Jay, Andy, Martin, David, Carol, Mike and others.
Thank all of you for creating a hybrid third-space bridge or COMMON
POOL in which to swim communicatively.
Jay, thank you also for your article reviewing Dynamic Systems theory.
I would like to give some recognition to the need for valuing "folk"
narratives as it is locations such as elementary schools where various
folk discourses on ideas such as "concepts" and "identity" and
"learning" are constructed and shared. Moscovici's social
representation theory is an example of an approach which values folk
narratives as central to emergence of new and novel possibilities.
It is conversations such as this one on "concepts" [created in a third
space] which are central to transforming those folk tales [that so
profoundly structure our perspectives and children's development in
institutional structures such as schools.]
I've printed out this conversation to re-read and re-cognize as it
offers a map in order to help locate the different perspectives from
the many conversants contributing to constructing this particular
cultural clearing.
FASCINATING
Larry
On Tue, Apr 12, 2011 at 9:55 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
OK, thanks for that Jay. I understand your position and it is
clearly well-founded. I will nonetheless keep working at what I am
doing, and I really doubt that I will find myself elaborating and
justifying folk theories. It is a fact, I believe, that human
beings are born realists, and we will continue to spontaneously
populate the world with independently existing things. But this
does not stop us from acting as if we were meaning-making rather
than manipulating objects. So I think there is value in a general
theory of these reifications.
Andy
Jay Lemke wrote:
I agree that there is both a rhetorical-political dimension
to the issue of "concepts" and a theoretical one. If you're
talking to people who don't have any other way to make sense
of some things except with a notion of "concepts", then you
have to create some hybrid third-space or translation bridge
or common pool in which to swim communicatively.
But I like to hope that I can offer interlocutors some
alternative ways of talking about and so making sense of
things, and that they might get to feel a bit more comfortable
with it over time, and that I can then point out that their
old language has a lot of drawbacks, without leaving them with
no alternative to it (since they surely won't give it up
without one).
This is an alternative rhetorical-political strategy to the
one of trying to, as someone put it earlier, hollow out the
usage of the old terms and fill them with new meanings. I'd
change the metaphor there to something more like re-situate
the old terms in new discourses, with new semantic
relationships to a new network of terms (and some of the old
ones).
I'm all for trying both these approaches and seeing what happens.
But I don't want to buy into the conventional discourse
repertoire (Foucault's "discursive formation") that goes with
taking some notion to be "a concept". If I do that, say, for
"identity", then people expect that it's possible to define
what identity "is", and to do so precisely and in a way that
allows us to determine whether any given instance is an
instance of "identity" or not. I frankly think that's crazy,
and not the least bit productive for either scholarship or
good thinking. And if there are good reasons to criticize
various uses of the term identity, and various more extended
discourses that incorporate the term (and these extended
discourses are the relevant units in theoretical discussion,
not the term) -- and there surely are -- these have nothing to
do with trying to fit "identity" into a preconceived mold of
what a good "scientific concept" ought to be. There is a term
here, and an associated set of discourse patterns and extended
meanings, but no "concept". Going around attacking the
"concept" of identity would be pointless -- but it is just
this sort of discussion one often gets.
Here I'm aiming my argument at the notion of concepts, but the
bigger point about what the units of analysis for theoretical
discourse and intellectual history are most usefully taken to
be was made by Foucault in the Archeology of Knowledge (esp.
the section on method, defining discursive formations,
enunciative possibilities, etc.) a long time ago now, and on
the basis of exhaustive research with the historical source
texts for tracing major changes in ways of making sense of the
world, especially in the social sciences (also in medicine,
technology, etc.) over long periods of time (a few centuries).
That work led him to the same conclusions as functional
linguistic analyses of extended meaning-making in text, and by
completely different methods, and operating on completely
different scales. The conclusions in both cases are contrary
to our folk-theories about words, meanings, and concepts. And
way too much philosophical discussion of these matters really
looks to me like not much more than efforts to elaborate and
justify the folk theories.
