And no one cc's Jan on all this??
mike
On Thu, Sep 1, 2011 at 3:06 PM, Bakker, A. (Arthur) <A.Bakker4@uu.nl>
wrote:
Nicely put, Larry!
And perfectly in line with David Bakhurst's views on education as
Bildung,
helping students to develop autonomy (having reasons rather than being
subject to causal effects; and developing knowledge not as something
external but helping humans to be in charge, be free).
Yes, Jan's paper on Vygotsky and Spinoza is certainly worth reading.
And thanks for pointing to Theory & Psychology. Andy's paper on Gestalt
is
very interesting!
Arthur
________________________________________
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] on
behalf
of Larry Purss [lpscholar2@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2011 4:25 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Representationalism, as a way of knowing, has a
history
Thanks Arthur
I want to also suggest looking at Jan's article "The Unity of Intellect
and
Will: Vygotsky and Spinoza" in the journal "Education Review" vol.56,
June,
2004 pp113-120.
Jan, in the article quotes Pippen:
"One way of understanding a FREE life - 'your own life' - is to consider
which of your past decisions you could truly be said to 'stand behind,'
where that means being able to defend or JUSTIFY them when challenged, or
even which you could claim to understand. 'Having reasons' in THIS sense
for
what you did, having something to say about 'why,' is a general condition
for some event being considered an action of yours at all, and not having
ANY reasons means it is very hard to understand ANY link between you and
what conduct you engage in" [Pippen 2000]
Jan is making the point that if we do not have reasons and judgements for
our actions, we would therefore be SUBJECT to our actions rather than in
control of them. As Pippen says, A better form of self-understanding
might
make it possible to say you led a life more 'your own' ". It is in this
sense that Jan suggests Vygotsky sees education as a freedom-enhancing
process. In Spinoza's terms, [as interpreted by Jan]
"to know the reasons why I act is to be a cause of myself (causa sui)
rather
than be the subject of extraneous determinations. The responsibility of a
scholar to interrogate and attempt to understand THE REASONS FOR a belief
or
perspective is developmental to both mind and free will" (p.116)
Arthur, Jan bringing Spinoza into the conversation and his notion of free
will [as both creative and constrained] is contrasted with our current
common sense folk psychology] notions of free will as being without
constraints. Jan points out the particular notion of free will we
operationalize has profound effects on the types of social arrangements
in
schools. The reason for education as Jan is articulating Vygotsky's
views
is to learn to understand the reasons for holding particular beliefs and
perspectives and rejecting others. Education is NOT the acquiring the
KNOWLEDGE of these beliefs and perspectives but rather learning a PROCESS
of
reasoning to help us understand the reasons WHY we hold particular
beliefs
and perspectives. [This is the same theme as Wittgensein suggesting the
fly
in the fly bottle and "learning" a way out of the bottle]
The development of "free will" [in Spinoza's and Vygotsky's terms - as
articulated by Jan] is a very powerful "ethical stance" to take towards
the
purpose of education. Charles Taylor's response to this particular
ethical
stance is to locate it in an even broader historical surrounding [horizon
of
understanding] that VALUES making assertoric judgements and reasons FOR
our
actions a particular historically formed "ethical stance"
This in no way challenges the notion that todays purpose for education is
to
develop the skills of giving and asking for reasons in order to develop
"free will" and become less constrained [subjected] to circumstances.
I would only add that developing the skills of giving and asking for
reasons
not loose sight of Taylor's DISTINCTION that there is another central
apect
to speech acts - the disclosive - It is the aspect of disclosive speech
acts that John Shotter's project is articulating.
The relational links between "free will" and "reason" seems to be a
fertile
con-text to explore further. However, the distinction between the
assertoric and disclosive aspects of speech acts is also a key
distinction
in exploring "reasoning" as an intersubjective, dialogical process of
dwelling in the world as a particular "way of life" which is INformed
from
within a particular "ethical stance" [how we SHOULD or OUGHT to proceed
when
orienting to the world] .
