Re: [xmca] Consciousness As Noticing and Abstraction

[David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>]

Larry, Mike:
 
Many thanks to Mike for his morphological analysis. I did notice some of that when I was going over it in Russian (that is, the fact that  осознание and  cознание have the same root, and that one seems to mean "about knowing" and the other seems to mean something like "with knowing". 
 
When I noticed it, though, I wondered if it was just due to my not being a speaker of Russian. Perhaps, if I were a Russian like Vygotsky and his readers I would no more notice that than the fact that "conscious" comes from a Latin root that means, also "with knowing" and so of course "meta-consciousness" really means "about with knowing".
 
And a few more thanks to Larry. As usual, the answer is no--I haven't read the Stetsenko you refer to, I haven't read Aristotle since he was required reading at the University of Chicago and I don't know anything about your Danish architect except what I just gleaned from Wikipedia.
 
(I think we will have to amend Will Rogers' comment that "An ignoramus is somebody who doesn't know what I just learnt" to "An ignoramus is somebody who doesn't know wat I just found on Wikipedia").
 
But further thanks nevertheless Larry, because your posting reminds me of why I was mildly surprised by Steve snipping my comments on television, computer games, and social networking from the thread and because I think it will help us get this thread back to Seth Chaiklin, where I think it really belongs.
 
If Wikipedia and my thirty-five year old memories of Aristotle are correct, then what "phronesis" really means is almost the opposite of "about consciousness". It's really "for consciousness", a kind of awareness that is tied to changing social practices rather than learning about ideal forms. 
 
So the unsnipped textological parts of my message to Steve about the original Russian text of Thinking and Speech and Tool and Symbol were not phronetic, but the comments equating internet addition with drug addiction where phronetic.
 
On p. 130 of Chaiklin's article in MCA 18: 2 he says that his meta-perspective on the two research traditions is a CONTRAST to both action research (no hyphen and no scare quotes) and cultural-historical research because "both traditions have a special focus on societal practices". At first I thought this was gobbledy-gook because actually all three perspectives focus on societal practices, and it is therefore not a point of contrast but rather a locus of comparison. 
 
But I think what Chaiklin means is that in order to see how the TWO subtraditions are similar, we cannot compare them directly, like toy blocks; we have to see them as instantiations of something that encompasses both but which stands in contrast to either, like a common ancestor. As Vygotsky points out, difference is different from similarity; to notice similarity, we need abstraction, while concreteness works perfectly well in pointing up differences.
 
Chaiklin is very good at DE-MYSTIFYING, and even defrocking, the idea of activist social research. He makes it very clear that what Lewin had in mind when he spoke of "improvement" of societal practices was improving America's war effort. Of course, to Lewin, that meant saving his Jewish friends and family back home. 
 
To me it means something much different: I remember as a child my father remarking casually that all of the work he and his colleagues did on the Manhattan Project was really only necessary for the Nagasaki plutonium bomb, because "we didn't need to test the one for Hiroshima; everybody knew it'd work." It sure did: a city-wide My Lai style massacre that was at the same time the world's largest and cruelest physics experiment on human subjects. 
 
The problem for me is that my father's work on the Manhattan Project meets every single one of Seth Chaiklin's criteria for "improving social practices". Yes, the murder of hundreds of thousands of people, very many of them school children, was "a direct consideraton and important orienting focus in forming research questions." Yes, it was a part of gaining basic knowledge, and, no, it did not involve separating science from social action. 
 
Societal values and interests were certainly considered (e.g. when Leo Szilard and Enrico Fermi suggested removing Kyoto from the list of cities that could be obliterated if the weather of Hiroshima was not propitious because of the historical interest of the city). Interventions were made in ongoing practices, and thre was no distinction between the "basic" research and its criminal applications. So I have to conclude that my father's work really was consistent with this older idea of societal research, and even that Lewin would have approved of this "action-research".
 
