Jay,
VIRTUAL AND HISTORICAL REALITY:
Regarding the question raised at the end of your last message:"I'd be
interested to know what people think is the limit, if any, of this argument
for the symmetry of virtual and ordinary realities?"
1. It appears to me that Ilyenkov, following Marx, regards subjective
cognition - read perception, measure and rational manipulation of data - as
model building. The processes of acquisition of experience, its abstraction
and then concentration of abstractions to form concrete notions of current
conditions does not and cannot replicate objective conditions. The problem
lies in the fact that any set of data produces far more possible
abstractions than can be reasonably accomodated by rational processing. I
once calculated that for three facts (fact = identifications and measures of
a selected experience) the Hegelian model of rational processing allows for
some 648 syllogisms (syllogisms=a pair of premises and a solution) and some
1,944 possible dialectical sequences (dialectical sequences=an ordered
sequence of syllogisms). Considering that we usually manage more than three
pieces of data at one time this is a bit much for even the most experienced
of objective conditions; i.e. the most permanent or re-ocurring conditions.
So even the most concrete notions of subjective cognition must be regarded
as models rather than replications.
2. The fundamental basis of Marxist materialism is that, unlike subjective
cognition, objective conditions are always concrete. Subjective cognitions
can and must be objectified if they are to become more than hidden internal
dialogues, but once they have been objectified they must lose the abstracted
and rational construction they had as subjective activity. Take, for
example, Marx's theories concerning the development of social formations.
KM's stated in the Grundrisse, that even when historical social formations
bear some resemblence to the dialectical constructions we use to explain
current conditions, the historical conditions are, by virtue of their having
been the concrete expression of social relations of those times, very
different than the abstractions of the dialectic.
it is true, therefore, that the categories of bourgeois economics possess a
truth for all other forms of society, this is to be taken only with a grain
of salt. They can contain them in a developed, or stunted, or caricatured
form etc., but always with an essential difference. The so-called historical
presentation of development is founded, as a rule, on the fact that the
latest form regards the previous ones as steps leading up to itself, and,
since it is only rarely and only under quite specific conditions able to
criticize itself-leaving aside, of course, the historical periods which
appear to themselves as times of decadence-it always conceives them
one-sidedly.
and
In the succession of the economic categories, as in any other historical,
social science, it must not be forgotten that their subject-here, modern
bourgeois society-is always what is given, in the head as well as in
reality, and that these categories therefore express the forms of being, the
characteristics of existence, and often only individual sides of this
specific society, this subject, and that therefore this society by no means
begins only at the point where one can speak of it as such; this holds for
science as well. (Marx 1939 Grundrisse; Introduction; (3) The Method of
Political Economy pp. 105-106)
Despite Marx's clarity on this issue, deep-seated European epistemological
paradigms that distinguish between thought and reality and the rational
nature of The REAL tend to push most of his interpreters - including
Engels - towards projecting the rationalizing processes of the subjective
dialectic into the objective world. The consequent transformation of
Marxist theory into that of economic determinism and dialectical historicism
produces a body of social philosophy that is in many if not most respects
diametrically opposed to what Marx wrote! In the past some Marxist thinkers
criticized these developments, but other objective conditions - namely the
politics of the Socialist Internationals and then of that of the Peoples'
Republics - either marginalized them (Korsch) or enforced their
recantation (Lukac). Of course, this does not mean that the CHAT, Frankfort
school, or Korsche versions of Marxism can be justified as being closer to
the original conception than that of orthodox dialectical materialism: the
original conception was subjectively Marx's and not accessible to anyone
else. My preference for the CHAT, Frankfort school, or Korsch versions of
Marxism is from an appreciation of their inherently self-critical character,
i.e. a firm denial of distance between the researcher-activist as subject
and the social conditions of interest as object. As you can already see
there is then a special distinction between subjective and objective
activity and conditions. The next step is to specify just how this
distinction relates to your question.
3. I am assuming here that your referent for virtual conditions is based on
the capacity of machine intelligence to produce virtual world, so the
following is a "thought experiment" that considers the relation between
constructed worlds and the world of historical conditions. It appears to me
that there are AT LEAST three levels of indeterminacy (asymmetry) between
machine built virtual worlds and the world of historical conditions:
a. Any virtual world starts life as a conception of its creator. Without
exception most programmed virtual worlds and game worlds are team products
and represent a historical development involving the objectifications of
subjective activities of the many participants involved in its making. So,
the virtual world itself is a historical objective condition embedded within
a larger historical process of which it is only a part. The link between the
original conception and the final product of a virtual program will then
involve the indeterminate relation that we have shown to be a necessary
feature of objectification of all products of subjective activity. This is
the first level of assymmetry between virtual and objective world
conditions.
b. I don't believe that either computer hardware or software has yet
achieved the capacity for autonomous conceptualization, but it is probably
possible in principle. If and when we have such computers then we will have
to regard the computer's acquisition of the virtual program as similar to if
not identical with the data-making, data reducing, and notion concentrating
processes that comprise subjective activity. It's more than unlikely that
such a machine could actually replicate objective historical conditions.