Taylor is asking us to NOTICE this more inclusive historical con-text as
we
proceed together
Larry
Thu, Sep 1, 2011 at 4:02 AM, Bakker, A. (Arthur) <A.Bakker4@uu.nl>
wrote:
Here is the online first version that I have of Jan Derry's paper (Jan
is
female :-). Guess nothing wrong with emailing this one (not the
published
one).
Arthur
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On
Behalf Of Larry Purss
Sent: dinsdag 30 augustus 2011 16:46
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Representationalism, as a way of knowing, has a
history
Arthur
Thanks for Deery's article.
On page 14 he writes about our "second nature" that operates withIN
what
McDowell [drawing on Wilfred Sellars] called "the space of reasons".
Then
Deery writes, in regard to this "space of reasons" that "our responses
are
NECESSARILY normative"
It is this normative aspect of the space of reasons that Charles Taylor
is
pointing to in his exploration of ETHICAL stances in the world.
Also on page 7 of the article it points out that Wertsch draws on
Taylors
distinction between the DESIGNATIVE [signifies reference TO the object
or
TO
SAYING ABOUT the object] and the contrast with EXPRESSIVIST approaches
to
meaning. This parallels Taylors distinction between the
assertoric/disclosive aspects of speech acts.
Arthur, this in no way challenges what Deery and you are pointing to in
elaborating "a space of reasons". It only highlights Taylor's point
that
the DESIGNATIVE [assertoric] METHOD of participating in speech acts
must
be
embedded withIN a "way of life" that points to a particular ETHICAL
STANCE
that is expressed withIN a "way of life". My understanding of Taylor
is
that the "space of reasons" is a culturalhistorical METHOD of
understanding
and knowledge that REQUIRES a "committment" [which is implicit within a
horizon of understanding]. As Martin Packer has pointed out, most of
us
have accepted the "cost" of participating within this particular
"reasoned"
way of life as we developed our "selves". In Taylor's view we have
made
a
committment to a way of life.
To emphasize Taylor's key point, it is not reason he is questioning but
reason ALONE [as reductive] His perspective suggests the
expressive/disclosive realm of speech acts should not be reduced to the
designative/assertoric space of reasons. It is his opinion that it is
useful to make a distinction between these aspects of speech acts. It
is
then key to link up or interweave these two distinct forms of
utterances
[in
a way similar to weaving thinking and speech. This is a very complex
task
but would start by NOTICING 2 distinct realms of speec acts.
If one agrees with this perspective then Shotter, and Bahktin and
others
exploring the disclosive/expressive [Taylor] realm may be asking us to
NOTICE another critical realm of speech acts.
PS The latest journal "Theory & Psychology" has articles by Andy, John
Shotter, Ivana Markova [dialogical theory] and Eugene Matusov.
Thanks Arthur for the article. It is helping me differentiate multiple
notions of "reason" and how they get expressed. I have also retreived
Deery's article exploring the links between Vygotsky and Spinoza that
was
referenced in the bibliography of the article you circulated.
Larry
On Tue, Aug 30, 2011 at 2:50 AM, Bakker, A. (Arthur) <A.Bakker4@uu.nl
wrote:
Andy,
It was certainly not my intention to merge inference in the
philosophical
sense and statistical inference. In fact, in the paper, we tried to
warn
the
reader for possible confusion, but apparently not clear enough.
I asked Jan Derry about how Brandom is influenced by Hegel. She wrote
to
me:
"Brandom argues that Hegel developed a non-psychological conception
of
the
conceptual in the Phenomenology where conceptual content is
articulated
by
determinate negation. He sees himself as following this line in his
own
work
e.g. when the parrot says red it only reacts to the stimuli, the
human
utterance of red already entails not green, not blue etc. - the
inferential
relations are prior to the designation. Of course, many Hegel
scholars
resist any argument that Brandom is following Hegel."
See further Derry's paper on rationality, a draft is here;
http://eprints.ioe.ac.uk/1138/1/Derry2008Abstract49.pdf
You are right that an educational focus on inferences is not
sufficient;
it
is about the type of inferences. As you write, there are inferences
from
"the mean is 6" that are very boring, schoolish etc. What I should
perhaps
have emphasized more is that we were after inferences that
statisticians
and
knowers of statistics make with airthmetic means, such as judging the
difference between two groups - something that receives little
attention
in
middle school and which students are often not inclined to do. So we
stimulated students to engage in more authentic problems in which
they
can
see the need to use the mean (and other statistical concepts) in
fruitful
ways and linked to contextual meaning. I don't see the dressage here!
