Here I want to throw a bunch of quotes that, in my view are relevant to =
Wertsch, Tulviste, & Hagstrom's (1993) paper discussed currently on xmca =
and see how they interact with each other.
Lynn Nelson (1993, Epistemological communities. In L. Alcoff & E. =
Potter (Eds.), Feminist epistemologies. New York: Routledge.) wrote,
"In suggesting that it is communities that construct and acquire =
knowledge, I do not mean (or 'merely' mean) that what comes to be =
recognized or 'certified' as knowledge is the result of collaboration =
between, consensus achieved by, political struggles engaged in, =
negotiations undertaken among, or other activities engaged in by =
individuals who, *as individuals, know* in some logically or empirically =
'prior' sense?.. The change I am proposing involves what we should =
construe as the *agents* of these activities. My arguments suggest that =
the collaborators, the consensus achievers, and, in more general terms, =
the agents who generate knowledge are communities and subcommunities, =
not individuals" (p. 124)
I think that Lynn Nelson's conceptualizing is what Stanton Wortham and =
Bill Penuel meant by their wording of "radically sociocentric." =
Nelson's radical viewpoint on agency (and knowledge, and meaning) =
reminds me George Mead's writing on social act and gesture. However, I =
am not sure that Nelson would fully agree with Mead's microanalysis of =
communication about details of how meaning is created.
George Mead (1977, On social psychology. A. Strauss (Ed.). London, UK: =
The University of Chicago Press) wrote,
"Meaning arises and lies within the field of the relation between the =
gesture of a given human organism and the subsequent behavior of this =
organism [i.e., social act - EM] as indicated to another human organism =
by that gesture. ..? the nature of meaning is intimately associated with =
the social process as it thus appears -- that meaning involves this =
threefold relation among phases of the social act as the context in =
which it arises and develops: this relation of the gesture of one =
organism to the adjustive response of another organism (also implicated =
in the given act) and to the completion of the given act -- is a =
relation such that the second organism responds to the gesture of the =
first as indicating or referring to the completion of the given act" =
(pp. 163-4).
=20
It seems to me that both Nelson and Mead would probably reject the units =
of analysis proposed by Vygotsky ("word"), Bakhtin ("utterance"), and =
Wertsch ("mediated action") as being too individualistic. Of course, it =
does not mean that Vygotsky, Bakhtin, or Wertsch are purely =
individualistic theoreticians but they seemed to recognize the =
individual agency while Nelson and Mead seemed to reject it. If I'm =
correct in my interpretation, according to Nelson and Mead, whatever an =
individual does (e.g., "word," "utterance," "mediated action") does not =
make sense by itself AT ALL. =20
Wertsch, Tulviste, & Hagstrom's (1993) "response" to Nelson and Mead's =
radical rejection of the individual agency is quite intriguing and =
interesting. It definitely continues the Vygotsky-Bakhtin-Wertsch =
tradition of navigating between (or away?) purely individualistic and =
purely communitarian positions on agency. It suggests that the =
individual agency (i.e., individual responsibility for actions) is =
shaped by the continuum of community generated problems and mediational =
pathways of solutions.=20
Wertsch, Tulviste, & Hagstrom (1993, A sociocultural approach to agency. =
In E. Forman, N. Minick & C. Stone (Eds.), Education and mind: The =
integration of institutional, social, and developmental processes. =
Oxford University Press. New York, NY.) wrote,
"?.. the appropriate unit of analysis for understanding agency is an =
individual or individuals functioning together with mediational means. =
In this view the individual(s) involved certainly continues to bear the =
major responsibility for initiating and carrying out an action, but the =
possibilities for formulating certain problems, let alone the =
possibilities for following certain paths of action are shaped by the =
mediational means employed. The resulting picture is one in which the =
irreducible unit of analysis for agency is =
'individual(s)-operating-with-mediational-means.' Rather than trying to =
employ this cumbersome hyphenated term, we shall refer to it as =
'mediated agency'" (p.342).
I think that the three approaches to the problem of agency -- purely =
individualistic, purely communitarian, and socio-individual, -- with =
rich variations inside of each approach, provide the direction and =
context of the ongoing discussions on agency (being continued by Rolfe =
Windward, Gordon Wells, and others on the net).
Eugene Matusov
UC Santa Cruz
PS Folks, I have just switched to the Microsoft Exchange e-mail software =
with Windows 95. Does it cause any trouble to read my messages?