I recognize the necessity of communicative compromise. But I
also recognize some educational responsibility. The first in
the shorter term, to ground the second in the longer term.
JAY.
Jay Lemke
Senior Research Scientist
Laboratory for Comparative Human Cognition
University of California - San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, California 92093-0506
Professor (Adjunct status 2009-11)
School of Education
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
www.umich.edu/~jaylemke <http://www.umich.edu/%7Ejaylemke>
Professor Emeritus
City University of New York
On Apr 12, 2011, at 8:42 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
Jay, you say "We make meanings with sign resources in
contexts." But this is what a concept is, isn't it? And if
you had to explain to someone what another concept, say
"identity" or "situation" is, then you would have to come
to the same kind of summary conclusion. Isn't there value
in clarifying what a concept is with the concept of
concept? But if you simply leave the concept of concept
alone with its "mentalist, idealist, universalist baggage"
then won't we have to do that with "identity" or
"situation" and every other concept eventually? How will
we talk under those conditions?
Andy
Jay Lemke wrote:
I liked Ana's questioning of the cultural value
attached to particular views about concepts in her
response to David's commentary on two little passages
about Jinho.
David is extolling the formal aspect of meaning as a
tool: classification, set theory, syllogistic
reasoning. Ana is emphasizing the value of meaning as
a tool for story-telling, for engaging someone in an
imagined world, for projecting possibilities. David's
first example is, from the second point of view,
pedantic and artificial, a mere pretext for the
exegesis of a a system of classification (i.e. all
boys are either Korean or foreign. This boy is
Korean.). There is no projected story, no engagement,
at least relatively to the second one, which could be
the opening of the saga of a Korean Naruto.
Of course this overstates things, but it does call
attention to the multiple functions of verbal
meaning-making, and its seems to me unwise to extol
abstract classification and generalization at the
level of the word-based category as being the higher
"conceptual" function of language. I always try to
understand Vygotsky's use of "the word" as meaning not
individual isolated words (except sometimes) but more
to speech, to utterance, to verbal meanings, which
usually require a lot more than one word, or at least
that word in a richly prepared context (verbal and/or
nonverbal). A word, or a verbal meaning is not
automatically a generalization. Isolated words have a
"meaning potential" a probability distribution of
possible meanings, and as they are combined with
co-text and context, the net meanings they help to
make get more specified, and can be either meanings
about general propositions or meanings about specific
instances. Words are sign-tools that when used in
particular meaning-making practices can indicate
categories, and relations among categories that count
as generalizations, or equally well can be used to
designate particular concrete things or tell very
specific stories.
Isolated words are always the wrong unit of analysis
when considering questions of meaning.
This applies even to the acquisition of single-word
utterances in early childhood, as I think is now
pretty well accepted.
So verbal meaning making does not automatically imply
generalization or categories, though languages have
devices for distinguishing through different wordings
between meanings made about instances and meanings
made as generalizations or through categories.
And the ability to support meanings about abstract
categories is just one function of the linguistic
system and our ways of using it, and not necessarily
(indeed I would say rather obviously not) the highest
or most valuable of its functions in use.
So what of "concepts," then? I think we have to
distinguish between reasoning in terms of abstract
categories to make general propositions, and doing so
through language (which is the original sign system
for doing so) and saying that this process entails
"concepts". The process surely happens. It surely
happens most of the time, and originally in
intellectual-social development, through mobilizing
the linguistic sign system (along with other sign
modalities). None of that implies a model or analysis
of the process in terms of "concepts". Depending
obviously on what one means by a concept. I am pretty
sure that this process does not take place by the
deployment of some fixed (even expandable) repertoire
of semantic primitives. Nor in terms of any unit of
meaning that precedes and then gets "expressed in"
language. The meanings come into being in and through
the deployment of the linguistic signs and do not have
any independent or prior existence (contra Platonism
and its romantic revivals, contra the thesis of a
"lingua mentis" and contra Fodor and maybe Pinker).
So whatever LSV may have meant by "concept", in
linking it as he does to language and speech in
development, he likely did not mean either idealist
concepts or internal mental realities that then get
expressed outwardly in speech.
