RE: [xmca] ISCAR Newsletter?

[David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu>]

Andy, et al, thanks for your responses.

I think part of what has made this an interesting discussion is that many respondents engage with "science" as a theoretical entity, locating this activity system through philosophical coordinates within a landscape of other discourse forms, both realized and potential. What a rich framing, but very different from the fully sociological perspective that I've adopted (at least in part because I'm not up to speed on philosophy--that's why I've not responded to some of the very interesting philosophical comments that have been offered).

This contra-theoretical orientation applies not only to my view of science, but also provides the backdrop for my framing of my own goals as an educational theorist. Andy, your first paragraph, below, misconstrues my intentions. My orientation toward the practical requirements of educators is not my starting point for a theoretical project: "making judgments about the development of the sciences." For me, theories are instrumentally useful for educators, or they're not. My goal is to figure out how to orient education toward psychology so that psychological theories are more useful. My particular approach involves recognizing the tendency for psychological theories to extend beyond their initial (and natural) domain of application to encompass all of the major interests of the field--a tendency that is driven by the preparadigmatic imperative toward becoming a mature science (i.e., toward paradigmatic unity). So, when I go back to the earlier versions of theories as a basis for framing a genre of teaching, this is not suggesting that such a move has any relevance or merit for those within psychology (in fact, I'm hurting psychology by suggesting the theoretical cutting edge is irrelevant to education), or for those philosophers and theorists interested in "the /resolution /of contradictions between theories ... [and] the creating of new theories" (though I'm delighted this may have some heuristic value for your work).

Within your theoretical effort, you seem to be of two minds about science in relation to other activity systems. On the one hand, you acknowledge that CHAT is unlike science: "Activity Theory is inherently interdisciplinary, but science as a whole, in this world, is not." On the other hand, you want to homogenize science into a broader frame that includes CHAT: "the world is made up of an array of distinct activities (projects) but all these projects interact with one another, both cooperatively and in conflict." It seems to me the effort to decompose and recompose CHAT as separate sciences, but in intercourse with one another, only is accomplished by ignoring the bounded character of scientific discourse (though perhaps you can mount a more compelling case). I disagree that "being a self-enclosed, independent, self-consistent theory it is /dead /as a science, and science is only alive to the extent that it struggles at its boundaries." The dynamic struggle at the boundaries is characteristic of scientific revolution, not the everyday business of normal science. In characteristic sociological mode, I wonder if the motive for maintaining a connection between CHAT and science isn't tied to the very real and material advantage to be gained by having CHAT remain part of the scientific enterprise.

Finally, turning to your third paragraph, I don't see the unlikelihood of psychology ever actually achieving paradigmatic consensus as relevant to its preparadigmatic status. The important question is how do the branches of psychology interact with one another? If, as I've suggested, the relationship is characterized by encroachment and competition, then we have a preparadigmatic science. Now, I do think the weak prospects for achieving paradigmatic status are relevant to education's relationship to psychology. Psychologists within the dominant paradigm are always talking about how we're just on the verge of putting into place the comprehensive picture of learning that educators need to do their work effectively. The behaviorists did it, the cognitivists are doing it now, and I have little doubt that if sociocultural psychology were to emerge as the dominant paradigm in psychology, we'd be doing it too. This is NOT dishonesty; psychologists in the dominant branch generally really do believe they are about to unify all of psychology under their own tent. They almost need to believe it, because promulgating one's paradigm as comprehensive is a necessary competitive strategy within a competitive process that is inherently sociological, involving as it does incommensurable framings of the field. So, if I really believed the hype, I'd be waiting, along with the rest of education, for Nirvana, instead of pushing for a genres approach that takes the fragmented state of learning theory as its starting point.

David

-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: Thursday, November 08, 2012 6:32 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] ISCAR Newsletter?

David, your suggestion - to make a specific social problem or task the starting point and focus for making judgments about the development of the sciences - is indeed a very fruitful one, and certainly gives me pause for thought. It is the solution of such practical social problems which is the driving force equally for the /resolution /of contradictions between theories as it has been the force for the creating of new theories. I probably over-emphasised one side at the expense of the other to make a point! Your point is taken.
[Andy, my 

In the ISCAR Newsletter interview I argued that it was the fragmented character of the intellectual environment in which CHAT researchers worked which was at the root of the divergence of strands of CHAT. 
Activity Theory is inherently interdisciplinary, but science as a whole, in this world, is not. But recall that I do not see CHAT as a family of *separate *sciences - emphasis on "separate" - any more than I see social practice in general as an array of "separate" activities. Rather the world is made up of an array of distinct activities (projects) but all these projects interact with one another, both cooperatively and in conflict. One world, albeit fractured.

