RE: [xmca] On metaphysics: origin of the term

[Rauno Huttunen <rakahu@utu.fi>]

Hello,

Thank you. I'll sent the article soon.

Rauno

-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Packer
Sent: 25. maaliskuuta 2013 19:20
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] On metaphysics: origin of the term

Hi Rauno,

Well, Heidegger wanted to overcome *traditional* metaphysics. What he replaced it with was another ontology - monist, historical, existential...

I'd certainly be interested in reading your manuscript. I'll help if I can.

Martin

On Mar 25, 2013, at 12:06 PM, Rauno Huttunen <rakahu@utu.fi> wrote:

> Hello,
> 
> Larry  presents very interesting point. I think Gadamer's  comment is addressed to Gadamer's teacher Heidegger who wanted to overcome history of metaphysics.
> 
> Rauno
> 
> P.S. With Leena Kakkori I have made article (manuscript) on Vygotsky, Heidegger and Gadamer. Is there anybody with kind of interests? We might need some help with that article. 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss
> Sent: 25. maaliskuuta 2013 17:13
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] On metaphysics: origin of the term
> 
> Hello rauno,
> 
> Gadamet's commentary on Hegel and metaphysics is interesting. Gadamer
> writes,
> 
> Thus something seems to have become true that Hegel, from a position of
> full engagement with the reality of philosophy, still perceived as an
> impossible contradiction when he said that a people without a metaphysics
> would be like a temple without a sanctuary, an empty temple, a temple in
> which nothing dwells any longer and hence is itself nothing anymore. That
> is it: "a people without a metaphysics!"
> 
> Larry
> 
> On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 7:14 AM, Rauno Huttunen <rakahu@utu.fi> wrote:
> 
>> Hello,
>> 
>> Creating rational criteria for ontology/metaphysics is very challenging
>> task. Immanuel Kant tried create metaphysics that is as strict as
>> mathematics and its is science. The best attempt so far I would say but
>> still not plausible today.
>> 
>> There is no rational way to answer the basic ontological question:
>> materialism or idealism (or Spinozian panteism as synthesis of them both).
>> For idealist, reason (ratio) itself is a substance and there cannot be any
>> speak on "rational solution" if not the idea of reason is not presupposed
>> as a priori entity. For reductionistic materialist, materia is the basic
>> entity and "reasoning" is just causal material happening in our brain.
>> There is no "reason" to choose theory A or B. We think that we are
>> reasoning, but our brain just follow "causal laws of thinking". Of course
>> there is other forms of materialism like Karl Popper's emergent materialism
>> and Karl Marx's dialectical materialism. I like them both but I have no
>> "real reason" to do so. My best rational arguments works only within the
>> paradigm I have chosen (or learn).
>> 
>> Rauno Huttunen
>> 
>> 
>> ________________________________________
>> Lähettäjä: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>> k&#228;ytt&#228;j&#228;n Martin Packer [packer@duq.edu] puolesta
>> Lähetetty: 25. maaliskuuta 2013 15:50
>> Vastaanottaja: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Aihe: Re: [xmca] On metaphysics: origin of the term
>> 
>> Hi Brecht,
>> 
>> Yes, a rational critique of ontology is possible, and indeed necessary. I
>> was trying to engage in such a critique of activity theory, which it seems
>> to me departs considerably rather the admirable (though not unquestionable)
>> ontology that Marx proposed. (And yes, as you suggest, the claim to be
>> "purely empirical" seems to me a return to the outdated and simplistic
>> notion that there is on the one hand 'metaphysics' and on the other hand
>> 'genuine science.' But let that pass.) Activity theory, in my view,
>> essentializes a particular organization of human activity and in doing so
>> obscures the historical character of that organization. Would you agree?
>> 
>> Martin
>> 
>> 
>> On Mar 25, 2013, at 4:00 AM, Brecht De Smet <Brechttie.DeSmet@UGent.be>
>> wrote:
>> 
>>> Martin, I obviously agree with your presentation of the historical
>> lineages of the "word" metaphysics. However, with regard to the current
>> discussion on the "terms of the debate", it is quite obvious that Andy's
>> original remark: "So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states
>> of mind", or intelligent infants, etc" clearly deployed metaphysics in the
>> critical (derogatory?) sense of a "false ontology", i.e. the domain of
>> fantastic "a priori" speculation. Retorting that everyone uses metaphysics,
>> a.k.a. an ontology-epistemology, paradigm, Weltanschauung, etc. obscures
>> the fact that a rational critique of particular ontologies is possible and
>> even a necessary part of the scientific project.
>>> 
>>> With regard to the "concept" of metaphysics, the Marxian critique is
>> important because at the time it did not only posited its "own" metaphysics
>> against the dominant paradigms, but, instead of analyzing the social
