RE: [xmca] On metaphysics: origin of the term

[Rauno Huttunen <rakahu@utu.fi>]

Hello Larry,

I'll sent article you too.

Rauno

-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss
Sent: 25. maaliskuuta 2013 20:43
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] On metaphysics: origin of the term

Rauno

I would be interested in this article. martin's comment that Heidegger
constituted another ontology
and the way it opened up another way of thinking/being as ways of dwelling
in the world allows a return to multiple understandings of reasoning from
within alternative *meta*physics.
Gadamer shares Hegel's understanding of *objective* spirit but questions
absolute spirit.
If spirit is translated as imagination then it opens inquiry within
objective imagination?

Larry
On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 10:22 AM, Rauno Huttunen <rakahu@utu.fi> wrote:

> Hello,
>
> Thank you. I'll sent the article soon.
>
> Rauno
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> Behalf Of Martin Packer
> Sent: 25. maaliskuuta 2013 19:20
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] On metaphysics: origin of the term
>
> Hi Rauno,
>
> Well, Heidegger wanted to overcome *traditional* metaphysics. What he
> replaced it with was another ontology - monist, historical, existential...
>
> I'd certainly be interested in reading your manuscript. I'll help if I can.
>
> Martin
>
> On Mar 25, 2013, at 12:06 PM, Rauno Huttunen <rakahu@utu.fi> wrote:
>
> > Hello,
> >
> > Larry  presents very interesting point. I think Gadamer's  comment is
> addressed to Gadamer's teacher Heidegger who wanted to overcome history of
> metaphysics.
> >
> > Rauno
> >
> > P.S. With Leena Kakkori I have made article (manuscript) on Vygotsky,
> Heidegger and Gadamer. Is there anybody with kind of interests? We might
> need some help with that article.
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> On Behalf Of Larry Purss
> > Sent: 25. maaliskuuta 2013 17:13
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] On metaphysics: origin of the term
> >
> > Hello rauno,
> >
> > Gadamet's commentary on Hegel and metaphysics is interesting. Gadamer
> > writes,
> >
> > Thus something seems to have become true that Hegel, from a position of
> > full engagement with the reality of philosophy, still perceived as an
> > impossible contradiction when he said that a people without a metaphysics
> > would be like a temple without a sanctuary, an empty temple, a temple in
> > which nothing dwells any longer and hence is itself nothing anymore. That
> > is it: "a people without a metaphysics!"
> >
> > Larry
> >
> > On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 7:14 AM, Rauno Huttunen <rakahu@utu.fi> wrote:
> >
> >> Hello,
> >>
> >> Creating rational criteria for ontology/metaphysics is very challenging
> >> task. Immanuel Kant tried create metaphysics that is as strict as
> >> mathematics and its is science. The best attempt so far I would say but
> >> still not plausible today.
> >>
> >> There is no rational way to answer the basic ontological question:
> >> materialism or idealism (or Spinozian panteism as synthesis of them
> both).
> >> For idealist, reason (ratio) itself is a substance and there cannot be
> any
> >> speak on "rational solution" if not the idea of reason is not
> presupposed
> >> as a priori entity. For reductionistic materialist, materia is the basic
> >> entity and "reasoning" is just causal material happening in our brain.
> >> There is no "reason" to choose theory A or B. We think that we are
> >> reasoning, but our brain just follow "causal laws of thinking". Of
> course
> >> there is other forms of materialism like Karl Popper's emergent
> materialism
> >> and Karl Marx's dialectical materialism. I like them both but I have no
> >> "real reason" to do so. My best rational arguments works only within the
> >> paradigm I have chosen (or learn).
> >>
> >> Rauno Huttunen
> >>
> >>
> >> ________________________________________
> >> Lähettäjä: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> >> k&#228;ytt&#228;j&#228;n Martin Packer [packer@duq.edu] puolesta
> >> Lähetetty: 25. maaliskuuta 2013 15:50
> >> Vastaanottaja: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >> Aihe: Re: [xmca] On metaphysics: origin of the term
> >>
> >> Hi Brecht,
> >>
> >> Yes, a rational critique of ontology is possible, and indeed necessary.
