Re: [xmca] Consciousness As Noticing and Abstraction

[Bella Kotik-Friedgut <bella.kotik@gmail.com>]

осознание  as "about knowing" has a connotation of a process
On Sat, May 14, 2011 at 5:09 AM, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>wrote:

> Larry, Mike:
>
> Many thanks to Mike for his morphological analysis. I did notice some of
> that when I was going over it in Russian (that is, the fact that  осознание
> and  cознание have the same root, and that one seems to mean  and the other
> seems to mean something like "with knowing".
>
> When I noticed it, though, I wondered if it was just due to my not being a
> speaker of Russian. Perhaps, if I were a Russian like Vygotsky and his
> readers I would no more notice that than the fact that "conscious" comes
> from a Latin root that means, also "with knowing" and so of course
> "meta-consciousness" really means "about with knowing".
>
> And a few more thanks to Larry. As usual, the answer is no--I haven't read
> the Stetsenko you refer to, I haven't read Aristotle since he was required
> reading at the University of Chicago and I don't know anything about your
> Danish architect except what I just gleaned from Wikipedia.
>
> (I think we will have to amend Will Rogers' comment that "An ignoramus is
> somebody who doesn't know what I just learnt" to "An ignoramus is somebody
> who doesn't know wat I just found on Wikipedia").
>
> But further thanks nevertheless Larry, because your posting reminds me of
> why I was mildly surprised by Steve snipping my comments on television,
> computer games, and social networking from the thread and because I think it
> will help us get this thread back to Seth Chaiklin, where I think it really
> belongs.
>
> If Wikipedia and my thirty-five year old memories of Aristotle are correct,
> then what "phronesis" really means is almost the opposite of "about
> consciousness". It's really "for consciousness", a kind of awareness that is
> tied to changing social practices rather than learning about ideal forms.
>
> So the unsnipped textological parts of my message to Steve about the
> original Russian text of Thinking and Speech and Tool and Symbol were not
> phronetic, but the comments equating internet addition with drug addiction
> where phronetic.
>
> On p. 130 of Chaiklin's article in MCA 18: 2 he says that his
> meta-perspective on the two research traditions is a CONTRAST to both action
> research (no hyphen and no scare quotes) and cultural-historical research
> because "both traditions have a special focus on societal practices". At
> first I thought this was gobbledy-gook because actually all three
> perspectives focus on societal practices, and it is therefore not a point of
> contrast but rather a locus of comparison.
>
> But I think what Chaiklin means is that in order to see how the TWO
> subtraditions are similar, we cannot compare them directly, like toy blocks;
> we have to see them as instantiations of something that encompasses both but
> which stands in contrast to either, like a common ancestor. As Vygotsky
> points out, difference is different from similarity; to notice similarity,
> we need abstraction, while concreteness works perfectly well in pointing up
> differences.
>
> Chaiklin is very good at DE-MYSTIFYING, and even defrocking, the idea of
> activist social research. He makes it very clear that what Lewin had in mind
> when he spoke of "improvement" of societal practices was improving America's
> war effort. Of course, to Lewin, that meant saving his Jewish friends and
> family back home.
>
> To me it means something much different: I remember as a child my father
> remarking casually that all of the work he and his colleagues did on the
> Manhattan Project was really only necessary for the Nagasaki plutonium bomb,
> because "we didn't need to test the one for Hiroshima; everybody knew it'd
> work." It sure did: a city-wide My Lai style massacre that was at the same
> time the world's largest and cruelest physics experiment on human subjects.
>
> The problem for me is that my father's work on the Manhattan Project meets
> every single one of Seth Chaiklin's criteria for "improving social
> practices". Yes, the murder of hundreds of thousands of people, very many of
> them school children, was "a direct consideraton and important orienting
> focus in forming research questions." Yes, it was a part of gaining basic
> knowledge, and, no, it did not involve separating science from social
> action.
>
> Societal values and interests were certainly considered (e.g. when Leo
> Szilard and Enrico Fermi suggested removing Kyoto from the list of
> cities that could be obliterated if the weather of Hiroshima was not
> propitious because of the historical interest of the city). Interventions
> were made in ongoing practices, and thre was no distinction between the
> "basic" research and its criminal applications. So I have to conclude that
> my father's work really was consistent with this older idea of societal
> research, and even that Lewin would have approved of this "action-research".