Even considering the faster processing of perceptual input of machine
intelligence, the rational processing of the immensity of all percepts that
even a single individual uses to regard the world would demand a machine
larger than the known universe and would involve machine runs that would
extend beyond the heat-death of the organized universe (see Poundstone on
problems of NP completeness - Poundstone, William1988 Labyrinths of Reason
chap. 9 NP-Completeness: The Labyrinth of Ts'ui Pen pp. 160-190). Still,
expanding our imagination into the magical, let's assume that such a machine
could be made. Unless this machine is identical to the universe, the
products of its internal processing must be regarded as "subjective"
relative to the world from whom it has acquired its experience (the team of
machine and program builders) and relative to the world in which it has
objectified its internal activities (the world of consumers of its labor).
Even if we were to plug our computing machine directly into the brains of
the consumer (the Brains in the Jar problem see Poundstone (ibid pp.207-208)
again, also (Putnam, Hilary 1981 Reason, Truth and History) or go find a
copy of Matrix 1) there would be extraneous conditions, e.g. the temperature
of the liquids in which the brains float, the current state of the machines
providing nutrients necessary for cellular activity and survival and the
random movements of the brains in the jars as well as the current running
temperature of the machine's CPU, the immediate state of conductivity of the
electrodes connected to the brain, and the random variation of values
produced by long calculation runs. So the second level of indeterminate
(assymmetrical) relation between virtual and objective worlds is the
interface between the virtual world producing machine subject and the
consumer object.
c. Assuming that we are discussing virtual realities that involve
interaction between its producer and its consumers, the subjective
processing of the objectified products of the virtual reality machine by the
consumer and their objectification in turn serves as a third level of
assymetrical relation between virtual and objective realities.
So, in conclusion: the most revolutionary aspect of Marx's theory of
historical materialism is his special redefinition of the nature of
objective reality as an inherently concrete product of the history of
perceptions of objective conditions and the objectification of concrete
notions of many subjects. Among other things, inherent to this paradigm of
reality is an iron-hard distinction between virtual and objective
conditions. In fact, the paradigm goes much further than this insofar as
it negates all possibility of true mind-reading (if mind-reading was
possible). On the other hand it asserts the absolute dependence of all
subjectivity on objective historical conditions and upon the MAN-MADE ORIGIN
OF ALL OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS. And, this leads us back to the issue of false
consciousness.
FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS:
As I wrote in an earlier message, while Marx recognized the the existence of
false consciousness (consciousness produced by lies and intentional
witholding of information) his primary concern was the exposure of hidden
contradictions integral to political-economic systems. Contradictions such
as these are neither lies nor witheld information, they comprise the very
fabric of social relations, and are characteristic of all social systems.
By the way, Gramsci (1971 The Modern Prince ) was very emphatic about the
importance of the persistent effects of hidden contradictions integral to
social formations relative to the much more transitory and minimal effects
of lies and misdirection:
"In its most widespread form as economistic superstition, the philosophy of
praxis loses a great part of its capacity for cultural expansion among the
top layer of intellectuals, however much it may gain among the popular
masses and the second-rate intellectuals, who do not intend to overtax their
brains but still wish to appear to know everything, etc. As Engels wrote,
many people find it very convenient to think that they can have the whole of
history and all political and philosophical wisdom in their pockets at
little cost and no trouble, concentrated into a few short formulae. They
forget that the thesis which asserts that men become conscious of
fundamental conflicts on the level of ideology is not psychological or
moralistic in character, but structural and epistemological; and they form
the habit of considering politics, and hence history, as a continuous marché
de dupes, a competition in conjuring and sleight of hand. "Critical"
activity is reduced to the exposure of swindles, to creating scandals, and
to prying them into the pockets of public figures." Gramsci 1971 The Modern
Prince: Some Theoretical and Practical Aspects of "Economism" 9th paragraph)
Much of The Grundrisse and The Capital is devoted to demonstrating how the
notion of the commodity (commodity = something that is produced for the
purpose of exchanging for something else, and as such, is the material form
given to a fundamental social relation - the exchange of labour; from
Encyclopedia of Marxism, MIA -
http://www2.cddc.vt.edu/marxists/admin/intro/index.htm) effectively conceals
sources of profit of capitalist owners of the means of production through
the exploitation of labor. The commodity is not a lie, all of us - even the
Marxists among us - manage our lives in a society dominated by the notion of
the commodification of labor. The fact that the proletariat, i.e. most of
us, suffer exploitation through our active affirmation of commodified labor
without recognizing the mechanics of exploitation implicit in commodity
based social relations is at the root of what Marx regarded as the
acquiesence of the proletariat to a system that operates against their
interests.
