Re: [xmca] Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article is choice

[Carol Macdonald <carolmacdon@gmail.com>]

Andy

Sure I will look into that.

Carol

On 20 March 2013 10:31, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

> Undoubtedly, Carol, all these concepts - intention, belief, etc - are
> prefectly valid concepts for psychology. But we are discussing a paper
> proposing an approach to the psychology of emotions, i.e., foundational
> problems, so I am concerned that concepts such as belief and intention are
> framed in the AT context. That's all.
>
> Andy
>
>
> Carol Macdonald wrote:
>
>> Andy
>>
>> I think that beliefs can exist separately from intentions, but that
>> intentions are necessary  for belief-based action and that intentions may
>> not be realized, and that some actiosmay not be belief-based (for example,
>> as reactive).
>>
>> I realise that I have introduced a third "concept" here, but is needed for
>> explication of the relationship.
>>
>> Carol
>>
>> On 20 March 2013 06:11, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> Martin
>>> Thanks for this clarification.
>>> Your mentioning that intentions as action and intentions as mental states
>>> must be kept distinct invites further inquiry.
>>> If mental states as a belief are culturally specific ways of
>>> understanding
>>> action then *mental states* as a concept must exist as artefacts.
>>> This notion of *mental states* therefore must have emerged in a
>>> particular
>>> historical epoch.
>>> By tracing the historical emergence of the belief in *mental
>>> states* showing how this notion has developed we possibly could become
>>> clearer on how our own ethnotheory assumes the existence of mental
>>> states as natural.
>>> Do you know of any authors or books which have traced the history of the
>>> development of *mental states* as a *folk* psychology?
>>>
>>> Martin, my understanding of the point you are making is that expression
>>> signs and gestures AS actions are central to development, but the move to
>>> *mental states* can be questioned as a particular cultural
>>> historical model of beliefs.
>>>
>>> Larry
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 7:19 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> I need a little clarification too, Martin.
>>>>
>>>>    * What do you mean specifically by "when the infant acts
>>>>
>>>>
>>> intelligently"?
>>>
>>>
>>>>    * The other thing that comes to mind is this. Manfred has been quite
>>>>      specific in developing his approach to emotions within Activity
>>>>      Theory, so we need to interrogate his paper in that context,
>>>>      rather than in the context of internal states of the mind.
>>>>
>>>> and can we remember to cc Manfred?
>>>> Andy
>>>>
>>>> Martin Packer wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Hi Helen,
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, of course. Rather than try to define them, at least at first, let
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> me
>>>
>>>
>>>> try to illustrate them:
>>>>>
>>>>> Let's say you see me fumbling with the window handle. There are the
>>>>> following ways of understanding my action:
>>>>>
>>>>> 1. I'm opening the window - intention in action
>>>>>
>>>>> 2. I'm planning to get some fresh air - prior intention
>>>>>
>>>>> 3. I believe that it is colder outside than in, and I desire that this
>>>>> colder air enter the room - mental states of belief and desire
>>>>>
>>>>> You can see that these are not mutually exclusive; indeed each seems to
>>>>> be in some sense a deeper understanding than the previous one. This
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> already
>>>
>>>
>>>> seems to suggest that in ontogenesis a child is likely to move from 1
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> to 2
>>>
>>>
>>>> to 3. But it's not the case that all three are always necessary, because
>>>>> there are actions that have an intention in action and no prior
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> intention,
>>>
>>>
>>>> and others that have a prior intention but no beliefs and desires.
>>>>> An example of the first: I can get up and pace around the room without
>>>>> forming any prior intention to do so. An example of the second: I can
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> plan
>>>
>>>
>>>> to go to work by getting on the bus (prior intention and intention in
>>>>> action), but since I do this every day it seems odd to attribute to me
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> in
>>>
>>>
>>>> addition a belief that the bus will take me to my workplace, or a
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> desire to
>>>
>>>
>>>> get there. First, I may have no such conscious belief or desire and yet
>>>>> still get successfully to my office. Second, if one says that the
>>>>> mental
>>>>> states are there but tacit, where does this stop? I must also believe
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> that
>>>
>>>
>>>> buses carry people, and they do not float, and they do not dissolve....
>>>>> So it is important to distinguish these three ways of understanding an
>>>>> action, and recognize when each is called for. A child who can only
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> grasp 1
>>>
>>>
>>>> and 2 may still be able to function successful in a range of situations.
>>>>> In addition, these are not the only three ways that an action can be