>> relations and politics that emerged from a certain philosophy, it studied
>> the concrete historical social relations and politics that gave rise to
>> shapes of metaphysics. In this sense it constituted a "Copernican
>> revolution". Superficially, yes, "the materialist method" as Marx calls it
>> in the German Ideology has an "ontology", in the sense that it is based on
>> a number of premises, but, in contradistinction to the theories that came
>> before: "The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not
>> dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the
>> imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material
>> conditions under which they live, both those which they find already
>> existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be
>> verified in a purely empirical way." (
>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm)
>>> 
>>> Of course we can make a lot of fuss about the supposed empiricism of
>> this passage, but its essence amounts to a call for an emancipatory project
>> with at its core real, historical humanity. Within the history of this
>> project, the "insult of metaphysics" has taken on many forms, from a
>> rational critique of a-historical, idealist, or anti-humanist ontologies to
>> the sectarian attacks by the ideologists of (ironically the extremely
>> "metaphysical" ossified doctrine of) "Marxism-Leninism". We may deem such
>> insults as unfortunate, but they are perhaps unavoidable when the domain of
>> ontology is as much penetrated by politics as politics is by metaphysics.
>> To conclude: if anything, Marx subverted the "neutrality" of the
>> philosophical "category" of ontology/epistemology and its "constitutive"
>> position within society.
>>> 
>>> Best,
>>> 
>>> Brecht
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Hi Brecht,
>>>> 
>>>> Yes, of course you're correct, Andy is reading Hegel from a Marxist
>> point of view, therefore upside down, so to speak. But Marx's materialism
>> is still an ontology, still a metaphysics.
>>>> 
>>>> Your confusion comes from the fact that there have been two uses of the
>> word 'metaphysics.' One use is to label some kind of talk as having no
>> basis in reality, as completely speculative and unverifiable. The logical
>> positivists, for example, wanted to eliminate metaphysics in this sense
>> from science - for them any notion was metaphysical if it was not
>> verifiable. They realized that Newtonian physics contained unverifiable
>> concepts, and they believed that Einstein's physics had eliminated
>> metaphysics by defining everything in terms of operations of observation
>> and measurement.
>>>> 
>>>> We know now how narrow, unfruitful, and inconsistent the positivist
>> view of science turned out to be. The second use of the word 'metaphysics'
>> helps us understand why: "'metaphysics' refers to accounts of what truly
>> exists, and to accounts of relationships between 'existences' (e.g.
>> reduction relations, and perhaps other forms of dependence or priority)"
>> (Kreines, 2006). That is, metaphysics is the brach of philosophy that deals
>> with ontology (and sometimes epistemology is included), as well as the
>> assumptions that any science makes about the entities that it studies.
>>>> 
>>>> One person's ontology is another person's metaphysics. That is, when
>> someone disagrees with another's ontological claims, a quick and easy
>> insult is to label them "metaphysical." But the word itself simply came
>> from the sequence of titles in Aristotle's texts: the text which dealt with
>> what we would now call ontology and epistemology was simply next in the
>> traditional list of titles after the 'Physica,' and so was called
>> 'Meta-physica.'
>>>> 
>>>> Did Marx make ontological assumptions? Certainly! For example, as you
>> point out, for Marx the "essence of man" is "in reality,' "the ensemble of
>> social relations." In this passage Marx states one of his core ontological
>> assumptions. Much has been written about the ontological assumptions of
>> Marxism (e.g. Gould, 1978). In the same passage Marx himself confuses
>> things by using the term metaphysics in its first, derogatory sense.
>> Unsympathetic readers of Marx's writings have also at times judged them
>> merely metaphysical. Others, sympathetic readers, have also often referred
>> to them as metaphysical, but in a positive sense. The negative use of the
>> term is falling into disuse, with good reason. As the importance of
>> ontology is now understood, it no longer makes sense to reject all talk
>> about ontology as speculative and unscientific, or unphilosophical.
>>>> 
>>>> Martin
>>>> 
>>>> Gould, C. C. (1978). Marx's social ontology: Individuality and
>> community in Marx's theory of social relations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Kreines, J. (2006). Hegel's metaphysics: Changing the debate.
>> Philosophy Compass, 1(5), 466-480.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Mar 24, 2013, at 5:16 AM, Brecht De Smet <Brechttie.DeSmet@UGent.be>
