Re: [xmca] Abstract to Concrete

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

Andy, Christine,

I am struggling to follow along with your evolving thoughts and reflections
but one fragment of the conversation left me wanting to add my 2 cents
worth. If it is going off topic, or is tangenital to the body of this work
just ignore  my comments.

Both of you have been questioning if Yrjo's work is focused mainly on
particular ideal-typical sequences [grades, stages,]  of cognitive acts
FOR  interventions. The question this invites is to ask if concept
formation in the wild extends beyond activity as interventions?
*Interventions* as a concept  implies the use of metaphors such as
*construction* or *building* models to solve problems.  Models built are
according to plans.

This fragment from your conversation is what I'm addressing:

"The ideal-typical line of development which Yrjo has presented here is
proposed as ideal-typical of "concept formation in the wild," as that is
the title he himself chose for the special issue. But it looks much more to
me like the ideal-typical sequence of cognitive acts for an intervention.
In general, I find the germ cell is *discovered* not "constructed" or
"modelled." This moment, the "Aha! moment," has always been one of the most
challenging ones for "logicians" to describe. It is a *leap*. In general I
would say it is a sudden insight that more resembles a moment of discovery
than a "construction."

As I read this fragment I was asking myself if your conversation is
shifting the focus of developing *concepts in the wild*  FROM *modelling*
and *intervening* as functional reasons for solving problems TO  a more
general concept of concepts that is focusing on *discovering* the way
concepts originate as *germ cells* in the wild.

Andy, Christine, in playing with the concept of *discovery* as preferable
to using the metaphor of construction or building models, does the concept
*discovery* referring to dicovering the germ cell as an *aha* moment LEAP
beyond the boundaries of  explaining the concept of concepts as focusing
on*interventions* & *constructing* and *building* from blueprints or plans?

In other words does *discovery* as central to the notion of the process or
*rhythm* [Dewey's term] of  forming concepts  mean *unveiling* [what is
overflowing the boundaries] or is it more accurate to perceive *discovery*
as  *unearthing* what already exists but must be re-discovered?
[an archeological metaphor].

The notion of rhythm implies REcurrence of an occurence but is this
recurrence a repeating cycle of relationships that is *mechanical* [can be
measured and quantified and be predicted because repeatable] and therefore
the rhythm is predictable or does the rhythm of recurrence transform the
*relationships*  with EACH recurrence as a new occurence?
In other words NO repetition as identity but a continuing rhythm with
changing relational occurrence with EACH recurrence.

Andy, Christine, I am merely *thinking out loud* trying to grok the
recurring theme of this thread.
Hope it is not too private a reverie.

Larry

On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 6:30 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