>
> But Chaiklin then shows that the earlier tradition DOES contrast with that
> of Lewin, because Lewin DOES separate "objective standards of achievement"
> from social action, and he DOES consider the experimental distinct from and
> logically prior to field work (p. 133). That's why practitioners must come
> to researchers and not vice-versa (p. 137).
>
> He even shows that Lewin had a very Piagetian approach to "pure facts" and
> "unbiased insight" (p. 134), even if his idea of a "causal-dynamic" approach
> to laws is far closer to that of Vygotsky than the "supra-causality" of
> Piaget (135).
>
> How does this fit with Vygotsky? Contrary to what Chaiklin says on p. 144,
> I think the answer is rather poorly. Iin addition to their other
> disagreements, e.g. over the central role of language, there seem to me to
> be some pretty fundamental disagreements.
>
> Vygotsky does NOT place experimental research before socially situated
> interventions; the relationship is much more reversible. In "Thinking and
> Speech", Vygotsky DOES put Chapter Five (the experimental one) before
> Chapter Six (the social action chapter), but this is really purely for
> historical reasons; he makes it clear that if anything he sees Chapter Five,
> the study of "artificial concepts" as subordinated to and only interpretable
> in the light of  Chapter Six, the study of scientific concepts, which are in
> turn interpretable in the light of the study of everyday concepts.
>
> Vygotsky does NOT believe in "unbiased facts" and "pure insight"; he
> believes that facts are only interpretable in the light of a certain theory
> (Chapter Two of T&S). Chapter Six is not an "action-research" (that is, a
> hybrid of two completely different activities), it is more like action
> research as we know it today, an attempt to carry out a real, tangible,
> perceptible intervention in a known teaching situation and to observe the
> variations WITHIN the activity with sufficient rigor so that generalizations
> between this activity and related activities are possible, given a
> sufficiently powerful theory.
>
> Finally, it seems to me that Vygotsky's interpretation of Lewin's
> expression "causal-dynamic" is very different. Vygotsky never really got a
> name for what he was doing, and I think he would be rather surprised to call
> it "cultural historical" or even "historico-cultural" (the order I prefer).
>
> In Chapter One, though, he does say that his goal is a "causal dynamic"
> account of development. For Vygotsky, "causal" means determined in a
> materialistic, historical sense, while I think that for Lewin it means
> determined in a logical, Aristotelian sense. Vygotsky uses "dynamic" as a
> synonym for development, and I think that for Lewin it simply means change.
>
> What is the difference? The former, I think, applies to the freeing of
> young minds from the grip of culturally induced and commercially cultivated
> addictions, whether it be to drugs or to computer games. But the bombing of
> Hiroshima is a perfectly good example of dynamic change.
>
> David Kellogg
> Seoul National University of Education
>
>
> --- On Fri, 5/13/11, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness As Noticing and Abstraction
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Date: Friday, May 13, 2011, 9:00 AM
>
>
> The word translated as "awareness" is the term, osaznanie
> about-consciousness in contrast with soznanie, consciousness. This causes
> me
> some confusion in thinking about these issues.
>
> Does phronisis imply the kind of "aboutness" or "turning-on-its-selfness"
> that o-soznanie does?
>
> (and note soznanie is so-znanie, with-knowing. It is worth in this regard
> thinking about the implications of the last page of T&L. (see LSV, V1, Ch7,
> p. 285). I would post but do not have to hand.
> mike
>
>
> On Thu, May 12, 2011 at 9:12 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Hi DavidI
> > You wrote,
> >
> > To clear this up, he suggests junking ALL of the above and replacing them
> > with a FOURTH meaning of "conscious", which is volitional, voluntary,
> > deliberate noticing of one's own psychological activity, which he calls
> > "awareness". The example he gives is knot-tying: Then you suggest when
> the
> > focus of conciousness alights on HOW I make those  particular actions
> this
> > is a particular FORM of consciousness which can be termed *awareness*
> >
> > This notion of *awareness* as a particular FORM of consciousness that
> > focuses on HOW action proceeds seems similar to Aristotle's notion of
> > phronesis [practical activity about how WE should proceed]  Is
> 8awareness8
> > the psychological equivalent on the subjective level to the cultural
> > historical level of phronesis.?