In
fact, the standard approach of addressing all concepts and
representations
one by one and testing them with some simple calculations is much
more
drill-and-practice.
I agree that there is no judgement without concept and vice versa.
But
we
noticed that if we stimualted students to make
observations/judgements
that
their concepts developed, whereas the prior focus on drilling
computations
seemed to lead to inert knowledge, forgetting how they should be
done.
I do have one point of critique on Brandom's inferentialism, and that
is
what Bakhurst more eloquently articulates than I can (chapter 5 of
his
Formation of Reason book). It is Brandom's decision to reverse the
order
of
explanation; instead of the Descartian/representationalist route from
representation to inference, he starts with inference in particular
practices and methodologically explains how representations get their
meaning. Like Bakhurst, I actually think (and my experience in
classrooms
supports this) that representation and ifnerence go hand in hand.
Brandom's
methodological explanation of starting with inference can therefore
not
be
transferred to how learning develops in this extreme form, I think.
But,
as
an antidote to how many teachers and even some researchers seem to
think
about knowing and learning, I find Brandom's idea pretty useful.
Arthur
________________________________________
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] on
behalf
of Andy Blunden [ablunden@mira.net]
Sent: Saturday, August 20, 2011 5:51 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Representationalism, as a way of knowing, has a
history
Arthur,
I have had a chance to read the paper you did with Jan Derry, but
unfortunately Robert Brandom is still a closed book to me. I
understood
from friends that he was some kind of Hegelian, but I can't see this
in
your quotations. I may get the wrong end of the stick in my comments
due
to not knowing Brandom. Also, my positive response to the idea of
Vygotsky as an "inferentialist" as opposed to a "representationalist"
was probably premature, as in your paper "inference" is merged with
"statistical inference." So I may be confused. Please excuse me if I
get
things mixed up.
Firstly, I think I agree with the recommendations you are making to
teachers of statistics. This is because a concept can only be grasped
(and Vygotsky agrees) as a situation, or as a problem and its
solution.
I gather you propose confronting students with problems, and then
offering them some statistical tools to use to solve the problem.
This
approach is of course straight out of the Vygotsky handbook. It also
reflects a certain concept of concept ... but this is not what I
gather
an "inferentialist" concept of concept is according to Brandom
(judging
from your quotes only), and I can anticipate a line of argument
basing
itself on statistical inference which manages to reconcile empiricism
to
the obvious fact that human beings can reason. (It is an idea which
is
popular among the neuroscientists as well, being a variation on the
idea
of conditioned reflex.) If this is what Brandom argues, then my
interest
in him declines apace. I think Hegel and Vygotsky have a far superior
approach. :)
You quote Brandom as follows: "The concept _concept_ is not
intelligible
apart from the possibility of such application in judging. ...To
grasp
or understand (...) a concept is to have practical mastery over the
inferences it is involved in - to know, in the practical sense of
being
able to distinguish, what follows from the applicability of a
concept,
and what follows from it."
I really don't see the Big Leap Forward from "representationalism"
here.
How is this reflected in the concept of "mean"? Presumably when a
student can recognise when a number such as 6 is the mean of 3, 6 and
9?
and reason with it, eg the mean of x + y = the mean of x plus the
mean
of y. This is not how I think you are suggesting teachers teach
statistics.
The quote from Vygotsky: "we must seek the psychological equivalent
of
the conceptnot in general representations ... [but] in a system of
judgments in which the concept is disclosed." NB "*disclosed*", i.e.,
we
can observe that a concept has been grasped when correct judgments
are
made based on the concept. But I think it is wrong to deduce from
this
that judgment is prior to concept in analysis, in structure or in
learning. You can't make a judgment on a concept unless you know the
concept. Agreed, learning the concept, in practice, transforms error
into understanding. But this really proves nothing. Judgments get
better
as you get a better and better grasp of the concept. But what is the
concept? The only sense I cana make of this is some kind of dressage.
