RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts

["Denise Newnham" <dsnewnham@bluewin.ch>]

HI Andy...  need to read this article and reread the part in 2007 and will
come back:)

Denise

-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: 06 August 2010 15:55
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts

What do you make of this, Denise? yourself.
Andy

Denise Newnham wrote:
> Dear Michael, 
> 
>  
> 
> I wrote to Jaan about your question as no where was it clearly stipulated
in
> the earlier works and he has just replied so I forward his words and text
> 
>  
> 
> Denise
> 
> Dear Denise,
> 
>  
> 
> Good question! In 1998 I was somewhat naively optimistic about Peirce cand
> abduction (see Pizarroso & V 2009 on overcoming that optimism).
> 
> But the 1998 quote from my book is indeed an embryonic form of what later
> (2001 in Potsdam, and more thoroughly in my 2007 book CULTURE IN MINDS AND
> SOCIETIES became clear-- words as POINT-LIKE CONCEPTS cannot be the
highest
> level of semiotic mediation as they would close up further creativity of
> meaning-making. So Vygotsky was basically limited.
> 
> Instead, the pseudo-concept translates in my terminology into field-type
> sign (Level 4 in my system of semiotic mediation)
> 
>  
> 
> Jaan
> 
>  
> 
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> Behalf Of Michael Glassman
> Sent: 05 August 2010 15:22
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
> 
>  
> 
> Hi Denise,
> 
>  
> 
> I was wondering, does Valsiner have an argument as to how and why
> pseudo-concepts actally aids in Peirces ilogic of abduction.  I am
currently
> under the impresson that abduction is primarily about hypothesis
generation
> - the ability to develop new hypotheses in response to unique problems.
So
> I'm wondering what role pseudo-concepts, if we are going by Vygotsky's
> definition, might play in all this.
> 
>  
> 
> Michael
> 
>  
> 
>   _____  
> 
>  From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Denise Newnham
> Sent: Thu 8/5/2010 5:26 AM
> To: ablunden@mira.net; 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'
> Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
> 
> Hello Andy, the reference as you saw to pseudoconcepts is in his book 'The
> guided mind' 1998 and the other is : The development of the concept of
> development: Historical and epistemological perspectives. In W. Damon, &
R.
> Lerner(Eds), Handbook of child psychology. 5th Ed. VOl.1. Theoretical
models
> of human development (pp. 189-232). New York: Wiley.
> 
> I quote (1998): 'Vygotsky and his colleagues (Luria would be the closest
> example) attributed and overly idealized role to the role of concepts in
> human reasoning. The role fitted with his emphasis on the hierarchy of
> mental functions (i.e. higher mental functions regulating lower ones), yet
> by this exaggerated emphasis the focus on the process of semiogenesis is
> actually diminished. In contrast, it could be claimed that pseudo-concepts
> (i.e. specific unified conglomerates of concept and complex qualities) are
> the core (and highest form) of human psychological functioning. The claim
> would fit with the unity of representational fields (of Karl Buhler,
> described and extended earlier) and with the central focus of abduction
> (rather than induction or deduction) in the process of making sense (along
> the lines of Pierce).
> 
> I read you paper 'when is a concept really a concept' and heard that there
> was a debate on XMCA but as I was not connected at that time have not
heard
> or read this debate.
> 
> Denise
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> Sent: 05 August 2010 10:22
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
> 
> Can you give us the full reference for "see Valsiner,
> 1997d", Denise, and maybe even the context? I just find it
> incredible that someone could know as much about Vygotsky as
> Valsiner does and place pseduoconcepts at the top of the
> development hierarchy.
> 
> Andy
> 
> Denise Newnham wrote:
>> Dear Larry and others,
>>
>> I am new to this game so perhaps am doing something out of turn so if so
> let
>> me know. Larry I read your reply and this extract below made me think of
>> Valsiner's work on semiotic mediators and concepts where he states that
>> pseudoconcepts (1998, p.278-279) should be placed at the top to the
>> developmental hierarchy as the hierarchy should be seen as 'open to
> changes
>> or formation of intrasensitive order- [see Valsiner, 1997d]' (2001, p.
>> 85).This brings ot my mind Markova's discussion on the spontaneous of
>> intuitive in knowledge formation (2003) and I think that Cole's fifth
>> dimension attests to this argument. There is an interesting paper by
>> Galligan (2008) "using Valsiner" on the web.
>>
>> Denise
>>
>> 'These reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the
>> developmental question of how  socially situated microgenetic experiences
>> get "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize
>> experience across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower"
and
>> "higher"
>> functions]?'
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
>> Behalf Of Larry Purss
>> Sent: 04 August 2010 19:04
>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on
>> Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
>>
>> Hi Leif and Katerina
>>
>> Leif,
>> I have recently read Daniel Stern's latest book "The Present Moment" and
I
