Merhaba! Kusura bakmayın Gülseren Hanım e-postanızı yeni gördüm. Saygılarımla .... 2011/2/1 <xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu> > Send xmca mailing list submissions to > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > xmca-owner@weber.ucsd.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of xmca digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. pretending, imitating, playing and performing > (Gregory Allan Thompson) > 2. Re: pretending, imitating, playing and performing (mike cole) > 3. Re: Ways With Words (David Kellogg) > 4. Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously > (Eijck, M.W. van) > 5. RE: Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously > (Peter Smagorinsky) > 6. Re: Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously > (Andy Blunden) > 7. Re: RE: Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously > (Ivan Rosero) > 8. RE: Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously > (Rod Parker-Rees) > 9. RE: Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously > (Colette Murphy) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2011 16:41:54 -0600 (CST) > From: Gregory Allan Thompson <gathomps@uchicago.edu> > Subject: [xmca] pretending, imitating, playing and performing > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > Message-ID: <20110131164154.AJL15495@mstore00.uchicago.edu> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > Lois, > I just had a chance to take a peek at the fantastic article that you > circulated (lots more to say but no time...), it reminded me of a video from > an article that was discussed on XMCA about a year ago with regard to Teach > for America (Atlantic Monthly article "What makes a great teacher"). Much of > the discussion on XMCA involved policy and TfA, about which I didn't have > much to say. I was struck by one of the videos of the teachers (his video is > labeled "The Motivator"): > > http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/01/what-makes-a-great-teacher/7841/ > > He puts on a wonderful performance and the kids appear to be riveted by his > performance as evidenced by their performances, sometimes imitative, as he > institutes Operation Get Smart in his classroom (certainly the cameras had > something to do with everyone's performance, but maybe there is a lesson > there too). He tells his students everyone in the class has the potential to > be "the smartest students in the country". There are certainly parts of his > delivery that could have been better, but it's a hundred times better than I > could have ever done... And it seemed like a nice example of pretending, > playing, and performing. > > -greg > > > > > >Message: 4 > >Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2011 12:22:56 -0500 > >From: Lois Holzman <lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org> > >Subject: [xmca] pretending, imitating, playing and performing > >To: Activity eXtended Mind Culture <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> > >Message-ID: > > <059CBF2B-7257-4B83-B402-DD6BA12C4B55@eastsideinstitute.org> > >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > > >Hi, > > > >I'm passing along a short essay by Lenora Fulani and Fred Newman, entitled > Let's Pretend, that looks at lots we've been discussing here lately in > relation to schooling and reform efforts. > >Comments? > >You can find it at > http://admin-allstars.promotions.com/sites/default/files/Let's Pretend > Special Report 010611.pdf > > > >Lois > > > >Don't forget to check out the latest at http://loisholzman.org > > > >Lois Holzman, Ph.D. > >Director, East Side Institute for Group and Short Term Psychotherapy > >920 Broadway, 14th floor > >New York NY 10010 > >Chair, Global Outreach for UX (www.allstars.org/ux) > >tel. 212.941.8906 ext. 324 > >fax 718.797.3966 > >lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org > >www.eastsideinstitute.org > >www.performingtheworld.org > >loisholzman.org > >www.allstars.org > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >------------------------------ > > > >_______________________________________________ > >xmca mailing list > >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > > >End of xmca Digest, Vol 68, Issue 30 > >************************************ > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2011 14:52:06 -0800 > From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> > Subject: Re: [xmca] pretending, imitating, playing and performing > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> > Message-ID: > <AANLkTimNxRHe5-yc8xaySVBG+qtGgbv5cPRqGcTN2jdg@mail.gmail.com<AANLkTimNxRHe5-yc8xaySVBG%2BqtGgbv5cPRqGcTN2jdg@mail.gmail.com> > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 > > Lets talk. Are you in tomorrow at any time? > mike > > On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 2:41 PM, Gregory Allan Thompson < > gathomps@uchicago.edu> wrote: > > > Lois, > > I just had a chance to take a peek at the fantastic article that you > > circulated (lots more to say but no time...), it reminded me of a video > from > > an article that was discussed on XMCA about a year ago with regard to > Teach > > for America (Atlantic Monthly article "What makes a great teacher"). Much > of > > the discussion on XMCA involved policy and TfA, about which I didn't have > > much to say. I was struck by one of the videos of the teachers (his video > is > > labeled "The Motivator"): > > > > > http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/01/what-makes-a-great-teacher/7841/ > > > > He puts on a wonderful performance and the kids appear to be riveted by > his > > performance as evidenced by their performances, sometimes imitative, as > he > > institutes Operation Get Smart in his classroom (certainly the cameras > had > > something to do with everyone's performance, but maybe there is a lesson > > there too). He tells his students everyone in the class has the potential > to > > be "the smartest students in the country". There are certainly parts of > his > > delivery that could have been better, but it's a hundred times better > than I > > could have ever done... And it seemed like a nice example of pretending, > > playing, and performing. > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > >Message: 4 > > >Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2011 12:22:56 -0500 > > >From: Lois Holzman <lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org> > > >Subject: [xmca] pretending, imitating, playing and performing > > >To: Activity eXtended Mind Culture <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> > > >Message-ID: > > > <059CBF2B-7257-4B83-B402-DD6BA12C4B55@eastsideinstitute.org> > > >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > > > > >Hi, > > > > > >I'm passing along a short essay by Lenora Fulani and Fred Newman, > entitled > > Let's Pretend, that looks at lots we've been discussing here lately in > > relation to schooling and reform efforts. > > >Comments? > > >You can find it at > > http://admin-allstars.promotions.com/sites/default/files/Let's< > http://admin-allstars.promotions.com/sites/default/files/Let%27s>Pretend > Special Report 010611.pdf > > > > > >Lois > > > > > >Don't forget to check out the latest at http://loisholzman.org > > > > > >Lois Holzman, Ph.D. > > >Director, East Side Institute for Group and Short Term Psychotherapy > > >920 Broadway, 14th floor > > >New York NY 10010 > > >Chair, Global Outreach for UX (www.allstars.org/ux) > > >tel. 212.941.8906 ext. 324 > > >fax 718.797.3966 > > >lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org > > >www.eastsideinstitute.org > > >www.performingtheworld.org > > >loisholzman.org > > >www.allstars.org > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >------------------------------ > > > > > >_______________________________________________ > > >xmca mailing list > > >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > > > > > >End of xmca Digest, Vol 68, Issue 30 > > >************************************ > > __________________________________________ > > _____ > > xmca mailing list > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 3 > Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2011 16:13:48 -0800 (PST) > From: David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Ways With Words > To: lchcmike@gmail.com, Culture ActivityeXtended Mind > <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> > Message-ID: <783107.8601.qm@web110302.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 > > Well, yes and no. That is, David Kirshner's post does clarify a lot of my > misunderstandings of his work. But it also produces some new puzzles, at > least for me. > > For example, David says that A, perhaps even THE, main difference between a > domain which is well framed for a skills teaching genre and one which is > framed for enculturation/acculturation has to do with the way in which the > domain is defined in words. > > An "undefined" domain is conducive to enculturation. He gives the example > of politeness. But of course there are far more (and even far better) > definitions of politeness (e.g. wedding procedures) then there are of > pecan-shelling processes, at least here in China. > > It's not clear to me what it means to define a domain. You would think that > marching together in unison is an almost perfect example of a skill. But > when we actually try to "define" it, we don't end up giving recipes (e.g. > "First everybody puts there right foot forward at exactly the same time"). > That kind of thing might help you get the ball rolling but it in no way > helps with the difficult part, which is what you do when you begin to march > out of step. > > In fact, the "definitions" we give are almost always tautological: they are > not procedures so much as what Harris calls "constitutive rules"; they are > descriptions of what it means to walk in unison. "When you begin to march > out of step you have to look at the kid next to you and adjust your gait to > his or hers by either slowing down or speeding up." That looks much more > like conceptual knowledge, rather than procedural knowledge, so it belongs > to the knowledge-as-concepts genre rather than the knowledge-as-skills > genre. > > But of course nobody actually teaches this way. For one thing, it > presupposes a kind of descriptive knowledge that usually follows rather than > precedes performance. If you gotta ask, you ain't never gonna know. For > another, it assumes that the kid next to you is marching in step. Suppose he > or she isn't? > > So iInstead, we "just do it". You get a bunch of kids together and you get > them to march more or less in unison, and they create a kind of > culture-of-marching-in-step, using something like good old "Watch this" and > "Follow me". That, of course, sounds like an acculturation genre followed by > an enculturation genre. And of course it begs Salman Rushdie's question: How > does newness come into the world? > > David Kellogg > Seoul National University of Education > > PS: Did anyone else feel that Fred Newman and Lisa Fulani's article was > PIAGETIAN--that is, it separates development and learning, and places the > former absolutely and logically prior to the latter? I did, and perhaps for > that reason found it really VERY depressing. > > dk > > --- On Mon, 1/31/11, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote: > > > From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Ways With Words > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> > Date: Monday, January 31, 2011, 7:42 AM > > > Both of you messages D&D, are helpful. > David Ki, do you have a manuscript on the en-ac-ulturation distinction and > the genre approach? > mike > > On Sun, Jan 30, 2011 at 6:56 PM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu> wrote: > > > David, > > > > Thanks for the lovely wedding anecdote, and also the example of your > > mother-in-law inducting you into practices of pecan cracking through her > > verbal instructions. The model of enculturation that most of us have to > go > > by comes from the situated cognition literature grounded in examples of > > craft apprenticeship. In this model, identity development (from > peripheral > > to central participation) as well as the production of skills and > concepts > > are incorporated into a complex integrative model of learning. This seems > to > > be the frame that you are bringing to bear in understanding my > enculturation > > genre. > > > > It is precisely this integrative assumption that the genres approach > > resists. The sculpted genres of teaching enable a parsing of the discrete > > elements interacting even within complex settings. For instance, the > > shelling of pecans, though certainly a cultural practice, is precisely > > defined and hence subject to being learned as a skill, outside of > cultural > > context. (Contrast this with open-ended cultural practices like > politeness > > or approaches to solving of non-routine problems which cannot be > precisely > > specified and hence must be learned in cultural context.) Indeed, though > > your pecan-shelling lesson did transpire in an authentic cultural locale, > I > > would want to argue that the structure of the learning support for your > > pecan-shelling prowess is from habituation instruction, not from > > enculturation. > > > > The key to habituated learning is unconscious (subcognitive) association > of > > perceptual stimuli and motor responses. Your mother-in-law's directions > for > > how you should hold and operate the apparatus served to make perceptually > > salient certain aspects of the stimulus and response domains, and your > > practice served to establish the requisite subcognitive linkages between > > them. I think we can probably rule out concept teaching, as presumably > your > > mother-in-law was telling you what to do, rather than explaining > principles > > to you (not discounting the possibility that you, independently, chose to > > "make sense" of what you were being asked to do). From a genres > perspective, > > habituation would be a sufficient explanation to account for your > newfound > > skill in pecan shelling. In fact, the requirements for enculturational > > learning of this "practice" probably were not present. > > > > Let me take a moment to unpack the two enculturation-related pedagogies > in > > order to be able to continue the genres analysis of your pecan-shelling > > learning episode. One of the difficulties, given the prior model of > situated > > cognition theory and craft apprenticeship, is to imagine how > enculturational > > learning could be separated from identity development. However, in the > > genres analysis, identity becomes a salient concern in the case of > > alternative identity possibilities. For instance, in entering a craft > > apprenticeship, one makes a decision to "become" a craftsperson (of a > > certain sort). Thus one is actively seeking to acculturate oneself to the > > practices of the culture. > > > > This dynamic helps structure the "acculturation pedagogy" genre that I > will > > soon distinguish from the "enculturation pedagogy." In acculturation > > pedagogy, a bona-fide member of the culture models mature cultural > practices > > in order that novices seeking to acculturate themselves to the culture > can > > emulate those practices. In your case, David, it doesn't seem that you > > considered this to be a Chinese cultural practice, or even that you > expected > > your mother-in-law to be proficient in it. If anything, what you most > > admired about her was her ability to transfer from her prior experience > with > > cracking peanuts and pumpkin seeds to new nuts and new devices. However, > the > > ability to transfer was NOT what you were learning. You were learning to > > shell pecans. > > > > Enculturation is an even worse fit than acculturation to your > > pecan-shelling episode. Enculturation is the process of cultural > absorption > > that comes about when one is immersed in a unitary cultural milieu, for > > instance a child within the national culture adopting the characteristic > > practices of the culture. This kind of learning is accomplished without > > conscious intention or awareness. The associated pedagogical genre has > the > > teacher work surreptitiously to develop the classroom microculture so > that > > it gradually comes to resemble the reference culture with respect to > valued > > practices. Students learn not because of an intention to assume a new > > identity, but because they're immersed in a classroom culture that they > > gradually become enculturated to, even as it continues to evolve. For > > instance, a math teacher might seek to shape the culture of argumentation > in > > the classroom so that it comes to more closely resemble the kinds of > logical > > chains of reasoning that characterize mathematical proof. This is a > gradual > > process over a long period of time--not a good fit for your > pecan-shelling > > experience. > > > > Thanks for engaging with the genres approach. I hope this helps clarify > > some of the genres, and the way the genres framework is used to analyze > > situations of learning and teaching. > > > > David > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] > On > > Behalf Of David Kellogg > > Sent: Sunday, January 30, 2011 6:20 PM > > To: Culture ActivityeXtended Mind > > Subject: [xmca] Ways With Words > > > > > > > > David (Kirshner) is of course quite correct to point out that narrative > is > > not a necessary or sufficient element in his "enculturation" educational > > genre. But it does seem to me that the "enculturation" educational genre > is > > distinguished by greater discursivity; it's a much talkier model, and I > > think it is for this reason we often find it in traditional, more oral > > cultures. Unfortunately (I think) we also find it in foreign language > > classrooms, where I think it is fundamentally inappropriate. > > > > First of all, it seems to me that enculturation almost necessarily > involves > > some kind of legitimate peripheral participation, non-essential but > > nevertheless participatory roles in an activity that can in theory be > taken > > by children and outsiders. This clearly suggests a very hierarchical set > of > > roles, which, since they are not set by skills or by knowledge must be > set > > by some other criterion (e.g. being a so-called "native speaker") > > > > Secondly, it seems to me that enculturation models place a premium on > doing > > fairly simple, general, everyday things with great adroitness, > creativity, > > and confidence. An obvious example of this would be cooking, something > which > > everybody has to do but which can be done either with routinism, or with > > verve and inspiration, or with the consummate mastery that is born of > > endless routines illuminated by flashes of inspiration. > > > > Thirdly (and as David says, this is where narrative "kicks in") > > enculturation means learning what Shirley Brice Heath calls "ways with > > words". If it were simply a matter of "Watch this" "Now you try it", then > > there would be no difference between the discursive model and the skills > > model. Even if we add "Now, what was the difference?" we only get a > skills > > model plus explicit knowledge, and that is not what the enculturation > model > > is really about. > > > > That's really all I have to say here. The rest of this post is just two > > anecdotes to illustrate. and if I had any sense I would just shut up at > this > > point. I am sure that many readers will stop reading at this point, if > not > > long before. But of course in the enculturation model, ways with words > are > > very important, and sometimes anecdotes and illustrations are more > important > > than the actual skills and concepts imparted. > > > > The other day I was sitting here at this very table cracking newly > imported > > American pecans for my mother-in-law, who has had a stroke and can barely > > speak. She was watching