>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> Because I do not want to derail the current thread, I start a new one:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> My point was that Hegel is hardly the person to turn to if one wants
>> to avoid metaphysics! Individual, Universal, Particular - there's a whole
>> metaphysics here.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Well, if you look how Andy appropriates Hegel in his various writings
>> I think you can hardly call what he does a form of metaphysics. On the
>> contrary, he turns Hegel upside down, reading his logic in a materialist
>> and non-metaphysical way.
>>>>> 
>>>>> In this regard I think the philosophical implications of Marx's Theses
>> on Feuerbach are still grossly underestimated. In a few lines he summarizes
>> the deficiences of both idealism and materialism, subjectivism and
>> objectivism, finishing off a few centuries of philosophical thought (of
>> course the theses were but the end product of a whole project). After the
>> theses Marx largely moves on from philosophical critique to developing his
>> "materialist method".
>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/index.htm
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thesis 1: with regard to "ontology": Marx criticized classical
>> materialism because it conceived of the actual world not as human practice
>> (subjective), but as merely objective. Whereas for Hegel the world
>> consisted merely of thought-objects, for Feuerbach the world was
>> constituted by sensuous objects. In both perspectives human practice was
>> absent, as either an objective or subjective activity. As such both were
>> forms of metaphysical thinking, i.e. a form of thinking and activity that
>> did not place human practice at its core. (Also see thesis 5)
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thesis 2: with regard to "epistemology": "The question whether
>> objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of
>> theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the
>> reality and power, the this-sidedness [Diesseitigkeit] of his thinking, in
>> practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is
>> isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question."
>>>>> 
>>>>> This is almost a Copernican revolution with regard to epistemology.
>> True knowledge, "truth", is not derived from either formal or dialectical
>> logic, but from the encounter between human thought and human practice. The
>> reality of any phenomenon outside this encounter "is a purely scholastic
>> question" or an exercise in metaphysics. Cf. snare theory, dark matter,
>> etc. Thesis 8 reasserts this premisse: "All social life is essentially
>> practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational
>> solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice." Real
>> human practice or activity is the only base for gaining true knowledge
>> about humanity.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thesis 3: with regard to "emancipation": classical (mechanical)
>> materialism pointed out that humans are the product of their environments.
>> Changing their environments resulted in changed humans. Of course, who
>> changes their environments? Humans themselves. So transformation of
>> circumstances + human activity = self-change = revolutionary practice.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thesis 4: with regard to the position of a critical or emancipatory
>> science: It is insufficient to just deconstruct oppressive ideological
>> concepts, "after completing this work, the chief thing still remains to be
>> done". The reverse movement should be explained as well: how real social
>> relations are the basis for these ideological forms. Of course, this means
>> that the contradiction cannot be resolved in thought, but has to be
>> overcome in reality, in practice. This is the core meaning of thesis 11:
>> "Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the
>> point is to change it."
>>>>> 
>>>>> In this sense, metaphysics was also a way of resolving real
>> contradictions in the realm of thought.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thesis 6: with regard to the "essence" of humankind: "...the essence
>> of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality, it
>> is the ensemble of the social relations." Taking "the individual" as the
>> unit of philosophy/social sciences is an a-historical and atomizing
>> abstraction which "belongs in reality to a particular social form" (Thesis
>> 7). A social science basing itself on the actions, intentions, emotions,
>> etc. of discrete individuals takes a metaphysical and abstract view of
>> humanity as its departure point. See also thesis 9 and 10.
>>>>> 
>>>>> --
>>>>> Brecht De Smet
>>>>> Assistant Professor at the Department Conflict and Development Studies
>>>>> Researcher at MENARG (Middle East and North Africa Research Group)
>>>>> Department of Political and Sciences
>>>>> Ghent University
>>>>> www.psw.ugent.be/menarg
>>>>> Universiteitsstraat 8 / 9000 Gent / Belgium