But Chaiklin then shows that the earlier tradition DOES contrast with that of Lewin, because Lewin DOES separate "objective standards of achievement" from social action, and he DOES consider the experimental distinct from and logically prior to field work (p. 133). That's why practitioners must come to researchers and not vice-versa (p. 137).
 
He even shows that Lewin had a very Piagetian approach to "pure facts" and "unbiased insight" (p. 134), even if his idea of a "causal-dynamic" approach to laws is far closer to that of Vygotsky than the "supra-causality" of Piaget (135).
 
How does this fit with Vygotsky? Contrary to what Chaiklin says on p. 144, I think the answer is rather poorly. Iin addition to their other disagreements, e.g. over the central role of language, there seem to me to be some pretty fundamental disagreements. 
 
Vygotsky does NOT place experimental research before socially situated interventions; the relationship is much more reversible. In "Thinking and Speech", Vygotsky DOES put Chapter Five (the experimental one) before Chapter Six (the social action chapter), but this is really purely for historical reasons; he makes it clear that if anything he sees Chapter Five, the study of "artificial concepts" as subordinated to and only interpretable in the light of  Chapter Six, the study of scientific concepts, which are in turn interpretable in the light of the study of everyday concepts. 
 
Vygotsky does NOT believe in "unbiased facts" and "pure insight"; he believes that facts are only interpretable in the light of a certain theory (Chapter Two of T&S). Chapter Six is not an "action-research" (that is, a hybrid of two completely different activities), it is more like action research as we know it today, an attempt to carry out a real, tangible, perceptible intervention in a known teaching situation and to observe the variations WITHIN the activity with sufficient rigor so that generalizations between this activity and related activities are possible, given a sufficiently powerful theory. 
 
Finally, it seems to me that Vygotsky's interpretation of Lewin's expression "causal-dynamic" is very different. Vygotsky never really got a name for what he was doing, and I think he would be rather surprised to call it "cultural historical" or even "historico-cultural" (the order I prefer). 
 
In Chapter One, though, he does say that his goal is a "causal dynamic" account of development. For Vygotsky, "causal" means determined in a materialistic, historical sense, while I think that for Lewin it means determined in a logical, Aristotelian sense. Vygotsky uses "dynamic" as a synonym for development, and I think that for Lewin it simply means change.
 
What is the difference? The former, I think, applies to the freeing of young minds from the grip of culturally induced and commercially cultivated addictions, whether it be to drugs or to computer games. But the bombing of Hiroshima is a perfectly good example of dynamic change. 
 
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education 
 

--- On Fri, 5/13/11, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:


From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness As Noticing and Abstraction
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Friday, May 13, 2011, 9:00 AM


The word translated as "awareness" is the term, osaznanie
about-consciousness in contrast with soznanie, consciousness. This causes me
some confusion in thinking about these issues.

Does phronisis imply the kind of "aboutness" or "turning-on-its-selfness"
that o-soznanie does?

(and note soznanie is so-znanie, with-knowing. It is worth in this regard
thinking about the implications of the last page of T&L. (see LSV, V1, Ch7,
p. 285). I would post but do not have to hand.
mike


