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David, can we see CHAT, i.e., the range of theories on display whenever
there is an ISCAR Congress, as a "family of sciences" which, like
members of a family, have a family resemblance and/or genetic
relationship to other members of the famliy, though not to every other? A long time ago, in various places which we would call the roots of CHAT, contradictions arose in a given body of theory and practice, and these were resolved by innovations, i.e. the introduction or abandonment or modification of a key concept of the theory or key practice. But as in biological evolution, this led to a bifurcation of the genome (so to speak) and/or differential adaptations to different scientific environments, rather than the total extinction of one or the other branch? So far as I know every strand of CHAT takes itself to be scientific and is in dialogue with various other currents of science in and outside of CHAT. I don't see any challenge to the scientificness of CHAT here. Andy David H Kirshner wrote: I'm obviously having trouble asking this question in an acceptable form, but I'm really interested in answers to it, so I'll try to indicate the nature of the question by reviewing the conversational elements leading to it. ...Thanks for sticking with this. Nektarios characterized CHAT as "interrelating to each other, and one theorists complementing each other and very often the fruit of it is a qualitavely different theory than the other but neverthless the fruit of the previous theories.. So it means that CHAT it is not a close system, it is not an absolute theory, it is more like a method." I take this statement as indicating that CHAT is a kind of heterogeneous and emergent conceptual system, characteristics that, for me, distinguish it from conceptual systems of sciences, which somehow are more bounded, at least during periods of "normal science" (i.e., of paradigmatic stability). Presumably the bounded character of scientific conceptual systems is needed for theories to be falsifiable (which Mike notes is basic to the organization of scientific practice). The major branches of psychology--behavioral, developmental, cognitive--aspire to be scientific, in this sense, and therefore to establish conceptual systems of this more bounded variety. Furthermore, Vygotsky and his contemporaries offered their theories as scientific explanations of learning and development. So, somewhere in the intervening decades the scientific aspirations that cultural-historical theorists held for their theories seems to have eroded. My question asks after this change: --Have cultural-historical psychologists, overall, abandoned scientific aspirations for their theories? --Have some abandoned those aspirations, but other maintain them? --Are cultural-historical psychologists ambivalent about this issue, unsure of how to frame their aspirations? --In a poststructural frame, are the aspirations of cultural-historical theory indexed to particular discourses, in some of which theories are clearly scientific, in others, clearly not? I hope this clarifies the question. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Wednesday, November 07, 2012 7:05 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: [xmca] ISCAR Newsletter? It had never occurred to me either, David, that a science aspired to closure. In fact I had always taken it that one of the defining characteristics of science was that it was NOT bounded in this sense: to be a science, a body of claims and practices has to be integrated with the entire body of scientific practice. For example, falt-earthism is a self-contained, bounded and consistent theory, just as are spiritualism (i.e. weegie boards etc), astrology, and so on. What makes such theories unscientific is that their eminently self-consistent, closed and maybe even helpful systems of concepts cannot be made consistent with science. So in a sense, as I see it, there is ideally /only one science/. But would I could agree with is this: every science (i.e. a particular science) has at its core a concept of its subject matter, which in the sense of Thomas Kuhn, constitutes a paradigm which sets all the puzzles to be solved by "normal science." In that sense a science is like the physical universe according to Einstein: finite, but unbounded and inexhaustible. Andy David H Kirshner wrote:Thanks, Mike. I presume that theory that is sufficiently bounded or closed to be falsifiable is the scientific standard that behavioral psychology, developmental psychology, and cognitive psychology aspire to, and that Vygotsky aspired to during the time he formulated his theories. I'm very interested to understand what happened to those aspirations for sociocultural theory: --Has sociocultural psychology renounced those ambitions? --Are theorists divided on the question of whether sociocultural theory strives for closure? --Are theorists ambivalent about this issue, unsure about how to frame these aspirations? --Or, perhaps, in a poststructural frame, are the aspirations of sociocultural theory indexed to particular discourses, in some of which sociocultural theory is clearly scientific, and others clearly not? --None of the above? David From: mike cole [mailto:lchcmike@gmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, November 07, 2012 4:00 PM To: David H Kirshner Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: [xmca] ISCAR Newsletter? That is indubitably a high standard for science, David. It seems incompatible with how I understand what bio-cultural-social-historical activity/practice/situated theories of human nature could aspire to, and not sure even that they should. mike On Wed, Nov 7, 2012 at 10:12 AM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu<mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote: Mike, Empirical falsification requires a theoretical system that is sufficiently fixed and determinate so as to enable indubitable logical deduction. Whether the correct word for such a system is "closed" or "bounded" I don't know. Feel free to substitute "bounded, if that works better for you; but the question stands. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu> [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Wednesday, November 07, 2012 11:39 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: [xmca] ISCAR Newsletter? David-- It had never occurred to me that sciences are by definition closed. Bounded perhaps? With leaky borders and a commitment to falsification? mike On Wed, Nov 7, 2012 at 8:08 AM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu<mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote:So, Nektarios, CHAT is just chat! More seriously, thinking of CHAT as a methodology--a set of practices--accommodates what seems to be its irrevocably "open," non-absolute in character. But what does this do to the aspirations of sociocultural psychology to be taken seriously as a "science?" Aren't sciences, by definition, closed systems of thought? --Has sociocultural psychology renounced those ambitions? --Are theorists divided on the question of whether sociocultural theory strives for closure? --Are theorists ambivalent about this issue, unsure about how to frame these aspirations? --Or, perhaps, in a poststructural frame, are the aspirations of sociocultural theory indexed to particular discourses, in some of which sociocultural theory is clearly scientific, and others clearly not? --None of the above? David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu> [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>] On Behalf Of Nektarios Alexi Sent: Wednesday, November 07, 2012 9:25 AM To: ablunden@mira.net<mailto:ablunden@mira.net> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: RE: [xmca] ISCAR Newsletter? What an interesting genealogy!! So the father of CHAT was Aristotle?:) Is ike the Abraham of Bible?:) But i think in terms of dialectical materialism CHAT it is all them interrelating to each other,and one theorists complementing each other and very often the fruit of it is a qualitavely different theory than the other but neverthless the fruit of the previous theories.. So it means that CHAT it is not a close system, it is not an absolute theory, it is more like a method that because of its not teleological morphology it always create the appropriate space to integrate anything relevant that helps us to understand us (humans) in relation to society and culture and vice versa? Nektarios -----Original Message----- From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>] Sent: Thu 11/8/2012 12:36 AM To: Nektarios Alexi Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: [xmca] ISCAR Newsletter? Others can probably enlighten us more than I can, Nektarios, but I think he was a very erudite person. Clearly from a young age he was hungry for knowledge and read widely in many languages. But specifically, he was coming of age in Russia right in the midst of the Russian Revolution. This revolution threw literally millions of people into all kinds of "social criticism" (Luria describes the tumultuous scene in his University at the time, in his Autobiography). New movements in Art, literature, Linguistics, natural science, social theory, philosophy, technology, social organisation,... sprung up spontaneously on all sides. Vygotsky was a part of that. That is the main thing. But for geopolitical reasons it was a short-lived "Spring." In particular, I think, Vygotsky came from Art Criticism (in a milieu where drama theory, linguistics and aesthetic theory were making world historic advances in Vygotsky's immediate social circle. Then his intellectual disposition (as exhibited in his Psychology of Art) took him into education and scientific psychology. At that time, prior to and independently of the Revolution, Russia was already in the forefront of Behaviourist research in Psychology. Vygotsky was in an ideal position to bring the social criticism he learnt as a student into the scientific establishment around Pavlov, Bekhterev, etc. Add to that his close study of Marx's Capital, Lenin's philosophical works, and Engels' popularisation, is the broth which produced Vygotsky. See http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/chat/Genealogy-CHAT.htm Andy Nektarios Alexi wrote: Hi Andy, My question is how Vygotsky could tackle such subtle problems in the theories of Piaget but also others in his book Thought and Language? What kind of intellectual or theoretical backgorund did Vygotsky had that allowed him to see the human nature in such a depth and not just that but also find the precise language to describe it, but not just describe it but describe it in scientific terms and also with evidence? Can we say that it was his comprehensive knowledge on arts and especially of classic literature that helped him to see that deep and notice such subtle details and errors in so many other important psychological theories of his time? Just saying.. Nektarios -----Original Message----- From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Larry Purss Sent: Thu 11/8/2012 12:02 AM To: ablunden@mira.net<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: [xmca] ISCAR Newsletter? Andy I just finished reading your article in the newsletter. It is a clear statement of ways to expand the conversation. I have recently re-read the 1st chapter of Raymond Williams book *Marxism and Literature* on the concept of *culture*. It is a wonderful