So I am a little bemused.
Andy
Bakker, A. (Arthur) wrote:
Interesting discussion! Here is my penny on representationalism.
Robert Brandom puts forward his inferentialism as an alternative to
representationalism. Inferentialism in my view is a significant
development
in contemporary philosophy, which places inference rather than
representation at the heart of human knowing, and which also has
implications for education. Brandom explains the meaning of
representations
from people's participation in the game of giving and asking for
reasons
(inference).
Brandom, R. B. (2000). Articulating reasons: An introduction to
inferentialism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
See also the recent book by David Bakhurst - The formation of
reason
-
on
this topic. He argues that Brandom is perhaps too drastic in
reversing
the
order of explanation.
With Jan Derry I have written a more educationally oriented paper
on
inferentialism as an alternative to representationalism (quite common
in
statistics education, e.g.):
Bakker, A. & Derry, J. (2011). Lessons from inferentialism for
statistics
education. Mathematical Thinking and Learning, 13, 5-26.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10986065.2011.538293
I cite a small part from this article:
+++++
Representationalism refers to the position that representations are
the
basic theoretical construct of knowledge. In common with several
philosophers (e.g., Dewey, Heidegger, Rorty,
Wittgenstein) and educators (e.g., Cobb, Yackel, & Wood, 1992),
Brandom
(2000) takes issue with this approach noting the dominance of the
representational paradigm since Descartes:
Awareness was understood in representational terms. . . .
Typically,
specifically conceptual representations were taken to be just one
kind
of
representation of which and by means of which we can be aware. (p. 7)
Representationalism is based on the assumption that the use of
concepts
was explained by what they refer to (i.e., where conceptual content
is
primarily understood atomistically rather than relationally). Knowing
what
individual concepts mean is then the basis for being able to make
sentences
and claims, which in turn can be connected to make inferences.
Assuming
that
a definition of a concept fully conveys its meaning is a possible
consequence of such a view.
Brandom reverses the representationalist order of explanation,
which
leads to an account that he refers to as inferentialism. Taking
judgments
as
the primary units of knowledge rather than representations, he
reminds
us
that:
One of [Kant's] cardinal innovations is the claim that the
fundamental
unit of awareness or cognition, the minimum graspable, is the
judgment.
Judgments are fundamental, since they are the minimal unit one can
take
responsibility for on the cognitive side, just as actions are the
corresponding unit of responsibility on the practical side. . . .
Applying a
concept is to be understood in terms of making a claim or expressing
a
belief. The concept concept is not intelligible apart from the
possibility
of such application in judging. (Brandom, 2000, pp. 159-160, emphases
in
the
original)
This entails giving priority to inference in accounts of what it is
to
grasp a concept:
To grasp or understand (. . .) a concept is to have practical
mastery
over the inferences it is involved in-to know, in the practical sense
of
being able to distinguish, what follows from the applicability of a
concept,
and what it follows from. (Brandom, 2000, p. 48) This clarifies his
definition of concepts as "broadly inferential norms that implicitly
govern
practices of giving and asking for reasons" (Brandom, 2009, p. 120).
Any
inference leading to a claim is made within such a normative context.
Claims both serve as and stand in need of reasons or
justifications.
They
have the contents they have in part in virtue of the role they play
in
a
network of inferences. (Brandom, 2000, p. 162)
++++
We also cite Vygotsky on this issue:
We must seek the psychological equivalent of the concept not in
general
representations, . . . not even in concrete verbal images that
replace
the
general representations-we must seek it in a system of judgments in
which
the concept is disclosed. (Vygotsky, 1998, p. 55)
and think Vygotsky can be interpreted from an inferentialist rather
than
a representationalist perspective.
See further
Derry, J. (2008). Abstract rationality in education: From Vygotsky
to
Brandom. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 27, 49-62.
Arthur
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:
xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On Behalf Of Larry Purss
Sent: dinsdag 16 augustus 2011 3:36
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Representationalism, as a way of knowing, has a
history
Tony,
The point that Karen Barad is making is that there is a long
historical
line
of viewing the world through a particular set of lenses.
Representationalism and its basic metaphysical premises that
"entities",
"things", "relata", PRE-EXIST phenomena and it is through the
INTER-activity
of pre-existing "atoms" that relationships form. Karen's
INTRA-activity
perspective argues the opposite position, that phenomena pre-exist
the
agential "cutting" or scientific "scissors" that are applied to
phenomena.
WithIN this phenomenal intra-activity of cutting fuzzy boundaries
emerge
and
BECOME more distinct and "structured" within the phenomena. Karen
always
puts in scare quotes terms such as "components" "parts" and other
terms
that attempt to explain "things" withIN phenomena. From her
perspective
"relata" or "entties" do not exist prior to intra-activity but are
emerging
aspects OF this situated intra-activity.
Her perspective emerges from an elaboration of Neils Bohrs work in
theoretical physics. Karen received her doctorate in theoretical
physics
and
then moved into philosophy. I'm going to quote a key section of her
article.
"Bohr rejects the atomistic metaphysics that takes "things" as
ontologically
basic entities. For Bohr, things do not have inherently determinate
meanings. Bohr also calls into question the related Cartesian
belief
in
the
inherent distinction between subject and object, and knower and
known....
It
[Bohr's epistemological framework] rejects the presupposition that
language
and measurement perform mediating functions. Language does not
represent
states of affairs, and measurements do not represent
measurement-independent
states of being."
For Bohr the uncertainty principle is not a matter of "uncertainty"
at
all
but rather of INDETERMINANCY of phenomena. For Bohr THEORETICAL
CONCEPTS
[e.g., "position" and "momentum"] are NOT ideational in character
but
rather
are SPECIFIC PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS which are not inherent
attributes
of
independently existing objects. Any measurement of "position" must
use
a
RIGID apparatus [such as a ruler] and the "position" is NOT
attributed
to
the abstract independently existing "object" but rather is a
property
of
the
PHENOMENON - the inseparability of "observed object" and "agencies
of
observation". This relational phenomena BETWEEN the apparatuses of
production and the phenomena produced is a process of "agential
intra-action"
Karen then states,
"Therefore, according to Bohr, the PRIMARY epistemological unit is
NOT
independent objects with inherent boundaries and properties but
rather
PHENOMENA. On my agential realist elaboration, [of Bohr's
uncertainty
principle] phenomena do not merely mark the epistemological
inseparability
of "observer" and "observed"; rather, PHENOMENA ARE THE ONTOLOGICAL
INSEPARABILITY OF AGENTIALLY INTRA-ACTING "COMPONENTS" That is,
phenomena
are ontologically primitive relations - relations without
pre-existing
relata."
>From Karen's perspective there is always a mutual ontological
dependence of
"relata" withIN the relation. Phenomena is the ontological
primitive.
Relata
only exist withIN phenomena as a result of specific intra-actions.
There
is
only relata-withIN-relations.
To make this perspective concrete Karen gives this example. When
light
passes through a two-slit diffraction apparatus the light forms a
wavelike
diffraction pattern. BUT light also exhibits PARTICLElike
characteristics
called PHOTONS. The apparatus can be modified to allow only one
slit
and
THIS modification allows a DETERMINATION of a given photon's
position
as
particles only go through a single slit at a time. However in this
intra-activity the wavelike diffraction pattern is destroyed. Bohr
explains
this wave-particle paradox as follows: "the objective referent is
not
some
abstract independently existing entity but rather the PHENOMENON of
light
intra-acting with the apparatus. The FIRST apparatus gives
DETERMINATE
MEANING to the notion of "wave". The second apparatus gives
DETERMINATE
MEANING to the notion of "particle" The notions of "wave" and
"particle"
do
NOT refer to inherent characteristics of an object that PRECEDES
its
intra-action. THERE ARE NO SUCH INDEPENDENTLY EXISTING OBJECTS WITH
INHERENT
CHARACTERISTICS. As Karen emphasizes, the two DIFFERENT
APPARATUSES
effect
DIFFERENT CUTS [measures]. That is draw different distinctions
delineating
the "measured object" FROM the "measuring instrument". In other
words
Karen
believes the two phenomena DIFFER in their local MATERIAL
resolutions
OF
the
inherent ontological INDETERMINANCY withIN phenomena.
