or tools only
> in a system of human activity; deprived of connections within this
> system they lose their existence as stimuli, goals, or tools. For
> example, a tool considered apart from a goal becomes the same kind of
> abstraction as an operation considered apart from the action that it
> realizes.
>
> Investigation of activity requires an analysis specifically of its
> internal systemic connections.
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
>
> --
>
> Steven L. Thorne
> Assistant Professor of Applied Linguistics
> Linguistics and Applied Language Studies
> and
> Communication Arts and Sciences
> Associate Director, Center for Language Acquisition
> Associate Director, Center for Advanced Language Proficiency Education
> and Research
> The Pennsylvania State University
> Interact > 814.863.7036 | sthorne@psu.edu |
> http://language.la.psu.edu/~thorne/ | IM: avkrook
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/
> xmca_______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Mon Aug 01 2005 - 01:01:00 PDT