[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: [xmca] Merleau-Ponty and Vygotsky
- To: lchcmike@gmail.com, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
- Subject: Re: [xmca] Merleau-Ponty and Vygotsky
- From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
- Date: Sun, 17 Jul 2011 23:19:56 -0700
- Cc:
- Delivered-to: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
- Dkim-signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :content-type; bh=v7lbzIjZGET3LleK7BDRLupYti16ygyzC7hZ7yP1vHQ=; b=XQfjEE3LmQfrPDl/zbVibLYTcs+sC7J23889SeFA46SAWsJWRT+PadtDVfE3P6vttS 70e+tGqqSfuYEhrmjyFGKO+ULmE17CRj2MOPw/4/yaiWe5BHJjF3beDSW4kZZH6iyUFs w/F3xZT2oBT5zeDFeRgESWGFlfHSCnj05WV8Y=
- In-reply-to: <CAHCnM0DbFC4pn_RqFQ35Ahc4-uK8YAGfSM4M+veujZHHBtGo7A@mail.gmail.com>
- List-archive: <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca>
- List-help: <mailto:xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu?subject=help>
- List-id: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca.weber.ucsd.edu>
- List-post: <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
- List-subscribe: <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>, <mailto:xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu?subject=subscribe>
- List-unsubscribe: <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>, <mailto:xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu?subject=unsubscribe>
- References: <CAGaCnpySh5Nf=hoGj64pAgDCNygqc7hxkGZ=sLw4J0UZZbWsvA@mail.gmail.com> <CAHCnM0DbFC4pn_RqFQ35Ahc4-uK8YAGfSM4M+veujZHHBtGo7A@mail.gmail.com>
- Reply-to: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
- Sender: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
Mike, I do find this "line of inquiry" fascinating.
I googled Tim Ingold and notice he has written a book on how we "orient" to
the world through taking a particular "line". I also notice he is
exploring a concept labelled "dwelling-in-the-world". Samuel Todes [who
John Shotter has written about] wrote a book which he wrote as his thesis in
1963. [It was finally published in 2001.] It is titled "Body and World". In
that book a central notion is the need to find a sense of being "at home in
the world". My hunch is that Todes and Ingold are exploring similar
themes.
These notions of "dwelling-in-the-world" or "being at-home-in-the-world"
point to what may be a central MOTIVATION of all persons. If this is
possible, then Vygotsky's summary statements of chapter seven of "thought &
world" where he transitions from "inner thought" to the more deeply personal
level of "motivation" may be the link or intertwining between Vygotsky and
Merleau-Ponty [and Ingold, Todes, and Shotter] M-P, Todes, Ingold, and
Shotter are all exploring the notion of "expression" or "expressive
cognition" as the concept linking [intertwining] "sedimented"
discourses [systems of meaning] and the living microgenetic movement of
creative novel embodied expressive cognition. In other words, a central
motivation for persons may be the process of orienting or coordinating
activities in order to feel at home in the world.
Since expessive cognition for M-P IS this movement of orienting or dwelling
in the world, his particular notion of expressive cognition [as a master
concept] needs to be elaborated. The first step is to distinguish M-P's
notion of expression from Husserl's notion of expression. They are radically
different. Following is Lawrence Hass' acount of the differences.
Husserl was articulating a "platonic" perspective of searching for the
NECESSARY property [eidos] that is inherent to and defines an object. For
M-P the goal was to articulate how the world is illuminated through open
ambiguous gestalts that with expression form along one line of possibility
[among multiple potential possibilities] Phenomenology as articulated by
Husserl's notion of "expression" was a search for the differentiation of the
empirical from expression [subjectivity]
This position is often taken to be the central idea of all phenomenology.
However M-P's phenomenology is distinctly non-Husserlian and
anti-transcendental. For M-P "knowledge" is NOT re-presentation of what has
come before or a search for transcendental objects outside history. For M-P
"expression" is a creative transformation [sublimation] of the given field
into new novel forms. Lawrence Hass compares M-P's insights on expression as
similar in many respects to Deleuze's notion that centralizes expression as
an operation through which univocal being perpetually unfolds, multiplies,
and differentiates itself.
