I think a valuable way to understand Wertsch's approach
to agency, particularly the need for an _account_ of
agency, can be found in Kenneth Burke's notions of
purpose and agent. (1989, _On Symbols and Society_, U of Chicago).
To Burke, what distinguishes "symbolic action" from
"nonsymbolic motion" or human action from animals' and
objects is this notion of purpose. Purpose does
not determine action, but is a part of a "pentad" of
terms that characterize human action--along with
scene, agency (means), agent (or doer), and act. Purposes,
moreover, like Michael Glassman suggests, can be
attributed to entities or organisms in activity far from
the individual. Moreover, the "scene-purpose ratio"
in Burke's terms could heavily favor the scene.
Burke's notion of agent in the pentad is really as a
doer of action--in the sense of "who is doing the
speaking/acting/remembering?" Again, agents can
be an individual or several. There can be several
agencies. I think Burke leaves out the notion of
cause here in defining agents, only to say that
"this notion of agent has to be in the picture of
action" just like purpose.
Wertsch's thinking as I understand it is closer to
Burke's in this regard than I think Stanton's review
suggests. I do think Stanton is right, however, in
pointing out that the notion of agency is less than
radically sociocentric, and I think Francoise's
points about the importance of "uniqueness" are
relevant here. To Wertsch, there is a unique moment
in human action that is not captured by a totally
sociocentric determinism.
Bill Penuel
_________________________
PreventionInventions
139 Holly Forest
Nashville, TN 37221