The etymology, as was noted, for "concept" meant a
taking or pulling together. A concept brings together
instances, giving one name to many similar but
different things. At least that's the received notion.
But is it, itself, anything more than the name we use
to do this? and as a name, merely part of more complex
locutions we use to do this? or as makes more sense,
developmentally and in semiotic analysis, merely the
front-man for a complex systems of speech and gesture
and integration with context, and generally a very
multi-modal procedure for con-cepting a lot of stuff
under a category-term? The object of study needs to be
this whole complex of doings and meanings (as verbs)
that produces the category result, and surely this is
not anything one would call "a concept".
All that of course is just taking categories one at a
time, and we know things are never that simple.
Categories are made through distinctions, and so
systems of categories get created and the meanings we
make with any one category-term are interpretable in
relation to to all the others (e.g. foreign vs.
Korean). But there is lots of research on how
categories get made and used linguistically and they
all pretty much show that what you have to pay
attention to are the complex processes by which the
connections among things in the categories are
foregrounded or backgrounded, making category use more
flexible and indeed potentially ambiguous, polysemic,
etc. Categories get merged and divided, new ones are
formed out of the shards of older ones. ALL
"concepts", not just scientific ones, come in such
fluid and squabbling families. Scientific and
especially mathematical category terms, defined by
their family connections to one another (and in the
case of scientific ones by links to nonverbal objects
and activities), TRY to impose an artificial stability
and fixedness (and in mathematics special conditions
allow greater success in doing so) -- but these are
hardly a model for how these matters usually go.
I think we have fallen culturally into the habit of
saying that we think in terms of concepts, but I see
no persuasive evidence that we do. We make meanings
with sign resources in contexts, and some of those
meanings sometimes have some of the features said to
define a concept. Meanwhile the mentalist, idealist,
universalist baggage that the notion drags in with it
continues to do immeasurable harm in both education
and psychology.
Jay Lemke
Senior Research Scientist
Laboratory for Comparative Human Cognition
University of California - San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, California 92093-0506
Professor (Adjunct status 2009-11)
School of Education
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
www.umich.edu/~jaylemke
<http://www.umich.edu/%7Ejaylemke> Professor Emeritus
City University of New York
On Apr 12, 2011, at 7:09 PM, Ana Marjanovic-Shane wrote:
Dear David and all,
Just a small remark or a question:
If the two lines you compare were a beginning of
two novels, and someone
asked you which one of these novels would you
prefer to read, what would be
your answer?
For some reason, I would be more intrigued to read
the novel beginning with
the second line:
"Look! He has a blue sweater. He has no glasses.
He has stripey hair. His
name is Jinho."
It seems not imprisoning me in the visual, but on
the contrary, openiing my
eyes to see something interesting. The first one
is telling me nothing that
I don't already know -- except that there is a
Korean boy Jinho. OK - so
what?
So even though you claim that the first line is
conceptual, and that the
second one is a mere description of visuals, I am
attracted to the second
line as a beginning of a possibly exciting story.
I wonder if the second line does not carry some
other important properties,
other than conceptual but equally improtant?
Ana
_______________________________________
Ana Marjanovic-Shane
215-995-3207 <tel:215-995-3207>
e-mails: anamshane@gmail.com
<mailto:anamshane@gmail.com>
ana@zmajcenter.org
<mailto:ana@zmajcenter.org>
On Mon, Apr 11, 2011 at 11:45 PM, David Kellogg
<vaughndogblack@yahoo.com
<mailto:vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>>wrote:
Tonight I have to discuss the difference
between the following.
T: Look! This is a boy. He's not a foreign
boy. He's a Korean boy. This is
Jinho.
T: Look! He has a blue sweater. He has no
glasses. He has stripey hair. His
name is Jinho.