> Christine! Thank you very much indeed for those annotations and thoughts
> on the "ascent from abstract to concrete."
> I said I was "not sure" about the place of dual stimulation in Action 2,
> and you have convinced me. What I didn't see is that dual stimulation is
> precisely what characterises the use of the germ cell /after /Action 2, so
> my doubts must be dispelled. Thank you for that.
>
> I also have long thought that the germ cell of Hegelian
> concept-formation and Vygotskyan theory is the same thing as the
> "transitional object" which is central to Donald Winnicott's child
> psychoanalysis. This connection does shed a lot of light on concept
> formation when it is introduced, as you have done, into the "ascent from
> abstract to concrete." Most particularly it does away, once for all, any
> rendering of this process as a "purely congnitive/rational" process, from
> which all need-and-desire have been expunged. Of course, the object appears
> in Hegel's Psychology, as something with a unity of its own outside the
> domain of the subject itself, precisely via becoming the object of desire.
> So as you point out, this notion really ties together a lot of apparently
> disparate theory. Thank you for that!
>
> I have collected my observations so far, begun in my conversation with
> you, Christine, here: http://home.mira.net/~andy/**works/engestrom.htm<http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/engestrom.htm>
>
> Thanks for that Christine!
> Andy
>
> Christine Schweighart wrote:
>
>> Thank you Andy, there are typos.  My doubt about  dual stimulation does
>> arise from its role in intervention. When you say 'just here' I'm taking
>> you to mean just between notions and grasping abstract concept 'germ cell',
>> though as transitory objects in action research are just those kind of
>> concepts ( theoretical& explanatory, generating  phenomena and also
>> enabling the transition movement to be revealed) - which isn't a 'wild'
>> transition' but is intervention based on the value of achieving evaluation
>> using theoretical analysis.
>>  There's a troublesome reaching back into what is 'notional' with what is
>> already abstract ( but brought in by a researcher/teacher/some other), this
>> does happen , though the resources to enable conditions favourable for
>> exploration in intervention settings are often far different to  'Ok what's
>> the idea your so keen on, who's any good at it, let's give it a go'.
>> When you emphasise that 'Each of those steps (Hegel called them "grades"
>> rather than "stages" sometimes) includes and sublates others in a kind of
>> cascade. It is not a neat sequence of events, culminating in a "new stable
>> form of practice" , this seems to be very true , but it's also of a form of
>> theoretical thinking to be so. Maybe I'd see them differently, ( my
>> influences/background's different.:)
>> •         The first action is that of..
>>  expressing disquiet with some situation or practice
>>
>>     •         The second action is that of ..
>> identifying relationships that are significant to those attending to the
>> expressions or feeling of disquiet
>>  ( Here origins and explanatory mechanisms are drawing on theoretical
>> thinking already - so either this is present in  practice , from varius
>> discipines but not necessarily affording analytical insight across groups
>> etc. So  what is set out below as  'second'  is problematic
>>     /Analysis involves mental, discursive or practical transformation
>>     of the situation in order to find out origins and explanatory
>>     mechanisms./
>>
>>
>>     •         The third action is that of ...
>> identifying abstract concepts , and " /modeling a new explanatory
>>     relationship in some publicly observable and transmittable medium.
>>     This means constructing an explicit, simplified model of the new
>>     idea, a germ cell, that explains the problematic situation and
>>     offers a perspective for resolving and transforming it./" ( as there
>> are various potentialities)
>>
>>
>>     •         /The fourth action is that of ....
>> examining the  ( relevant aspects through) model/ *S*,
>>
>>     /..... experimenting on it in order to fully
>>     grasp its dynamics, potentials, and limitations../
>>
>>  in relation to actual living practice.
>>
>>     •         The fifth action is that of ...
>>
>>    / concretizing / developing thinking and taking action to evaluate and
>> refine /by means of practical applications, enrichments,
>>     and conceptual extensions./
>>
>>
>>     •        / The sixth and seventh actions are those of reflecting on
>>     and evaluating the process and consolidating its outcomes into a
>>     new stable form of practice./
>>
>>
>> Though  still focussing on moving from notions and dual stimulation there
>> are conditions conducive and if the germ cell isn't already there , then
>> such rational thinking isn't what is affording (the aha moment),  'the
>> conditions' are other aspects. Not to draw too much out here, I was
>> deepening my reading of Ilyenkov ( I'm still in Chapter 1), by reading VV
>> Davydov's Chapter 2 inActivity Theory and Social Practice , ' Activity
>> Structure and Content - and his view that nothing can be said about
>> activity without understanding how 'spititual or organic desire' and how
>> it's tranformed into a need.  Needs and desires make the basis on which
>> emotions function.  He says later the general functions emotions perform is
>> that they enable a person to set a certain vital task; but they enable a
>> person to decide from the very beginning whether physical , spiritual and
>> moral  means to fulfil a task are available, if not the task isn't taken
>> up.  Seems that these aspects might be relevant to 'conditions'  for
>> whatever 'actions'  of whole process.
>>
>> In this vein 'transitional object' might be more aking to Winnicott's.
>> Though in schooling teaching 'formal concepts' what happens?
>>
>> Christine.
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 12:49 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net<mailto:
>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>>
>>     Enjoy your Ilyenkov, Christine. If you come across any typos,
>>     please send them to me.
>>
>>     Yes, the third action is the formation of the "germ cell" -
>>     getting to the abstract heart of the problem - and is therefore
>>     exactly what Ilyenkov is talking about in the passage you cite.
>>     But whether the concept of double stimulation helps just here I
>>     don't know. And also, I personally think it is worth devoting some
>>     time to grasping the *whole process* of concept formation and this
>>     paragraph of Engestrom's is one of the few places where a writer
>>     attempts to do this and analyse it. So I would encourage people to
>>     work on that whole process, rather than picking out one action,
>>     important as that also is.
>>
>>     The ideal-typical line of development which Yrjo has presented
>>     here is proposed as ideal-typical of "concept formation in the
>>     wild," as that is the title he himself chose for the special
>>     issue. But it looks much more to me like the ideal-typical
