31 october 2000
from peter jones, sheffield hallam university
Friends
this message has been stewing for a few days as i've been really struggling
both with the book and with the many ideas thrown up in discussion, including
dot's earlier email (and her later clarifications) which provoked a lot of
interesting debate, and in particular, some issues which are not so easy to
resolve. i wanted to return to the issue of external/internal and
externalization/internalization (and i've harped on about this before, so
apologies!). the cultural-historical position is usually expressed as follows
(and indeed vygotsky put it this way): the direction of development is from
social to individual (= external to internal). this way of expressing things
cannot be right (i should stress that i don't think vygotsky actually
understood it in this way, despite the way that it is expressed). it is wrong
because the individual IS THE SOCIAL BEING (marx)!! think about it: if social
means 'external' then the process of 'internalizing' the external cannot
therefore be social - it cannot be part of the 'social process' and
consequently the individual (the person, the personality) is not a social
phenomenon! but this is absurd! the process of 'internalization' (however we
construe it) is part of the (SOCIAL!) process of becoming of the individual
person, the (individual ) social being. it is absolutely wrong, therefore, to
counterpose the individual to the social; the internal to the external in this
way. there is of course a valid distinction between 'collective' and
'individual' activities etc but this is not to do with the former being social
and the latter not. the 'inner' states of the individual mind are just as much
social phenomena as the stock exchange. i understand the 'social' to mean the
concerted, co-action, co-operation etc of particular individuals; it means that
in everything the individual person does (or thinks) other people are present,
other people are 'addressed' (to use Felix Mikhailov's term - 'obrashchenie')
whether directly in immediate practical circumstances of active cooperation
where, as individuals we must start our personal journey, or indirectly in
'inner speech' and private contemplation. as marx put it (i think we've looked
at this quote before): 'Social activity and social enjoyment exist by no means
ONLY in the form of some DIRECTLY communal activity and directly COMMUNAL
enjoyment, although COMMUNAL activity and COMMUNAL enjoyment - ie activity and
enjoyment which are manifested and affirmed in ACTUAL direct ASSOCIATION with
other men - will occur wherever such a DIRECT expression of sociability stems
from the true character of the activity's content and is appropriate to the
nature of the enjoyment. But also when i am active SCIENTIFICALLY, etc - an
activity which i can seldom perform in direct community with others - then my
activity is SOCIAL because i perform it as a MAN. Not only is the material of
my activity given to me as a social product (as is even the language in which
the thinker is active): my OWN existence IS social activity, and therefore that
which i make of myself, i make of myself for society and with the consciousness
of myself as a social being.' this is from the early writings (1844) and goes
on in similar vein in a way which is directly relevant to the discussion i
think.so the development of our physical and mental powers as individuals, of
our capacity to act, think, plan, imagine, feel, etc etc is not a movement from
'social to individual': it IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL ITSELF - my
individual 'progress' is the 'progress' of other people too; the development of
the individuals (together, through and with one another) is the development of
the community! if an individual solves a problem it is our solution - humanity
as a whole has solved it. (conversely an individual's problems are everybody's
problems!). leont'ev does not, i don't think, make this equation 'social =
external' although sometimes his remarks seem a bit cryptic. but for instance
(section 3.2): 'Human psychology is concerned with the ACTIVITY OF CONCRETE
INDIVIDUALS that takes place either in conditions of open association, in the
midst of people, or eye to eye with the surrounding object world - before the
potter's wheel or behind the writing desk'. He goes on in the same section to
criticise a view which is 'limited by the concept "socialization" of the psyche
of the individual' although this implies that he sees the concept of
"socialization" of the psyche as valid within certain liimits. his discussion
of 'internal' and 'external' is very nuanced - and in section 3.4 he accepts
some kind of interaction or dialectic of internal and external - 'the existence
of regularly occurring transitions in the opposite direction also, from
internal to external activity' although he general insists on the primacy of
internalization as the process of formation of the individual "psyche". but
there are problems with this. it seems to me (partly because of the exclusive
focus - at least in detailed analysis - on individual activity) that the
categories of 'internal' and 'ideal' (theoretical etc) activity are conflated
(and perhaps this is the force of yrjo's early comment on the whole book. but
the two distinctions do not match up: remember marx on the architect and the
bee! the architect does his/her planning on paper on the drawing board - this
is completely external! the 'plan' is the thing, the sensuous (super-sensuous,
ie ideal) object in front of him/her being altered in advance of the real
thing. of course there is activity going on 'inside the head' of the architect
too (ie internally) which is of course, part of the planning process; but this
'internal' activity in the head is part of any activity! if activity is truly
conscious and purposeful (ie it has an object, motive in leont'ev's sense) then
how can 'external activity' not be/include (at the same time) 'internal
activity' in leont'ev's sense?? so that his distinction between
external/internal breaks down. theoretical (or in general ideal) activity is
just as 'external' as any other activity, as witness this discussion we're
having about the meaning of his book! paul's point about the pre-eminence of
production over consumption is a good, one, i think but it does not really make
the point that he wants to make. production is purposeful activity - it runs
its course (cf marx on the labour process) according to a purpose which
(ideally) precedes (and guides) the actual transformation of object into
product. so in leont'ev's (inadequate?) terms production is 'externalization'
of the 'internal'!! yours in some confusion!
P
PS: why do my messages come out in a weird format? should i be pressing some
button??
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