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Citeren Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> Oh! (he exclaims). My point was that Hegel is hardly the person to
>> turn to if one wants to avoid metaphysics! Individual, Universal,
>> Particular - there's a whole metaphysics here. Take a look at the Stanford
>> Enc of Philosophy entry on Hegel (link below) for a sense of the debate
>> over this. There has been an "orthodox or traditional understanding of
>> Hegel as a ?metaphysical? thinker in the pre-Kantian ?dogmatic? sense. This
>> was followed by a view by some that "particular works, such as the
>> Phenomenology of Spirit, or particular areas of Hegel's philosophy,
>> especially his ethical and political philosophy, can be understood as
>> standing independently of the type of unacceptable metaphysical system
>> sketched above."  (But Andy hates the Phenomenology!) And then there are
>> people who are "appealing to contemporary analytic metaphysics as
>> exemplifying a legitimate project of philosophical inquiry into fundamental
>> ?features? or ?structures? of the world itself."
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Myself, I'm closest to the last of these views. I don't think we want
>> to *avoid* metaphysics (ontology and epistemology) ; indeed I don't think
>> that is possible. rather, we need to adopt the *right* metaphysics. We can
>> debate what the criteria of that need to be. But to claim of a position, in
>> philosophy or the social sciences, that there is "No metaphysics here!" is
>> a tad naive.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel/>
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Mar 23, 2013, at 12:36 PM, Carol Macdonald <carolmacdon@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I thought that what he said was avoiding it: back up your
>> exclamation Martin
>>>>>>> Carol
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On 23 March 2013 16:48, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I though you wanted to *avoid* metaphysics, Andy!
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Mar 22, 2013, at 8:17 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Thank you Manfred for that clear explanation, and for correcting my
>>>>>>>> typing mistake! :(
>>>>>>>>> This might be an occasion to mention how my own development of
>> Activity
>>>>>>>> Theory differs from yours and that of ANL.
>>>>>>>>> I do not work with duality of "the publically assigned meaning and
>> the
>>>>>>>> personally felt sense". Rather I use Hegel's approach in which the
>>>>>>>> Individual and Universal are mediated by the Particular. This is a
>> relation
>>>>>>>> which is applicable not just to motives, but any concept. It allows
>> the
>>>>>>>> meaning of the situation to be something which is *realised*. This
>> word
>>>>>>>> "realised" is what Wiulliam James would have described as a
>>>>>>>> "double-barrelled word" (following Charles Dickens' "double
>> barrelled
>>>>>>>> compliment), in that it means both "realised" in the objective
>> sense of
>>>>>>>> "made real", as in "The plan was at last realised when the judge
>> delivered
>>>>>>>> his verdict," and subjective in the sense of "woke up to", as in "I
>>>>>>>> realised that my efforts to reconcile with my wife were doomed to
>> failure."
>>>>>>>> I believe that this resolves certain problems which arise in Actvity
>>>>>>>> Theory, but remaining within the Activity approach as outlined in
>> your
>>>>>>>> excellent paper.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Holodynski, Manfred wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Dear colleagues,
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> thank you very much for all your valued comments on my article.
>> There
>>>>>>>> are a lot of aspects already discussed and I have some difficulties
>> to
>>>>>>>> follow all lines of argumentation. Therefore, I would like to
>> answer to the
>>>>>>>> following:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 1. Emotions as psychological function within the macrostructure of
>>>>>>>> activity.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> As Andy claims it I get my Activity Theory from AN Leont'ev and I
>>>>>>>> focused especially on his concept of macrostructure of activity and
>> its
>>>>>>>> levels of activity that is related to motives, actions that are
>> related to
>>>>>>>> goals and operations that are related to the conditions under which
>> an
>>>>>>>> action is given. And Andy gets precisely to the heart of it when he
>> stated
>>>>>>>> that my article needs to be read with attention to motivation and
>> how the
>>>>>>>> macrostructure of an activity is related to the motives and goals
>> of an
>>>>>>>> individual. One activity can be realized by different actions, and
>> one
>>>>>>>> action can realize different activities.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> May I quote Andy's words:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> " Because motives are not given to immediate perception; they
>> have to
>>>>>>>> be inferred/learnt. Emotional expression and experience signal the
>> success,