> I
> >> was trying to engage in such a critique of activity theory, which it
> seems
> >> to me departs considerably rather the admirable (though not
> unquestionable)
> >> ontology that Marx proposed. (And yes, as you suggest, the claim to be
> >> "purely empirical" seems to me a return to the outdated and simplistic
> >> notion that there is on the one hand 'metaphysics' and on the other hand
> >> 'genuine science.' But let that pass.) Activity theory, in my view,
> >> essentializes a particular organization of human activity and in doing
> so
> >> obscures the historical character of that organization. Would you agree?
> >>
> >> Martin
> >>
> >>
> >> On Mar 25, 2013, at 4:00 AM, Brecht De Smet <Brechttie.DeSmet@UGent.be>
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >>> Martin, I obviously agree with your presentation of the historical
> >> lineages of the "word" metaphysics. However, with regard to the current
> >> discussion on the "terms of the debate", it is quite obvious that Andy's
> >> original remark: "So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical
> "states
> >> of mind", or intelligent infants, etc" clearly deployed metaphysics in
> the
> >> critical (derogatory?) sense of a "false ontology", i.e. the domain of
> >> fantastic "a priori" speculation. Retorting that everyone uses
> metaphysics,
> >> a.k.a. an ontology-epistemology, paradigm, Weltanschauung, etc. obscures
> >> the fact that a rational critique of particular ontologies is possible
> and
> >> even a necessary part of the scientific project.
> >>>
> >>> With regard to the "concept" of metaphysics, the Marxian critique is
> >> important because at the time it did not only posited its "own"
> metaphysics
> >> against the dominant paradigms, but, instead of analyzing the social
> >> relations and politics that emerged from a certain philosophy, it
> studied
> >> the concrete historical social relations and politics that gave rise to
> >> shapes of metaphysics. In this sense it constituted a "Copernican
> >> revolution". Superficially, yes, "the materialist method" as Marx calls
> it
> >> in the German Ideology has an "ontology", in the sense that it is based
> on
> >> a number of premises, but, in contradistinction to the theories that
> came
> >> before: "The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not
> >> dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the
> >> imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the
> material
> >> conditions under which they live, both those which they find already
> >> existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus
> be
> >> verified in a purely empirical way." (
> >>
> http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm)
> >>>
> >>> Of course we can make a lot of fuss about the supposed empiricism of
> >> this passage, but its essence amounts to a call for an emancipatory
> project
> >> with at its core real, historical humanity. Within the history of this
> >> project, the "insult of metaphysics" has taken on many forms, from a
> >> rational critique of a-historical, idealist, or anti-humanist
> ontologies to
> >> the sectarian attacks by the ideologists of (ironically the extremely
> >> "metaphysical" ossified doctrine of) "Marxism-Leninism". We may deem
> such
> >> insults as unfortunate, but they are perhaps unavoidable when the
> domain of
> >> ontology is as much penetrated by politics as politics is by
> metaphysics.
> >> To conclude: if anything, Marx subverted the "neutrality" of the
> >> philosophical "category" of ontology/epistemology and its "constitutive"
> >> position within society.
> >>>
> >>> Best,
> >>>
> >>> Brecht
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Hi Brecht,
> >>>>
> >>>> Yes, of course you're correct, Andy is reading Hegel from a Marxist
> >> point of view, therefore upside down, so to speak. But Marx's
> materialism
> >> is still an ontology, still a metaphysics.
> >>>>
> >>>> Your confusion comes from the fact that there have been two uses of
> the
> >> word 'metaphysics.' One use is to label some kind of talk as having no
> >> basis in reality, as completely speculative and unverifiable. The
> logical
> >> positivists, for example, wanted to eliminate metaphysics in this sense
> >> from science - for them any notion was metaphysical if it was not
> >> verifiable. They realized that Newtonian physics contained unverifiable
> >> concepts, and they believed that Einstein's physics had eliminated
> >> metaphysics by defining everything in terms of operations of observation
> >> and measurement.
> >>>>
> >>>> We know now how narrow, unfruitful, and inconsistent the positivist
> >> view of science turned out to be. The second use of the word
> 'metaphysics'
> >> helps us understand why: "'metaphysics' refers to accounts of what truly
> >> exists, and to accounts of relationships between 'existences' (e.g.
> >> reduction relations, and perhaps other forms of dependence or priority)"
> >> (Kreines, 2006). That is, metaphysics is the brach of philosophy that
> deals
> >> with ontology (and sometimes epistemology is included), as well as the
> >> assumptions that any science makes about the entities that it studies.