Regards,
Victor
----- Original Message -----
From: "Jay Lemke" <jaylemke@umich.edu>
To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Friday, December 26, 2003 5:42 AM
Subject: real and virtual worlds
>
> So this is Part 2.
>
> ... not about false consciousness, but about the real and the virtual ...
>
> I am trying to work out some useful theoretical notions for dealing with
> computer games and their relations to ordinary lived experience.
>
> I find that I have a very hard time finding a way to talk about "reality".
> That is, I can talk about virtual environments, virtual attentional
spaces,
> etc., but when I then want to contrast these with ordinary lived
> experience, the kind we have without computer-generated worlds, there are
> no names for the contrasting term that make any sense to me.
>
> The experiences that many people have in computer gameworlds, especially
> the collaborative-interactive persistent 3D worlds where you can move
> about, interact with object, use tools, etc., do not seem to me to be in
> any qualitative or categorial way different from ordinary experience.
>
> The reality of virtual worlds is just as material as that of everyday
life.
> The reality of everyday life is just as symbolically mediated as that of
> virtual computer-generated environments.
> (These points are akin to Eugene's posting on Ilyenkovian views of the
real
> and the ideal/virtual.)
>
> Virtual world realities and our experiences with them are a SUBSET of
> ordinary life reality, not something to be contrasted with ordinary
reality.
>
> So what ARE the significant differences? and significant for what?
>
> One approach is to look at the role of the technology, a specific
> technology. But the experienced reality is co-generated by the computers,
> the programs, and the actions of the users. How is that different from
> ordinary reality, or the rest of reality?
>
> It is not because the computer-mediated worlds are computational and
> ordinary reality is not. In fact one very good model of ordinary reality
is
> that it is emergent from interactions among components, down to the
> nanoscale (certainly in the case of human organisms, cells, neurons,
etc.),
> and up to ecological and social scales, and that this is indeed a form of
> (analogue, and sometimes digital) "computation". Moroever, in the
> Maturana-Varela view, our experience of reality and knowledge of it is
> always just a knowledge deriving from our own participation in larger
> physical systems, and we derive our knowledge only through the part of the
> system-processes that takes place inside our own organisms (i.e. our
> perceptual responses and neurological "models"). The whole trick of
virtual
> realities is just in "fooling" our brains into interpreting the
> output-input loops of neurons (motor and perception) as if there was a
> different material reality at the other end of the loop compared to what
we
> conventionally say is there. We say you are seeing a screen, not a room.
> But we never do see a room. We respond to photons coming into our eyes
that
> we interpret as having bounced off objects that form a room. And that is
> just what we do with the virtual room on the screen.
>
> We could say that in the case of unmediated perception and virtual reality
> perception there are different relationships between the material
> substrates and their symbolic interpretations. But, so what? for what
> purposes do such differences matter? There are always some purposes for
> which any model of the ideal-real fusion will fail. Does anyone other than
> the design engineers need to worry about these differences? do users need
> to? when? why?
>
> If the universe is a giant computer feeding data to my organic sensorium,
> and virtual worlds are similar data fed by a smaller computer that is part
> of that larger one, then what is the fundamental difference? the
> ontological difference?
>
> So far, none. Or at least none in general. There are a million specific
> cases where the differences matter, each for some specific reason. But no
> generic, universal difference. In particular, no difference for the
> purposes of meaningful activity in or with the resources of the virtual
> world, provided we act within the parameters of what those resources are
> designed to afford. Which is equally true of "non-virtual" activities and
> their material supports.
>
> Where this gets interesting is when we start asking about what happens as
> people cross-over and move back and forth between operating in virtual
> environments and so-called real ones.
>
> I'd be interested to know what people think is the limit, if any, of this
> argument for the symmetry of virtual and ordinary realities?
>
> JAY.
>
>
>
>
>
> At 05:36 PM 12/25/2003 -0500, you wrote:
> >Dear Iraj and everybody-
> >
> >Iraj wrote,
> > > In Lefebvre and Soja's language, there is a 'gap' between the
> > > 'perceived' or 'First space' and the produced 'conceived' or 'Second
> >space.'
> > > What is 'true' here then? Is it not that , based on the same real
> >reality
> > > we can produce many social spaces--virtual realities, identities,
> >conceived
> > > or second spaces?