It seems to me there are three important
differences, from the teacher's
point of view.
a) The first one repeats the concept "boy" and
the indefinite article used
to mark it as an example of the concept
(actually, a number, as opposed to
an indicative or a demonstrative like "the" or
"this" or "that"). The second
does not.
b) Imagine the teacher following up this
information with the open question
"Tell me about Jinho". The first offers
conceptual material ("foreign",
"boy", "Korean") that can be used by the
children with ALL the other
characters in our textbook: Joon, Ann, Nami,
Peter, Bill, and so on. The
second one does not.
c) Imagine the teacher following up the
answers with a CRITICAL metaprocess
question "How do you know?" The first leads to
a conversation about what
names are boy's names and what names are
girl's names, which names sound
Korean and which sound foreign. The second
merely leads back to the picture,
or back to the teacher's hearsay.
Ideologically, the first one suggests a model
of a concept that is a
generalized and abstracted essence: "boy",
"foreign", and "Korean" are all
essential QUALITIES (and not, actually,
things). The second ALSO has an
implicit model of a concept; it is based on
the possession of material
objects (and not essential properties).
It seems to me that for all three reasons, the
first way of framing the
question provides a way OUT of the enslavement
of the visual field and the
second does not. I remember that Larry
speculated about concepts and
conceptualizations that emprison us. It seems
to me that prisons are made of
much sturdier and sterner stuff.
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education
--- On Mon, 4/11/11, Martin Packer
<packer@duq.edu <mailto:packer@duq.edu>> wrote:
From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu
<mailto:packer@duq.edu>>
Subject: Re: [xmca] concepts
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
<xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
Date: Monday, April 11, 2011, 8:16 PM
Phillip,
I didn't mean any petard-hoisting, honestly! I
just get excited at times
about ideas. Big ones, and little ones too.
Let me respond a bit more appreciatively to
what you're saying. I'm most
interested at the moment, in my own work, in
trying to understand Vygotsky.
I think I share that interest with some others
here, but I'm equally sure
not everyone has the interest. But to me it's
quite fascinating to struggle
to try to interpret and apply texts that I am
separated from by time,
language, geography and economic system.
Is there power in knowledge? Do knowledge
claims bolster positions of
professional expertise? Do academics not
traffic in prestige and advantage
even as we make apparently neutral and
detached pronouncements about trivial
details? Does success in every endeavor not
"depend on a very complex
knowledge of and ability to manipulate
determinative politics, discourses,
and institutions -- on professional
competencies and social privileges that
constitute even the 'organic intellectuals'"?
(That's Paul Bové beating up
on Charles Taylor in his foreword to Deleuze's
book on Foucault.)
Yes, of course. I take Foucault very
seriously. Does Vygotsky write about
any of this? No, not really. Does that mean he
was not aware of it?
Impossible! This was a man who read Marx, who
was living at the time of a
revolution whose stated aim it was to correct
the distortions that an unjust
society had wrought on human beings, and who
was in a position of power
himself when Stalin took control. How could he
possibly not have been aware
of the connections between knowledge and
power, the micro-politics of
concepts?
He did write occasionally, as in "The
Socialist Formation of Man," of
topics such as the formation of the
"psychological superstructure of man"
and of "the basic assumption that intellectual
production is determined by
the form of material production." He wrote
that "A fundamental change of the
whole system of these [societal] relationships
which man is a part of, will
also inevitably lead to a change in
consciousness, a change in man’s whole
behaviour." He even wrote of Nietzsche and
questioned his assumption that
the will to power would continue to dominate
human relations. By and large,
though, his writings let these things pass.
Just as at the beginning of T&S Vygotsky
writes that of course emotion and
communication are intimately linked to
thinking and speaking, but that they
must fade into the background in his analysis
in that book, I read all
Vygotsky's texts assuming that politics and
power are also in the
background, unspoken but not forgotten. Then,
to me, it seems that what
Vygotsky was doing is similar to what Foucault
was doing in his writings on
the ethics of self-formation. He is focused on
the *formation* of subjects,
and of forms of subjectivity, as children grow
into adults in whatever kind
of distorted social order they happen to be
born into. Could he explicitly
put it that way? Did he have the space or time
to spell out the whole story?
Or do we have to do it for him?