>>>>>>>> failure, frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for
>> both
>>>>>>>> participant/observers and the individual subject themself, emotion
>> is tied
>>>>>>>> up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure of an
>> activity.
>>>>>>>> One and the same action could be part of different ??actions
>> activities (!)
>>>>>>>> (MH)??. It is the emotions which signal (internally and externally)
>> the
>>>>>>>> success, etc., etc., that is, in an action's furthering an
>> activity, and it
>>>>>>>> is this which makes manifest and actual that connection between
>> action and
>>>>>>>> activity, for both the observer/participant and the individual
>> subject.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states of
>> mind", or
>>>>>>>> intelligent infants, etc."
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> a) Take the example of the opening of the window. That's the
>> behavior.
>>>>>>>> What's the goal?
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> b) Imagine the person is a leader and opens the window in order to
>>>>>>>> greet his followers and to hold a speech. That's the goal. What is
>> the
>>>>>>>> activity?
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> c) If one look at the circumstances one can derive that the
>> speech is a
>>>>>>>> part of a political activity in order to celebrate the election
>> victory.
>>>>>>>> So, if the leader also feels pride and enthusiasm about the victory
>> there
>>>>>>>> is coincidence between the publically assigned meaning and the
>> personally
>>>>>>>> felt sense of the situation. However, it may also be possible that
>> he
>>>>>>>> doesn't feel pride but a great burden and he personally feels to be
>>>>>>>> overloaded with the duties and future expectations. Then the
>> societal
>>>>>>>> meaning assigned by the followers to this situation and the
>> personal sense
>>>>>>>> assigned by the leader himself are not congruent. The leader framed
>> this
>>>>>>>> situation under an achievement perspective whether he is able to
>> fulfill
>>>>>>>> the leadership.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> But, note when we talk about actions and activity, then we speak
>> about
>>>>>>>> an advanced level of activity e.g. in children or adults, but not in
>>>>>>>> infants who start to have intentions but still not a mental image
>> of a
>>>>>>>> future state of affairs.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 2. Differentiation between the basic level in infants and advanced
>>>>>>>> level in older children:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> - A young infant has not already established a goal-driven level
>> of
>>>>>>>> actions. In the first weeks one can observe the acquisition of first
>>>>>>>> operations and of first expectations what should happen. But these
>>>>>>>> expectations are not yet represented as a mental image about the
>> desired
>>>>>>>> future states. This is the product of the acquisition of a sign
>> system
>>>>>>>> which enables the person to evoke and imagine a future state in the
>> here
>>>>>>>> and now and to start to strive for it. And for this starting point,
>> not
>>>>>>>> only to imagine different future states, but also to select one of
>> them and
>>>>>>>> to start to strive for it, emotional processes come into play that
>> color
>>>>>>>> one of the imagined future state e.g. in a state worth striving for
>> and
>>>>>>>> that mobilize the executive power to start striving for it.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> However, the ability to form such notions of goals and to
>> transform
>>>>>>>> them into actions is not something that occurs automatically. It
>> emerges in
>>>>>>>> a long-drawn ontogenetic learning process in which the attainment
>> of goals
>>>>>>>> through actions is tried, tested, and increasingly optimized. Older
>>>>>>>> children are
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> So, for an understanding of my emotion concept the macrostructure
>> of an
>>>>>>>> activity is very decisive because I embedded emotions as a specific
>>>>>>>> psychological function within the macrostructure of an activity.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Best
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Manfred
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Institut für Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Fliednerstr. 21
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> D-48149 Münster
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34311
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat)
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax)
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
>>>>>>>>>> Von: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
>>>>>>>>>> Gesendet: Freitag, 22. März 2013 04:13
>>>>>>>>>> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>>>>> Cc: Holodynski, Manfred
>>>>>>>>>> Betreff: Re: Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article is
>> choice
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Mike, Manfred gets his Activity Theory from AN Leontyev, rather