me intently, having never seen either pecans or > the > > jar-opening device I was using to crack them, and began to make speaking > > sounds. I leaned over to listen and suddenly realized she was giving very > > precise instructions about how to use the device so that the meat would > not > > be shattered. > > > > Her body no longer obeys her brain, and she has reacquired the skills > that > > an infant must have in getting others to obey it instead. But in normal > > times this simply involves laughing or crying, not "ways with words". The > > unusual thing about this was the objectivity, the precision, and > efficiency > > of her instructions: as soon as I held the jar-opening device the way she > > told me to, my speed doubled, my efficiency tripled, and not a single > > nut-meat was broken. > > > > I realized that cracking peanuts and pumpkin seeds with immense precision > > is something she has spent a large stretch of her non-working life doing > > (she retired from the textile mill where she worked at forty years of > age) > > and she obviously had very developed views, transferable to entirely new > > products and even completely new tools, about how it should be done. In > > normal times (when we were both twenty years younger) she would have > simply > > shoved me out of the way and done it herself. But in this situation, > > absolutely no other way of transferring her knowledge than a slurred > mixture > > of Shaanxi and Henan dialects, to which I am normally fairly impervious. > > > > This circumstance is probably not unique; over thousands of years of > human > > history there were probably many situations where knowledge had to be > > transferred in this highly imperfect way from disabled elders to not yet > > able juniors. And so ways with words turn out to be as important as > skilled > > performances. > > > > But unskilled performances also have to be included, first of all, to > > provide the contrast that we have in skills models ("Watch this" "Now you > > try it") and the explicit knowledge we have in conceptual models ("See > the > > difference"), secondly to allow the elders to show the mastery on which > > their authority must ultimately be based (we cannot always live off of > the > > capital of social position), and thirdly to allow some means by which > > outsiders can teach insiders, as well as insiders teach outsiders, making > > the enculturation model not entirely a closed system and allowing the > whole > > to develop new forms of knowing. > > > > Yesterday my brother-in-law and I went to a wedding in a nearby village > > where he is doing some business with the local village head, whose friend > > had a son getting married. Village weddings in China are what I would > call > > loosely scripted: certain things must be done, but they are not done to > > schedule; they happen when all the principals are accounted for and there > is > > enough of an audience to make it worthwhile. In order to make sure that > the > > audience shows up and stays, a huge tub of "saozi mian" (noodles) is kept > on > > the boil all day, and anyone can eat as much as they like, whether they > are > > related to the bride and groom or not. > > > > There are lots of roles that call for little skill, but there are also > > roles which can be fulfilled very skillfully. For example, when we first > > arrived at the wedding, they were carrying the bride's gifts to her new > > inlaws into a room where the inlaws sat before portraits of their > ancestors > > to receive them. > > > > My brother-in-law and I, along with some neighborhood children, took some > > of them in (I took a large, purple plastic thermos bottle) and in return > the > > male adults were given cigarettes and the children were given milk > sweets. > > > > While my brother-in-law was smoking his cigarette (I stuck mind behind my > > ear because I don't smoke and I didn't want another pressed upon me), the > > bride herself arrived. The groom's sister barred and locked the door, and > > then the spy-hole was prized out so that negotiations could begin. > > > > The bride had to knock, of course. The groom's sister, as per tradition, > > eyeballed the spy hole (she had to stand on tippy-toe) and then, in > standard > > Chinese, told the bride's family that the door was barred, and if the > > bride's family really wanted to cross the threshold, they had to give a > > "hongbao" (a red envelope, with money). > > > > An envelope was produced, but when it the groom's sister opened it she > > found it only had a light greenish one yuan note in it (I think that's > about > > twelve cents at current exchange rates). She complained that the bride's > > family was "xiaochi" (stingy) and began to open the door. > > > > My brother-in-law finished his cigarette and sprang to his feet. He > barred > > the door with is wiry frame and let out a torrent of choice insults in > the > > local dialect. Egged on by hilarious laughter (from both sides of the > door), > > he finished with a rhetorical flourish based on slightly different > > emphases--he wants a BIG red envelope, and big RED one (one hundred yuan > > notes are red). > > > > Another envelope was produced (with a blue five yuan note) and my brother > > in law relented. The bride came in and bowed to the ancestors, and they > went > > off to enjoy their new marital status, their sumptuous (by peasant > > standards) new lodgings and the spiffy new plastic purple thermos I had > > carried up the stairs. > > > > As we left, we noticed that another wedding being held nearby. On closer > > inspection, this turned out to be wedding we had really been invited > to--we > > had peripherally participated in the wrong wedding, and nobody cared or > even > > noticed. And so the concept of party crashers was introduced to a remote > > village in Northwest China. > > > > David Kellogg > > Seoul National University of Education > > --- On Sat, 1/29/11, Rod Parker-Rees <R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> > wrote: > > > > > > From: Rod Parker-Rees <R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> > > Subject: RE: [xmca] Folk Psychology from a narrative perspective > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> > > Date: Saturday, January 29, 2011, 9:38 AM > > > > > > Children with older siblings observe the way they manage indignant > parents > > and can quickly work out what works and when (back in the 1980s Judy Dunn > > found plenty of evidence of 2 year olds - who had older siblings - > appealing > > to parents for support but not when they 'knew' that they were > responsible > > for a conflict). They don't need to know HOW or WHY a particular appeal > > works before they start to use it and they 'join in' well before they > > develop this sort of understanding (a particularly clear example of the > > general genetic law). Only children have a tougher job to work out how to > > manage their parents but they at least have the advantage of plenty of > > practice. > > > > All the best, > > > > Rod > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] > On > > Behalf Of Robert Lake > > Sent: 29 January 2011 17:23 > > To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Folk Psychology from a narrative perspective > > > > Yes, I appreciate your comments as well Greg. > > > > I only have one thing to add and LSV might appreciate this. > > > > My grand daughter was saying "It was an accident" when she was 3. :-) > > > > Robert > > > > On Sat, Jan 29, 2011 at 11:17 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > An interesting elaboration of the idea of the retrospective > construction > > of > > > meaning, Greg. I had not thought about it in these terms before. > > > mike > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 28, 2011 at 11:55 PM, Gregory Allan Thompson < > > > gathomps@uchicago.edu> wrote: > > > > > > > Yes, and the insistence on ascribing motive to practice starts early. > > My > > > > favorite is the parent that looks at his two year old who has just > torn > > > half > > > > the pages out of a cherished book of his (substitute lipstick all > over > > > the > > > > dining room table or paint on the new carpet) and chastises the child > > > "Why > > > > did you do that?" or better "What were you thinking?" > > > > > > > > As if the child has some complex motivation and thought behind what > > they > > > > did. The child can only stare back in shock wondering what is > > happening. > > > > > > > > But there is important work being done in those ridiculous questions. > > Put > > > > together enough of these moments and by the time they are 7 or so, > they > > > get > > > > it - "It was an accident" and "I didn't mean to do it" become stock > > > > responses regardless of what happened. And by 12 they have become > > nearly > > > > fully competent at manipulating the situation, intentions and all, > e.g. > > > "I > > > > was trying to help my sister... and...". For each event, they are > able > > to > > > > reconstruct a philosophy of the act, so to speak. > > > > > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > >------------------------------ > > > > > > > > > >Message: 2 > > > > >Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2011 11:53:27 -0600 > > > > >From: "David H Kirshner" <dkirsh@lsu.edu> > > > > >Subject: RE: [xmca] Folk Psychology from a narrative perspective > > > > >To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> > > > > >Message-ID: > > > > > <731CECC23FB8CA4E9127BD399744D1EC02E0CDFD@email001.lsu.edu> > > > > >Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > > > > > > > > >As with Tollefsen, who reviewed Hutto's book, I'm not quite sure > what > > > > >kinds of specialized narrative practices are supposed to be needed > to > > > > >establish our folk psychology's rational ascriptions. The ascription > > of > > > > >motive to behavior is ubiquitous. Admittedly, it may take one a long > > > > >time to get good at ascribing particular motives to particular > > actions. > > > > >But our social/cultural frame demands such ascription, so presumably > > we > > > > >all are going to get a lot of practice. > > > > > > > > > >It is one thing to look to narrative as a site for development of a > > > > >particular cultural practice--the folk psychology ascription of > > > > >motives--quite another to associate narrative with the fundamental > > > > >process of enculturation, itself. My approach to enculturation does > > not > > > > >take narrativization of one's identity as fundamental. That only > kicks > > > > >in in the specialized process of "acculturation"--intentional > > emulation > > > > >of cultural practices to fulfill goals of cultural membership. But > > > > >enculturation functions more fundamentally as a spontaneous adaption > > to > > > > >the culture in which one is enmeshed. > > > > > > > > > >David > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >-----Original Message----- > > > > >From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu > > ] > > > > >On Behalf Of Larry Purss > > > > >Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2011 7:21 PM > > > > >To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > >Subject: Re: [xmca] Folk Psychology from a narrative perspective > > > > > > > > > >Hi David Ke > > > > > > > > > >David > > > > >Your distinction between history and narrative is interesting. Do > you > > > > >think > > > > >Bruner collapses the distinction. Hutto's framework on narratives is > > > > >that > > > > >they are forms of story-telling that give "reasons for actions" in > > terms > > > > >of > > > > >beliefs and desires which are the folk psychological frameworks that > > are > > > > >culturally grounded frames of reference. He suggests this form of > > > > >explanation is socioculturally grounded. My recollection of > Bruner's > > > > >work > > > > >is he suggests it is one of the two basic forms of constructing > > meaning. > > > > >Therefore, for Bruner, history would be a particular form of > > narrative. > > > > > > > > > >David, if Hutto's work interests you, I would also google his edited > > > > >book > > > > >"Folk Psychology Reassessed" which gives alternative theoretical > > > > >approaches > > > > >which are challenging the "theory theory" model and "simulation" > model > > > > >of > > > > >folk psychology. The edited volume situates Hutto's work in a > larger > > > > >stream > > > > >of thought. > > > > > > > > > >On this topic of folk psycholgy I'm currently reading a book > > "Philosophy > > > > >in > > > > >the Flesh" by Lakoff & Johnson that posits BASIC or PRIMARY forms of > > > > >cognition as fundamentally metaphorical. We imaginally compare a > > source > > > > >concept to a target concept. The SOURCE concept of these primary > > > > >cognitive > > > > >structures are ALWAYS based in our physical bodies. Lakoff & Johnson > > > > >suggest > > > > >from these primary metaphors more complex metaphorical meanings > > develop. > > > > >If > > > > >this perspective is accurate, then language is not the SOURCE of our > > > > >most > > > > >basic metaphors. The source is in the sensory-motor or somatic > > embodied > > > > >cognition. Language expresses these basic metaphors. If there is > some > > > > >merit > > > > >in this position then education and developmental science should > > engage > > > > >with > > > > >basic