I think there is merit in your idea of "pre-paradigmatic science" but
(1) The impending resolution implied in the "pre-" is a problem, and I say this as a Hegelian who says that Hegel's Absolute Idea has to be taken with a grain of salt, (2) It is science notwithstanding the "pre-paradigmatic", though I grant you that insofar as any science is /content /with being a self-enclosed, independent, self-consistent theory it is /dead /as a science, and science is only alive to the extent that it struggles at its boundaries. So we are united as inter- or cross-disciplinarians.

And I agree, the solution of problems such as teaching methods is fertile ground for interaction and contest between theories, which in a better world, should result in rational outcomes and the emergence of unified theories.

Andy

David H Kirshner wrote:
>> Every problem, when captured in a concept, becomes the foundation of a new science and system of practice.
>>     
>
> Andy,
>
> This statement reiterates your suggestion that CHAT is diverging into a family of separate sciences. I'm sure you're working from some model of what is a science that makes this a sensible proposal; however, it's not one that I find myself able to connect with (thus far in the conversation). In fact, notwithstanding "the possibility that it may be a thousand years before a paradigm capable of unifying [the branches of psychology] is achieved," I think a good sociological argument can be mounted that the major branches of psychology are preparadigmatic branches of a single science. The primary evidence for this comes in the form of clear signs of competitive engagement of these branches with one another, for instance, Skinner's (1958) attempt to extend behavioral psychology from unmediated response conditioning to verbal behavior famously rebuffed by Chomsky (1959) at the start of the "cognitive era" (Gardner, 1987). Similarly, the now mainstream cognitive science has clashed with newer upstarts like situativity (situated cognition) theory (Anderson, Reder, & Simon, 1996, 1997;  Greeno, 1997) that have emerged in part because of a perceived failure of cognitive science to adequately extend from decontextualized problem solving to contextual reasoning (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989; Greeno, 1993; Hirst & Manier, 1995). This is not the way separate sciences behave toward one another.
>
> But you're right, my interest in these questions about CHAT is related to my crossdisciplinary efforts--for purposes of pedagogical theorizing, only!--to treat these branches as if they are independent sciences thereby deriving separate genres of teaching. That's why Nektarios' characterization of CHAT as evolving in emergent fashion from the intercourse of "qualitavely different theory than the other but neverthless the fruit of the previous theories" caught my attention. In order for a branch of psychology to remain a contender in the preparadigmatic contest to unify the field, it needs to maintain the internal structure of a science. This means that theoretical departures within the branch need to be advanced with a view toward convergence. From Nektarios' and perhaps Mike's statements, it seems CHAT may no longer be willing to stay that course. My questioning, here, is an attempt to find out if this view of CHAT is widely shared, if theorists are divided on it, if the perspective depends on the discursive context, etc.  
>
> ...Many thanks, Larry, for suggested reading that further explore these questions!
>
> David
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] 
> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> Sent: Thursday, November 08, 2012 3:09 AM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] ISCAR Newsletter?
>
> Ah! I see now, your are alluding to your interesting work on genres set out in "Discursive Construction of 'Good Teaching:' A Crossdisciplinary Framework" where you applied yourself to competing theories of learning and teaching.
>
> The problem is that to argue that psychology and social science in general are "pre-paradigmatic", being engaged in a kind of free-for-all struggle over fundamentals, does not dispose of the possibility that it may be a thousand years before a paradigm capable of unifying this activity is achieved. This thought calls into question that paradigmatic science is "normal" in any sense beyond the specialisd sense given to the word by Kuhn. In fact, I would argue that what you call preparadigmatic is fact normal. I can see your point, but you seem to be anticipating the "end of history."
>
> Every problem, when captured in a concept, becomes the foundation of a new science and system of practice. For this not to be the case seems to suppose a unified science of everything and the creation of a global society free of all contradiction.
>
> Andy
>
> David H Kirshner wrote:
>   
>> Andy,
>>
