I've just returned to my e-mail after having been away, except for brief and
sporadic readings, for over a month to find 1339 messages in my XMCA mailbox of
which 1035 are still unread. (Not all of them from this last month, thank
goodness! My unread messages go back to November.)
I haven't yet read the Ilyenkov piece but I've downloaded it and I'd like to
thank Andy who took the trouble to transcribe all 71 pages. This is very much
appreciated by those who, like me, live in parts of the world where we can't
just run down to a library and find the references and where ordering books is
both expensive and takes time (4 to 6 weeks leaves us out of most discussions).
So thank you Andy!
Having said this, I must also say that in entereing the discussion I have to
fight back a strong flight impulse to Marxist discourse. This flight impulse has
to be understood in the context of the very heavy, dogmatic role that Marxist
discourse played in the social sciences in many places in Latin America from the
late 60s to the mid or late 80s where it just took over. In some anthropology
departments here anthropologists were replaced by sociologists and economists
and the anthropology curriculum became Capital I, II and III and Modes of
production I, II and III.
So, I'm going to enter sideways, so to speak, into the discussion of animal
consciousness brought up by Diane and related to a posting on consciousness by
Helena and then taken up by various others. I'm trying to get a grasp on how
"consciousness" is being talked about, which seems to be by opposing it to ....
what? Instinctual, maybe? Or "biologically encoded"?
Since I share my home with 11 dogs from several distinct families, I spend some
time observing their forms of social organization. One group consists of a
mother (Noche) and her two daughters, both grown now and from the same litter.
Noche, the mother, is the dominant dog of this group, in fact she is the
dominant dog over all the other 10. She claims and gets exclusive first rights
to all the commodities: food, drink, attention, me. If some tidbit or treat is
thrown out in their living area it "belongs" to Noche, even if she is already
busy with some previous tidbit. I have learned from them that if I want one of
the daughters to get a treat, I have to give it to them individually in their
mouths. When I do this, they gobble it down almost gleefully (my interpretation)
with sidelong glances at their mother (like kids who know they can get away with
things when guests are present). If the treat falls on the floor, it's gone ...
it belongs to Noche.
OK. It seems to me that there's an area of consciousness here that responds to
forms of social organization and that transcends the purely biological. They,
the dogs, are not conscious of the interaction in the same way that I am. I can
stand outside it, observe myself interacting with them, plan, draw analogies. I
think Vigotsky spoke of reflection for this ability. Yet there is some
"knowledge" of rules and roles and transgressions and affordances granted by a
higher power that belong in an area that can be given the name "consciousness"
that seems to be grayer than the all or none choices that
have been proposed.
And it's not me (the presence of the human intellect) that is doing things. I
have adapted myself and my behaviours to this complex group, learning from them
and learning what I can do and what I shouldn't do so as not to risk dire
consequences for one of them, since Noche will take only so much of my
interference with her social hierarchy.
In another example, I have to daily give another little dog some drops for an
ailment. He tends to run away from me, so Noche (sheepdog) jumps down from her
garden, cuts him off from the other two dogs that live in this patio, jumps on
him and holds him down with her two front paws while I approach and give him his
drops.
Noche uses her inbred traits as a sheepdog as a response to my goal-oriented
behaviours. She doesn't grab one of the other dogs, who are also running around
like crazy. She grabs the one I'm after and won't let him get away until I
approach. There is some complex form of interaction here that goes beyond the
purely biological and there is something to which some degree of the term
"consciousness" ought to be applied. Shouldn't it? Although in this case, my
"consciousness" is more prominent than in the other.
Rosa
P.D. Incidentally, the little dog is being treated for episodes of mange which
according to my vet, a homeopath are probably brought on by some undetermined
"source of stress" in his environment.
Nate Schmolze wrote:
> I read the piece a couple times and too found it interesting. Consciouness
> too came to the forefront especially the emphasis on the ideal. Initially
> had mixed reactions, but with Helen's message decided to re-read focusing on
> the consciousness question.
>
> Starting on what on my Microsoft reader is page 66 (piece ends on 71), there
> were 4 blurbs or quotes that specifically stood out for me. They are all
> from the latter part of the piece that focus on the ideal.
>
> "It is here and only here that there arises the IDEAL plane of life activity
> unknown to the animal. Consciousness and will are not the “cause” of the
> manifestation of this new plane of relationships between the individual and
> the external world, but only the mental forms of its expression, in other
> words, its effect."
>
> "Psychology must necessarily proceed from the fact that between the
> individual consciousness and objective reality there exists the “mediating
> link” of the historically formed culture, which acts as the prerequisite and
> condition of individual mental activity. This comprises the economic and
> legal forms of human relationships, the forms of everyday life and forms of
> language, and so on. For the individual’s mental activity (consciousness and
> will of the individual) this culture appears immediately as a “system of
> meanings”,which have been “reified” and confront him quite objectively as
> “non-psychological”, extra-psychological reality."
>
> "The riddle and solution to the problem of “idealism” is to be found in the
> peculiar features of mental activity of the subject, who cannot distinguish
> between two fundamentally different and even opposed categories of phenomena
> of which he is sensuously aware as existing outside his brain: the natural
> properties of things, on the one hand, and those of their properties which
> they owe not to nature but to the social human labour embodied in these
> things, on the other."
>
> "Man acquires the “ideal” plane of life activity only through mastering the
> historically developed forms of social activity, only together with the
> social plane of existence, only together with culture. “Ideality” is nothing
> but an aspect of culture, one of its dimensions, determining factors,
> properties. In relation to mental activity it is just as much an objective
> component as mountains and trees, the moon and the firmament, as the
> processes of metabolism in the individual’s organic body."
>
> Now, in regards to a "neutral" question of how consciousness is formed and
> where it exists his arguments of the ideal really make sense to me. Staying
> in this "neutral" space for just a moment, where consciousness and we maybe
> could add "cognition" and identity lie is a very practical question as Helen
> pointed towards in the field of education.
>
> In the end through this is just a "how question" which philosophers and
> psychologists love. The talk of "man" and "human life activity" gave me the
> strong impression that there is this "one consciousness" which is very
> difficult for me to accept. A definate hierarchy in places in which
> "western culture" is put on top as the more "human".
>
> I think questions like what kinds of consciousness are being formed in this
> or that activity are important ones to ask especially in a field like
> education. So, when Ilyenkov argues "man acquires the ideal plane only
> through mastering historically developed forms of social activity" it leaves
> me with a lot of questions. One being there seems to be social activitieS
> and they are often in tension with each other.
>
> I guess the big question for me is the application of the ideal to more
> culturally, socially specific forms of historical activities.
>
> Nate
>
> who-is-at @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
>
> Nate Schmolze
> http://members.home.net/schmolze1/
> schmolze1@home.com
>
> who-is-at @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
>
> who-is-at @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
>
> Nate Schmolze
> http://members.home.net/schmolze1/
> schmolze1@home.com
>
> who-is-at @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
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