> >
> >I was "raised" on Il'enkov's tradition. According to Il'enkov, there is
not
> >"real" and "virtual" (or "ideal" in his terminology) consciousness
because
> >by its very nature consciousness is always virtual while any virtual
fantasy
> >is always reality-based. (Modern philosopher Zizek (sp?) recently made a
> >similar statement about "virtual sex" on the Internet arguing that any
sex
> >has its virtual aspect). Thus, the issue is not "virtuality" versus
> >"reality". I do not think that the issue of "false consciousness" is
about
> >immediate versus mediated experiences (if I correctly understand 'first
> >space' vs. 'second space' distinguish "home" vs. "office") because there
is
> >not such thing as "non-mediated" experience and any experience also has
its
> >immediate aspect. I think what makes consciousness "false consciousness"
is
> >not the nature of the consciousness itself (e.g., "virtual" vs. "real"
> >artifacts) or the nature of underlining experiences but rather the nature
of
> >social relations and practices in which the consciousness is embedded in
> >(situated) and emerge from.
> >
> >In this sense, I more incline to Latour's analysis of cultural
> >"irrationality" in his book "Science in action" who tries to reconstruct
> >cultural practices to understand apparent "irrationality" (or "false
> >consciousness"). Latour is definitely right that the issue of
irrationality
> >or "false consciousness" is about relationship of incomprehensibility
> >between I and another (or in an extreme case between I-in-past and
> >I-am-now).
> >
> >What makes sense for a Latino male in California voting for
Schwarzenegger
> >embedded in his history and his relations does not make sense for Mike
> >embedded in his own history and his relations. Often this
> >incomprehensibility is based on fragmentation of communities when people
do
> >not have direct contact with each other and can't talk. Mike, do you know
> >any Latino male in California who voted for Schwarzenegger? If so, did
you
> >ask him a question, why he voted this way and if he was aware about
possible
> >economic consequences for his family?
> >
> >What do you think?
> >
> >Eugene
> >
> >
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: IRAJ IMAM [mailto:iimam@cal-research.org]
> > > Sent: Wednesday, December 24, 2003 3:21 PM
> > > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > Subject: RE: false consciousness
> > >
> > > Eugene:
> > >
> > > 'Mike raised an interesting issue about the nature of so-called "false
> > > consciousness" or why and how people willingly choose what is
"obviously"
> > > bad for them thinking that it is good for them...
> > >
> > > 1. People sometimes act guided by projective, virtual reality (back to
the
> > > issue of role-taking play).
> > >
> > > 2. Cultural models that are widely available to people through media,
> > > school, and institutions are essentially middle- and upper-class.
> >"American
> > > dream" is very much middle-class ideology. People can't invent their
own
> > > cultural models - thinking tools - each time on individual basis.
However,
> > > publicly available cultural models are colonized by those who are in
> > > power..."
> > >
> > > iraj:
> > >
> > > 1. is it not the whole purpose of propaganda(pr/spin/ad) to make
people
> > > believe in something that it is not 'true' in the first place--ie,
> >deception
> > > (eg, WMD, imminent threat from iraq, and link to Al-Qaede. Or the add:
'if
> > > you drink this brand of alcoholic beverage, good looking young people
will
> > > surround you')?
> > >
> > > 2. Put differently, the purpose is to produce "false consciousness" as
> > > social space. Here the virtual or 'imagined space' has to NOT to
> >correspond
> > > to the 'real space.' In CHAT's language, the identity is not matching
the
> > > activity. In Lefebvre and Soja's language, there is a 'gap' between
the
> > > 'perceived' or 'First space' and the produced 'conceived' or 'Second
> >space.'
> > > What is 'true' here then? Is it not that , based on the same real
> >reality
> > > we can produce many social spaces--virtual realities, identities,
> >conceived
> > > or second spaces?
> > >
> > > 3. If people are trapped into a "projective, virtual reality" or "
> > > Cultural models" then they act upon them. In CHAT: identities feedback
on
> > > and shape activities (Eugene's example of the "American Dream"). IN
> >Lefebvre
> > > and soja's: second space is shaping social space.
> > >
> > > 4. If ruling ideas of the time come from the ruling classes, then one
> >should
> > > expect all of this! And hence the opportunity for critical or
> > > transformational perspectives. Or time for production of new (imagined
and
> > > real) space; of identity, of cultural models, of activity, of new and
> > > different social space (eg, Freire and others). If people are
presented
> >with
> > > alternative 'cultural model' they may go on to produce their own
> >individual
> > > and group new spaces, and hence new activities. On by engaging in new
> > > activities, they can explore and produce new social spaces (real and
> > > imagined). May be that is why our w admin and our dominant cultural
> > > productions needs so much censorship--to prevent production of a
different
> > > space.
> > >
> > > Cheers!
> > >
> > > iraj
> > >
> > >
> > >
>
>
> Jay Lemke
> Professor
> University of Michigan
> School of Education
> 610 East University
> Ann Arbor, MI 48104
>
> Tel. 734-763-9276
> Email. JayLemke@UMich.edu
> Website. www.umich.edu/~jaylemke
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