On Thu, May 12, 2011 at 9:12 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi DavidI
> You wrote,
>
> To clear this up, he suggests junking ALL of the above and replacing them
> with a FOURTH meaning of "conscious", which is volitional, voluntary,
> deliberate noticing of one's own psychological activity, which he calls
> "awareness". The example he gives is knot-tying: Then you suggest when the
> focus of conciousness alights on HOW I make those  particular actions this
> is a particular FORM of consciousness which can be termed *awareness*
>
> This notion of *awareness* as a particular FORM of consciousness that
> focuses on HOW action proceeds seems similar to Aristotle's notion of
> phronesis [practical activity about how WE should proceed]  Is 8awareness8
> the psychological equivalent on the subjective level to the cultural
> historical level of phronesis.?
>
> My question is an attempt to LINK Anna Stetsenko's notion of
> *transformative
> activist stance* with the exploration of phronesis in authors such as
> Gadamer.  Have you read articles by Bent Flyvsbjerg on *phronetic social
> research*?  He is a city planner in Denmark who is exploring the notion of
> town planning as an act of phronesis.
>
> Larry
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, May 12, 2011 at 4:57 PM, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com
> >wrote:
>
> > Mike, Steve:
> >
> > I meant this bit, which is paragraph 32 of the Second Section of Chapter
> > Six. Vygotsky has just complained that Freud and Piaget are using
> > "unconscious" or "subconscious" to mean things that are genetically
> > completely different: not yet conscious (that is, genetically primary),
> > semi-conscious (partially conscious and therefore somewhere in the
> > middle) and repressed from consciousness (that is, genetically late
> > emerging).
> >
> > To clear this up, he suggests junking ALL of the above and replacing them
> > with a FOURTH meaning of "conscious", which is volitional, voluntary,
> > deliberate noticing of one's own psychological activity, which he calls
> > "awareness". The example he gives is knot-tying:
> >
> > "Я завязываю узелок. Я делаю это сознательно. Я не могу, однако,
> > рассказать, как именно я это сделал. Мое сознательное действие
> оказывается
> > неосознанным, потому что мое внимание направлено на акт самого
> завязывания,
> > но не на то, как я это делаю. Сознание всегда представляет какой-то кусок
> > действительности. Предметом моего сознания является завязывание узелка,
> > узелок и то, что с ним происходит, но не те действия, которые я произвожу
> > при завязывании, не то, как я это делаю. Но предметом сознания может
> стать
> > именно это — тогда это
> >  будет осознание. Осознанием является акт сознания, предметом которого
> > является сама же деятельность сознания."
> >
> > ("I make a knot. I do it consciously. I cannot, however, tell you exactly
> > how I did it. My conscious act is unconscious, because my attention is
> > focused on the act of the tying, but not on how I do it. Consciousness is
> > always some piece of reality. The object of my consciousness is tying the
> > knot, a knot, and what was happening to it but not those actions that I
> make
> > when tying, not how I do it. But the object of consciousness can be just
> > that - then it will be awareness. Awareness is an act of consciousness,
> the
> > subject of which is itself the very same activity of consciousness.")
> >
> > I don't agree that there is any light between Luria and Vygotsky on this
> > question, Steve. the part I quote from Tool and Symbol is from a
> manuscript
> > co-authored by both of them. I also don't agree that what I wrote about
> > computer addiction and role play is not relevant to this thread; I think
> > that one of the great strengths of xmca is that it really does allow us
> to
> > "rise to the concrete". But I do admit that adolescence is more or less
> > beyond my expertise (I notice that whenever I start talking about my own
> > childhood I have probably trespassed the extremely narrow boundaries of
> what
> > I know about kids).
> >
> > So here are three things that are more to the point.
> >
> > a) My former grad, Yongho, who is doing his Ph.D. thesis is looking at
> some
> > data where the kids can manipulate "avatars" made with their own
> photographs
> > and get them to interact with each other. The third graders love it. The
> > fourth graders are a little shy. And the fifth graders hate it.
> >
> > b) At the same time, we've found that when we ask kids to role play,