Bottom line, I don't see that a politics of
concepts is in any clear way
incompatible with Vygotsky's project, as I
grasp it. His 'concrete
psychology' of the Moscow tram driver would
also be a study of the American
professor.
Martin
On Apr 11, 2011, at 8:52 PM, White, Phillip wrote:
ah, the bliss of being hoisted upon one's
own petard! thanks, Martin.
(;-)
yeah, Foucault's use of concept is constant.
what i was obliquely attempting to get at
was that the term 'concept'
could be seen as highfalutin, rather than,
say, the term "big idea". (hah!
of course, my father would rebuke me with,
"What's the big idea?!")
but what i mean is that concept is another
word for idea. and an idea
that appears to be difficult to grasp,
abstract in short, could be seen as a
'big idea'.
it's about lingo, using latinate/greek
words, rather than those little
ordinary daily words.
it even seems to me that when, say, i'm
teaching about "community of
practice" - i guess we could say that's a
pretty big concept, or even
"legitimate peripheral participation", that
initially it seems abstract, but
once everyone in the class talks about it,
that over time, with concrete
examples from experience, that "community of
practice" no longer seems
abstract. in fact, it seems quite real and
people can identify it when they
observe it, just like they can identify the
difference between an ornamental
pear tree and a comice pear tree.
takes me back to Bateson - that making
sense of the world, recognizing
the patterns, is recognizing the difference
that makes a difference. and
it's that curious difference wherein a child
over time can distinguish
bertween a cat and a dog and a horse and a
donkey, and it's through
recognizing the difference that makes a
difference.
so, while Foucault didn't suggest it, i'm
suggesting that one of the ways
experts claimed expertise was to employ a
vocabulary that would set the
profession apart from the everyday world of being.
am i being anti-intellectual?
because when with my students we been
reading Lave, say, and there is
always someone who complains about her
vocabulary, i always argue in support
of her vocabulary.
internal contractions.
phillip
Phillip White, PhD
University of Colorado Denver
School of Education
phillip.white@ucdenver.edu
<mailto:phillip.white@ucdenver.edu>
________________________________________
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
[xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>] On
Behalf Of Martin Packer [packer@duq.edu
<mailto:packer@duq.edu>]
Sent: Monday, April 11, 2011 5:38 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] concepts
But,
Phillip,
wasn't Foucault's central concern in, say,
The Order of Things, to
explore the *basis* on which human knowledge,
or knowledges, are
constituted? In his terms, within a discursive
formation there is a
dispersion of concepts. An ordering of words
is used to order what can be
seen in the world. The point was not that
there is no such thing as
'concept,' but that concepts are not neutral,
natural maps of a preexisting
and independent reality. For example, he wrote
of the "form of positivity"
of the sciences - "the concepts around which
they are organized, the type of
rationality to which they refer and by means
of which they seek to
constitute themselves as knowledge." To a
great extent, his attention to the
material practices in which both objects and
abstractions are produced was
drawn from Marx, so I don't think it is wildly
incompatible with Vygotsky's
project.
Martin
On Apr 11, 2011, at 5:36 PM, White,
Phillip wrote:
though really, i'm more with Jay on
this point that there is no such
thing as a 'concept' - i'm thinking that the
practice of the word became,
what?, let's say 'insitutionalized', or
'valorized' during the enlightenment
project... that period which Foucault points
to of ways of categorization
and classifications that emerged as
professional experts exercised for
themselves the power to label, prescribe,
diagnose, etc. etc., as in, for
example, the separation of madness and reason.
yeah ......
another one of my half-baked ideas!
phillip
Phillip White, PhD
University of Colorado Denver
School of Education
phillip.white@ucdenver.edu
<mailto:phillip.white@ucdenver.edu>
________________________________________
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
[xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>] On
Behalf Of mike cole [lchcmike@gmail.com
<mailto:lchcmike@gmail.com>]
Sent: Monday, April 11, 2011 4:07 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] concepts
I agree, Monica. Its odd that we make
such distinctions and then worry
that
we do not
know what a key term in the discussion
(in this case, concept) is
supposed
to mean (we all find a way to make
sense of it for ourselves however!)..
