Re: [xmca] http://marxismocritico.com/category/psicologia-marxista/

[Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>]

Dear Chuck
You expect me to say what ? Ideas come from where ? Would you expect me to resort to Plato's 'ideas' ? Vygotsky resolutely rejects them (previous quotes) . How are they produced ? The only thing we can say presently is : Mind and Brain are not one and the same thing . Have you solved it for yourself ? why in fact they seem to have effect on people's minds. Not that they seem to have effect but they do have effect upon people's minds . Ask Homo Sapiens Species how they evolved from an inanimate matter to apes , to hominids , to a thinking man . Don't you have vast knowledge of these notions ? Don't you know anything about labour , tool , herds , fruit gatherers , the discovery of fire , etc. etc. especially if you believe somewhat in Vygotsky being a Marxist/Materialist . We are dealing with Vygotsky's way of thinking and his choice of a new psychology : we read :
  
I advance the thesis that the analysis of the crisis and the structure of psychology indisputably testifies to the fact that no philosophical system can take possession of psychology directly, without the help of methodology, i.e., without the creation of a general science. The only rightful application of Marxism to psychology would be to create a general psychology – its concepts are being formulated in direct dependence upon general dialectics, for it is the dialectics of psychology. Any application of Marxism to psychology via other paths or in other points outside this area, will inevitably lead to scholastic, verbal constructions, to the dissolution of dialectics into surveys and tests, to judgment about things according to their external, accidental, secondary features, to the complete loss of any objective criterion and the attempt to deny all historical tendencies of the development of psychology, to a terminological revolution, in sum to a
 gross distortion of both Marxism and psychology. This is Chelpanov’s way.
Engels’ formula – not to foist the dialectical principles on nature, but to find them in it – is changed into its opposite here. The principles of dialectics are introduced into psychology from outside. The way of Marxists should be different. The direct application of the theory of dialectical materialism to the problems of natural science and in particular to the group of biological sciences or psychology is impossible, just as it is impossible to apply it directly to history and sociology. In Russia it is thought that the problem of “psychology and Marxism” can be reduced to creating a psychology which is up to Marxism, but in reality it is far more complex. Like history, sociology is in need of the intermediate special theory of historical materialism which explains the concrete meaning, for the given group of phenomena, of the abstract laws of dialectical materialism. In exactly the same way we are in need of an as yet
 undeveloped but inevitable theory of biological materialism and psychological materialism as an intermediate science which explains the concrete application of the abstract theses of dialectical materialism to the given field of phenomena.
Dialectics covers nature, thinking, history – it is the most general, maximally universal science. The theory of the psychological materialism or dialectics of psychology is what I call general psychology.
In order to create such intermediate theories – methodologies, general sciences – we must reveal the essence of the given area of phenomena, the laws of their change, their qualitative and quantitative characteristics, their causality, we must create categories and concepts appropriate to it, in short, we must create our own Das Kapital. It suffices to imagine Marx operating with the general principles and categories of dialectics, like quantity-quality, the triad, the universal connection, the knot [of contradictions], leap etc. – without the abstract and historical categories of value, class, commodity, capital, interest, production forces, basis, superstructure etc. – to see the whole monstrous absurdity of the assumption that it is possible to create any Marxist science while by-passing by Das Kapital. Psychology is in need of its own Das Kapital – its own concepts of class, basis, value etc. – in which it might express, describe
 and study its object. And to discover a confirmation of the law of leaps in Lehmann’s statistical data of the forgetting of the nuances of the grey colour means not to change dialectics or psychology one jot. This idea of the need for an intermediate theory without which the various special facts cannot be examined in the light of Marxism has long since been realised, and it only remains for me to point out that the conclusions of our analysis of psychology match this idea.

enough for one post 
Best
Haydi

________________________________
 From: Charles Bazerman <bazerman@education.ucsb.edu>
To: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> 
Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>; Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> 
Sent: Monday, 17 December 2012, 1:50:22
Subject: Re: [xmca] http://marxismocritico.com/category/psicologia-marxista/
 

On your first issue, there are certainly things that look like ideas (and ideals) in the public sphere.  The issue here is where they come from and how these are produced and why in fact they seem to have effect on people's minds.


The ideological justifications are publicly circulated words that are intended to change the perceptions of those to be persuaded (or at least acquiesced to) by the justifications.  I am not claiming and cannot begin to say in general the extent to which the people uttering those justifications themselves use them to organize their own internal states or they produce these words for public distribution at odds with their internal thought structures. But then at least the production of the words have something to do with their perceptions of the public sphere of persuasion.


There is also the sense we have of rich internal lives  and these we use to self monitor and guide our actions, perceptions and stances.  Vygotsky provides mechanisms about how these come about.  They are not will of the wisps and do not come from an immaterial world, but are the results of human capacities to use symbols and internalize them to reflect on our lives. This internalized sphere, in Vygotsky's world are of great value and characterize great human potentials of making a habitable life. He is attempting to heal precisely the kind of split the philosophic critiques you discuss complain of.  