> >
> > My question is an attempt to LINK Anna Stetsenko's notion of
> > *transformative
> > activist stance* with the exploration of phronesis in authors such as
> > Gadamer.  Have you read articles by Bent Flyvsbjerg on *phronetic social
> > research*?  He is a city planner in Denmark who is exploring the notion
> of
> > town planning as an act of phronesis.
> >
> > Larry
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Thu, May 12, 2011 at 4:57 PM, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com
> > >wrote:
> >
> > > Mike, Steve:
> > >
> > > I meant this bit, which is paragraph 32 of the Second Section of
> Chapter
> > > Six. Vygotsky has just complained that Freud and Piaget are using
> > > "unconscious" or "subconscious" to mean things that are genetically
> > > completely different: not yet conscious (that is, genetically primary),
> > > semi-conscious (partially conscious and therefore somewhere in the
> > > middle) and repressed from consciousness (that is, genetically late
> > > emerging).
> > >
> > > To clear this up, he suggests junking ALL of the above and replacing
> them
> > > with a FOURTH meaning of "conscious", which is volitional, voluntary,
> > > deliberate noticing of one's own psychological activity, which he calls
> > > "awareness". The example he gives is knot-tying:
> > >
> > > "Я завязываю узелок. Я делаю это сознательно. Я не могу, однако,
> > > рассказать, как именно я это сделал. Мое сознательное действие
> > оказывается
> > > неосознанным, потому что мое внимание направлено на акт самого
> > завязывания,
> > > но не на то, как я это делаю. Сознание всегда представляет какой-то
> кусок
> > > действительности. Предметом моего сознания является завязывание узелка,
> > > узелок и то, что с ним происходит, но не те действия, которые я
> произвожу
> > > при завязывании, не то, как я это делаю. Но предметом сознания может
> > стать
> > > именно это — тогда это
> > >  будет осознание. Осознанием является акт сознания, предметом которого
> > > является сама же деятельность сознания."
> > >
> > > ("I make a knot. I do it consciously. I cannot, however, tell you
> exactly
> > > how I did it. My conscious act is unconscious, because my attention is
> > > focused on the act of the tying, but not on how I do it. Consciousness
> is
> > > always some piece of reality. The object of my consciousness is tying
> the
> > > knot, a knot, and what was happening to it but not those actions that I
> > make
> > > when tying, not how I do it. But the object of consciousness can be
> just
> > > that - then it will be awareness. Awareness is an act of consciousness,
> > the
> > > subject of which is itself the very same activity of consciousness.")
> > >
> > > I don't agree that there is any light between Luria and Vygotsky on
> this
> > > question, Steve. the part I quote from Tool and Symbol is from a
> > manuscript
> > > co-authored by both of them. I also don't agree that what I wrote about
> > > computer addiction and role play is not relevant to this thread; I
> think
> > > that one of the great strengths of xmca is that it really does allow us
> > to
> > > "rise to the concrete". But I do admit that adolescence is more or less
> > > beyond my expertise (I notice that whenever I start talking about my
> own
> > > childhood I have probably trespassed the extremely narrow boundaries of
> > what
> > > I know about kids).
> > >
> > > So here are three things that are more to the point.
> > >
> > > a) My former grad, Yongho, who is doing his Ph.D. thesis is looking at
> > some
> > > data where the kids can manipulate "avatars" made with their own
> > photographs
> > > and get them to interact with each other. The third graders love it.
> The
> > > fourth graders are a little shy. And the fifth graders hate it.
> > >
> > > b) At the same time, we've found that when we ask kids to role play,
> > > the third graders take it very seriously, the fourth graders ham it up,
> > and
> > > the fifth graders tend to either parody or satirize.
> > >
> > > c) Finally, I am looking at some data this morning where the teacher
> > > is trying to get the kids to distinguish between nuclear two-generation
> > > families and extended three-generation families by looking at their own
> > > family trees. She's having a lot of trouble  because the kids keep
> mixing
> > up
> > > a "broad" family (many siblings) with a "deep" one (many generations)
> by
> > > talking about "large" families. So she introduces the term "nuclear".
> > >
> > > One of the kids immediately identifies the term as referring to atomic
> > > weapons. The teacher is hopeful, since this would mean being able to
> talk
> > > about North Korea, about divided families, and maybe even about the
> > > "nucleus" of an atom and a family.