primary metaphors as foundational in the emergence of > cognitive > > > > >capacity and in how these basic metaphors IMPLICITLY structure our > > folk > > > > >psychology. > > > > > > > > > >>From this perspective of primary metaphor as embodied it is not > too > > > > >big a > > > > >step to reflect on primary intersubjectivity as a precursor to > > > > >secondary > > > > >intersubjectivity. I have a hunch these 2 constructs are intimately > > > > >related. > > > > > > > > > >Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >On Wed, Jan 26, 2011 at 4:14 PM, David Kellogg > > > > ><vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>wrote: > > > > > > > > > >> Wow--I have to get that book! Thanks, Larry. > > > > >> > > > > >> The way I understand David Kirshner's work is this: there is > really > > > > >only > > > > >> ONE of the three meta-discourses in education that is narrative, > at > > > > >least > > > > >> narrative in the sense of oriented towards the action of a hero in > a > > > > >problem > > > > >> space who evaluates and achieves some kind of resolution. > > > > >> > > > > >> That's his THIRD meta-discourse, the one which sees education as a > > > > >process > > > > >> of becoming a participant, a member, a practioner and as mastering > a > > > > >> particular set of discourses that accompany membership. > > > > >> > > > > >> It seems to me that his first meta-discourse, which sees education > > as > > > > >a > > > > >> process of mastering skills, is not narrativist, because it > focuses > > on > > > > >> problem solutions and pretty much ignores the hero and the > > evaluation > > > > >of the > > > > >> problem space. > > > > >> > > > > >> His second meta-discourse, which sees education as a process of > > > > >acquiring > > > > >> conceptual knowledge, is not narrativist either, because it sees > > this > > > > >> knowledge as being not embodied in a particular hero and because > it > > > > >sees the > > > > >> knowledge as being quite separable from the solution of problems. > > > > >> > > > > >> I don't think this means that DHK would consider the third > > > > >meta-discourse > > > > >> the most complete. I think it's only the most complete if we view > it > > > > >from a > > > > >> narrativist point of view, and that is no coincidence, since it > > > > >co-evolved > > > > >> with a lot of Bruner's work. > > > > >> > > > > >> I have a question about the difference between narrative and > history > > > > >(as in > > > > >> "cultural historical"). It seems to me that everything we say > about > > > > >> narrative (its structure, it's "I-ness" and even its > past-to-present > > > > >> orientation) is radically UNTRUE of history (because history is > not > > > > >> structured around heroes in problem spaces, it is not "I" shaped, > > and > > > > >it is > > > > >> oriented present-to-past). Why, then, do people of our peculiar > > > > >historical > > > > >> epoch treat the two as synonymous? > > > > >> > > > > >> David Kellogg > > > > >> Seoul National University of Education > > > > >> > > > > >> --- On Wed, 1/26/11, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > >> Subject: [xmca] Folk Psychology from a narrative perspective > > > > >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> > > > > >> Date: Wednesday, January 26, 2011, 2:38 PM > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> I have attached a book review for others interested in a > perspective > > > > >on > > > > >> folk > > > > >> psychology that assumes a perspective inspired by Jerome Bruner's > > work > > > > >on > > > > >> narrative practices, Hutto is positing a 2nd person dialogical > > > > >grounding > > > > >> for understanding "reasons for actions" He suggests this mode of > > > > >> understanding is most pronounced when actions are unpredictable. > > > > >Hutto > > > > >> suggests there are other more direct embodied forms of recognition > > and > > > > >> engagement that are not narrative based. > > > > >> > > > > >> I see some affinity in this perspective to David Kirschner's > > approach > > > > >to > > > > >> learning theory as narrative based genres. > > > > >> > > > > >> Larry > > > > >> > > > > >> -----Inline Attachment Follows----- > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> __________________________________________ > > > > >> _____ > > > > >> xmca mailing list > > > > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > > > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> __________________________________________ > > > > >> _____ > > > > >> xmca mailing list > > > > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > > > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > >> > > > > >__________________________________________ > > > > >_____ > > > > >xmca mailing list > > > > >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > > > >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >------------------------------ > > > > > > > > > >_______________________________________________ > > > > >xmca mailing list > > > > >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > > > >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >End of xmca Digest, Vol 68, Issue 27 > > > > >************************************ > > > > __________________________________________ > > > > _____ > > > > xmca mailing list > > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > > > > __________________________________________ > > > _____ > > > xmca mailing list > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > *Robert Lake Ed.D. > > *Assistant Professor > > Social Foundations of Education > > Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > > Georgia Southern University > > P. O. Box 8144 > > Phone: (912) 478-5125 > > Fax: (912) 478-5382 > > Statesboro, GA 30460 > > > > *Democracy must be born anew in every generation, and education is its > > midwife.