If you don't buy his account, of course you are left with the dilemma.  If you accept some version of it, the dichotomy you and many others assert are no longer a trouble, but just two ways of viewing ourselves that are sublated into a new conceptualization.


On your last query, Martin has given a good explanation about the practical reasoning that precedes the self-regulation that comes through symbols applied to the experience of the self.  

Chuck



----- Original Message -----

From: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>

Date: Sunday, December 16, 2012 1:54 pm

Subject: Re: [xmca] http://marxismocritico.com/category/psicologia-marxista/

To: Charles Bazerman <bazerman@education.ucsb.edu>, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>

Cc: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>


> Hi Dear Chuck

> 1. I said Vygotsky not 'someone' ; hope I've not been lying !

> 2. The conditions of slaves and slave-owners's personal and social 

> experiences were also 'material' ; their Gods were also material but 

> the method they used to express their intentions was 'idealistic' ; no 

> doubt at each era all along the path of 'idealism' , there was another 

> path of 'materialism' . 

> 3. The same Vygotsky who innovated 'sign' for psychical activities as 

> 'tool' had done for 'labour' , believes in distinguishing two lines of 

> scientific research : materialistic vs. idealistic and is quite 

> insistent on that . 

> 4. There is a 'hiararchy' between 'perceptions' , 'actions' , 

> 'articulations' . 

> 5. I see no necessary relationship (maybe vygotsky doesn't either) 

> between the 'above' and 'publicly circulated and internally 

> reconfigured language . Any language could have many different things 

> behind it . Let's further read Vygotsky's formation of concepts , etc.

> 6. What is that Vygotsky posits ?

> 

> The split of the dual analytical method

> into a phenomenological and an inductive-analytical one leads us to the

> ultimate points upon which the bifurcation of the two psychologies 

> rests –

> their epistemological premises. I attach great importance to this distinction,

> see it as the crown and center of the whole analysis, and at the same 

> time for me

> it is now as obvious as a simple scale. Phenomenology (descriptive psychology)

> proceeds from a radical distinction between physical nature and mental 

> being.

> In nature we distinguish phenomena in being. “In other words, in the mental

> sphere there is no distinction between phenomenon [Erscheinung] and

> being [Sein], and while nature is existence [Dasein] which

> manifests itself in the phenomena,” this cannot be asserted about 

> mental being

> (Husserl, 1910). Here phenomenon

> and being coincide. It is difficult to give a more precise formulation 

> of

> psychological idealism. And this is the epistemological formula of

> psychological materialism: “The difference 

> between thinking and being has not been destroyed in psychology.

> Even concerning thinking one must distinguish the thinking of thinking 

> and the

> thinking as such” [Feuerbach]. The

> whole debate is in these two formulas.

> 

> We must be able to state the

> epistemological problem for

> the mind as well and to

> find the distinction between being and thinking, as materialism 

> teaches us to

> do in the theory of knowledge of the external world. The acceptance of 

> a

> radical difference between the mind and physical nature conceals the

> identification of phenomenon and being,

> mind and matter, within psychology,

> the solution of the antinomy by removing one part – matter – in psychological

> knowledge. This is Husserl’s idealism of the purest water. Feuerbach’s 

> whole

> materialism is expressed in the distinction of phenomenon and being within

> psychology and in the acceptance of being as the real object of study.

> 

> When one mixes up the

> epistemological problem with the ontological one by introducing into

> psychology not the whole argumentation but its final results, this 

> leads to the

> distortion of both. In Russia the

> subjective is identified with the mental and later it is proved that 

> the mental

> cannot be objective. Epistemological consciousness as part of the antinomy

> “subject-object” is confused with empirical, psychological 

> consciousness and

> then it is asserted that consciousness cannot be material, that to 

> assume this

> would be Machism. And as a result one ends up with neoplatonism, in 

> the sense

> of infallible essences for which being and phenomenon coincide. They 

> flee from

> idealism only to plunge into it headlong. They dread the 

> identification of

> being with consciousness more than anything else and end up in 

> psychology with

> their perfectly Husserlian identification. We must not mix up the relation

> between subject and object with the relation between mind and body, as Høffding

> [1908] splendidly explains. The distinction between mind [Geist] and 

> matter is a

> distinction in the content of our knowledge. But the distinction between

> subject and object manifests itself independently from the content of 

> our

> knowledge.

> 

> 

> This is not the place to

> give both problems a precise demarcation and basis in materialistic psychology,

> but to indicate the possibility of two solutions, the boundary between 

> idealism

> and materialism, the existence of a materialistic formula. For distinction,

> distinction to the very end, is psychology’s task today. After all, 

> many “Marxists” are not

> able to indicate the difference between theirs and an idealistic 

> theory of

> psychological knowledge, because it does not exist. Following Spinoza,

> we have compared our science to a mortally ill patient who looks for an

> unreliable medicine. Now we see that it is only the surgeon’s knife 

> which can

> save the situation. A bloody operation is immanent. Many textbooks we 

> will have

> to rend in twain, like the veil in the temple [58], many phrases will 

> lose

> their head or legs, other theories will be slit in the belly. We are only

> interested in the border, the line of the rupture, the line which will 

> be described

> by the future knife.