> > >
> > > But it turns out that the child only knows the "nuclear option" in the
> > game
> > > of Starcraft, which is an option offered to the human-like Terrans; the
> > > option of simply dropping a bomb on subhuman races and eradicating
> them.
> > For
> > > the child, it's not a weapon at all; it's just a trump card in a game.
> > >
> > > Now it seems to me that what ALL of these examples have in common is a
> > > growing ability to ABSTRACT a concept, including a self-concept, from
> its
> > > context--and from its consequences. THAT seems to me to be
> > > characteristic the end of childhood. I am hard put to describe this, as
> > > Leontiev and Karpov do, as the struggle to be taken seriously by
> adults.
> > >
> > > David Kellogg
> > > Seoul National University of Education
> > >
> > >  --- On Thu, 5/12/11, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> > > Subject: Re: [xmca] how did Luria explain practical intellect
> > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > Date: Thursday, May 12, 2011, 8:03 AM
> > >
> > >
> > > I am way back on "Vygotsky used the example of a knot."
> > > Which example, David? Are you referring to tying a knot to remember and
> > > example of quipu? If so, I cannot understand
> > > what you say about it.
> > >
> > > Could you clarify?
> > >
> > > Arent the examples you give of driving a car etc for sort of
> > > "action-reflexes" what, following Leontiev, Zinchenko, et al, are
> > referred
> > > to as operations?
> > >
> > > I'll start from the top if you could clarify here and get back on the
> > > trail.
> > > mike
> > >
> > >
> > > On Wed, May 11, 2011 at 11:56 PM, Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com>
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > > How did Luria explain practical intellect, automatic behaviors, etc.
> > and
> > > > the distinctions David is making?
> > > >
> > > > - Steve
> > > >
> > > > PS I changed the subject line and snipped out other topics.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On May 11, 2011, at 5:52 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
> > > >
> > > >  Steve:
> > > >>
> > > >> We need a distinction here, and I think it is equivalent to the
> > > >> omnirelevant distinction Vygotsky makes between higher, culturally
> > > mediated,
> > > >> and lower, biologically endowed, psychological functions.
> > > >>
> > > >> Martin says (and I agree) that SOME forms of practical thinking are
> > > purely
> > > >> sensorimotor: always have been and always will be. I think that is
> > true,
> > > but
> > > >> that when we examine those functions we find that they are utterly
> > > >> uninteresting to historico-cultural psychology except insofar as
> they
> > > form
> > > >> the basis for higher, culturally mediated functions.
> > > >>
> > > >> I guess I would include the "jump" you create when you fire a gun
> next
> > > to
> > > >> somebody's ear (they jump before realizing that it is a gun), the
> > sickly
> > > >> feeling you get when you look down from a very tall building or come
> > > around
> > > >> a trail bend and see a coiled snake, and eidetic memories (the
> "after
> > > >> vision" you see when you shut your eyes after looking at a bright
> > > light).
> > > >>
> > > >> I think that if these were all there were to psychology,
> > > >> historico-cultural pscyhology would be a bizarre branch of
> philosophy,
> > > or an
> > > >> obscure literary practice, and the reactologists would have been
> right
> > > after
> > > >> all. There is, however, a second kind of practical thinking which is
> > > >> functionally similar, looks structurally similar, but is genetically
> > > utterly
> > > >> different and therefore, in the final analysis (e.g. under
> conditions
> > of
> > > >> pathological degeneration as in old people with Alzheimer's) it is
> > also
> > > >> structurally different.
> > > >>
> > > >> These are the hand-to-eye "reflexes" we see in driving, in computer
> > > games,
> > > >> in piano playing, and in a wide range of societal practices that are
> > > >> manifestly symbolic manipulations. They are semiotically
> consequential
> > > for
> > > >> other people (not just for the biological organism).
> > > >>
> > > >> But they do appear for all the world like "automatic" reflexes (a
> term
> > > >> that I think Vygotsky would avoid, except for metaphorical usages),
> > > actions
> > > >> into which consciousness does not (any longer) appear to enter.
> These
> > > are
> > > >> the actions I would like to call "post-verbal" or "de-verbal"
> thinking
> > > >> rather than "pre-verbal" or "non-verbal" thinking.
> > > >>
> > > >> Vygotsky's example is tying a knot. It's not that this is
> unconscious
> > > (you
> > > >> are not asleep when you tie your shoes, and you are not even in a
> > > trance).
> > > >> It is that it is largely non-conscious, because your attention is
> > > focused on
> > > >> the result of the action and not on the activity itself. You can, if
> > you
> > > >> wish, focus on the activity, and in this sense it is structurally
> > quite
> > > >> different from what happens when I unexpectedly fire a gun next to
> > your
> > > ear.
> > > >>
> > > >> You cannot, no matter how hard you try, focus on the jump that you
> > > >> involuntarily make when you hear an unexpected gunshot. The same is
> > true
> > > of
> > > >> the other examples as long as they are unexpected, although of
> course
> > > people
> > > >> can and do culturally mediate their vertigo and deliberately train
> for
> > > >> eidetic memory, after which we can no longer call it a lower
> > > psychological
> > > >> function.
> > > >>
> > > >> I think that all kinds of history, including ontogeny, know
> instances
> > of
> > > >> what in phylogenesis is called convergent evolution. The wings of
> > birds,
> > > >> insects and airplanes are functionally and even structurally
> similar,
> > > but
> > > >> they are only externally related; that is, related because of their
> > very
> > > >> different adaptation to the functional needs and to the environment.
> I
> > > think
> > > >> that pre-verbal and post-verbal "automatism" has the same type of
> > > >> resemblance: a phenotypical rather than a genotypical one.
> > > >>
> > > >
> > > > <snip>
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >> David Kellogg
> > > >> Seoul National University of Education .
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> --- On Wed, 5/11/11, Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com> wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> From: Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com>
> > > >> Subject: Re: [xmca] last on concepts
> > > >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > >> Date: Wednesday, May 11, 2011, 3:28 AM
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> David,
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > > <snip>
> > > >
> > > >  Question: is what you are referring to as "practical intellect" and
> > > >> "post-verbal" behavior equivalent to what Vygotsky refers to as
> > > automatic
> > > >> behavior or activity, such as in his discussion of Claparede's law,
> v1
> > p
> > > >> 183?  "This law states that difficulties or impediments encountered
> in
> > > >> automatic activity lead to conscious reflection on that activity." p
> > 70
> > > >>  (Vygotsky seems to accept this law, but only as a functional law -
> > his
> > > >> criticism is that it only indicates whether the need for conscious
> > > awareness
> > > >> is present or absent in an individual, not how conscious awareness
> > > itself
> > > >> emerges. v1 p183)
> > > >>
> > > >> A classic example of automatic activity versus behavior guided by
> > > >> conscious awareness is of course comparing the driver who is used to
> > > >> changing gears with a stick shift to someone just learning how to do
> > > that.
> > > >>  The coordination of the gear shift with the clutch eventually
> becomes
> > > >> habitual and only rises to consciousness when there is a problem for
> > the
> > > >> first driver, but initially requires constant attention from the
> > second
> > > one.
> > > >>
> > > >> - Steve
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> On May 10, 2011, at 5:16 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >>  Steve:
> > > >>>
> > > >>> One of the things we did when we translated T&S into Korean was to
> > > >>> carefully compare every single paragraph with the Minick
> translation
> > > into
> > > >>> English. We found quite a few differences. Here's the original
> > > Vygotsky:
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Отношение мышления и речи в этом случае можно было бы схематически
> > > >>> обозначить двумя пересекающимися окружностями, которые показали бы,
> > что
> > > >>> известная часть процессов речи и мышления совпадает. Это . так
> > > называемая
> > > >>> сфера &Lt;речевого мышления&Gt;. Но это речевое мышление не
> > исчерпывает
> > > ни
> > > >>> всех форм мысли, ни всех форм речи. Есть большая область мышления,
> > > которая
> > > >>> не будет иметь непосредственного отношения к речевому мышлению.