Martin and other conceptual knowers.
LSV and Luria insisted that words
were
generalizations. How is that idea of
generalization related to the idea
of a
concept?
A con-cept. With-cept? I have no
conception!
mike
On Mon, Apr 11, 2011 at 1:13 PM,
Monica Hansen <
monica.hansen@vandals.uidaho.edu
<mailto:monica.hansen@vandals.uidaho.edu>>
wrote:
Martin,
I have enjoyed reading your back
and forth on this topic of concepts.
Examining the concept of concepts
is indeed problematic, but it is the
crux
of the whole issue.
Social/individual, internal/external,
physiological/mental,
concrete/abstract, etc.
You ended with this:
"But to sever completely the links
between everyday discourse and
scientific
discourse would be to prevent the
informing of the former by the latter
that
LSV found so important."
I would just like to go one
further: severing the links between
everyday
discourse and scientific discourse
would prevent the former(everyday)
from
informing the latter(scientific).
There can be no higher psychological
processes, no scientific concepts
without everyday concepts because it
is
the specific and local nature of
experience that informs all the others
(and
is informed by the others as
well). It is the dialogic nature of
concepts
that makes them so fascinating and
so powerful.
Monica
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
[mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>]
On
Behalf Of Martin Packer
Sent: Sunday, April 10, 2011 11:33 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] concepts
On Apr 10, 2011, at 12:33 PM,
Martin Packer wrote:
Maybe the notion of a
"concept" might be a
bit like that of a "gene"
in
the sense that a gene is a sort of
functional unit, but it has no
simple
material reality in itself.
Jay's opening sentence neatly
illustrates the difficulty of
eliminating
'concept.' He writes of 'the
notion' of a concept - which is to
say, to
write about concepts he has to
employ a concept, namely that of
'concept'!
(If that seems odd, try reading
some Frege!)
As the Stanford Encyclopedia
article points out, no one has
satisfactorily
defined a concept. But the seeming
unavoidability of invoking something
like
'concept' follows from the fact
that we humans (and perhaps animals
too;
another seemingly intractable
debate) deal not so much with
particularities
as with generalities. We talk and
write not about this think and that
thing,
but this 'kind' of thing and that
'type' of thing. We write not about
the
specific concept of 'rabbit,' but
about 'the notion' of concept.
As Henry James once wrote, "The
intellectual life of man consists
almost
wholly in his substitution of a
conceptual order for the perceptual
order
in
which his experience originally
comes." One may disagree with the
separation
of the two order that James' words
seems to suggest, but it seems
implausible to deny that there are
*two* orders.
Do this order of generalities
involve complex interrelations or
systems, as
Jay suggests? Are they specified
in practice, in ways that depend on
context? Yes, of course. I am deep
in the middle of chapter 6 of T&S,
and
LSV wrote of all this, 70 years
ago. We have already discussed
here his
notion [!] of a system of
generality, represented
metaphorically by
lines
of
longitude and latitude on a globe.
He conceived of this system as
operating
in acts of thought that actively
grasp their objects. He saw both the
dependence of generalities on
language, and their distinction.
Should we avoid, as Jay
recommends, claiming that "there
are concepts
as
such"? I'm not sure what this
claim would amount to. There are, and
can
only be, "concepts for us." Should
we avoid reifying concepts?
Certainly!
Should we remove the term from all
scientific discourse, leaving it
only as
an "everyday locution"? That's a
matter of taste, I suppose. But to
sever
completely the links between
everyday discourse and scientific
discourse
would be to prevent the informing
of the former by the latter that LSV
found
so important.
Martin__________________________________________
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xmca mailing list
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--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
Joint Editor MCA:
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=g932564744
<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title%7Edb=all%7Econtent=g932564744>
Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>
Book:
http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857
<http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857>
MIA: http://www.marxists.org
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--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
Joint Editor MCA:
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=g932564744
<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title%7Edb=all%7Econtent=g932564744>
Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>
Book: http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857
<http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857>
MIA: http://www.marxists.org
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