Tony, this is certainly a shift of "perspective" but one that is
"grist
for
the mill" It does emphasize phenomena as inherently relational and
objects
[relata] as derivative. Not sure where this fits into CHAT or
phenomenology. John Shotter has diffracted Karen Barad's
perspective
THROUGH
his elaboration of speech acts from a perspective that diffracts
Bakhtin.
He also brings in Merleau-Ponty's perspectives. Tim Ingold's
articles
also
point in this direction. Certainly challenges the
representationalist
epistemology/ontology.
Larry
On Mon, Aug 15, 2011 at 8:59 AM, Tony Whitson <twhitson@udel.edu>
wrote:
I think what Larry says is right about the Cartesian legacy, but I
think
the legacy in the Anglophone world might owe as much to Hobbes and
Locke. I
see all three as sources of the common legacy of modernism.
Descartes is more rationalist while Hobbes and Locke are more
empiricist,
but representationalism is what's common to them all.
On Sun, 14 Aug 2011, Larry Purss wrote:
Hi Martin
The other post had 18 entries so thought I would begin a new
post.
Karen Barad, in 2003, wrote an article, "Posthumanist
Performativity:
Toward
an nderstanding of how Matter Comes to Matter" in the journal
"Signs:
Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 2003, Vol.28, no. 3 pp.
801-831"
She has a provocative quote that speaks to Vygotsky's historical
methodology
or way of seeing. She is pointing to the fact that both
scientific
realism
and social constructivism share common ground in how they view
scientific
knowledge IS the multiple representational forms which MEDIATE
our
access
to
the material world. Where they differ is on the question of
referent.
Whether scientific knowledge represents things in the world as
they
really
are or "objects" that are the PRODUCTS of social activities, but
Karen
points out BOTH groups subscribe to representationalism.
Karen points out,
"Representationalism is so deeply entrenched withIN Western
culture
that
it
has taken on a common sense appeal. It seems inescapable, if not
downright
natural. But representationalism (like "nature itself," not merly
our
representations of it!) HAS A HISTORY" [p. 806]
She references Ian Hacking who traced this notion of knowledge
back
to
Ancient Greece and the Democritean dream of atoms and the void
that
posited
a gap between representations and represented and the concept of
"appearance" makes its first appearance. Karen's perspective is
that
the
problem of realism in philosophy is a PRODUCT of THIS atomistic
worldview.
And from this moment in history the consequence of this product
isthe
DIVISION between "internal" and "external" that breaks the line
of
the
knowing subject.
Joseph Rouse is quoted in Karen's article. He states,
"The presumption that we can know what we mean, or what our
verbal
performances say, more readily than we can know the objects those
sayings
are about is a Cartesian legacy, a LINQUISTIC variation on
Descartes'
insistence that we have a direct and privileged access to the
contents
of
our thoughts that we lack towards the "external" world."
Karen summarizes this section of her article by saying,
"In other words, the ASYMMETRICAL FAITH in our access to
representations
over things is a contingent fact of HISTORY and not a logical
necessity;
that is, it is simply a Cartesian habit of mind. It takes a
healthy
skepticism toward Cartesian doubt to begin to be able to see an
alternative"
(p. 807)
Karen ends with a concrete example of this perspective which she
borrows
from Foucault. In sixteenth century Europe, language was not
thought
of
as
a
MEDIUM; rather, it was simply "one of the figurations of the
world".
(Foucault, 1970, p.56). Today the notion of "con-figurations" or
gestalten
point in the same direction of a shift away from representative
notions
of
knowledge formation. This shift allows us to use our "scissors"
differently
as we make "agential CUTS" in coming to dwell in the world.
Larry
______________________________**____________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
Tony Whitson
UD School of Education
NEWARK DE 19716
twhitson@udel.edu
______________________________**_
"those who fail to reread
are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
-- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
______________________________**____________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
__________________________________________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
__________________________________________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
Joint Editor MCA:
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=g932564744
Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
Book: http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857
MIA: http://www.marxists.org
__________________________________________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
__________________________________________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
__________________________________________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
__________________________________________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
__________________________________________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
__________________________________________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
__________________________________________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca