RE: A horse with no name, a sign with no object?

From: Cunningham, Donald J. (
Date: Fri Dec 17 2004 - 07:41:39 PST

Bill do you mean intentionality as purposive or intentionality as in
"Brentano's thesis"?

-----Original Message-----
From: Bill Barowy []
Sent: Friday, December 17, 2004 10:01 AM
Subject: A horse with no name, a sign with no object?

(Betting dollars to donuts someone disliked that song)

What I'm wondering is, how does Peirce's semiotics stand in relation to
activity theory, and specifically with Wartofsky's mapping? Where is
intentionality in semiotics? Is it in this doubt that Don mentions?

Here's a reminder of Wartofsky ala Engestrom, with the ref following
which it came:

Wartofsky (1979) proposes three types of artifact that mediate human
and this class is developed by Engestrom (Engestrom, 1990) into a
three-level hierarchy, mapping on to Leont'ev's (1981) hierarchy of
. Primary artifacts are tools used directly in production to mediate
relationship between the subject and object of activity; secondary
are representations of modes of action - models - used to preserve and
transmit skills in the production and use of primary artifacts; tertiary

artifacts are imaginative or visionary and give "identity and
perspective to collective activity systems" (Engestrom, 1990, p.174).

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