Hass points out how M-P's project had a developmental history. In his
earlier work M-P focused on the priority of "origins" and talked of
expression as "originating" thought. Thought was secondary or derived from
expression. Living perception was also primary to thought. Hass agrees that
M-P's earlier work is open to this line of critique or "nostalgia for
origins" and a search for what is primary. In his earlier works living
perception was more primary than scientific discourse. But in M-P's later
writings he came to understand this line of understanding phenomenology was
flawed. He came to realize that phenomenology is only one important mode or
level of discourse ABOUT the world, but not more fundamental than all the
other possible modes and he stopped talk of what is primary. For M-P the
phenomenon of expression requires a radical re-vision [re-search] of the
whole notion of "primary"
M-P acknowledges secondary, derived, ready-made thoughts as the upshot of
expressions that have SETTLED into habits. However, new, novel expressive
thinking and speaking always emerge amid sedimented thoughts, memories, and
language WITHOUT BEING REDUCIBLE TO THEM. The relation between expressive
and sedimented thought and language is mutually informing, symbiotic,
non-reductive, intertwining. I will quote M-P to highlight this important
point.
"We must therefore say about sedimented language in relation to meaning
[that is expression] what Simone de Beauvoir says of the body in relation to
the mind: it is neither primary or secondary... there is no subordination
... between them. What we have to SAY is only the EXCESS of what we live
over what has already been said"
Expressive thought is not derived in any deductive or causal sense FROM
sedimented language as GIVEN but neither is it more primary than or
foundational than sedimented language. The relationship is MARKED not by
empiricist or phenomenological REDUCTION but rather by excess and
creativity. M-P is not denying the originality of the order or system or
discourse of knowledge vis-a-vis the perceptual order. M-P is only trying
to loosen the web that ties them to one another, to re-discover the paths of
sublimation which transform the perceived world into the spoken world. [This
style of writing seems to have parallels to chapter 7 of Thought and
Language] M-P's perspective on this relation between perception and
word highlights its non-reductive REVERSIBILITY between the visible and
invisible [perception and thought and language] For M-P expression,
thinking, and language are intertwined aspects of the invisible.
This line of thinking explores the deepest level [of motivation as
expression] as a way to dwell-in-the-world or be at home in the world. I
wonder if this line of inquiry has the potential to delve deeper into the
links between the levels of motivation and inner thought and word meaning in
Vygotsky's project? Chapter 7 of Vygotsky's Thought and Language ends with
his reflecting on the level of motivation as fundamental and primary to the
forming of thought and language. Merleau-Ponty, Todes, Ingold, and Shotter
are scholars who are exploring a particular aspect of motivation within a
cultural-historical perspective. Motivation as orienting and coordinating
[expression] as a WAY to be at home in the world.
A final comment is that this line of thinking may add to the relections on
discourse and activity that Anna Sfard and Andy were discussing as a search
for an intertwining "discursive activity" Lawrence Hass in his book reviews
Husserl's views on mathematical objects that adds other perspectives to
understanding math objects. Anna's theory of reification as communication
shares many points of agreement with M-P. However, he adds a perceptual
level of intertwining to add another dimension to the discussion.
Larry
On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 9:57 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
> I figured you would be interested in the way M-P is circulating around this
> and related discussions, Larry.
>
> Right now my wife has our copy of *Metaphysical Club* with the turned down
> pages.
> She has picked out some other relevant passages. I asked Tony a while back
> about
> the book because, in addition to finding it fascinating and relevant to
> xmca
> discussions, I was uncertain of the interpretation of Pierce .
>
> This speaks to the complaints about relying on interpreters, as Anton and
> Miller are advocating. Terrible to rely on interpreters, I agree. Just hard
> to avoid relying on them all the time. I fear wading into Pierce.
>
> With Merleau-Ponty I was so caught by his talk on people seen from the
> outside, I have been pondering over that text ever since. The new Ingold
> book, suggested by
> Joe Glick, really interests me because it brings Gibson together with M-P
> in
> such an
> interesting way. This overlaps work I have been doing trying to understand
> the affinities between Gibson and Russian followers of the Vygotsky group,
> fractured as it may have been, in the 30 years following his death.