> > the third graders take it very seriously, the fourth graders ham it up,
> and
> > the fifth graders tend to either parody or satirize.
> >
> > c) Finally, I am looking at some data this morning where the teacher
> > is trying to get the kids to distinguish between nuclear two-generation
> > families and extended three-generation families by looking at their own
> > family trees. She's having a lot of trouble  because the kids keep mixing
> up
> > a "broad" family (many siblings) with a "deep" one (many generations) by
> > talking about "large" families. So she introduces the term "nuclear".
> >
> > One of the kids immediately identifies the term as referring to atomic
> > weapons. The teacher is hopeful, since this would mean being able to talk
> > about North Korea, about divided families, and maybe even about the
> > "nucleus" of an atom and a family.
> >
> > But it turns out that the child only knows the "nuclear option" in the
> game
> > of Starcraft, which is an option offered to the human-like Terrans; the
> > option of simply dropping a bomb on subhuman races and eradicating them.
> For
> > the child, it's not a weapon at all; it's just a trump card in a game.
> >
> > Now it seems to me that what ALL of these examples have in common is a
> > growing ability to ABSTRACT a concept, including a self-concept, from its
> > context--and from its consequences. THAT seems to me to be
> > characteristic the end of childhood. I am hard put to describe this, as
> > Leontiev and Karpov do, as the struggle to be taken seriously by adults.
> >
> > David Kellogg
> > Seoul National University of Education
> >
> >  --- On Thu, 5/12/11, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] how did Luria explain practical intellect
> > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > Date: Thursday, May 12, 2011, 8:03 AM
> >
> >
> > I am way back on "Vygotsky used the example of a knot."
> > Which example, David? Are you referring to tying a knot to remember and
> > example of quipu? If so, I cannot understand
> > what you say about it.
> >
> > Could you clarify?
> >
> > Arent the examples you give of driving a car etc for sort of
> > "action-reflexes" what, following Leontiev, Zinchenko, et al, are
> referred
> > to as operations?
> >
> > I'll start from the top if you could clarify here and get back on the
> > trail.
> > mike
> >
> >
> > On Wed, May 11, 2011 at 11:56 PM, Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > How did Luria explain practical intellect, automatic behaviors, etc.
> and
> > > the distinctions David is making?
> > >
> > > - Steve
> > >
> > > PS I changed the subject line and snipped out other topics.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On May 11, 2011, at 5:52 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
> > >
> > >  Steve:
> > >>
> > >> We need a distinction here, and I think it is equivalent to the
> > >> omnirelevant distinction Vygotsky makes between higher, culturally
> > mediated,
> > >> and lower, biologically endowed, psychological functions.
> > >>
> > >> Martin says (and I agree) that SOME forms of practical thinking are
> > purely
> > >> sensorimotor: always have been and always will be. I think that is
> true,
> > but
> > >> that when we examine those functions we find that they are utterly
> > >> uninteresting to historico-cultural psychology except insofar as they
> > form
> > >> the basis for higher, culturally mediated functions.
> > >>
> > >> I guess I would include the "jump" you create when you fire a gun next
> > to
> > >> somebody's ear (they jump before realizing that it is a gun), the
> sickly
> > >> feeling you get when you look down from a very tall building or come
> > around
> > >> a trail bend and see a coiled snake, and eidetic memories (the "after
> > >> vision" you see when you shut your eyes after looking at a bright
> > light).
> > >>
> > >> I think that if these were all there were to psychology,
> > >> historico-cultural pscyhology would be a bizarre branch of philosophy,
> > or an
> > >> obscure literary practice, and the reactologists would have been right
> > after
> > >> all. There is, however, a second kind of practical thinking which is
> > >> functionally similar, looks structurally similar, but is genetically
> > utterly
> > >> different and therefore, in the final analysis (e.g. under conditions
> of
> > >> pathological degeneration as in old people with Alzheimer's) it is
> also
> > >> structurally different.
> > >>
> > >> These are the hand-to-eye "reflexes" we see in driving, in computer
> > games,