>> Your metaphor of sciences branching off from one another like species in an evolutionary chain entails a divergence over time of what are initially shared interests and methods. But there doesn't seem to be much historical evidence of that in CHAT. Although it's true that "every strand of CHAT ... is in dialogue with various other currents of science in and outside of CHAT," the external dialogues are different from the internal ones. Externally, CHAT borrows and learns from non-CHAT discourses. But internally, there is a sense of competition over a single subject matter over which the different approaches are attempting to claim hegemony. This is the classic configuration of a single preparadigmatic science, rather than of separate sciences evolving away from one another. Indeed, your very characterization of CHAT as "the range of theories on display whenever there is an ISCAR Congress" is sociological evidence of a single science. Separate sciences don't congress with one another.
>>
>> What I'm focusing on in your response is  your perception that "every strand of CHAT takes itself to be scientific." To me this means that there is an underlying motive toward formulation of theory that is convergent, that forms a single system of thought as is needed for falsifiability. In that respect, the tendency for CHAT theories to be divergent and heteronomous, as Nektarios avers, is uncomfortable, something the field strives to get past. But this is at odds with Mike's experience that a convergent theoretical system is "incompatible with how I understand what bio-cultural-social-historical activity/practice/situated theories of human nature could aspire to."
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>> From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
>> Sent: Wednesday, November 07, 2012 11:38 PM
>> To: David H Kirshner
>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Subject: Re: [xmca] ISCAR Newsletter?
>>
>> David, can we see CHAT, i.e., the range of theories on display whenever there is an ISCAR Congress, as a "family of sciences" which, like members of a family, have a family resemblance and/or genetic relationship to other members of the famliy, though not to every other?
>>
>> A long time ago, in various places which we would call the roots of CHAT, contradictions arose in a given body of theory and practice, and these were resolved by innovations, i.e. the introduction or abandonment or modification of a key concept of the theory or key practice. But as in biological evolution, this led to a bifurcation of the genome (so to speak) and/or differential adaptations to different scientific environments, rather than the total extinction of one or the other branch?
>>
>> So far as I know every strand of CHAT takes itself to be scientific and is in dialogue with various other currents of science in and outside of CHAT. I don't see any challenge to the scientificness of CHAT here.
>>
>> Andy
>>
>> David H Kirshner wrote:
>>
>> I'm obviously having trouble asking this question in an acceptable form, but I'm really interested in answers to it, so I'll try to indicate the nature of the question by reviewing the conversational elements leading to it. ...Thanks for sticking with this.
>>
>>
>>
>> Nektarios characterized CHAT as "interrelating to each other, and one theorists complementing each other and very often the fruit of it is a qualitavely different theory than the other but neverthless the fruit of the previous theories.. So it means that CHAT it is not a close system, it is not an absolute theory, it is more like a method."
>>
>>
>>
>> I take this statement as indicating that CHAT is a kind of heterogeneous and emergent conceptual system, characteristics that, for me, distinguish it from conceptual systems of sciences, which somehow are more bounded, at least during periods of "normal science" (i.e., of paradigmatic stability). Presumably the bounded character of scientific conceptual systems is needed for theories to be falsifiable (which Mike notes is basic to the organization of scientific practice).
>>
>>
>>
>> The major branches of psychology--behavioral, developmental, cognitive--aspire to be scientific, in this sense, and therefore to establish conceptual systems of this more bounded variety. Furthermore, Vygotsky and his contemporaries offered their theories as scientific explanations of learning and development.
>>
>> So, somewhere in the intervening decades the scientific aspirations that cultural-historical theorists held for their theories seems to have eroded. My question asks after this change:
>>
>>
>>
>> --Have cultural-historical psychologists, overall, abandoned scientific aspirations for their theories?
>>
>> --Have some abandoned those aspirations, but other maintain them?
>>
>> --Are cultural-historical psychologists ambivalent about this issue, unsure of how to frame their aspirations?
>>
>> --In a poststructural frame, are the aspirations of cultural-historical theory indexed to particular discourses, in some of which theories are clearly scientific, in others, clearly not?
>>
>>
>>
>> I hope this clarifies the question.
>>
>>
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>>
>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>>
>> Sent: Wednesday, November 07, 2012 7:05 PM
>>
>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>