> Сюда
> > > следует
> > > >>> отнести раньше всего, как уже указывал Бюлер, инструментальное и
> > > техническое
> > > >>> мышление и
> > > >>> вообще всю область так называемого практического интеллекта,
> который
> > > >>> только в последнее время становится предметом усиленных
> исследований.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Here's an English translation, with some of the differences with
> > Minick
> > > >>> in parentheses:
> > > >>>
> > > >>> "(It would be possible to) schematically designate the relation of
> > > >>> thinking and speech (in this case) by two intersecting circles,
> > (which
> > > would
> > > >>> show that a certain part) of the processes of speech and thinking
> do
> > > >>> coincide. (Here is the so-called sphere of “verbal thinking”. But)
> > this
> > > >>> verbal thinking exhausts neither all the forms of thought nor all
> the
> > > forms
> > > >>> of speech. There is the large area of thinking, which will not have
> > > direct
> > > >>> relation to the vocal thinking. (Here one should relate first of
> all
> > as
> > > >>> already indicated Bühler, instrumental and technical thinking and
> > > generally
> > > >>> the entire region of so-called the practical intellect, which only
> > > recently
> > > >>> becomes the object of those intensified studies.)"
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Now, Minick dislikes Vygotsky's tendency to say the same thing
> three
> > > >>> times, and like Hanfmann and Vakar he often prunes in the hope of
> > > producing
> > > >>> a stronger and clearer image. Martin doesn't like Vygotsky's love
> of
> > > >>> striking, and often spatial, images (and I certainly agree with
> > Martin
> > > that
> > > >>> they ARE dangerous sometimes, as in the idea of four "planes" that
> so
> > > struck
> > > >>> you, Professor Mack, and Colin, which I think is a complete
> > > >>> misunderstanding).
> > > >>>
> > > >>> I like both, and I think they are related. I think that we are
> > supposed
> > > >>> to take both with a block of salt, the way a cow does. I think that
> > we
> > > take
> > > >>> Vygotsky's slightly different redundancies and his not quite
> > > overlapping
> > > >>> images not as Galton photographs (where similarities reinforce each
> > > other
> > > >>> and differences obscure) but as frames in a moving picture, verbal
> > > >>> approximations of something that is changing as we speak.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> So here we have the image of two intersecting circles. Vygotsky
> says
> > > it's
> > > >>> only one of several ways to imagine this (and in fact he has
> already
> > > >>> described it as the intersection of two lines, as a tangled skein,
> as
> > > two
> > > >>> "currents" that flow into each other, etc. So it is right and
> proper
> > to
> > > >>> begin with "It might be possible" or "it may be possible" or "it
> > would
> > > be
> > > >>> possible" which is what Vygotsky really does.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> He's talking about speech functions in ADULTS, which is why he says
> > "in
> > > >>> this case". Think of an adult driving a car. This is an almost
> > perfect
> > > >>> example of practical, mechanical intellect. Vygotsky is surely
> right
> > to
> > > >>> suggest that it has no DIRECT relationship to verbal thinking; if
> you
> > > >>> describe what you are doing while you are driving, you are probably
> > > going to
> > > >>> have an accident.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> But it's not at all like PRE-verbal nonverbal thinking, is it? We
> can
> > > see
> > > >>> this in a number of ways. First of all, we find conversation a
> little
> > > >>> burdensome when we are driving unless it is actually connected with
> > the
> > > >>> driving task (e.g. a GPS). This suggests positive and negative
> > > interference,
> > > >>> doesn't it? Secondly, we do LEARN to drive in a verbal way, from
> > > >>> instructions, instructors, and ultimately verbal tests. So perhaps
> we
> > > should
> > > >>> say that structurally, genetically, yea, even functionally, driving
> > is
> > > >>> POST-verbal or DE-verbal rather than PRE-verbal. And this DOES
> > suggest
> > > an
> > > >>> INDIRECT relationship to verbal thinking.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Here's some other stuff, earlier in the chapter, worth looking at
> in
> > > this
> > > >>> context:
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Так, Бюлер со всей справедливостью говорит: &Lt;Действия шимпанзе
> > > >>> совершенно независимы от речи, и в позднейшей жизни человека
> > > техническое,
> > > >>> инструментальное мышление (Werkzeugdenken) гораздо менее связано с
> > > речью и
> > > >>> понятиями, чем другие формы мышления&Gt; (13, с. 100). Дальше мы
> > должны
> > > >>> будем еще возвратиться к этому указанию Бюлера. Мы увидим, что
> > > действительно
> > > >>> все, чем мы располагаем по этому вопросу из области
> экспериментальных
> > > >>> исследований и клинических наблюдений, говорит за то, что в
> мышлении
> > > >>> взрослого человека отношение
> > > >>>
> > > >> интеллекта
> > > >>
> > > >>> и речи не является постоянным и одинаковым для всех функций, для
> всех
> > > >>> форм интеллектуальной и речевой деятельности.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> So Bühler, (with entire validity), says “The (performances) of the
> > > >>> chimpanzee are completely independent from speech, and (in the
> later
> > > life of
> > > >>> man) technical, instrument thinking (Werkzeugdenken) is much less
> > > connected
> > > >>> with speech and with concepts, than other forms of thnking” (13, p.