> >>>>
> >>>> One person's ontology is another person's metaphysics. That is, when
> >> someone disagrees with another's ontological claims, a quick and easy
> >> insult is to label them "metaphysical." But the word itself simply came
> >> from the sequence of titles in Aristotle's texts: the text which dealt
> with
> >> what we would now call ontology and epistemology was simply next in the
> >> traditional list of titles after the 'Physica,' and so was called
> >> 'Meta-physica.'
> >>>>
> >>>> Did Marx make ontological assumptions? Certainly! For example, as you
> >> point out, for Marx the "essence of man" is "in reality,' "the ensemble
> of
> >> social relations." In this passage Marx states one of his core
> ontological
> >> assumptions. Much has been written about the ontological assumptions of
> >> Marxism (e.g. Gould, 1978). In the same passage Marx himself confuses
> >> things by using the term metaphysics in its first, derogatory sense.
> >> Unsympathetic readers of Marx's writings have also at times judged them
> >> merely metaphysical. Others, sympathetic readers, have also often
> referred
> >> to them as metaphysical, but in a positive sense. The negative use of
> the
> >> term is falling into disuse, with good reason. As the importance of
> >> ontology is now understood, it no longer makes sense to reject all talk
> >> about ontology as speculative and unscientific, or unphilosophical.
> >>>>
> >>>> Martin
> >>>>
> >>>> Gould, C. C. (1978). Marx's social ontology: Individuality and
> >> community in Marx's theory of social relations. Cambridge, MA: MIT
> Press.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Kreines, J. (2006). Hegel's metaphysics: Changing the debate.
> >> Philosophy Compass, 1(5), 466-480.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> On Mar 24, 2013, at 5:16 AM, Brecht De Smet <Brechttie.DeSmet@UGent.be
> >
> >> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> Because I do not want to derail the current thread, I start a new
> one:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> My point was that Hegel is hardly the person to turn to if one wants
> >> to avoid metaphysics! Individual, Universal, Particular - there's a
> whole
> >> metaphysics here.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Well, if you look how Andy appropriates Hegel in his various writings
> >> I think you can hardly call what he does a form of metaphysics. On the
> >> contrary, he turns Hegel upside down, reading his logic in a materialist
> >> and non-metaphysical way.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> In this regard I think the philosophical implications of Marx's
> Theses
> >> on Feuerbach are still grossly underestimated. In a few lines he
> summarizes
> >> the deficiences of both idealism and materialism, subjectivism and
> >> objectivism, finishing off a few centuries of philosophical thought (of
> >> course the theses were but the end product of a whole project). After
> the
> >> theses Marx largely moves on from philosophical critique to developing
> his
> >> "materialist method".
> >> http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/index.htm
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Thesis 1: with regard to "ontology": Marx criticized classical
> >> materialism because it conceived of the actual world not as human
> practice
> >> (subjective), but as merely objective. Whereas for Hegel the world
> >> consisted merely of thought-objects, for Feuerbach the world was
> >> constituted by sensuous objects. In both perspectives human practice was
> >> absent, as either an objective or subjective activity. As such both were
> >> forms of metaphysical thinking, i.e. a form of thinking and activity
> that
> >> did not place human practice at its core. (Also see thesis 5)
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Thesis 2: with regard to "epistemology": "The question whether
> >> objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of
> >> theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the
> >> reality and power, the this-sidedness [Diesseitigkeit] of his thinking,
> in
> >> practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which
> is
> >> isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question."
> >>>>>
> >>>>> This is almost a Copernican revolution with regard to epistemology.
> >> True knowledge, "truth", is not derived from either formal or
> dialectical
> >> logic, but from the encounter between human thought and human practice.
> The
> >> reality of any phenomenon outside this encounter "is a purely scholastic
> >> question" or an exercise in metaphysics. Cf. snare theory, dark matter,
> >> etc. Thesis 8 reasserts this premisse: "All social life is essentially
> >> practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their
> rational
> >> solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice."
> Real
> >> human practice or activity is the only base for gaining true knowledge
> >> about humanity.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Thesis 3: with regard to "emancipation": classical (mechanical)
> >> materialism pointed out that humans are the product of their
> environments.