> > >> in piano playing, and in a wide range of societal practices that are
> > >> manifestly symbolic manipulations. They are semiotically consequential
> > for
> > >> other people (not just for the biological organism).
> > >>
> > >> But they do appear for all the world like "automatic" reflexes (a term
> > >> that I think Vygotsky would avoid, except for metaphorical usages),
> > actions
> > >> into which consciousness does not (any longer) appear to enter. These
> > are
> > >> the actions I would like to call "post-verbal" or "de-verbal" thinking
> > >> rather than "pre-verbal" or "non-verbal" thinking.
> > >>
> > >> Vygotsky's example is tying a knot. It's not that this is unconscious
> > (you
> > >> are not asleep when you tie your shoes, and you are not even in a
> > trance).
> > >> It is that it is largely non-conscious, because your attention is
> > focused on
> > >> the result of the action and not on the activity itself. You can, if
> you
> > >> wish, focus on the activity, and in this sense it is structurally
> quite
> > >> different from what happens when I unexpectedly fire a gun next to
> your
> > ear.
> > >>
> > >> You cannot, no matter how hard you try, focus on the jump that you
> > >> involuntarily make when you hear an unexpected gunshot. The same is
> true
> > of
> > >> the other examples as long as they are unexpected, although of course
> > people
> > >> can and do culturally mediate their vertigo and deliberately train for
> > >> eidetic memory, after which we can no longer call it a lower
> > psychological
> > >> function.
> > >>
> > >> I think that all kinds of history, including ontogeny, know instances
> of
> > >> what in phylogenesis is called convergent evolution. The wings of
> birds,
> > >> insects and airplanes are functionally and even structurally similar,
> > but
> > >> they are only externally related; that is, related because of their
> very
> > >> different adaptation to the functional needs and to the environment. I
> > think
> > >> that pre-verbal and post-verbal "automatism" has the same type of
> > >> resemblance: a phenotypical rather than a genotypical one.
> > >>
> > >
> > > <snip>
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >> David Kellogg
> > >> Seoul National University of Education .
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> --- On Wed, 5/11/11, Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com> wrote:
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> From: Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com>
> > >> Subject: Re: [xmca] last on concepts
> > >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >> Date: Wednesday, May 11, 2011, 3:28 AM
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> David,
> > >>
> > >>
> > > <snip>
> > >
> > >  Question: is what you are referring to as "practical intellect" and
> > >> "post-verbal" behavior equivalent to what Vygotsky refers to as
> > automatic
> > >> behavior or activity, such as in his discussion of Claparede's law, v1
> p
> > >> 183?  "This law states that difficulties or impediments encountered in
> > >> automatic activity lead to conscious reflection on that activity." p
> 70
> > >>  (Vygotsky seems to accept this law, but only as a functional law -
> his
> > >> criticism is that it only indicates whether the need for conscious
> > awareness
> > >> is present or absent in an individual, not how conscious awareness
> > itself
> > >> emerges. v1 p183)
> > >>
> > >> A classic example of automatic activity versus behavior guided by
> > >> conscious awareness is of course comparing the driver who is used to
> > >> changing gears with a stick shift to someone just learning how to do
> > that.
> > >>  The coordination of the gear shift with the clutch eventually becomes
> > >> habitual and only rises to consciousness when there is a problem for
> the
> > >> first driver, but initially requires constant attention from the
> second
> > one.
> > >>
> > >> - Steve
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> On May 10, 2011, at 5:16 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
> > >>
> > >>  Steve:
> > >>>
> > >>> One of the things we did when we translated T&S into Korean was to
> > >>> carefully compare every single paragraph with the Minick translation
> > into
> > >>> English. We found quite a few differences. Here's the original
> > Vygotsky:
> > >>>
> > >>> Отношение мышления и речи в этом случае можно было бы схематически
> > >>> обозначить двумя пересекающимися окружностями, которые показали бы,
> что