>> Subject: Re: [xmca] ISCAR Newsletter?
>>
>>
>>
>> It had never occurred to me either, David, that a science aspired to closure. In fact I had always taken it that one of the defining characteristics of science was that it was NOT bounded in this sense: to be a science, a body of claims and practices has to be integrated with the entire body of scientific practice. For example, falt-earthism is a self-contained, bounded and consistent theory, just as are spiritualism (i.e. weegie boards etc), astrology, and so on. What makes such theories unscientific is that their eminently self-consistent, closed and maybe even helpful systems of concepts cannot be made consistent with science.
>>
>> So in a sense, as I see it, there is ideally /only one science/.
>>
>>
>>
>> But would I could agree with is this: every science (i.e. a 
>> particular
>>
>> science) has at its core a concept of its subject matter, which in the sense of Thomas Kuhn, constitutes a paradigm which sets all the puzzles to be solved by "normal science." In that sense a science is like the physical universe according to Einstein: finite, but unbounded and inexhaustible.
>>
>>
>>
>> Andy
>>
>>
>>
>> David H Kirshner wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks, Mike.
>>
>> I presume that theory that is sufficiently bounded or closed to be falsifiable is the scientific standard that behavioral psychology, developmental psychology, and cognitive psychology aspire to, and that Vygotsky aspired to during the time he formulated his theories. I'm very interested to understand what happened to those aspirations for sociocultural theory:
>>
>>
>>
>> --Has sociocultural psychology renounced those ambitions?
>>
>> --Are theorists divided on the question of whether sociocultural theory strives for closure?
>>
>> --Are theorists ambivalent about this issue, unsure about how to frame these aspirations?
>>
>> --Or, perhaps, in a poststructural frame, are the aspirations of sociocultural theory indexed to particular discourses, in some of which sociocultural theory is clearly scientific, and others clearly not?
>>
>> --None of the above?
>>
>>
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> From: mike cole [mailto:lchcmike@gmail.com]
>>
>> Sent: Wednesday, November 07, 2012 4:00 PM
>>
>> To: David H Kirshner
>>
>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>
>> Subject: Re: [xmca] ISCAR Newsletter?
>>
>>
>>
>> That is indubitably a high standard for science, David.
>>
>> It seems incompatible with how I understand what 
>> bio-cultural-social-historical activity/practice/situated
>>
>> theories of human nature could aspire to, and not sure even that they should.
>>
>> mike
>>
>> On Wed, Nov 7, 2012 at 10:12 AM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu<mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu><mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu><mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote:
>>
>> Mike,
>>
>> Empirical falsification requires a theoretical system that is sufficiently fixed and determinate so as to enable indubitable logical deduction. Whether the correct word for such a system is "closed" or "bounded" I don't know. Feel free to substitute "bounded, if that works better for you; but the question stands.
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>>
>> From: 
>> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu><mailt
>> o :xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu><mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.ed
>> u
>>     
>>> <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>] On Behalf Of mike cole
>>>       
>> Sent: Wednesday, November 07, 2012 11:39 AM
>>
>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>
>> Subject: Re: [xmca] ISCAR Newsletter?
>>
>>
>>
>> David-- It had never occurred to me that sciences are by definition closed.
>>
>> Bounded perhaps? With leaky borders and a commitment to falsification?
>>
>>
>>
>> mike
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Nov 7, 2012 at 8:08 AM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu<mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu><mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu><mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> So, Nektarios, CHAT is just chat!
>>
>> More seriously, thinking of CHAT as a methodology--a set of
>>
>> practices--accommodates what seems to be its irrevocably "open,"
>>
>> non-absolute in character.
>>
>> But what does this do to the aspirations of sociocultural psychology
>>
>> to be taken seriously as a "science?" Aren't sciences, by definition,
>>
>> closed systems of thought?
>>
>> --Has sociocultural psychology renounced those ambitions?
>>
>> --Are theorists divided on the question of whether sociocultural
>>
>> theory strives for closure?
>>
>> --Are theorists ambivalent about this issue, unsure about how to 
>> frame
>>
>> these aspirations?
>>
>> --Or, perhaps, in a poststructural frame, are the aspirations of
>>
>> sociocultural theory indexed to particular discourses, in some of
>>
>> which sociocultural theory is clearly scientific, and others clearly not?
