Re: [xmca] Merleau-Ponty and Vygotsky

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

The following blog entry on "Being Alive" may contribute here, Larry and
Sarah, for those who have no idea of what we are going on about. (I have the
book on Kindle. Hard to get it into transmittable form on line for
discussion purposes)

http://blog.uvm.edu/aivakhiv/2011/06/14/tim-ingold-the-liveliness-of-the-living/

Ingold makes lots of very relevant points. I am enjoying the implications of
focusing
on "the materials" instead of "materiality" and his sympathetic but critical
approach
to Actor Network Theory.

So many directions to go, so many threads to follow!!!
mike

On Mon, Jul 18, 2011 at 8:46 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi Sarah
>
> Welcome to XMCA.  Your bringing in the writings of the "enactivists" is a
> perspective that I also agree is a line of inquiry that can deepen our
> reflections on dwelling in the world.
> Could you tell us a bit more about McGilchrist's new book. How does it link
> up to notions of dwelling-in-the-world?
>
> Your reference to Ingold's articles on the archives [google "ingold XMCA"
> and the archives are the first item. Then go to 2001 discussion papers] was
> a lead [line] that I followed up and I agree that his critique of the
> "complimentary thesis" and the alternative perspective of developing
> "skills
> in attention" or "tuning" is exploring the theme of dwelling in the world.
> As Mike mentioned, Merleau-Ponty's perspective on "knowing" as "expression"
> [not to be confused with Husserlian expression] is explorinf this realm of
> paying attention and tuning as a way to be at home or dwell in the world.
> I also hope that this line of inquiry, [Ingold is an example, and so is
> John
> Shotter's article I posted from his website are exploring and re-searching
> the links and relations BETWEEN the visible [perceptual] and invisible
> [thought and language] that is NON-reductive to either empirial OR
> phenomenological accounts but rather is a REVERSIBLE intertwining. The
> example of binocular vision [Bateson and M-P both use this metaphor] and
> Bernstein's example of the smith [in Ingold's article in archives] are
> paradigmatic of this line of inquiry.  At the center of this line of
> inquiry
> is the exploration of "anticipation" "responsiveness to the other" AND the
> irreducability of the difference-separation of the other..
>
> One possible way to bring this line of inquiry into the discussion of
> Vygotsky's exploration of the levels of thought and language is to focus on
> the level of motivation which Vygotsky suggests [at the end of the book] is
> foundational for the EMERGENCE of thought and language.  This notion of
> motivation [a key concept in Vygotsky's project] points to the notion of
> "to
> motivate" [self and others] "to move" to "dwell-in-the-world", to be "at
> home in the world" as a process of RELATIONAL BEING and BECOMING that is
> always about EXCESS and OVERFLOWING and OVERLAPPING intertwining
> [REVERSIBLE
> ECART as separation-difference which is NOT difference as opposition]
> "Self" "other", "world" are always aspects of a single activity of
> expression that produce cultural historical objects.
>
> Larry
> On Mon, Jul 18, 2011 at 2:31 AM, Sarah Eagle <s.eagle@bristol.ac.uk>
> wrote:
>
> > I notice there are a couple of Ingold papers on the lchc Archive and that
> > there was a discussion of his work some years back on xmca. I've enjoyed
> > those papers and been dipping into the essays in his book *"The
> Perception
> > of the Environment: Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill*" (2000) at
> > the
> > same time as reading the work of the enactivists (Maturana, Varela,
> > Thompson) plus Iain McGilchrist's  *The Master and His Emissary: The
> > Divided
> > Brain and the Making of the Western World* (2009).
> >
> > It's quite a heady mix. Merleau-Ponty is a common thread across all.
> > Ingold's *flow* and *dwelling *finds parallels in both the other texts.
> I'm
> > not sufficiently well versed in Thought and Language to begin even to
> > phrase
> > questions about the connections with Vygotskian ideas, but I can see that
> > they are there. So I hope the Merleau-Ponty / Ingold thread continues and
> > helps at least this xmca reader to  begin to articulate her own queries
> and
> > lines of thought!
> >
> > Sarah Eagle, Graduate School of Education, University of Bristol, UK
> >
> > On 18 July 2011 07:19, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Mike, I do find this "line of inquiry" fascinating.