> > >>> известная часть процессов речи и мышления совпадает. Это . так
> > называемая
> > >>> сфера &Lt;речевого мышления&Gt;. Но это речевое мышление не
> исчерпывает
> > ни
> > >>> всех форм мысли, ни всех форм речи. Есть большая область мышления,
> > которая
> > >>> не будет иметь непосредственного отношения к речевому мышлению. Сюда
> > следует
> > >>> отнести раньше всего, как уже указывал Бюлер, инструментальное и
> > техническое
> > >>> мышление и
> > >>> вообще всю область так называемого практического интеллекта, который
> > >>> только в последнее время становится предметом усиленных исследований.
> > >>>
> > >>> Here's an English translation, with some of the differences with
> Minick
> > >>> in parentheses:
> > >>>
> > >>> "(It would be possible to) schematically designate the relation of
> > >>> thinking and speech (in this case) by two intersecting circles,
> (which
> > would
> > >>> show that a certain part) of the processes of speech and thinking do
> > >>> coincide. (Here is the so-called sphere of “verbal thinking”. But)
> this
> > >>> verbal thinking exhausts neither all the forms of thought nor all the
> > forms
> > >>> of speech. There is the large area of thinking, which will not have
> > direct
> > >>> relation to the vocal thinking. (Here one should relate first of all
> as
> > >>> already indicated Bühler, instrumental and technical thinking and
> > generally
> > >>> the entire region of so-called the practical intellect, which only
> > recently
> > >>> becomes the object of those intensified studies.)"
> > >>>
> > >>> Now, Minick dislikes Vygotsky's tendency to say the same thing three
> > >>> times, and like Hanfmann and Vakar he often prunes in the hope of
> > producing
> > >>> a stronger and clearer image. Martin doesn't like Vygotsky's love of
> > >>> striking, and often spatial, images (and I certainly agree with
> Martin
> > that
> > >>> they ARE dangerous sometimes, as in the idea of four "planes" that so
> > struck
> > >>> you, Professor Mack, and Colin, which I think is a complete
> > >>> misunderstanding).
> > >>>
> > >>> I like both, and I think they are related. I think that we are
> supposed
> > >>> to take both with a block of salt, the way a cow does. I think that
> we
> > take
> > >>> Vygotsky's slightly different redundancies and his not quite
> > overlapping
> > >>> images not as Galton photographs (where similarities reinforce each
> > other
> > >>> and differences obscure) but as frames in a moving picture, verbal
> > >>> approximations of something that is changing as we speak.
> > >>>
> > >>> So here we have the image of two intersecting circles. Vygotsky says
> > it's
> > >>> only one of several ways to imagine this (and in fact he has already
> > >>> described it as the intersection of two lines, as a tangled skein, as
> > two
> > >>> "currents" that flow into each other, etc. So it is right and proper
> to
> > >>> begin with "It might be possible" or "it may be possible" or "it
> would
> > be
> > >>> possible" which is what Vygotsky really does.
> > >>>
> > >>> He's talking about speech functions in ADULTS, which is why he says
> "in
> > >>> this case". Think of an adult driving a car. This is an almost
> perfect
> > >>> example of practical, mechanical intellect. Vygotsky is surely right
> to
> > >>> suggest that it has no DIRECT relationship to verbal thinking; if you
> > >>> describe what you are doing while you are driving, you are probably
> > going to
> > >>> have an accident.
> > >>>
> > >>> But it's not at all like PRE-verbal nonverbal thinking, is it? We can
> > see
> > >>> this in a number of ways. First of all, we find conversation a little
> > >>> burdensome when we are driving unless it is actually connected with
> the
> > >>> driving task (e.g. a GPS). This suggests positive and negative
> > interference,
> > >>> doesn't it? Secondly, we do LEARN to drive in a verbal way, from
> > >>> instructions, instructors, and ultimately verbal tests. So perhaps we
> > should
> > >>> say that structurally, genetically, yea, even functionally, driving
> is
> > >>> POST-verbal or DE-verbal rather than PRE-verbal. And this DOES
> suggest
> > an
> > >>> INDIRECT relationship to verbal thinking.
> > >>>
> > >>> Here's some other stuff, earlier in the chapter, worth looking at in
> > this
> > >>> context:
> > >>>
> > >>> Так, Бюлер со всей справедливостью говорит: &Lt;Действия шимпанзе
> > >>> совершенно независимы от речи, и в позднейшей жизни человека
> > техническое,
> > >>> инструментальное мышление (Werkzeugdenken) гораздо менее связано с
> > речью и