>>
>> --None of the above?
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>>
>> From: 
>> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu><mailt
>> o :xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu><mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.ed
>> u
>>     
>>> <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>]
>>>       
>> On Behalf Of Nektarios Alexi
>>
>> Sent: Wednesday, November 07, 2012 9:25 AM
>>
>> To: 
>> ablunden@mira.net<mailto:ablunden@mira.net><mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>> <
>> mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>>
>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>
>> Subject: RE: [xmca] ISCAR Newsletter?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> What an interesting genealogy!!
>>
>>
>>
>> So the father of CHAT was Aristotle?:) Is ike the Abraham of Bible?:)
>>
>>
>>
>> But i think in terms of dialectical materialism CHAT it is all them
>>
>> interrelating to each other,and one theorists complementing each 
>> other
>>
>>     
>
>   
>> and very often the fruit of it is a qualitavely different theory than
>>
>> the other but neverthless the fruit of the previous theories.. So it
>>
>> means that CHAT it is not a close system, it is not an absolute
>>
>> theory, it is more like a method that because of its not teleological
>>
>> morphology it always create the appropriate space to integrate
>>
>> anything relevant that helps us to understand us (humans) in relation to society and culture and vice versa?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Nektarios
>>
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>>
>> From: Andy Blunden
>> [mailto:ablunden@mira.net<mailto:ablunden@mira.net><mailto:ablunden@m
>> i
>> ra.net>]
>>
>> Sent: Thu 11/8/2012 12:36 AM
>>
>> To: Nektarios Alexi
>>
>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>
>> Subject: Re: [xmca] ISCAR Newsletter?
>>
>>
>>
>> Others can probably enlighten us more than I can, Nektarios, but I
>>
>> think he was a very erudite person. Clearly from a young age he was
>>
>> hungry for knowledge and read widely in many languages. But
>>
>> specifically, he was coming of age in Russia right in the midst of 
>> the
>>
>> Russian Revolution. This revolution threw literally millions of 
>> people
>>
>> into all kinds of "social criticism" (Luria describes the tumultuous
>>
>> scene in his University at the time, in his Autobiography). New
>>
>> movements in Art, literature, Linguistics, natural science, social
>>
>> theory, philosophy, technology, social organisation,... sprung up
>>
>> spontaneously on all sides. Vygotsky was a part of that. That is the
>>
>> main thing. But for geopolitical reasons it was a short-lived "Spring."
>>
>>
>>
>> In particular, I think, Vygotsky came from Art Criticism (in a milieu
>>
>> where drama theory, linguistics and aesthetic theory were making 
>> world
>>
>> historic advances in Vygotsky's immediate social circle. Then his
>>
>> intellectual disposition (as exhibited in his Psychology of Art) took
>>
>> him into education and scientific psychology. At that time, prior to
>>
>> and independently of the Revolution, Russia was already  in the
>>
>> forefront of Behaviourist research in Psychology. Vygotsky was in an
>>
>> ideal position to bring the social criticism he learnt as a student
>>
>> into the scientific establishment around Pavlov, Bekhterev, etc. Add
>>
>> to that his close study of Marx's Capital, Lenin's philosophical
>>
>> works, and Engels' popularisation, is the broth which produced Vygotsky.
>>
>>
>>
>> See http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/chat/Genealogy-CHAT.htm
>>
>>
>>
>> Andy
>>
>>
>>
>> Nektarios Alexi wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>         Hi Andy,
>>
>>
>>
>>         My question is how Vygotsky could tackle such subtle problems
>>
>> in the theories of Piaget but also others in his book Thought and Language?
>>
>> What kind of intellectual or theoretical backgorund did Vygotsky had
>>
>> that allowed him to see the human nature in such a depth and not just
>>
>> that but also find the precise language to describe it, but not just
>>
>> describe it but describe it in scientific terms and also with
>>
>> evidence? Can we say that it was his comprehensive knowledge on arts
>>
>> and especially of classic literature that helped him to see that deep
>>
>> and notice such subtle details and errors in so many other important psychological theories of his time?
>>
>> Just saying..
>>
>>
>>
>>         Nektarios
>>
>>
>>
>>         -----Original Message-----
>>
>>         From: 
>> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu><mailt
>> o :xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu><mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu> 
>> on behalf of Larry Purss
>>
>>         Sent: Thu 11/8/2012 12:02 AM
>>
>>         To: 
>> ablunden@mira.net<mailto:ablunden@mira.net><mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>> < mailto:ablunden@mira.net>; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>
>>         Subject: Re: [xmca] ISCAR Newsletter?