history on the shifting flowing transforming meanings of various uses of the concept *culture* I noticed at the beginning of the article you are affiliated with a group with the title *continental philosophy* I often wonder if this umbrella term could be more explicitly brought into the conversation to illuminate the multiple streams of sociocultural theory and how CHAT is situated within this umbrella term. It would possibly assist in engaging deeply with philosophy as you advocate. I would like to bring in a distinction that Charles Taylor uses between what he refers to as *strict* dialectics and *interpretive* dialectics. Strict dialectics assumes each side of the dialectic [for example individual and social] are interactive but the essence of the objects interacting is determined. Interpretive dialectics in contrast puts in play the interpretive nature of the objects which are then joined in interaction. I am attaching the first two chapters of Raymond Williams book *Marxism and Literature* which I believe is an example of *interpretive* dialectics as described by Charles Taylor. The contrast between the notions *strict* and *interpretive* may be helpful in illuminating different notions of *interaction* and *activity* within mediated worlds. Andy, I hope others read the ISCAR newletter and join with us in a friendly CHAT. Larry On Wed, Nov 7, 2012 at 5:42 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > Strangely enough, Ron, my first contacts with Vygotskyan theory was with > academic colleagues at the University of Melbourne, with whom I was > interacting in the project of creating collaborative learning spaces. I > knew about social constructionism, which I took to be Berger and > post-modern critical theory (having only the vaguest knowledge of these > things) but then from my colleagues, who were van der Veer and Valsiner > types, I was surprised to find out that Vygotsky (whose name I knew from > Ilyenkov) was also a constructivist (I have never properly separated the > way those two words are used). So I then got a book out of the library on > constructivist epistemology which said that there were dozens of varieties > of constructivism, but that Vygotsky was a constructivist who took the > collaboration of carer-child dyads as the basis for the social construction > of knowledge, rather than the wider culture .... took me quite a while to > find my bearings in all that mess. > > I just think that we always have to allow a lot of latitude in > understanding what people actually mean when they use a word in a given > context. A word meaning is not a concept. > > Andy > > > Ron Lubensky wrote: > >> Hi Andy, >> >> I too thought the ISCAR newsletter interview article was very good. I >> especially liked your comparison of CHAT to interactionist approaches, >> which you and I have discussed before. One area that continues to be messy, >> as you suggest, is the relationship of CHAT to social constructIVism and >> social constructIONism. >> >> Since CHAT's first home is developmental psychology, it is out of the >> work of Piaget and Papert that these terms are usually defined, and so >> closely that they are often conflated. While these theories acknowledge the >> social and perhaps cultural influences on learning and interpretation, they >> centre on a cognitivist, mental model view of knowledge. There is also the >> normative aspect of giving control to the learner to construct his or her >> individual world-view. >> >> The other social constructIONism comes out of communications and >> sociology (e.g. Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, >> 1966), that challenges the inevitability of categorisations that are taken >> for granted in common discourse, and which form the bases for many >> institutions. This post-modern constructIONism generally places knowledge >> in discourse and interaction, but in more recent scholarship focuses on the >> cultural situation of the individual. This isn't a learning theory but >> rather a critical, meta-theoretical stance. To complicate matters, there >> are different strands with various accounts of what should be treated as >> real, true, essential, scientific, etc. and how communication should relate >> to action. It also challenges academic research standards with advocacy for >> interventionist approaches to practice. For an interdisciplinary expansion >> of CHAT, I think this constructIONism offers a rich field for comparison. >> >> -- >> Ron Lubensky >> http://www.deliberations.com.**au/ < http://www.deliberations.com.au/> >> 0411 412 626 >> Melbourne Australia >> > > -- > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > ------------ > *Andy Blunden* > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ < http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/> > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > http://ucsd.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden< http://ucsd.academia.edu/AndyBlunden> > > ______________________________**____________ > _____ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca< http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> > -- ________________________________ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://ucsd.academia.edu/AndyBlunden __________________________________________ _____ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca __________________________________________ _____ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca__________________________________________ _____ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca __________________________________________ _____ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca --
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