>>>>> understood. In addition:
>>>>>
>>>>> 4. I may have a commitment to a social role - perhaps I am a technician
>>>>> whose job it is to ensure that the room does not overheat.
>>>>>
>>>>> 5. I may have a commitment to an identity - I may consider it more
>>>>> healthy or more ethical to work in a cold office (apparently Facebook
>>>>> founder Mark Zuckerberg holds such a view)
>>>>>
>>>>> Now we're into levels that I don't think Tomasello or Gergely have
>>>>> explored. Obviously infants are not going to understand actions in
>>>>> these
>>>>> terms, but I think it's very interesting to explore at what age and
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> stage
>>>
>>>
>>>> children become capable of such understanding.
>>>>>
>>>>> Martin
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mar 19, 2013, at 7:33 PM, Helen Harper <helen.harper@bigpond.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> Hello Martin,
>>>>>> can you please elaborate a little on what you understand as the
>>>>>> distinction between 'prior intentions and mental states of belief and
>>>>>> desire'. or if that's too much of an ask in a paragraph or two, point
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> me
>>>
>>>
>>>> towards something I should read?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Helen
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 20/03/2013, at 9:55 AM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Larry,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I agree with you that we have here converging lines of
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> theory/research.
>>>
>>>
>>>> And I like your use of the term gesture, because presumably while for
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> the
>>>
>>>
>>>> adult an infant's smile is understood as a 'sign' of pleasure, or of
>>>>>>> recognition, or of appreciation, the infant has no intention to sign.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> For
>>>
>>>
>>>> the infant (in-itself) the smile is a gesture, while for the adult,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> within
>>>
>>>
>>>> a community of signers and symbolizers, (for-others) the smile is a
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> sign.
>>>
>>>
>>>> The problem I have with Gergely's work is that he seems to assume that
>>>>>>> any kind of intelligible act has to be backed by an intentional
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> state, by
>>>
>>>
>>>> beliefs and desires. He doesn't see the distinction that John Searle
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> has
>>>
>>>
>>>> drawn between intention in action and prior intention. Tomasello sees
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> that
>>>
>>>
>>>> distinction, but in my view he then fails to make the distinction
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> between
>>>
>>>
>>>> prior intentions and mental states of belief and desire. And both of
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> them
>>>
>>>
>>>> fail to see that mental state discourse is not culturally universal;
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> there
>>>
>>>
>>>> are other conceptual frameworks within which people understand
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> intentional
>>>
>>>
>>>> action.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That's a lot packed into one paragraph; I bring it up because at
>>>>>>> times
>>>>>>> I think that  Manfred Holodynski is also assuming that when the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> infant acts
>>>
>>>
>>>> intelligently in interaction with adults, this means he (the infant)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> is
>>>
>>>
>>>> forming intentions that cause those actions, and that these
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> intentions are
>>>
>>>
>>>> mental states. In my view this confuses the picture and prevents us
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> from
>>>
>>>
>>>> seeing the real developments.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> ______________________________****____________
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>>>>>
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>>> >
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> ------------------------------****----------------------------**--**
>>>> ------------
>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>>>> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
>>>> http://marxists.academia.edu/****AndyBlunden<http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden>
>>>> <
>>>>
>>>>
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>>> >
>>>
>>>
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>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> --
> ------------------------------**------------------------------**
> ------------
>
> *Andy Blunden*
> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
> http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden<http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden>
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-- 
Carol A  Macdonald Ph D (Edin)
Developmental psycholinguist: EMBED
Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor
Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa
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