Andy, Christine,
I am struggling to follow along with your evolving thoughts and
reflections but one fragment of the conversation left me wanting to
add my 2 cents worth. If it is going off topic, or is tangenital to
the body of this work just ignore my comments.
Both of you have been questioning if Yrjo's work is focused mainly on
particular ideal-typical sequences [grades, stages,] of cognitive
acts FOR interventions. The question this invites is to ask
if concept formation in the wild extends beyond activity as
interventions? *Interventions* as a concept implies the use
of metaphors such as *construction* or *building* models to solve
problems. Models built are according to plans.
This fragment from your conversation is what I'm addressing:
"The ideal-typical line of development which Yrjo has presented here
is proposed as ideal-typical of "concept formation in the wild," as
that is the title he himself chose for the special issue. But it looks
much more to me like the ideal-typical sequence of cognitive acts for
an intervention. In general, I find the germ cell is *discovered* not
"constructed" or "modelled." This moment, the "Aha! moment," has
always been one of the most challenging ones for "logicians" to
describe. It is a *leap*. In general I would say it is a sudden
insight that more resembles a moment of discovery than a "construction."
As I read this fragment I was asking myself if your conversation is
shifting the focus of developing *concepts in the wild* FROM
*modelling* and *intervening* as functional reasons for solving
problems TO a more general concept of concepts that is focusing on
*discovering* the way concepts originate as *germ cells* in the wild.
Andy, Christine, in playing with the concept of *discovery* as
preferable to using the metaphor of construction or building
models, does the concept *discovery* referring to dicovering the germ
cell as an *aha* moment LEAP beyond the boundaries of explaining the
concept of concepts as focusing on*interventions* & *constructing* and
*building* from blueprints or plans?
In other words does *discovery* as central to the notion of the
process or *rhythm* [Dewey's term] of forming concepts mean
*unveiling* [what is overflowing the boundaries] or is it more
accurate to perceive *discovery* as *unearthing* what already exists
but must be re-discovered? [an archeological metaphor].
The notion of rhythm implies REcurrence of an occurence but is this
recurrence a repeating cycle of relationships that is *mechanical*
[can be measured and quantified and be predicted because
repeatable] and therefore the rhythm is predictable or does the rhythm
of recurrence transform the *relationships* with EACH recurrence as a
new occurence?
In other words NO repetition as identity but a continuing rhythm with
changing relational occurrence with EACH recurrence.
Andy, Christine, I am merely *thinking out loud* trying to grok the
recurring theme of this thread.
Hope it is not too private a reverie.
Larry
On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 6:30 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
Christine! Thank you very much indeed for those annotations and
thoughts on the "ascent from abstract to concrete."
I said I was "not sure" about the place of dual stimulation in
Action 2, and you have convinced me. What I didn't see is that
dual stimulation is precisely what characterises the use of the
germ cell /after /Action 2, so my doubts must be dispelled. Thank
you for that.
I also have long thought that the germ cell of Hegelian
concept-formation and Vygotskyan theory is the same thing as the
"transitional object" which is central to Donald Winnicott's child
psychoanalysis. This connection does shed a lot of light on
concept formation when it is introduced, as you have done, into
the "ascent from abstract to concrete." Most particularly it does
away, once for all, any
rendering of this process as a "purely congnitive/rational"
process, from which all need-and-desire have been expunged. Of
course, the object appears in Hegel's Psychology, as something
with a unity of its own outside the domain of the subject itself,
precisely via becoming the object of desire. So as you point out,
this notion really ties together a lot of apparently disparate
theory. Thank you for that!
I have collected my observations so far, begun in my conversation
with you, Christine, here:
http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/engestrom.htm
<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/works/engestrom.htm>
Thanks for that Christine!
Andy
Christine Schweighart wrote:
Thank you Andy, there are typos. My doubt about dual
stimulation does arise from its role in intervention. When you
say 'just here' I'm taking you to mean just between notions
and grasping abstract concept 'germ cell', though as
transitory objects in action research are just those kind of
concepts ( theoretical& explanatory, generating phenomena and
also enabling the transition movement to be revealed) - which
isn't a 'wild' transition' but is intervention based on the
value of achieving evaluation using theoretical analysis.