> > >  I googled Tim Ingold and notice he has written a book on how we
> "orient"
> > to
> > > the world through taking a particular "line".   I also notice he is
> > > exploring a concept labelled "dwelling-in-the-world".  Samuel Todes
> [who
> > > John Shotter has written about] wrote a book which he wrote as his
> thesis
> > in
> > > 1963. [It was finally published in 2001.] It is titled "Body and
> World".
> > In
> > > that book a central notion is the need to find a sense of being "at
> home
> > in
> > > the world".  My hunch is that Todes and Ingold are exploring similar
> > > themes.
> > > These notions of "dwelling-in-the-world" or "being
> at-home-in-the-world"
> > > point to what may be a central MOTIVATION of all persons.  If this is
> > > possible, then Vygotsky's summary statements of chapter seven of
> "thought
> > &
> > > world" where he transitions from "inner thought" to the more deeply
> > personal
> > > level of "motivation" may be the link or intertwining between  Vygotsky
> > and
> > > Merleau-Ponty [and Ingold, Todes, and Shotter]  M-P, Todes, Ingold, and
> > > Shotter are all exploring the notion of "expression" or "expressive
> > > cognition" as the concept linking [intertwining]  "sedimented"
> > > discourses [systems of meaning] and the living microgenetic movement of
> > > creative novel embodied expressive cognition.  In other words, a
> central
> > > motivation for persons may be the process of orienting or coordinating
> > > activities in order to feel at home in the world.
> > > Since expessive cognition for M-P IS this movement of orienting or
> > dwelling
> > > in the world, his particular notion of expressive cognition [as a
> master
> > > concept] needs to be elaborated.  The first step is to distinguish
> M-P's
> > > notion of expression from Husserl's notion of expression. They are
> > radically
> > > different.  Following is Lawrence Hass' acount of the differences.
> > >
> > >  Husserl  was articulating a "platonic" perspective of searching for
> the
> > > NECESSARY property [eidos] that is inherent to and defines an object.
> >  For
> > > M-P the goal was to articulate how the world is illuminated through
> open
> > > ambiguous gestalts that with expression  form along one line of
> > possibility
> > > [among multiple potential possibilities]  Phenomenology as articulated
> by
> > > Husserl's notion of "expression" was a search for the differentiation
> of
> > the
> > > empirical from expression [subjectivity]
> > >  This position is often taken to be the central idea of all
> > phenomenology.
> > > However M-P's phenomenology is distinctly non-Husserlian and
> > > anti-transcendental. For M-P "knowledge" is NOT re-presentation of what
> > has
> > > come before or a search for transcendental objects outside history. For
> > M-P
> > > "expression" is a creative transformation [sublimation] of the given
> > field
> > > into new novel forms. Lawrence Hass compares M-P's insights on
> expression
> > as
> > > similar in many respects to Deleuze's notion that centralizes
> expression
> > as
> > > an operation through which univocal being perpetually unfolds,
> > multiplies,
> > > and differentiates itself.
> > >
> > > Hass points out how M-P's project had a developmental history. In his
> > > earlier work M-P focused on the priority of "origins" and talked of
> > > expression as "originating" thought. Thought was secondary or derived
> > from
> > > expression. Living perception was also primary to thought.  Hass agrees
> > that
> > > M-P's earlier work is open to this line of critique or "nostalgia for
> > > origins" and a search for what is primary. In his earlier works living
> > > perception was more primary than scientific discourse.  But in M-P's
> > later
> > > writings he came to understand this line of understanding phenomenology
> > was
> > > flawed.  He came to realize that phenomenology is only one important
> mode
> > or
> > > level of discourse ABOUT the world, but not more fundamental than all
> the
> > > other possible modes and he stopped talk of what is primary.  For M-P
> the
> > > phenomenon of expression requires a radical re-vision [re-search] of
> the
> > > whole notion of "primary"
> > >
> > > M-P  acknowledges secondary, derived, ready-made thoughts as the upshot
> > of
> > > expressions that have SETTLED into habits. However, new, novel
> expressive
> > > thinking and speaking always emerge amid sedimented thoughts, memories,
> > and
> > > language WITHOUT BEING REDUCIBLE TO THEM.  The relation between
> > expressive
> > > and sedimented thought and language is mutually informing, symbiotic,
> > > non-reductive, intertwining. I will quote M-P to highlight this
> important
> > > point.