>
> (The first American to go on the psychology exchange that Jim Wertsch and I
> eventually went on was a gibsonian, as well as a developmentalist, Herb
> Pick, and his wife, who also worked in that tradition).
>
> I am not sure how to take the discussion. There are a lot of affinities, a
> lot of overlaps, a lot of incomplete knowledge on all sides. It is not easy
> to discuss in any organized way. Perhaps, just enticing invitations to
> check
> things out? (John Shotter would be great to include in the discussion, why
> not try enticing him!?).
>
> Whither?
> mike
>
>
> On Sat, Jul 16, 2011 at 1:10 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Hi Mike
> >
> > I was interested in your brief comments on The Metaphysical Club and also
> > on
> > Merleau-Ponty.
> > I have almost finished Lawrence Hass' book "Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy"
> and
> > am seeing many intertwinings with CHAT discussions.
> >
> > The central place of experience as gestalt [figure/ground] that is OPEN
> and
> > creative and NOT representative, is a central notion.
> > M-P is often confused as sharing Husseral's transcendental perspective of
> > bracketing subjective experience but Hass points out for M-P the world
> and
> > perception of the world as getalten OVERFLOWS all conceptual forms.
> > Gestalten have multiple possibilities and potentials which our minds try
> to
> > grasp and perceive. At the moment of re-cognition the multiple
> overflowing
> > possibilities crystallize into a figure/ground gestalt that is perceived
> > and
> > in the NEXT moment in the sequence the person subjectively experiences
> THAT
> > PARTICULAR perception as a RESULT of NECESSITY. The act of expressive
> > cognition is an act of ECART [separation-differentiation which is NOT
> > difference as OPPOSITION.]
> > In the act of grasping the world the world is simultaneously grasping
> > the perceiver. There is an irreducible difference but not dichotomy of
> > opposites.
> > This notion of difference as fundamental and that this difference can
> never
> > be reduced to identity is central to M-P's project. He shares with
> Levinas
> > an understanding of the irreducuible otherness of the other and the world
> > BUT he does not frame this difference of otherness as opposition.
> > This style of writing shares similarities to the notions of "dialogue" as
> > intertwining fabric that is separate but not in opposition. Lawrence
> Hass
> > suggests we read M-P with Levinas to achieve an intertwining of their
> > notions of the otherness of the other. Hass points out their "styles"
> are
> > different. Whereas M-P recognizes ECART [separation-difference] as a
> > fundamental process that allows us to "sing the world" as carnal
> expression
> > Levinas is concerned with recognition as a form of totalizing of the
> other
> > to the same. Basically Hass suggests that M-P and Levinas offer
> > "complementary" perspectives on separation-difference that together offer
> > an
> > intertwining of recognition that is deeper than either monological
> > perspective.
> >
> > Another central idea from M-P is that ALL representational knowledge is
> an
> > abstraction that is experienced cognitively as a NECESSITY [after the
> fact
> > of expressive cognition] This necessity can be understood as primary and
> > conceptual but in actuality is derivative of primary expressive
> cognition.
> > Hass in Chapter 6 discusses mathematical objects and his views share with
> > Anna Sfard a notion of mathematical objects as expressive movements in
> > cultural-historical time. M-P rejects the notion of mathematical objects
> > as
> > transcendental existants that are discovered in historical time
> [Husserl's
> > perspective]
> > Hass says M-P has been understood as sharing Husserl's transcendental
> > phenomenology when n actual fact his phenomenology is deeply
> > cultural-historical and ideas such as mathematical objects SOURCE is in
> > expressive cognition.
> >
> > Mike I may want to read the book by Ingold if you recommend it.
> > Also, has John Shotter's recent writings been discussed on XMCA. I know
> he
> > is often situated as a social constructionist [like Kenneth Gergen] but
> his
> > incorporating ideas from M-P. Bateson, and a perso named Todes [wrote
> Body
> > &
> > World, 2001] suggest he is working in an overflowing, overlapping
> grasping
> > of new and novel ways to "know".
> >
> > Larry
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
__________________________________________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca