David,
Setting aside the issue of "False Consciousness" as a warped excrescence
of trivial Marxoid Economism, let's concentrate instead on the central issue
of Marx's work, the illusory relations between work and value engendered by
the centrality of the germinal notion of commodification of labor
characteristic of Capitalism. David (and Andy) Marxian theory does not
assume that Capitalism produces multiple class perspectives - au contraire -
it is based on the observation that all participant members of Capitalist
society accept as Truth the valuation of things (hence labor) in terms of
their exchange value. If this weren't the case the system wouldn't exist
for even a moment. The acceptance of exchange value as the way for judging
the worth of things is basic to much or most of our activity and thought -
as richly diverse and contradictory as it may be - and is a pan-class
feature of the society in which we live, Capitalist society.
In general, the class perspective, i.e. the Marxist analysis of the
relations between labor and value, has been a permanent historical fact in
very limited circles - mostly for some social theorists and activists - and
has had a had a very sporadic and stormy historical life for larger
groups - particularly for labor movements and their opposition in times of
crisis. Essentializing the "class perspective" at level of the individual
actor - even for those social theorists and activists who espouse it - or at
the level of collective activity - even for the trade Unions and Company
directorships that rally to their class-flags in industrial crises - is
either the wet-dream of particularly naive activists or a strawman built
for purposes of facilitating a weak argument.
The post-structuralists J Shotter and Garfinkle (Ethnomethodology) have made
their point; that Historical conditions, be they the stream of consciousness
of the individual actor or the fleeting, one-time states in the history of
collectivities are essentially chaotic and complex. But, if I may paraphras
e Jay Lemke's communications of several months ago, if all we can say about
human behavior is that it is chaotic and complex, we would do better to go
home and find something else to do. Some social relations - such as "the
commodity" mentioned above - have more centrality and longer life-spans than
other social relations, and these do give regular form and content to even
the least orderly of experience and organization.
Regards,
Victor
----- Original Message -----
From: "David H Kirshner" <dkirsh@lsu.edu>
To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Sunday, December 28, 2003 10:18 PM
Subject: RE: false consciousness: real and virtual worlds
>
>
>
>
> Andy,
> Whereas, the Marxian notion of false consciousness as rooted in a view of
> multiple class perspectives may pass postmodernist muster, it doesn't work
> for poststructuralists. Essentializing a "class perspective" at the level
> of the individual actor ignores the contradictory and shifting relations
of
> our constituent subjectivities.
> David
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.ne To:
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> t> cc: (bcc: David H
Kirshner/dkirsh/LSU)
> Subject: RE: false
consciousness: real and virtual worlds
> 12/25/2003 05:47
> PM
> Please respond to
> xmca
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Judy, "False consciousness" has never been a word in my vocabulary, I
> suppose because I find it kind of offensive. To the postmodern mind of
> course it is offensive because it contains the implication, as you
suggest,
> that there is a "true" consciousness.
>
> However, I think that very natural presumption misses the point of the
> basic idea behind "false consciousness". As I understand it, it is normal
> that every person or group of people has a viewpoint which flows from
their
> own position in society, their special interests and so on. This idea
leads
> to the basic idea that there is no "true" consciousness, only different
> perspectives on the same totality, and broader or narrower visions.
"False"
> consciousness however, is where a person or group adopts the viewpoint of
> another group not their own; so it is the employee who adopts the
viewpoint
> of the boss, mainly.
>
> >From the old standpoint of "being determines consciousness" it is obvious
> why people hold opinions expressing their own self-interest. What Marx had
> to explain was why/how people adopted views which expressed the interests
> of those groups who oppress and exploit them.
>
>
> Andy
>
> At 06:38 PM 25/12/2003 -0500, you wrote:
>
>
> Eugene, I agree with you (Ilenkov, apparently) that all
consciousness
> (& all
> semiosis) has its virtual basis, so virtuality cannot be the basis
of
> false
> consciousness. I don't understand your use of Latour, however; you
> seem to
> be equating irrationality w/ false consciousness, which just seems
to
> rephrase the claim about virtuality (except that your/Latour's
> emphasis is
> on cultural practices...) Where there is incomprehensibility between
> subjects, there is the evidence that the culture is irrational --
can
> you
> please explain your notion of a rational (& thus coherent???)
> culture?
>
> I would like a definition of false consciousness that I could use to
> refer
> to a regrettable condition, but every definition I've heard refers
to
> a
> condition that could be just the opposite -- a saving grace (like
> denial in
> general) for the subject under certain conditions. Like faith. But I
> do see
> the working class Latino's support for someone like Bush to be
> regrettable,
> in terms of that persons's interests. I suppose what I'm really
> struggling
> with is the notion that there is a consciousness of some kind that
> ISN'T
> false. But maybe that's because I "grew up" with Bateson, not
> Ilenkov.
>
> Judy
>
> Eugene wrote: (snip)
> In this sense, I more incline to Latour's analysis of cultural
> "irrationality" in his book "Science in action" who tries to
> reconstruct
> cultural practices to understand apparent "irrationality" (or "false
> consciousness"). Latour is definitely right that the issue of
> irrationality
> or "false consciousness" is about relationship of
incomprehensibility
> between I and another (or in an extreme case between I-in-past and
> I-am-now).
>
> What makes sense for a Latino male in California voting for
> Schwarzenegger
> embedded in his history and his relations does not make sense for
> Mike
> embedded in his own history and his relations. Often this
> incomprehensibility is based on fragmentation of communities when
> people do
> not have direct contact with each other and can't talk. Mike, do you
> know
> any Latino male in California who voted for Schwarzenegger? If so,
> did you
> ask him a question, why he voted this way and if he was aware about
> possible
> economic consequences for his family?
>
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