> > >
> > > "We must therefore say about sedimented language in relation to meaning
> > > [that is expression] what Simone de Beauvoir says of the body in
> relation
> > to
> > > the mind: it is neither primary or secondary... there is no
> subordination
> > > ... between them.  What we have to SAY is only the EXCESS of what we
> live
> > > over what has already been said"
> > >
> > > Expressive thought is not derived in any deductive or causal sense FROM
> > > sedimented language as GIVEN but neither is it more primary than or
> > > foundational than sedimented language. The relationship is MARKED not
> by
> > > empiricist or phenomenological REDUCTION but rather by excess and
> > > creativity.  M-P is not denying the originality of the order or system
> or
> > > discourse of knowledge vis-a-vis the perceptual order.  M-P is only
> > trying
> > > to loosen the web that ties them to one another, to re-discover the
> paths
> > of
> > > sublimation which transform the perceived world into the spoken world.
> > [This
> > > style of writing seems to have parallels to chapter 7 of Thought and
> > > Language]  M-P's perspective on this relation between perception and
> > > word highlights its non-reductive REVERSIBILITY between the visible and
> > > invisible [perception and thought and language]  For M-P expression,
> > > thinking, and language are intertwined aspects of the invisible.
> > >
> > > This line of thinking explores the deepest  level [of motivation as
> > > expression] as a way to dwell-in-the-world or be at home in the world.
>  I
> > > wonder if this line of inquiry has the potential to delve deeper into
> the
> > > links between the levels of motivation and inner thought and word
> meaning
> > in
> > > Vygotsky's project?  Chapter 7 of Vygotsky's Thought and Language ends
> > with
> > > his reflecting on the level of motivation as fundamental and primary to
> > the
> > > forming of thought and language.  Merleau-Ponty, Todes, Ingold, and
> > Shotter
> > > are scholars who are exploring a particular aspect of motivation within
> a
> > > cultural-historical perspective.  Motivation as orienting and
> > coordinating
> > > [expression] as a WAY to be at home in the world.
> > >
> > > A final comment is that this line of thinking may add to the relections
> > on
> > > discourse and activity that Anna Sfard and Andy were discussing as a
> > search
> > > for an intertwining "discursive activity"  Lawrence Hass in his book
> > reviews
> > > Husserl's views on mathematical objects that adds other perspectives to
> > > understanding math objects. Anna's theory of reification as
> communication
> > > shares many points of agreement with M-P.  However, he adds a
> perceptual
> > > level of intertwining to add another dimension to the discussion.
> > >
> > > Larry
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 9:57 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > > I figured you would be interested in the way M-P is circulating
> around
> > this
> > > > and related discussions, Larry.
> > > >
> > > > Right now my wife has our copy of *Metaphysical Club* with the turned
> > down
> > > > pages.
> > > > She has picked out some other relevant passages. I asked Tony a while
> > back
> > > > about
> > > > the book because, in addition to finding it fascinating and relevant
> to
> > > > xmca
> > > > discussions, I was uncertain of the interpretation of Pierce .
> > > >
> > > > This speaks to the complaints about relying on interpreters, as Anton
> > and
> > > > Miller are advocating. Terrible to rely on interpreters, I agree.
> Just
> > hard
> > > > to avoid relying on them all the time. I fear wading into Pierce.
> > > >
> > > > With Merleau-Ponty I was so caught by his talk on people seen from
> the
> > > > outside, I have been pondering over that text ever since. The new
> > Ingold
> > > > book, suggested by
> > > > Joe Glick, really interests me because it brings Gibson together with
> > M-P
> > > > in
> > > > such an
> > > > interesting way. This overlaps work I have been doing trying to
> > understand
> > > > the affinities between Gibson and Russian followers of the Vygotsky
> > group,
> > > > fractured as it may have been, in the 30 years following his death.
> > > >
> > > > (The first American to go on the psychology exchange that Jim Wertsch
> > and I
> > > > eventually went on was a gibsonian, as well as a developmentalist,
> Herb
> > > > Pick, and his wife, who also worked in that tradition).
> > > >
> > > > I am not sure how to take the discussion. There are a lot of
> > affinities,
> > a
> > > > lot of overlaps, a lot of incomplete knowledge on all sides. It is
> not
> > easy
> > > > to discuss in any organized way. Perhaps, just enticing invitations
> to
> > > > check
> > > > things out? (John Shotter would be great to include in the
> discussion,
> > why
> > > > not try enticing him!?).
> > > >
> > > > Whither?