There's a troublesome reaching back into what is 'notional'
with what is already abstract ( but brought in by a
researcher/teacher/some other), this does happen , though the
resources to enable conditions favourable for exploration in
intervention settings are often far different to 'Ok what's
the idea your so keen on, who's any good at it, let's give it
a go'.
When you emphasise that 'Each of those steps (Hegel called
them "grades" rather than "stages" sometimes) includes and
sublates others in a kind of cascade. It is not a neat
sequence of events, culminating in a "new stable form of
practice" , this seems to be very true , but it's also of a
form of theoretical thinking to be so. Maybe I'd see them
differently, ( my influences/background's different.:)
• The first action is that of..
expressing disquiet with some situation or practice
• The second action is that of ..
identifying relationships that are significant to those
attending to the expressions or feeling of disquiet
( Here origins and explanatory mechanisms are drawing on
theoretical thinking already - so either this is present in
practice , from varius discipines but not necessarily
affording analytical insight across groups etc. So what is
set out below as 'second' is problematic
/Analysis involves mental, discursive or practical
transformation
of the situation in order to find out origins and explanatory
mechanisms./
• The third action is that of ...
identifying abstract concepts , and " /modeling a new explanatory
relationship in some publicly observable and transmittable
medium.
This means constructing an explicit, simplified model of
the new
idea, a germ cell, that explains the problematic situation and
offers a perspective for resolving and transforming it./"
( as there are various potentialities)
• /The fourth action is that of ....
examining the ( relevant aspects through) model/ *S*,
/..... experimenting on it in order to fully
grasp its dynamics, potentials, and limitations../
in relation to actual living practice.
• The fifth action is that of ...
/ concretizing / developing thinking and taking action to
evaluate and refine /by means of practical applications,
enrichments,
and conceptual extensions./
• / The sixth and seventh actions are those of
reflecting on
and evaluating the process and consolidating its outcomes
into a
new stable form of practice./
Though still focussing on moving from notions and dual
stimulation there are conditions conducive and if the germ
cell isn't already there , then such rational thinking isn't
what is affording (the aha moment), 'the conditions' are
other aspects. Not to draw too much out here, I was deepening
my reading of Ilyenkov ( I'm still in Chapter 1), by reading
VV Davydov's Chapter 2 inActivity Theory and Social Practice ,
' Activity Structure and Content - and his view that nothing
can be said about activity without understanding how
'spititual or organic desire' and how it's tranformed into a
need. Needs and desires make the basis on which emotions
function. He says later the general functions emotions
perform is that they enable a person to set a certain vital
task; but they enable a person to decide from the very
beginning whether physical , spiritual and moral means to
fulfil a task are available, if not the task isn't taken up.
Seems that these aspects might be relevant to 'conditions'
for whatever 'actions' of whole process.
In this vein 'transitional object' might be more aking to
Winnicott's. Though in schooling teaching 'formal concepts'
what happens?
Christine.
On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 12:49 AM, Andy Blunden
<ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
Enjoy your Ilyenkov, Christine. If you come across any typos,
please send them to me.
Yes, the third action is the formation of the "germ cell" -
getting to the abstract heart of the problem - and is
therefore
exactly what Ilyenkov is talking about in the passage you
cite.
But whether the concept of double stimulation helps just
here I
don't know. And also, I personally think it is worth
devoting some
time to grasping the *whole process* of concept formation
and this
paragraph of Engestrom's is one of the few places where a
writer
attempts to do this and analyse it. So I would encourage
people to
work on that whole process, rather than picking out one
action,
important as that also is.
The ideal-typical line of development which Yrjo has presented
here is proposed as ideal-typical of "concept formation in the
wild," as that is the title he himself chose for the special
issue. But it looks much more to me like the ideal-typical
sequence of cognitive acts for an intervention. In
general, I find
the germ cell is *discovered* not "constructed" or "modelled."
This moment, the "Aha! moment," has always been one of the
most
challenging ones for "logicians" to describe. It is a
*leap*. In
general I would say it is a sudden insight that more
resembles a
moment of discovery than a "construction."