> 

> 

> Best 

> Haydi

> 

> 

> ________________________________

>  From: Charles Bazerman <bazerman@education.ucsb.edu>

> To: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>; "eXtended Mind, 

> Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> 

> Cc: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" 

> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> 

> Sent: Sunday, 16 December 2012, 23:59:48

> Subject: Re: [xmca] http://marxismocritico.com/category/psicologia-marxista/

>  

> 

> It seems to me that what is needed at this point in the discussion 

> that someone come forth with a clear articulation of how the personal 

> and social experiences that appear to be idealist are produced from a 

> material basis, the material conditions of our experiences in the 

> world and the way language and other symbols come to create a 

> transformed set of mental processes in which we recognize "ideas."  

> This account must also contend with the prelinguistic thinking which 

> Vygotsky posits as dominating in the early couple or three years, and 

> then remains in a sublated form even as our perceptions, actions, and 

> articulations become increasingly formed through publicly circulated 

> and internally reconfigured language. This, of course is all in 

> Vuygotsky, but until we actually discuss the mechanisms Vygotsky 

> posits we will not be able to remove ourselves from the philosophical 

> thickets.

> 

> 

> Chuck

> 

> 

> ----- Original Message -----

> 

> From: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>

> 

> Date: Sunday, December 16, 2012 12:04 pm

> 

> Subject: Re: [xmca] http://marxismocritico.com/category/psicologia-marxista/

> 

> To: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" 

> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>

> 

> 

> > Ok ! Thanks a lot , Martin ! This is my puzzle . This is my 

> confusion 

> 

> > . You are mostly absent from the discussions . Andy also believes 

> 

> > Vygotsky is a staunch marxist/materialist . My puzzle is Vygotsky 

> 

> > seems to have gotten mixed up . In his name everything is justified 

> . 

> 

> > I remember your ' Is Vygotsky still relevant ? ' to which you and 

> many 

> 

> > others answered , 'yes' . I so suppose Vygotsky tries to get the 

> 

> > 'good' of everything and credits the 'bad' things to liveliest , at 

> 

> 

> > times , hot critiques . He deals , for instance , with Spinoza in 

> such 

> 

> > manner . What I want to say is , here , on this forum , I might 

> fancy 

> 

> > ! there's no dividing line between 'materialism' vs. 'idealism' , 

> the 

> 

> > theme so pivotal to Vygotsky's understanding ; Not that 'idealists' 

> , 

> 

> > if any but me , have no right to come up with their ideas but that 

> if 

> 

> > the backbone of this forum recognizes someone as talking 

> 

> > idealistically which goes against what Vygotsky intends ,  they 

> should 

> 

> > clarify the

> 

> >  points as Vygotsky himself so clearly and brilliantly does . And if 

> 

> 

> > they are so progressive as to put Vygotsky behind their back , it's 

> we 

> 

> > who should sit calm and listen . Does this forum support Vygotskyian 

> 

> 

> > 'Materialism' ?

> 

> > Best

> 

> > Haydi        

> 

> > 

> 

> > 

> 

> > ________________________________

> 

> >  From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>

> 

> > To: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>; "eXtended Mind, 

> 

> > Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> 

> 

> > Sent: Sunday, 16 December 2012, 20:25:52

> 

> > Subject: Re: [xmca] http://marxismocritico.com/category/psicologia-marxista/

> 

> >  

> 

> > 

> 

> > Hi Haydi,

> 

> > 

> 

> > 

> 

> > I'm not entirely sure what aspect of this complex section of Crisis 

> 

> 

> > you'd like to discuss, but on this matter...

> 

> > 

> 

> > On Dec 16, 2012, at 9:27 AM, Haydi Zulfei 

> <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> 

> 

> > wrote:

> 

> > 

> 

> > 

> 

> > > Here we see lots of stuff dealing with and appraising 

> 

> > 'phenomenology' and 'idealistic approches' and epistemologies . Are 

> we 

> 

> > really discussing a mixture of 'idea' and 'matter' as one nomad ? 

> Are 

> 

> > they identical or just distinct ? while our beloved is a non-stop 

> 

> > believer in 'materialism' at the least account ? 

> 

> > 

> 

> > 

> 

> > My reading is that this is where LSV wants to cut psychology in two, 

> 

> 

> > and discard the idealist part. All he takes from phenomenology (and 

> at 

> 

> > the time this meant the phenomenology of Husserl, not of Heidegger 

> or 

> 

> > of Merleau-Ponty, which are quite different) is aspects of its 

> 

> > methodology. He completely rejects its idealist ontology - that what 

> 

> 

> > exists are 'eidetic structures' (mental essences, in effect). The 

> new 

> 

> > psychology is to be completely materialist. However, LSV insists 

> that 

> 

> > this doesn't mean it will ignore consciousness. On the contrary, it 

> 

> 

> > will study consciousness as something material. 

> 

> > 

> 

> > 

> 

> > Martin

> 

> > __________________________________________

> 

> > _____

> 

> > xmca mailing list

> 

> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu

> 

> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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