> >> Changing their environments resulted in changed humans. Of course, who
> >> changes their environments? Humans themselves. So transformation of
> >> circumstances + human activity = self-change = revolutionary practice.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Thesis 4: with regard to the position of a critical or emancipatory
> >> science: It is insufficient to just deconstruct oppressive ideological
> >> concepts, "after completing this work, the chief thing still remains to
> be
> >> done". The reverse movement should be explained as well: how real social
> >> relations are the basis for these ideological forms. Of course, this
> means
> >> that the contradiction cannot be resolved in thought, but has to be
> >> overcome in reality, in practice. This is the core meaning of thesis 11:
> >> "Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways;
> the
> >> point is to change it."
> >>>>>
> >>>>> In this sense, metaphysics was also a way of resolving real
> >> contradictions in the realm of thought.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Thesis 6: with regard to the "essence" of humankind: "...the essence
> >> of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In
> reality, it
> >> is the ensemble of the social relations." Taking "the individual" as the
> >> unit of philosophy/social sciences is an a-historical and atomizing
> >> abstraction which "belongs in reality to a particular social form"
> (Thesis
> >> 7). A social science basing itself on the actions, intentions, emotions,
> >> etc. of discrete individuals takes a metaphysical and abstract view of
> >> humanity as its departure point. See also thesis 9 and 10.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> --
> >>>>> Brecht De Smet
> >>>>> Assistant Professor at the Department Conflict and Development
> Studies
> >>>>> Researcher at MENARG (Middle East and North Africa Research Group)
> >>>>> Department of Political and Sciences
> >>>>> Ghent University
> >>>>> www.psw.ugent.be/menarg
> >>>>> Universiteitsstraat 8 / 9000 Gent / Belgium
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Citeren Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> Oh! (he exclaims). My point was that Hegel is hardly the person to
> >> turn to if one wants to avoid metaphysics! Individual, Universal,
> >> Particular - there's a whole metaphysics here. Take a look at the
> Stanford
> >> Enc of Philosophy entry on Hegel (link below) for a sense of the debate
> >> over this. There has been an "orthodox or traditional understanding of
> >> Hegel as a ?metaphysical? thinker in the pre-Kantian ?dogmatic? sense.
> This
> >> was followed by a view by some that "particular works, such as the
> >> Phenomenology of Spirit, or particular areas of Hegel's philosophy,
> >> especially his ethical and political philosophy, can be understood as
> >> standing independently of the type of unacceptable metaphysical system
> >> sketched above."  (But Andy hates the Phenomenology!) And then there are
> >> people who are "appealing to contemporary analytic metaphysics as
> >> exemplifying a legitimate project of philosophical inquiry into
> fundamental
> >> ?features? or ?structures? of the world itself."
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Myself, I'm closest to the last of these views. I don't think we
> want
> >> to *avoid* metaphysics (ontology and epistemology) ; indeed I don't
> think
> >> that is possible. rather, we need to adopt the *right* metaphysics. We
> can
> >> debate what the criteria of that need to be. But to claim of a
> position, in
> >> philosophy or the social sciences, that there is "No metaphysics here!"
> is
> >> a tad naive.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel/>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Martin
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> On Mar 23, 2013, at 12:36 PM, Carol Macdonald <
> carolmacdon@gmail.com>
> >> wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> I thought that what he said was avoiding it: back up your
> >> exclamation Martin
> >>>>>>> Carol
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> On 23 March 2013 16:48, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> I though you wanted to *avoid* metaphysics, Andy!
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Martin
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> On Mar 22, 2013, at 8:17 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> >> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Thank you Manfred for that clear explanation, and for correcting
> my
> >>>>>>>> typing mistake! :(
> >>>>>>>>> This might be an occasion to mention how my own development of
> >> Activity
> >>>>>>>> Theory differs from yours and that of ANL.
