I just want to share two extremely interesting papers that by chance, I =
read on one day by Ian Moll, a South African psychologist (and a =
xlchc-er, is Ian on the xmca now?), and Peter Smagorinsky, an American =
psychologist (and a xmca-er).
Moll, I. (1995). Cultural people and cultural contexts: Comments on =
Cole (1995) and Wertsch (1995). Culture & Psychology, 1 (3), 361-371.
Smagorinsky, P. (1995). The social construction of data: Methodological =
problems of investigating learning in the zone of proximal development. =
Review of Educational Research, 65 (3), 191-212.
Both of the paper discuss historical progress and diversity, both use =
the example of Luria's experiments in Asia. But they came to very =
different (if not opposite) conclusions which is a remarkable fact =
taking into account that both of them consider themselves Vygotskians. =
Let me give two big fragments from both papers. It seems that =
Vygotskian tradition in psychology is now in its phase of rapid grow and =
diversification. It seems to me that Jim Wertsch's distinguishing =
between [American] sociocultural approaches and [non-American] =
cultural-historical approaches is a really important contrast. But, =
judge yourself.
Ian Moll (1995), "[H]ere is one feature of the contemporary South =
African context which I think has a strong bearing on what =
cultural-historical theorists try to do in this situation: in South =
Africa, we are in a process of 'nation-building', of forging a common, =
national cultural identity amongst people (despite their differing =
ethnicities) who have been artificially separated and indeed forced =
apart for centuries by the political practices of segregation and =
apartheid. There is thus a great deal of emphasis in this country on =
'unity rather than diversity', not least in relation to cognitive =
development and both schooling and everyday community life. So, for =
example, in the context of South African cultural-historical psychology, =
Ronnie Miller (1984) -- its leading local theorist -- has described =
cultural relativist perspectives as kin to apartheid ('their most =
malignant form'). There is also a great deal of emphasis on the =
psychological universality and (biological) identity, as opposed to =
differences, of all individuals (see, e.g., a recent paper in which I =
seek to 'reclaim' a notion of natural universality in Vygotsky's theory =
-- Moll, 1994a)" (pp.362-363).
Then Ian Moll went on criticizing Wertsch and Cole for their relativism =
and rehabilitating Luria's famous cross-cultural experiments in Soviet =
Asia in the 30s.
He wrote, "The contemporary world is characterized by increasingly =
dominating forms of international economic, technological and cultural =
control (despite recent theoretical trends which construe phenomenal =
experiences of 'diversity' as accounts of social reality). When we =
study the mechanisms that account for the rupture and transformation of =
cognitive processes, it does not help us to concentrate only on =
'process' in one particular domain or context. We are obliged as well =
to study the way that different, more powerful, cultural contexts create =
(and impose) the conditions under which cognitive activities in that =
particular context are transformed willy-nilly. An old insight of Cole =
and Bruner makes this point strongly (despite their inclination in the =
rest of the article towards a 'cultural difference' position): 'When =
cultures are in competition for resources, as they are today, the =
psychologist's task is to analyze the source of cultural difference so =
that those of... the less powerful group may quickly acquire the =
intellectual instruments necessary for success of the dominant culture =
(Cole & Bruner, 1971, p. 876)'" (Moll, p.368)
Peter Smagorinsky (1995) wrote (almost in a 'response'), "Many cultures =
lead people to internalize 'higher' or sociocultural mental processes =
that from other perspectives, are not 'positive' or optimal. Urban =
youths participate in street gang activities, for instance, and =
internalize codes of behavior that are antithetical to civil law. A =
genocidal society such as Nazi Germany might provide signs and tools =
that lead its citizens to believe in that participate in the =
extermination of other groups or people, a practice labeled by members =
of other cultures as war crimes and atrocities. ... [I]n stressing the =
idea of telos [in development - EM], I should emphasize that a person is =
not limited to a single developmental focus, but can be developing in =
several ways at once. Tulviste's (1991) principle of heterogeneity is =
informative on this point. In his account of activity theory, Tulviste =
maintains that an environment, or overlapping social networks, can =
present a learner with a variety of types of problems to solve, thus =
allowing individuals to develop a number of frameworks for thinking... =
simultaneously..." (pp. 194-5)
And further, "Luria's (1976) remarks [about illiterate Moslem Uzbeks =
being backward -- EM] reveal that he had a specific view of telos, one =
that emerged from the same Russian middle-class view espoused by =
Vygotsky (1934/1987) in valuing the development of speech-mediated =
scientific concepts as the ultimate form of cognitive maturity. Luria's =
means of testing these remote peasants' cognitive activity were =
distinctly Western, as were his criteria for judging mature thought. As =
the following examples will illustrate, the peasants shared neither the =
researcher's sense of telos nor his regard for specific mediational =
means. As a consequence, I believe, the research is not mediational and =
therefore of questionable validity (cf. Cole, 1985; Saxe, 1994)" (pp. =
205-6)
Sorry for long quotes, folks, but I feel they deserve to be long because =
they packed with ideas and voices.
Eugene Matusov
UC Santa Cruz