>>
>>
>>
>>         Andy
>>
>>         I just finished reading your article in the newsletter.
>>
>>         It is a clear statement of ways to expand the conversation.
>>
>>         I have recently re-read the 1st chapter of Raymond Williams
>>
>> book *Marxism
>>
>>         and Literature* on the concept of *culture*. It is a 
>> wonderful
>>
>> history on
>>
>>         the shifting flowing transforming meanings  of various uses 
>> of
>>
>> the concept
>>
>>         *culture*
>>
>>
>>
>>         I noticed at the beginning of the article you are affiliated
>>
>> with a group
>>
>>         with the title *continental philosophy*
>>
>>         I often wonder if this umbrella term could be more explicitly
>>
>> brought into
>>
>>         the conversation to illuminate the multiple streams of
>>
>> sociocultural theory
>>
>>         and how CHAT is situated within this umbrella term.
>>
>>         It would possibly assist in engaging deeply with philosophy 
>> as
>>
>> you advocate.
>>
>>
>>
>>         I would like to bring in a distinction that Charles Taylor
>>
>> uses between
>>
>>         what he refers to as *strict* dialectics and *interpretive*
>>
>> dialectics.
>>
>>
>>
>>         Strict dialectics assumes each side of the dialectic [for 
>> example
>>
>>         individual and social] are interactive but the essence of the
>>
>> objects
>>
>>         interacting is determined. Interpretive dialectics in 
>> contrast
>>
>> puts in play
>>
>>         the interpretive nature of the objects which are then joined
>>
>> in interaction.
>>
>>
>>
>>         I am attaching the first two chapters of Raymond Williams 
>> book
>>
>> *Marxism and
>>
>>         Literature* which I believe is an example of *interpretive*
>>
>> dialectics as
>>
>>         described by Charles Taylor.
>>
>>
>>
>>         The contrast between the notions *strict* and *interpretive*
>>
>> may be helpful
>>
>>         in illuminating different notions of *interaction* and
>>
>> *activity* within
>>
>>         mediated worlds.
>>
>>
>>
>>         Andy, I hope others read the ISCAR newletter and join with us
>>
>> in a friendly
>>
>>         CHAT.
>>
>>         Larry
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>         On Wed, Nov 7, 2012 at 5:42 AM, Andy Blunden
>>
>> <ablunden@mira.net<mailto:ablunden@mira.net><mailto:ablunden@mira.net><mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net<mailto:ablunden@mira.net><mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>         > Strangely enough, Ron, my first contacts with Vygotskyan
>>
>> theory was with
>>
>>         > academic colleagues at the University of Melbourne, with
>>
>> whom I was
>>
>>         > interacting in the project of creating collaborative
>>
>> learning spaces. I
>>
>>         > knew about social constructionism, which I took to be 
>> Berger and
>>
>>         > post-modern critical theory (having only the vaguest
>>
>> knowledge of these
>>
>>         > things) but then from my colleagues, who were van der Veer
>>
>> and Valsiner
>>
>>         > types, I was surprised to find out that Vygotsky (whose 
>> name
>>
>> I knew from
>>
>>         > Ilyenkov) was also a constructivist (I have never properly
>>
>> separated the
>>
>>         > way those two words are used). So I then got a book out of
>>
>> the library on
>>
>>         > constructivist epistemology which said that there were
>>
>> dozens of varieties
>>
>>         > of constructivism, but that Vygotsky was a constructivist
>>
>> who took the
>>
>>         > collaboration of carer-child dyads as the basis for the
>>
>> social construction
>>
>>         > of knowledge, rather than the wider culture .... took me
>>
>> quite a while to
>>
>>         > find my bearings in all that mess.
>>
>>         >
>>
>>         > I just think that we always have to allow a lot of latitude 
>> in
>>
>>         > understanding what people actually mean when they use a 
>> word
>>
>> in a given
>>
>>         > context. A word meaning is not a concept.
>>
>>         >
>>
>>         > Andy
>>
>>         >
>>
>>         >
>>
>>         > Ron Lubensky wrote:
>>
>>         >
>>
>>         >> Hi Andy,
>>
>>         >>
>>
>>         >> I too thought the ISCAR newsletter interview article was
>>
>> very good. I
>>
>>         >> especially liked your comparison of CHAT to interactionist
>>
>> approaches,
>>
>>         >> which you and I have discussed before. One area that
>>
>> continues to be messy,
>>
>>         >> as you suggest, is the relationship of CHAT to social
>>
>> constructIVism and
>>
>>         >> social constructIONism.
>>
>>         >>
>>
>>         >> Since CHAT's first home is developmental psychology, it is
>>
>> out of the
>>
>>         >> work of Piaget and Papert that these terms are usually
>>
>> defined, and so
>>
>>         >> closely that they are often conflated. While these 
>> theories
>>
>> acknowledge the
>>
>>         >> social and perhaps cultural influences on learning and
>>
>> interpretation, they
>>
>>         >> centre on a cognitivist, mental model view of knowledge.
>>
>> There is also the
>>