> >>>>>>>>> I do not work with duality of "the publically assigned meaning
> and
> >> the
> >>>>>>>> personally felt sense". Rather I use Hegel's approach in which the
> >>>>>>>> Individual and Universal are mediated by the Particular. This is a
> >> relation
> >>>>>>>> which is applicable not just to motives, but any concept. It
> allows
> >> the
> >>>>>>>> meaning of the situation to be something which is *realised*. This
> >> word
> >>>>>>>> "realised" is what Wiulliam James would have described as a
> >>>>>>>> "double-barrelled word" (following Charles Dickens' "double
> >> barrelled
> >>>>>>>> compliment), in that it means both "realised" in the objective
> >> sense of
> >>>>>>>> "made real", as in "The plan was at last realised when the judge
> >> delivered
> >>>>>>>> his verdict," and subjective in the sense of "woke up to", as in
> "I
> >>>>>>>> realised that my efforts to reconcile with my wife were doomed to
> >> failure."
> >>>>>>>> I believe that this resolves certain problems which arise in
> Actvity
> >>>>>>>> Theory, but remaining within the Activity approach as outlined in
> >> your
> >>>>>>>> excellent paper.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Andy
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Holodynski, Manfred wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Dear colleagues,
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> thank you very much for all your valued comments on my article.
> >> There
> >>>>>>>> are a lot of aspects already discussed and I have some
> difficulties
> >> to
> >>>>>>>> follow all lines of argumentation. Therefore, I would like to
> >> answer to the
> >>>>>>>> following:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> 1. Emotions as psychological function within the macrostructure
> of
> >>>>>>>> activity.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> As Andy claims it I get my Activity Theory from AN Leont'ev and
> I
> >>>>>>>> focused especially on his concept of macrostructure of activity
> and
> >> its
> >>>>>>>> levels of activity that is related to motives, actions that are
> >> related to
> >>>>>>>> goals and operations that are related to the conditions under
> which
> >> an
> >>>>>>>> action is given. And Andy gets precisely to the heart of it when
> he
> >> stated
> >>>>>>>> that my article needs to be read with attention to motivation and
> >> how the
> >>>>>>>> macrostructure of an activity is related to the motives and goals
> >> of an
> >>>>>>>> individual. One activity can be realized by different actions, and
> >> one
> >>>>>>>> action can realize different activities.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> May I quote Andy's words:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> " Because motives are not given to immediate perception; they
> >> have to
> >>>>>>>> be inferred/learnt. Emotional expression and experience signal the
> >> success,
> >>>>>>>> failure, frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for
> >> both
> >>>>>>>> participant/observers and the individual subject themself, emotion
> >> is tied
> >>>>>>>> up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure of an
> >> activity.
> >>>>>>>> One and the same action could be part of different ??actions
> >> activities (!)
> >>>>>>>> (MH)??. It is the emotions which signal (internally and
> externally)
> >> the
> >>>>>>>> success, etc., etc., that is, in an action's furthering an
> >> activity, and it
> >>>>>>>> is this which makes manifest and actual that connection between
> >> action and
> >>>>>>>> activity, for both the observer/participant and the individual
> >> subject.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states of
> >> mind", or
> >>>>>>>> intelligent infants, etc."
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> a) Take the example of the opening of the window. That's the
> >> behavior.
> >>>>>>>> What's the goal?
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> b) Imagine the person is a leader and opens the window in order
> to
> >>>>>>>> greet his followers and to hold a speech. That's the goal. What is
> >> the
> >>>>>>>> activity?
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> c) If one look at the circumstances one can derive that the
> >> speech is a
> >>>>>>>> part of a political activity in order to celebrate the election
> >> victory.