* > > *-*John Dewey. > > __________________________________________ > > _____ > > xmca mailing list > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > __________________________________________ > > _____ > > xmca mailing list > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > > > > > > > __________________________________________ > > _____ > > xmca mailing list > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > __________________________________________ > > _____ > > xmca mailing list > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > > __________________________________________ > _____ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 4 > Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2011 14:52:39 +0100 > From: "Eijck, M.W. van" <m.w.v.eijck@tue.nl> > Subject: [xmca] Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> > Message-ID: > < > 226A018E3BF58F40BBE738812621232001A779A47317@EXCHANGE10.campus.tue.nl> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > Yesterday my 8 year old daughter asked me an intriguing question. She > wondered whether it is possible to say something out loud and to think (by > inner speech--not images) something different simultaneously. We tried this > in practice but we did not succeed in assessing whether we were actually > able to do it. As far as I could assess, it appeared to me that the speaking > and the thinking are not really occurring simultaneously but are following > up each other very swiftly. Actually, from both Vygotskyan and > neurolinguistic developmental perspectives I think it is impossible to say > something out loud and to think something different simultaneously, but I am > not 100% certain. > > What do you think? > > Michiel > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 5 > Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2011 13:55:58 +0000 > From: Peter Smagorinsky <smago@uga.edu> > Subject: [xmca] RE: Thinking and speaking different things > simultaneously > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> > Message-ID: > < > 17119644E5258145931499091942C41E0A87E5@SN1PRD0202MB074.namprd02.prod.outlook.com > > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > I can't answer this question, but would like to invite your daughter to > apply to our Ph.D. program. p > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On > Behalf Of Eijck, M.W. van > Sent: Tuesday, February 01, 2011 8:53 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [xmca] Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously > > Yesterday my 8 year old daughter asked me an intriguing question. She > wondered whether it is possible to say something out loud and to think (by > inner speech--not images) something different simultaneously. We tried this > in practice but we did not succeed in assessing whether we were actually > able to do it. As far as I could assess, it appeared to me that the speaking > and the thinking are not really occurring simultaneously but are following > up each other very swiftly. Actually, from both Vygotskyan and > neurolinguistic developmental perspectives I think it is impossible to say > something out loud and to think something different simultaneously, but I am > not 100% certain. > > What do you think? > > Michiel > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 6 > Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2011 01:47:36 +1100 > From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Thinking and speaking different things > simultaneously > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> > Message-ID: <4D481D08.3090308@mira.net> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed > > Particularly on the basis of the last chapter in T&S, I would say that > Vygotsky has no argument against this. > From personal experience I can say that it is possible. I can read > aloud while thinking something completely different. > > > Andy > > Eijck, M.W. van wrote: > > Yesterday my 8 year old daughter asked me an intriguing question. She > wondered whether it is possible to say something out loud and to think (by > inner speech--not images) something different simultaneously. We tried this > in practice but we did not succeed in assessing whether we were actually > able to do it. As far as I could assess, it appeared to me that the speaking > and the thinking are not really occurring simultaneously but are following > up each other very swiftly. Actually, from both Vygotskyan and > neurolinguistic developmental perspectives I think it is impossible to say > something out loud and to think something different simultaneously, but I am > not 100% certain. > > > > What do you think? > > > > Michiel > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > __________________________________________ > > _____ > > xmca mailing list > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Hegel Summer School: The New Atheism: Just Another Dogma? > <http://ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/hss2011.htm> > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 7 > Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2011 06:48:24 -0800 > From: Ivan Rosero <irosero@ucsd.edu> > Subject: Re: [xmca] RE: Thinking and speaking different things > simultaneously > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> > Message-ID: > <AANLkTinUsvzxAbXmH5=bQWyobB6+pC5cGaom8n6HdpHG@mail.gmail.com<bQWyobB6%2BpC5cGaom8n6HdpHG@mail.gmail.com> > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 > > How about when we lie? > > Especially to someone who we think might really be hurt by the "truth", > especially when it has to do with giving that person details regarding > their > competence at some task (because they ask for details!!!), and you have to > think about what they did wrong and make it sound like it wasn't really > wrong (because they actually know or have a strong clue what it is), and > you > have to invent things they did right which they didn't really do right... > All in real time. I wouldn't claim these situations actually involve > saying something other than what you are thinking, but the physical > discomfort, the hesitation, and the general slow-down in turn taking that > I've experienced during these moments suggests to me that whenever these > things take place we come close to embodying a double bind, it's very > physically and emotionally uncomfortable. > > Ivan > > On Tue, Feb 1, 2011 at 5:55 AM, Peter Smagorinsky <smago@uga.edu> wrote: > > > I can't answer this question, but would like to invite your daughter to > > apply to our Ph.D. program. p > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] > On > > Behalf Of Eijck, M.W. van > > Sent: Tuesday, February 01, 2011 8:53 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [xmca] Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously > > > > Yesterday my 8 year old daughter asked me an intriguing question. She > > wondered whether it is possible to say something out loud and to think > (by > > inner speech--not images) something different simultaneously. We tried > this > > in practice but we did not succeed in assessing whether we were actually > > able to do it. As far as I could assess, it appeared to me that the > speaking > > and the thinking are not really occurring simultaneously but are > following > > up each other very swiftly. Actually, from both Vygotskyan and > > neurolinguistic developmental perspectives I think it is impossible to > say > > something out loud and to think something different simultaneously, but I > am > > not 100% certain. > > > > What do you think? > > > > Michiel > > > > __________________________________________ > > _____ > > xmca mailing list > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 8 > Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2011 14:58:56 +0000 > From: Rod Parker-Rees <R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> > Subject: RE: [xmca] Thinking and speaking different things > simultaneously > To: "ablunden@mira.net" <ablunden@mira.net>, "eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> > Message-ID: > < > 6CD19ED93A7A8F4593955A11621242C237105D6B73@ILS133.