> > > 100).
> > > >>> Further on we must again return to this indication of Bühler’s. (We
> > > will
> > > >>> see), that actually everything that we now have available on this
> > > question
> > > >>> from the areas of experimental studies and clinical observations
> > (will
> > > >>> confirm as a point of fact) that in the thinking of the adult
> person
> > > the
> > > >>> relation of intellect and speech is neither constant nor identical
> > (for
> > > all
> > > >>> functions) and all forms of intellectual and verbal activity."
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Again, we can easily imagine that the practical, instantaneous
> > problem
> > > >>> solving behavior we see in an adult human repairing a car was
> > > originally
> > > >>> learnt from a repair manual, or from another more expert repairman;
> > in
> > > other
> > > >>> words, at one point the adult human’s thinking was virtually
> > identical
> > > with
> > > >>> written or oral speech and proceeded step by step alongside it.
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Finally, take a look at "Tool and Sign in Child Development", Steve
> > > >>> (Volume Six). In the first chapter, first section, paragraph 11-12,
> > > Vygotsky
> > > >>> and Luria go over this same ground. But this time they make an
> > > invidious
> > > >>> comparison between Kohler, who really tries to show how human the
> > chimp
> > > is,
> > > >>> and Buhler, who is trying to show how chimplike the human is. And
> > they
> > > draw
> > > >>> attention PRECISELY to the MISTAKE of assuming that practical
> > > intelligence
> > > >>> in later life is language free. Here's what they've got.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Эта тенденция остается неизменной и у всех дальнейших
> исследователей,
> > > за
> > > >>> небольшими исключениями. В ней наиболее ярко выражена та упомянутая
> > > >>> опасность зоологизирования детской психологии, которая, как уже
> > > сказано,
> > > >>> является господствующей чертой всех исследований в этой области.
> > Однако
> > > в
> > > >>> исследовании Бюлера эта опасность представлена в наименее серьезном
> > > виде.
> > > >>> Бюлер имеет дело с ребенком до развития речи, и в этом отношении
> > > основные
> > > >>> условия, необходимые для оправдания психологической параллели между
> > > шимпанзе
> > > >>> и
> > > >>> ребенком, могут быть соблюдены. Правда, Бюлер сам недооценивает
> > > значение
> > > >>> сходства основных условий, говоря, что действия шимпанзе совершенно
> > > >>> независимы от речи и в позднейшей жизни человека техническое,
> > > >>> инструментальное мышление в гораздо меньшей степени связано с речью
> и
> > > >>> понятиями, чем другие формы мышления.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> "This tendency, with a few exceptions, remains unchanged in the
> work
> > of
> > > >>> all following investigators. It is here that the danger of what
> might
> > > be
> > > >>> called the ‘animalization’ of child psychology, mentioned earlier,
> > > finds its
> > > >>> clearest expression as the prevalent feature of investigation in
> this
> > > field
> > > >>> (see earlier reference). However, this danger is at its smallest in
> > > Bühler’s
> > > >>> experiments. Bühler deals with the pre-speech period of the child,
> > > which
> > > >>> makes it possible to fulfill the basic conditions necessary to
> > justify
> > > the
> > > >>> psychological parallel between chimpanzee and child. It is true
> that
> > > Bühler
> > > >>> underestimates the importance of the similarities of these basic
> > > conditions
> > > >>> when he states : ‘The chimpanzee’s activities are totally
> independent
> > > of
> > > >>> speech, and in man’s later period of life technical, instrumental
> > > thinking
> > > >>> is much less connected to speech and concepts than other forms of
> > > thought’,”
> > > >>>
> > > >>> David Kellogg
> > > >>> Seoul National University of Education
> > > >>>
> > > >>
> > > > __________________________________________
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-- 
Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut
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