On 19 April 2011 09:01, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
You miss my point, Huw in the 1st paragraph. Having "Activity" as
a fundamental concept is the only way I know to *avoid* the
mental/physical dichotomy. But I wouldn't go so far as to try to
avoid the "distinction." Would you?
Adopting the words of Beer, I'd dissolve the distinction. :)
I've been thinking about it, though I don't think that cybernetics
entails the 'fundamental' concept of activity and yet meets all the
conceptual needs I've had for it to date.
You mention: "subject/organism/host of the epistemology". Are you
suggesting that something other than a human being can have an
epistemology?
You can point to any organism and say it knows something. To know
that you know is just another kind of knowing or affirmation. In the
sense of models and Godel.
Huw
Andy
Huw Lloyd wrote:
On 19 April 2011 02:01, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
Huw, I think any scientific theory should aspire to be
philosophically rigorous. Philosophial rigour though is not
something that depends on results as "scientific" rigour
does. For
example, is we use the concept of "activity" in our scientific
work as a relation between the mental and the physical for
example, then we need to be aware that this introduces a
dichotomy
which is ultimately unsustainable. On the other hand, it is
almost
impossible to talk about, let alone explain, Activity without
referring to "states of mind" and so on. This is the difficult
distinction between communicative action and concepts.
The mental/physical distinction looks like a dead-end to me
beyond the sphere of social discourse, though I understand
your gist here to be about coherence. Yes, I'd only offer
mild surprise that you'd willingly employ an incoherent
theory. The distinction between the "-graphy" aspects of
science and the "-ology" may be apt.
On concepts: It is true that a concept **can** be conceived of
within a matrix of similarity and differences, but I think
that is
a view which really misses what a concept is and fails to
capture
the full breadth of meaning of the word. It has the effect of
replacing the study of a concept with the study of "features"
ultimately leading to an arbitrary decision on what counts
as an
"irreducible" "chunk" or "feature". I think there is a
difference
between problems of recognition or categorisation, on one hand,
and conceptulisation on the other. Concepts actually always
have
fuzzy boundaries, and focus on boundary problems often
misses the
essence.
Yes. Most definitely. Although these fuzzy boundaries exist
(or are far greater in proliferation) when the
subject/organism/host of the epistemology entailing the
concepts is considered as an open system rather than a closed
system. I agree about the semiotic aspects, although I fear
if it is insisted that this aspect part of the definition of a
concept (rather than part of it's generation), you will create
more confusion and disagreement in your wake, especially in
the positivist camp.
The only other pithy point I have to make about the
commonalities & differences view of concepts right now is that
you can cover a lot of ground with a few mirrors. The
uniqueness and variety of our minds and behaviour is also a
function of the uniqueness and variety in the world, sometimes
this variety and fuzziness may simply be a reflection of it,
not something intrinsic to our own epistemology.
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