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > Might not reading aloud involve rather different processes from more > 'autonomous' speech production, possibly suggesting that the latter might be > more strongly implicated in verbal thinking while we may be able to engage > autopilot for (some kinds of) reading aloud? > > Ivan's question about the 'double bind' of trying to maintain smooth fluent > speech while grappling with tensions between 'how we see it' and 'how we > want someone else to think we see it' may relate to the use of voice > analysis in lie detection (I remember reading somewhere that the Dutch > police at one time were recruiting blind people to listen to witness > statements to pick out people who were likely to be lying). > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On > Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: 01 February 2011 14:48 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: Re: [xmca] Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously > > Particularly on the basis of the last chapter in T&S, I would say that > Vygotsky has no argument against this. > From personal experience I can say that it is possible. I can read > aloud while thinking something completely different. > > > Andy > > Eijck, M.W. van wrote: > > Yesterday my 8 year old daughter asked me an intriguing question. She > wondered whether it is possible to say something out loud and to think (by > inner speech--not images) something different simultaneously. We tried this > in practice but we did not succeed in assessing whether we were actually > able to do it. As far as I could assess, it appeared to me that the speaking > and the thinking are not really occurring simultaneously but are following > up each other very swiftly. Actually, from both Vygotskyan and > neurolinguistic developmental perspectives I think it is impossible to say > something out loud and to think something different simultaneously, but I am > not 100% certain. > > > > What do you think? > > > > Michiel > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > __________________________________________ > > _____ > > xmca mailing list > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Hegel Summer School: The New Atheism: Just Another Dogma? > <http://ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/hss2011.htm> > > __________________________________________ > _____ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 9 > Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2011 15:09:57 +0000 > From: Colette Murphy <c.a.murphy@qub.ac.uk> > Subject: RE: [xmca] Thinking and speaking different things > simultaneously > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>, > "ablunden@mira.net" <ablunden@mira.net> > Message-ID: > < > 8E291993ECA7D24E8178F50975000E2B25916977F7@EX2K7-VIRT-1.ads.qub.ac.uk> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > And - re lying, doesn't it seem easier to think and speak opposites, rather > than to think and speak totally unrelated ideas? > Colette > > Dr Colette Murphy > Senior Lecturer > School of Education > 69 University St > Queen's University > Belfast BT7 1HL > > tel: 02890975953 > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf > Of Rod Parker-Rees [R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk] > Sent: 01 February 2011 14:58 > To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: RE: [xmca] Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously > > Might not reading aloud involve rather different processes from more > 'autonomous' speech production, possibly suggesting that the latter might be > more strongly implicated in verbal thinking while we may be able to engage > autopilot for (some kinds of) reading aloud? > > Ivan's question about the 'double bind' of trying to maintain smooth fluent > speech while grappling with tensions between 'how we see it' and 'how we > want someone else to think we see it' may relate to the use of voice > analysis in lie detection (I remember reading somewhere that the Dutch > police at one time were recruiting blind people to listen to witness > statements to pick out people who were likely to be lying). > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On > Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: 01 February 2011 14:48 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: Re: [xmca] Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously > > Particularly on the basis of the last chapter in T&S, I would say that > Vygotsky has no argument against this. > From personal experience I can say that it is possible. I can read > aloud while thinking something completely different. > > > Andy > > Eijck, M.W. van wrote: > > Yesterday my 8 year old daughter asked me an intriguing question. She > wondered whether it is possible to say something out loud and to think (by > inner speech--not images) something different simultaneously. We tried this > in practice but we did not succeed in assessing whether we were actually > able to do it. As far as I could assess, it appeared to me that the speaking > and the thinking are not really occurring simultaneously but are following > up each other very swiftly. Actually, from both Vygotskyan and > neurolinguistic developmental perspectives I think it is impossible to say > something out loud and to think something different simultaneously, but I am > not 100% certain. > > > > What do you think? > > > > Michiel > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > __________________________________________ > > _____ > > xmca mailing list > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Hegel Summer School: The New Atheism: Just Another Dogma? > <http://ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/hss2011.htm> > > __________________________________________ > _____ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > End of xmca Digest, Vol 69, Issue 1 > *********************************** >
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