One the other hand, I think the danger in presenting the
concept
of concept as an ideal-typical line of development (something
which I also advocate) is that the reader may easily slip
into the
illusion that the given moment (here the discovery of the germ
cell) or action, is a once-off moment. In fact, the
germ-cell may
be discovered in what turns out to be a misconception, but may
nonetheless run the full gammet up to objectification and
"a new
stable form of practice" before falling into contradiction
with
itself and entering into conflict with a new germ cell,
and being
sublated into a new, deeper concept of the problem which
figures
in "action 1." This applies to all Yrjo's actions listed here.
But one of the great merits of Engestrom's writing is that his
reseach reports are equally much teaching and learning
instruments, and this neat seven-step program functions as an
excellent guide to practice. But one should remember that
a real
concept is not an ideal-typical concept (NB readers of
Vygotsky).
Each of those steps (Hegel called them "grades" rather than
"stages" sometimes) includes and sublates others in a kind of
cascade. It is not a neat sequence of events, culminating in a
"new stable form of practice" signalling the end of the
intervention and time to settle up and go home. The process of
concept development never stops.
Andy
Christine Schweighart wrote:
Hi Andy,
In the third action, developing an abstraction -
Yryo's work
uses a generic model in dual stimulation. This draws
upon his
historical development as argued in his research.
Is it not also possible to explore this third action
as an
abstraction without that particular model structure,
I ask
because I'm reading this section of Chapter 1 of Ilyenkov:
http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/abstract/abstra1d.htm
"The task of logic as a science grows out of the real
needs of
the developing cognition of the phenomena of the
surrounding
world. The question with which a thinking man turns to
logic
as a science is not at all the question of how
abstractions
should be made in general, how one can learn to
abstract the
general from the sensually given facts. To do that,
one need
not at all ask the logicians’ advice, one merely has
to have a
command of one’s native language and the ability to
concentrate one’s attention on the sensually given
similarities and differences.
The question with which one turns to logic and which
can only
be answered by logic involves a much more complicated
cognitive task: how is one to work out an abstraction
which
would express the objective essence of facts given in
contemplation and notions? The manner in which
processing a
mass of empirically obvious facts yields a generalisation
expressing the real nature of the object under study –
that is
the actual problem, whose solution is identical with
that of
the problem of the nature of concepts as distinct from
abstract general notions."
and it strikes me that dual stimulation might be upon
notions
from 'action 2' ...
Christine.
On Thu, Nov 15, 2012 at 8:54 AM, Andy Blunden
<ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>> wrote:
Taylor & Francis allows xmca only discuss one
article per
issue,
but I see no reason why we couldn't discuss this
excerpt from
Engestrom's paper. It concerns "rising from the
abstract
to the
concrete," which we were recently discussing, but
without
resolution.
--------------------------
Ascending from the abstract to the concrete is
achieved
through
specific epistemic or learning actions. Together
these actions
form an expansive cycle or spiral. An ideal-typical
sequence of
epistemic actions in ascending from the abstract
to the
concrete
may be described as follows:
• The first action is that of questioning,
criticizing, or
rejecting some aspects of the accepted practice
and existing
wisdom. For the sake of simplicity, we will call
this action
questioning.
• The second action is that of analyzing the
situation.
Analysis involves mental, discursive or practical
transformation
of the situation in order to find out origins and
explanatory
mechanisms.
• The third action is that of modeling a new
explanatory
relationship in some publicly observable and
transmittable
medium.
This means constructing an explicit, simplified
model of
the new
idea, a germ cell, that explains the problematic
situation and
offers a perspective for resolving and
transforming it.
• The fourth action is that of examining
the model,
running, operating, and experimenting on it in
order to fully
grasp its dynamics, potentials, and limitations.
• The fifth action is that of implementing
the model,
concretizing it by means of practical applications,
enrichments,
and conceptual extensions.
• The sixth and seventh actions are those of
reflecting on
and evaluating the process and consolidating its
outcomes
into a
new stable form of practice.
--------------------
MCA 19(1) pp. 288-289.
Andy
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*Andy Blunden*
Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>
Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
http://ucsd.academia.edu/AndyBlunden
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