> > > > mike
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Sat, Jul 16, 2011 at 1:10 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Hi Mike
> > > > >
> > > > > I was interested in your brief comments on The Metaphysical Club
> and
> > also
> > > > > on
> > > > > Merleau-Ponty.
> > > > > I have almost finished Lawrence Hass' book "Merleau-Ponty's
> > Philosophy"
> > > > and
> > > > > am seeing many intertwinings with CHAT discussions.
> > > > >
> > > > > The central place of experience as gestalt [figure/ground] that is
> > OPEN
> > > > and
> > > > > creative and NOT representative, is a central notion.
> > > > > M-P is often confused as sharing Husseral's transcendental
> > perspective
> > of
> > > > > bracketing subjective experience but Hass points out for M-P the
> > world
> > > > and
> > > > > perception of the world as getalten  OVERFLOWS all conceptual
> forms.
> > > > > Gestalten have multiple possibilities and potentials which our
> minds
> > try
> > > > to
> > > > > grasp and perceive. At the moment of re-cognition the multiple
> > > > overflowing
> > > > > possibilities crystallize into a figure/ground gestalt that is
> > perceived
> > > > > and
> > > > > in the NEXT moment in the sequence the person subjectively
> > experiences
> > > > THAT
> > > > > PARTICULAR perception as a RESULT of NECESSITY.  The act of
> > expressive
> > > > > cognition is an act of ECART [separation-differentiation which is
> NOT
> > > > > difference as OPPOSITION.]
> > > > > In the act of grasping the world the world is simultaneously
> grasping
> > > > > the perceiver. There is an irreducible difference but not dichotomy
> > of
> > > > > opposites.
> > > > > This notion of difference as fundamental and that this difference
> can
> > > > never
> > > > > be reduced to identity is central to M-P's project.  He shares with
> > > > Levinas
> > > > > an understanding of the irreducuible otherness of the other and the
> > world
> > > > > BUT he does not frame this difference of otherness as opposition.
> > > > > This style of writing shares similarities to the notions of
> > "dialogue"
> > as
> > > > > intertwining fabric that is separate but not in opposition.
>  Lawrence
> > > > Hass
> > > > > suggests we read M-P with Levinas to achieve an intertwining of
> their
> > > > > notions of the otherness of the other.  Hass points out their
> > "styles"
> > > > are
> > > > > different. Whereas M-P recognizes ECART [separation-difference] as
> a
> > > > > fundamental process that allows us to "sing the world" as carnal
> > > > expression
> > > > > Levinas is concerned with recognition as a form of totalizing of
> the
> > > > other
> > > > > to the same. Basically Hass suggests that M-P and Levinas offer
> > > > > "complementary" perspectives on separation-difference that together
> > offer
> > > > > an
> > > > > intertwining of recognition that is deeper than either monological
> > > > > perspective.
> > > > >
> > > > > Another central idea from M-P is that ALL representational
> knowledge
> > is
> > > > an
> > > > > abstraction that is experienced cognitively as a NECESSITY [after
> the
> > > > fact
> > > > > of expressive cognition]  This necessity can be understood as
> primary
> > and
> > > > > conceptual but in actuality is derivative of primary expressive
> > > > cognition.
> > > > > Hass in Chapter 6 discusses mathematical objects and his views
> share
> > with
> > > > > Anna Sfard a notion of mathematical objects as expressive movements
> > in
> > > > > cultural-historical time.  M-P rejects the notion of mathematical
> > objects
> > > > > as
> > > > > transcendental existants that are discovered in historical time
> > > > [Husserl's
> > > > > perspective]
> > > > > Hass says M-P has been understood as sharing Husserl's
> transcendental
> > > > > phenomenology when n actual fact his phenomenology is deeply
> > > > > cultural-historical and ideas such as mathematical objects SOURCE
> is
> > in
> > > > > expressive cognition.
> > > > >
> > > > > Mike I may want to read the book by Ingold if you recommend it.
> > > > > Also, has John Shotter's recent writings been discussed on XMCA.  I
> > know
> > > > he
> > > > > is often situated as a social constructionist [like Kenneth Gergen]
> > but
> > > > his
> > > > > incorporating ideas from M-P. Bateson, and a perso named Todes
> [wrote
> > > > Body
> > > > > &
> > > > > World, 2001] suggest he is working in an overflowing, overlapping
> > > > grasping
> > > > > of new and novel ways to "know".
> > > > >
> > > > > Larry
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