Re: Fwd: [xmca] A Failure of Communication

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

Andy
your comment:
"Ideal typical path of development" *points to* distinct settings (e.g.
natural science, everyday life at home, school, etc.) which is indeed close
to the idea of "genre," but "ideal typical path of development" is after
all about *paths of development*, ideal ones at that, not settings,
projects, theories, domains, social groups, frames, or anything else. :)

Andy, if the focus remains on *typical paths of development* OF genres, OF
distinct settings OF the existential life world, is it possible to have a
conversation within the multi-verse of *romantic science*
As I understand the focus on *typical* is *scientific*  the paths of
development may be romantic and implicate effective history.

I am circling around your invitation to have conversations that are
interdiciplinary. Simon Critchley, exploring the development of Continental
Philosophy wrote about Heidegger's idea of

 *an existential CONCEPTION of science*

Critchley commented,

"This would show how the practices of the natural sciences arise out of
life-world practices, and that the life-world practices are not simply
reducible to natural scientific explanation"

Andy, your specific project to develop awareness of the *typical paths* of
develop of concept use and transformation through time is  emerging within
a particular  tradition or genre of discourse [within effective history].
I am playfully inquiring if it may be  possible to *play* [a word you would
not use but points to a hermeneutical genre] on a larger *field of play*
 that *hears* and acknowledges your voice.

I will bring the discussion back to the paper under discussion and the
fuzzy boundaries between spontaneous and scientific [systematically 'true'
organized] concepts.  Andy the path of development FROM spontaneous TO
scientific concepts seems to have deen articulated within a genre. However,
this is not a dis-interested scientific development.
Mike pointed to developmental praxis as centrally concerning *social goods,
including moral goods*.

Within our developing understanding of  ideal paths of concept formation
how is this emerging understanding circling back to exploring how our
*hearing* gives *voice* to the other*?
{Which I suggest is one way to view the development of psychology as
a project within a shared moral compass}

Larry





On Tue, Nov 13, 2012 at 6:23 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

> Larry, you ask me how "ideal typical paths of development" relate to
> genres. Well, they are about different though related aspects of concepts.
>
> "Genre" is not a concept I use, but that is just because I come from Marx
> and Hegel, whose writings predated the linguistic turn which popularised
> the idea of genre. As a writer and teacher of writing, it is natural that
> Chuck should use "genre." I think it is an excellent concept that conveys a
> whole suite of ways in which concepts are used and framed. Concepts are
> both aggregates of more finite meanings, and themselves units of larger
> entities, which can perhaps be captured with the idea of "genre," rather
> than "project," social formation, discourse or something, because "genre"
> points to the character of the discourse itself, rather than the setting or
> motivation.
>
> "Ideal typical path of development" *points to* distinct settings (e.g.
> natural science, everyday life at home, school, etc.) which is indeed close
> to the idea of "genre," but "ideal typical path of development" is after
> all about *paths of development*, ideal ones at that, not settings,
> projects, theories, domains, social groups, frames, or anything else. :)
>
> Andy
>
> Larry Purss wrote:
>
>> Andy, Charles
>>  As I listened in to your conversation reflecting on "ideal typical paths
>> of development" the question of the place of *genres* was in the backgound
>> of my reading.  QUESTION:  Andy, do you perceive "ideal typical paths of
>> development as a genre" or having the potential to become a genre?
>> Also do you perceive genres and "traditions" as having a family
>> resemblance and having the potential to become part of the conversation
>> exploring "ideal typical paths of development"?   Andy, as your concrete
>> example [of the practice of law], or Charles concrete example [of filling
>> out tax forms as a practice]  indicate, concepts develop within activity
>> settings within historical events THROUGH TIME within *life worlds*.
>>  Your referencing Brandom [a student of Rorty] is fascinating.
>>  Your comment was:
>>   What I am interested in is an approach at the fundamental level which
>> can do justice to the subtlety and complexity of your discourse. Let me
>> cite from the American Pragmatic philosopher, a student of Richard Rorty at
>> Pittburg, Robert Brandom:
>>
>> "Traditional term logics built up from below, offering first
>> accounts of the meanings of the concepts associated with singular
>> and general terms (in a nominalistic way: in terms of what they name
>> or stand for), then of judgments constructed by relating those
>> terms, and finally of properties of /inferences /relating to those
>> judgments. This order of explanation is still typical of
>> contemporary representational approaches to semantics ... Pragmatist
>> semantic theories typically adopt a top-down approach because they
>> start from the /use /of concepts, and what one does with concepts is
>> apply them in judgment and action." [/Articulating Reasons/,
>> Brandom 200, p. 13]
>>  Andy this *Traditional* [classical?] genre known as a nominalistic "way"
>> as the *starting* point seems to point to an approach that Taylor refers to
>> as *strict* [sedimented] dialectics.  The terms are known PRIOR to
>> constructing the framework or theory that is built up using known products.
>>  Andy, your inviting us to consider a new starting point within praxis or
>> *shared projects* [as anticipated projections]  you are wanting to start
>> with *ideal  typical formations*
>>  It is interesting you mention Rorty. I want to attach a paper which may
>> be tangential to this thread, but he is exploring pragmatism as grounding
>> PARTICULAR genres in practice WITHIN effective history. Andy, it may have
>> some relevance for exploring *ideal typical forms of development* For me
>> this a fuzzy concept but hope with your willingness to *hear me into
>> speech* that I will develop further.
>>  Larry
>>  Larry
>>   However, how do you understand the relationship between these concepts?
>>
>> On Mon, Nov 12, 2012 at 7:16 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:
>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>>
>>     Thanks Charles. The example I gave was intended to challenge the
>>     idea that concepts can be understood in terms of a typology or
>>     system of classification. Rather I think the approach should
>>     utilise "ideal typical paths of development." And this is what I
>>     see Vygotsky doing.
>>
>>     That said, your further explanation of how you understand
>>     "scientific" as what I would call an ideal typical case of "not
>>     only the secular institutions and disciplines of the academy and
>>     professions, but also those of the spiritual domain, the
>>     performing and graphic arts, commerce games and sports, politics,
>>     criminal culture, and other domains that have a robust alignment
>>     of practice..." I think that small qualification goes a long way
>>     to giving people cause to think when they read Vygotsky.
>>
>>
>>     Andy
>>
>>
>>     Charles Bazerman wrote:
>>
>>         I look forward to your elaborations and will view your video.
>>         Chuck
>>
>>         ----- Original Message -----
>>         From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
>>         Date: Monday, November 12, 2012 6:27 pm
>>         Subject: Re: Fwd: [xmca] A Failure of Communication
>>         To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>         <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
>>
>>
>>             I'm sorry for being so obscure, Chuck. I am still working
>>             on how to explain my position. But all I am proposing is
>>             my reading of Vygotsky on Concepts as set out in "Thinking
>>             and Speech." Nothing more. I certainly do not think
>>             concepts are "philosophic phantasms," although this is the
>>             most common response to discovery of the kind of points I
>>             am raising:
>>             "Well, if concepts are not like this, then they must be
>>             philosophic phantasms and not worth chasing after."
>>
>>             I am fine with locating yourself in this world in a
>>             pragmatist way, etc., etc. I do nothing different. Though
>>             I am not sure what you mean by "communal" and other
>>             allusions to "community." Maybe my video
>>
>>             https://vimeo.com/groups/**129320/videos/35819238<https://vimeo.com/groups/129320/videos/35819238>
>>
>>             explains it better. Yes, I think there is a "more grounded
>>             approach,"
>>             though those are not words of mine. I am certainly not
>>             trying to "deal with concepts in an abstract way," in fact
>>             that is a fair definition of what I am opposing.
>>
>>             Andy
>>             Charles Bazerman wrote:
>>
>>                 Andy, I am not sure I see what you are driving at, and
>>                 thus I do not know how to continue the discussion.  I
>>                 know you have written and just published a book on
>>                 concepts, but I have not read it.       Are you
>>                 suggesting that there is a more grounded approach to
>>                 concepts or that concepts dissolve and that we should
>>                 not chase after them as philosophic phantasms?
>>             I am trying to deal with concepts not in an abstract
>>                 philosophic way
>>             but in a pragmatist way based on the social circulation of
>>             terms and their use in communal practices and then on what
>>             evidence we can glean about internal phenomena--and as I
>>             say in the essay, my primary activity system and project
>>             as a teacher of writing has to do with helping people
>>             engage with public circulation of words which people find
>>             of value in their endeavors and in their personal
>>             understanding of the world which they act within.  To that
>>             task I bring the resources of Vygotsky and activity
>>             theory.  I do not claim an epistemic position outside
>>             those realms of practice.  So what are you trying to
>>             persuade me and others of, or what difficulty in my
>>             pursuit of my practices within my activity systems do you
>>             want me to attend to?
>>
>>                 Once I have better bearings of the intersection of our
>>                 interests, I may be able to say something more useful.
>>                       Chuck
>>
>>
>>
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>>
> --
> ------------------------------**------------------------------**
> ------------
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> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
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