> > >>> понятиями, чем другие формы мышления&Gt; (13, с. 100). Дальше мы
> должны
> > >>> будем еще возвратиться к этому указанию Бюлера. Мы увидим, что
> > действительно
> > >>> все, чем мы располагаем по этому вопросу из области экспериментальных
> > >>> исследований и клинических наблюдений, говорит за то, что в мышлении
> > >>> взрослого человека отношение
> > >>>
> > >> интеллекта
> > >>
> > >>> и речи не является постоянным и одинаковым для всех функций, для всех
> > >>> форм интеллектуальной и речевой деятельности.
> > >>>
> > >>> So Bühler, (with entire validity), says “The (performances) of the
> > >>> chimpanzee are completely independent from speech, and (in the later
> > life of
> > >>> man) technical, instrument thinking (Werkzeugdenken) is much less
> > connected
> > >>> with speech and with concepts, than other forms of thnking” (13, p.
> > 100).
> > >>> Further on we must again return to this indication of Bühler’s. (We
> > will
> > >>> see), that actually everything that we now have available on this
> > question
> > >>> from the areas of experimental studies and clinical observations
> (will
> > >>> confirm as a point of fact) that in the thinking of the adult person
> > the
> > >>> relation of intellect and speech is neither constant nor identical
> (for
> > all
> > >>> functions) and all forms of intellectual and verbal activity."
> > >>>
> > >>> Again, we can easily imagine that the practical, instantaneous
> problem
> > >>> solving behavior we see in an adult human repairing a car was
> > originally
> > >>> learnt from a repair manual, or from another more expert repairman;
> in
> > other
> > >>> words, at one point the adult human’s thinking was virtually
> identical
> > with
> > >>> written or oral speech and proceeded step by step alongside it.
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> Finally, take a look at "Tool and Sign in Child Development", Steve
> > >>> (Volume Six). In the first chapter, first section, paragraph 11-12,
> > Vygotsky
> > >>> and Luria go over this same ground. But this time they make an
> > invidious
> > >>> comparison between Kohler, who really tries to show how human the
> chimp
> > is,
> > >>> and Buhler, who is trying to show how chimplike the human is. And
> they
> > draw
> > >>> attention PRECISELY to the MISTAKE of assuming that practical
> > intelligence
> > >>> in later life is language free. Here's what they've got.
> > >>>
> > >>> Эта тенденция остается неизменной и у всех дальнейших исследователей,
> > за
> > >>> небольшими исключениями. В ней наиболее ярко выражена та упомянутая
> > >>> опасность зоологизирования детской психологии, которая, как уже
> > сказано,
> > >>> является господствующей чертой всех исследований в этой области.
> Однако
> > в
> > >>> исследовании Бюлера эта опасность представлена в наименее серьезном
> > виде.
> > >>> Бюлер имеет дело с ребенком до развития речи, и в этом отношении
> > основные
> > >>> условия, необходимые для оправдания психологической параллели между
> > шимпанзе
> > >>> и
> > >>> ребенком, могут быть соблюдены. Правда, Бюлер сам недооценивает
> > значение
> > >>> сходства основных условий, говоря, что действия шимпанзе совершенно
> > >>> независимы от речи и в позднейшей жизни человека техническое,
> > >>> инструментальное мышление в гораздо меньшей степени связано с речью и
> > >>> понятиями, чем другие формы мышления.
> > >>>
> > >>> "This tendency, with a few exceptions, remains unchanged in the work
> of
> > >>> all following investigators. It is here that the danger of what might
> > be
> > >>> called the ‘animalization’ of child psychology, mentioned earlier,
> > finds its
> > >>> clearest expression as the prevalent feature of investigation in this
> > field
> > >>> (see earlier reference). However, this danger is at its smallest in
> > Bühler’s
> > >>> experiments. Bühler deals with the pre-speech period of the child,
> > which
> > >>> makes it possible to fulfill the basic conditions necessary to
> justify
> > the
> > >>> psychological parallel between chimpanzee and child. It is true that
> > Bühler
> > >>> underestimates the importance of the similarities of these basic
> > conditions
> > >>> when he states : ‘The chimpanzee’s activities are totally independent
> > of
> > >>> speech, and in man’s later period of life technical, instrumental
> > thinking
> > >>> is much less connected to speech and concepts than other forms of
> > thought’,”
> > >>>
> > >>> David Kellogg
> > >>> Seoul National University of Education
> > >>>
> > >>
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