>> than
>>>>>>>> Engestrom's "systems of activity."
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> So actions and activities are defined by their goals and motives.
>> So
>>>>>>>> Manfred's article needs to be read with attention to motivation and
>> how the
>>>>>>>> structure of an activity is related to motives and goals. Because
>> motives
>>>>>>>> are not given to immediate perception; they have to be
>> inferred/learnt.
>>>>>>>> Emotional expression and experience signal the success, failure,
>>>>>>>> frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for both
>>>>>>>> participant/observers and the individual subject themself, emotion
>> is tied
>>>>>>>> up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure of an
>> activity.
>>>>>>>> One and the same action could be part of different actions. It is
>> the
>>>>>>>> emotions which signal (internally and externally) the success,
>> etc., etc.,
>>>>>>>> that is, in an action's furthering an activity, and it is this
>> which makes
>>>>>>>> manifest and actual that connection between action and activity,
>> for both
>>>>>>>> the observer/participant and the individual subject.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states of
>> mind", or
>>>>>>>> intelligent infants, etc.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> It's all in there.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy - and here I was wondering why operation/action/activity
>> were
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> not prominent in Manfred's article. Where does he lay out the
>> views in
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> this note? Am I reading too superficially as usual? Seems
>> important
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> for me to get clear about!
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Mike
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> On Thursday, March 21, 2013, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Think of your illustration,Martin, about whether, in opening the
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> window, you were acting as a technician or moral leader. I.e.,
>> the
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of the action lies in the activity of which it is a part,
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> which is not immediately given. Manfred does not refer this to
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> "intention" or "belief". Manfred is quite specific that the
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> signalising and self-perception of an action in relation to an
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> activity - i.e., an action's being of this and not that activity
>> -
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> is a function played by emotion. Concepts like internal state and
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> intention are derivative from operation/action/activity, not
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>> 
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>>>>>> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>>>>>>>>> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
>>>>>>>>> http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> __________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> _____
>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> __________________________________________
>>>>>>>> _____
>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>> Carol A  Macdonald Ph D (Edin)
>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist: EMBED
>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor
>>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa
>>>>>>> __________________________________________
>>>>>>> _____
>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> __________________________________________
>>>>>> _____
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
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>>>>> 
>>>>> 
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>>>>> xmca mailing list
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>>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> __________________________________________
>>>> _____
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>> __________________________________________
>>>> _____
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>> 
>>> 
>>> __________________________________________
>>> _____
>>> xmca mailing list
>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> __________________________________________
>> _____
>> xmca mailing list
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> __________________________________________
>> _____
>> xmca mailing list
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> 
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> 


__________________________________________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
__________________________________________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca