One way into the agency problem is the one Wertsch et al take: to examine
what entity lies "behind" thought processes. But the more general problem
is the question of causes -- the question of what entity lies behind human
action in general. So my intent was not to impugn the argument as weak,
but instead to urge the authors to expand their sociocentric account to
the more general problem of agency.
I agree with Jesper Dopping that casting the problem as one of "agency"
tends to favor an individualistic solution. The traditional way of asking
the question is: when we trace back the chain of causes behind a human
action, where does the initial cause lie? This predisposes us to a
Cartesian solution, where we end up with an individual "agent" -- a sort
of homunculus. Wertsch et al are right that psychologists often
uncritically adopt this sort of account in grounding their explanations of
thought.
But I still think that we lack a worked out alternative. I agree with
Wertsch et al that a more sociocentric account is appealing. But what
exactly would it look like? Should we give up looking for "causes" in
human action (is the notion of causality part of the problem)? Or can we
find causes that fit a sociocentric view, without falling into social
determinism?
Dualism seems to leave us with an either-or choice: either the causes are
individual, or social/material (ie, external), or there is some sort of
non-synthetic combination. My worry about internalization was that the
concept locks us into this unappealing choice. Perhaps we could get
beyond this, to a new way of casting the problem. But I make no claim to
have such an account myself, and I think it will require more work.
Stanton Wortham