>>         >> normative aspect of giving control to the learner to
>>
>> construct his or her
>>
>>         >> individual world-view.
>>
>>         >>
>>
>>         >> The other social constructIONism comes out of 
>> communications and
>>
>>         >> sociology (e.g. Berger and Luckmann, The Social
>>
>> Construction of Reality,
>>
>>         >> 1966), that challenges the inevitability of 
>> categorisations
>>
>> that are taken
>>
>>         >> for granted in common discourse, and which form the bases
>>
>> for many
>>
>>         >> institutions. This post-modern constructIONism generally
>>
>> places knowledge
>>
>>         >> in discourse and interaction, but in more recent
>>
>> scholarship focuses on the
>>
>>         >> cultural situation of the individual. This isn't a 
>> learning
>>
>> theory but
>>
>>         >> rather a critical, meta-theoretical stance. To complicate
>>
>> matters, there
>>
>>         >> are different strands with various accounts of what should
>>
>> be treated as
>>
>>         >> real, true, essential, scientific, etc. and how
>>
>> communication should relate
>>
>>         >> to action. It also challenges academic research standards
>>
>> with advocacy for
>>
>>         >> interventionist approaches to practice. For an
>>
>> interdisciplinary expansion
>>
>>         >> of CHAT, I think this constructIONism offers a rich field
>>
>> for comparison.
>>
>>         >>
>>
>>         >> --
>>
>>         >> Ron Lubensky
>>
>>         >> http://www.deliberations.com.**au/
>> <<http://www.deliberations.com.au/>
>>
>> http://www.deliberations.com.au/><http://www.deliberations.com.au/>
>>
>>         >> 0411 412 626
>>
>>         >> Melbourne Australia
>>
>>         >>
>>
>>         >
>>
>>         > --
>>
>>         >
>> ------------------------------**------------------------------**
>>
>>         > ------------
>>
>>         > *Andy Blunden*
>>
>>         > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ 
>> <<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>
>>
>> http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/><http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>
>>
>>         > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
>>
>>         >
>> http://ucsd.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden<<http://ucsd.academia.edu/Andy
>> B
>> lunden>
>>
>> http://ucsd.academia.edu/AndyBlunden><http://ucsd.academia.edu/AndyBl
>> u
>> nden>
>>
>>         >
>>
>>         > ______________________________**____________
>>
>>         > _____
>>
>>         > xmca mailing list
>>
>>         >
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu><mailto:xmca@weber.ucs
>> d
>> .edu><mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>
>>         >
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mail
>> m
>> an/listinfo/xmca>
>>
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca><http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailma
>> n
>> /listinfo/xmca>
>>
>>         >
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>>
>>
>>
>> ________________________________
>>
>>
>>
>> *Andy Blunden*
>>
>> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>>
>> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
>>
>> http://ucsd.academia.edu/AndyBlunden
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> __________________________________________
>>
>> _____
>>
>> xmca mailing list
>>
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu><mailto:xmca@weber.ucs
>> d
>> .edu><mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> __________________________________________
>>
>> _____
>>
>> xmca mailing list
>>
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu><mailto:xmca@weber.ucs
>> d
>> .edu><mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>
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>>
>>
>>
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>> __________________________________________
>>
>> _____
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>> xmca mailing list
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>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>
>>
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>> __________________________________________
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>> _____
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>> xmca mailing list
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>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> ________________________________
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
>> http://ucsd.academia.edu/AndyBlunden
>> __________________________________________
>> _____
>> xmca mailing list
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>
>>
>>   
>>     
>
> --
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> --
> *Andy Blunden*
> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
> http://ucsd.academia.edu/AndyBlunden
>
>
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
>
>
>   

--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
http://ucsd.academia.edu/AndyBlunden


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