> >>>>>>>> So, if the leader also feels pride and enthusiasm about the
> victory
> >> there
> >>>>>>>> is coincidence between the publically assigned meaning and the
> >> personally
> >>>>>>>> felt sense of the situation. However, it may also be possible that
> >> he
> >>>>>>>> doesn't feel pride but a great burden and he personally feels to
> be
> >>>>>>>> overloaded with the duties and future expectations. Then the
> >> societal
> >>>>>>>> meaning assigned by the followers to this situation and the
> >> personal sense
> >>>>>>>> assigned by the leader himself are not congruent. The leader
> framed
> >> this
> >>>>>>>> situation under an achievement perspective whether he is able to
> >> fulfill
> >>>>>>>> the leadership.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> But, note when we talk about actions and activity, then we speak
> >> about
> >>>>>>>> an advanced level of activity e.g. in children or adults, but not
> in
> >>>>>>>> infants who start to have intentions but still not a mental image
> >> of a
> >>>>>>>> future state of affairs.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> 2. Differentiation between the basic level in infants and
> advanced
> >>>>>>>> level in older children:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> - A young infant has not already established a goal-driven level
> >> of
> >>>>>>>> actions. In the first weeks one can observe the acquisition of
> first
> >>>>>>>> operations and of first expectations what should happen. But these
> >>>>>>>> expectations are not yet represented as a mental image about the
> >> desired
> >>>>>>>> future states. This is the product of the acquisition of a sign
> >> system
> >>>>>>>> which enables the person to evoke and imagine a future state in
> the
> >> here
> >>>>>>>> and now and to start to strive for it. And for this starting
> point,
> >> not
> >>>>>>>> only to imagine different future states, but also to select one of
> >> them and
> >>>>>>>> to start to strive for it, emotional processes come into play that
> >> color
> >>>>>>>> one of the imagined future state e.g. in a state worth striving
> for
> >> and
> >>>>>>>> that mobilize the executive power to start striving for it.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> However, the ability to form such notions of goals and to
> >> transform
> >>>>>>>> them into actions is not something that occurs automatically. It
> >> emerges in
> >>>>>>>> a long-drawn ontogenetic learning process in which the attainment
> >> of goals
> >>>>>>>> through actions is tried, tested, and increasingly optimized.
> Older
> >>>>>>>> children are
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> So, for an understanding of my emotion concept the
> macrostructure
> >> of an
> >>>>>>>> activity is very decisive because I embedded emotions as a
> specific
> >>>>>>>> psychological function within the macrostructure of an activity.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Best
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Manfred
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Institut für Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Fliednerstr. 21
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> D-48149 Münster
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34311
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat)
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax)
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
> >>>>>>>>>> Von: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
> >>>>>>>>>> Gesendet: Freitag, 22. März 2013 04:13
> >>>>>>>>>> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>>>>>>> Cc: Holodynski, Manfred
> >>>>>>>>>> Betreff: Re: Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article is
> >> choice
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Mike, Manfred gets his Activity Theory from AN Leontyev, rather
> >> than
> >>>>>>>> Engestrom's "systems of activity."
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> So actions and activities are defined by their goals and
> motives.
> >> So
> >>>>>>>> Manfred's article needs to be read with attention to motivation
> and
> >> how the
> >>>>>>>> structure of an activity is related to motives and goals. Because
> >> motives
> >>>>>>>> are not given to immediate perception; they have to be
> >> inferred/learnt.
> >>>>>>>> Emotional expression and experience signal the success, failure,
> >>>>>>>> frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for both
> >>>>>>>> participant/observers and the individual subject themself, emotion
> >> is tied
> >>>>>>>> up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure of an
> >> activity.
> >>>>>>>> One and the same action could be part of different actions. It is
> >> the
> >>>>>>>> emotions which signal (internally and externally) the success,
> >> etc., etc.,
> >>>>>>>> that is, in an action's furthering an activity, and it is this
> >> which makes
> >>>>>>>> manifest and actual that connection between action and activity,
> >> for both
> >>>>>>>> the observer/participant and the individual subject.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states of
> >> mind", or
> >>>>>>>> intelligent infants, etc.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> It's all in there.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Andy
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy - and here I was wondering why
> operation/action/activity
> >> were
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> not prominent in Manfred's article. Where does he lay out the
> >> views in
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> this note? Am I reading too superficially as usual? Seems
> >> important
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> for me to get clear about!
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Mike
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> On Thursday, March 21, 2013, Andy Blunden wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Think of your illustration,Martin, about whether, in opening
> the
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> window, you were acting as a technician or moral leader. I.e.,
> >> the
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> meaning of the action lies in the activity of which it is a
> part,
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> which is not immediately given. Manfred does not refer this to
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> "intention" or "belief". Manfred is quite specific that the
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> signalising and self-perception of an action in relation to an
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> activity - i.e., an action's being of this and not that
> activity
> >> -
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> is a function played by emotion. Concepts like internal state
> and
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> intention are derivative from operation/action/activity, not
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> fundamental.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> --
> >>>>>>>>>
> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
> >>>>>>>>> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> >>>>>>>>> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
> >>>>>>>>> http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> __________________________________________
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> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> __________________________________________
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> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> --
> >>>>>>> Carol A  Macdonald Ph D (Edin)
> >>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist: EMBED
> >>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor
> >>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa
> >>>>>>> __________________________________________
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