>>     sequence of cognitive acts for an intervention. In general, I find
>>     the germ cell is *discovered* not "constructed" or "modelled."
>>     This moment, the "Aha! moment," has always been one of the most
>>     challenging ones for "logicians" to describe. It is a *leap*. In
>>     general I would say it is a sudden insight that more resembles a
>>     moment of discovery than a "construction."
>>
>>     One the other hand, I think the danger in presenting the concept
>>     of concept as an ideal-typical line of development (something
>>     which I also advocate) is that the reader may easily slip into the
>>     illusion that the given moment (here the discovery of the germ
>>     cell) or action, is a once-off moment. In fact, the germ-cell may
>>     be discovered in what turns out to be a misconception, but may
>>     nonetheless run the full gammet up to objectification and "a new
>>     stable form of practice" before falling into contradiction with
>>     itself and entering into conflict with a new germ cell, and being
>>     sublated into a new, deeper concept of the problem which figures
>>     in "action 1." This applies to all Yrjo's actions listed here.
>>
>>     But one of the great merits of Engestrom's writing is that his
>>     reseach reports are equally much teaching and learning
>>     instruments, and this neat seven-step program functions as an
>>     excellent guide to practice. But one should remember that a real
>>     concept is not an ideal-typical concept (NB readers of Vygotsky).
>>     Each of those steps (Hegel called them "grades" rather than
>>     "stages" sometimes) includes and sublates others in a kind of
>>     cascade. It is not a neat sequence of events, culminating in a
>>     "new stable form of practice" signalling the end of the
>>     intervention and time to settle up and go home. The process of
>>     concept development never stops.
>>
>>     Andy
>>
>>     Christine Schweighart wrote:
>>
>>         Hi Andy,
>>         In  the third action, developing an abstraction - Yryo's work
>>         uses a generic model in dual stimulation. This draws upon his
>>         historical development as argued in his research.
>>          Is it not also possible to explore this third action as an
>>         abstraction without that particular model structure,  I ask
>>         because I'm reading this section of Chapter 1 of Ilyenkov:
>>         http://www.marxists.org/**archive/ilyenkov/works/**
>> abstract/abstra1d.htm<http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/abstract/abstra1d.htm>
>>         "The task of logic as a science grows out of the real needs of
>>         the developing cognition of the phenomena of the surrounding
>>         world. The question with which a thinking man turns to logic
>>         as a science is not at all the question of how abstractions
>>         should be made in general, how one can learn to abstract the
>>         general from the sensually given facts. To do that, one need
>>         not at all ask the logicians’ advice, one merely has to have a
>>         command of one’s native language and the ability to
>>         concentrate one’s attention on the sensually given
>>         similarities and differences.
>>
>>         The question with which one turns to logic and which can only
>>         be answered by logic involves a much more complicated
>>         cognitive task: how is one to work out an abstraction which
>>         would express the objective essence of facts given in
>>         contemplation and notions? The manner in which processing a
>>         mass of empirically obvious facts yields a generalisation
>>         expressing the real nature of the object under study – that is
>>         the actual problem, whose solution is identical with that of
>>         the problem of the nature of concepts as distinct from
>>         abstract general notions."
>>
>>         and it strikes me that dual stimulation might be upon notions
>>         from 'action 2' ...
>>
>>          Christine.
>>
>>         On Thu, Nov 15, 2012 at 8:54 AM, Andy Blunden
>>         <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>>         <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
>>
>>             Taylor & Francis allows xmca only discuss one article per
>>         issue,
>>             but I see no reason why we couldn't discuss this excerpt from
>>             Engestrom's paper. It concerns "rising from the abstract
>>         to the
>>             concrete," which we were recently discussing, but without
>>         resolution.
>>
>>             --------------------------
>>
>>             Ascending from the abstract to the concrete is achieved
>>         through
>>             specific epistemic or learning actions. Together these actions
>>             form an expansive cycle or spiral. An ideal-typical
>>         sequence of
>>             epistemic actions in ascending from the abstract to the
>>         concrete
>>             may be described as follows:
>>
>>             •         The first action is that of questioning,
>>         criticizing, or
>>             rejecting some aspects of the accepted practice and existing
>>             wisdom. For the sake of simplicity, we will call this action
>>             questioning.
>>
>>             •         The second action is that of analyzing the
>>         situation.
>>             Analysis involves mental, discursive or practical
>>         transformation
>>             of the situation in order to find out origins and explanatory
>>             mechanisms.
>>
>>             •         The third action is that of modeling a new
>>         explanatory
>>             relationship in some publicly observable and transmittable
>>         medium.
>>             This means constructing an explicit, simplified model of
>>         the new
>>             idea, a germ cell, that explains the problematic situation and
>>             offers a perspective for resolving and transforming it.
>>
>>             •         The fourth action is that of examining the model,
>>             running, operating, and experimenting on it in order to fully
>>             grasp its dynamics, potentials, and limitations.
>>
>>             •         The fifth action is that of implementing the model,
>>             concretizing it by means of practical applications,
>>         enrichments,
>>             and conceptual extensions.
>>
>>             •         The sixth and seventh actions are those of
>>         reflecting on
>>             and evaluating the process and consolidating its outcomes
>>         into a
>>             new stable form of practice.
>>
>>
>>             --------------------
>>
>>             MCA 19(1) pp. 288-289.
>>
>>             Andy
>>
>>
>>
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>>
> --
> ------------------------------**------------------------------**
> ------------
>
> *Andy Blunden*
> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
> http://ucsd.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden<http://ucsd.academia.edu/AndyBlunden>
>
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