>> agree that he has a fascinating perspective on the topic of "engagement"
>> that emphasizes a "non-mind reading interpretation" of engaging with
>> others.  I will look up his earlier work discussing Vygotsky and Glick.
> It
>> is also interesting that you mention Joseph Glick. Glick's articles on
>> Werner are also fascinating as they suggest that Werner was also focused
> on
>> "microgenesis" as central to developmental accounts.
>>
>> Katerina,
>> I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "accept metaphor" but generally I
>> accept metaphor as a central way of understanding "human science" as
>> interpretive and "perspectival".  As I read  Glick's interpretation of
>> Werner's microgenetic developmental theory, I was also REFLECTING on Mike
> &
>> Natalia's focus on the microgenetic social situation of development, and
>> also my attempt to link these perspectives with neo-Meadian notions of
>> social ACTS [interchangeability of actual social positions].  These
>> reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the developmental
>> question of how  socially situated microgenetic experiences get
>> "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize
> experience
>> across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower" and "higher"
>> functions]?
>>
>> Glick's article "Werner's Relevance for Contemporary Developmental
>> Psychology"  points out that Werner thought developmental processes got
>> organized "at one of  three different levels: the sensorimotor, the
>> perceptual, or the symbolic." (p.562)  Metaphor organizes experience at
> the
>> 3rd symbolic level and at this level we can have metaphoric models of
> "mind"
>> [for example: conversation, text, computers, dance, orchestra, etc.]
>> However, this still leaves us with questioning  the RELATIONAL process of
>> linking language and metaphor to the other levels of organization at the
>> sensorimotor and perceptual levels.
>> Stern, Reddy, Werner, Glick, Gillespie & Martin, Mike and Natalia, and
>> others are exploring the possible dynamic fluidity of the capacity for
>> organizing and structuring the 3 levels of experience that may be more
>> reciprocal [and possibly simultaneous assemby] than a linear teleological
>> dynamic.  The question becomes, how central are the sensorimotor and
>> perceptual ways of "constructing" or "forming" experience once social
>> situations of development are  symbolic [and metaphorical]?  As Glick
> points
>> out, Werner believed these language and symbolic functions "undergo a
>> differentiation process from deeper sensorimotor roots." (p.562) However
>> these deeper roots are NOT TRANSCENDED but continue to organize
> experience.
>> The notion of "leading activity" implies an INVARIANT linear process
where
> a
>> specific leading activity DOMINATES each stage of development.  An
>> alternative perspective emphasizes the fluidity of these "leading
>> activities" as continuing to remain central for development. For
>> example functions such as "affiliation" are not only dominant in one
>> specific stage of developmentand then recede into the background, but
>> ACTUALLY continue to ACTIVELY organize experience [depending on the
> societal
>> microgenetic situation of development].  Whether the previous "leading
>> activity" recedes or remains active is dependent, not on the stage of
>> development [age determined] but rather on the particular social
situation
>> of development. Mike's point that particular school contexts correlate
> with
>> particular ages of students allows 2 alternative models of development.
>> Stage theory that is age "determined" or layered development that is
>> socially situated [schools CONSTRAIN affiliative activity which recedes
> into
>> the background]  If the 2nd alternative guided how we structured schools
> and
>> affiliation and interchangeability of social positions was VALUED,
> identity
>> and concept development would be altered.
>> My personal fascination, working in schools, is the idea of the
> possibility
>> of creating institutional structures which promote the
"interchangeability
>> of social positions in social acts" and how to facilitate social spaces
>> which nurture this interchangeability. An example of this is the creation
> of
>> the 5th dimension METAPHORICAL SPACES where interchangeability of
> positions
>> is fluid and dynamic and leads to the development of "agentic capacity"
>> where ALL participants experience being recognized and experiencing
> OTHERS
>> RESPONDING to their recognition.  This affiliative activity is formative
> of
>> particular "identity" characteristics [communal self] and also "concept
>> development" formed within microgenetic moments of development. The
reason
> I
>> appreciate  neo-Meadian accounts of development are
>> there privileging the centrality of ACTUAL INTERCHANGEABILITY of social
>> positions [which simultaneously organize and regulate sensorimotor,
>> perceptual, and symbolic experiences].  I also believe this "ideal" of
>> actual interchangeability is fundamentally affiliative and dialogical as
> the
>> participants openly share perspectives.  This also creates social
>> spaces where cognitive development [and reflective capacity] is nurtured
> and
>> "grown" [cultured]
>>
>> Larry
>>
>> On Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 7:32 AM, Katerina Plakitsi
> <kplakits@gmail.com>wrote:
>>> Larry, with "trans situated" do you mean that you accept "metaphor",
> which
>>> is been considered as a constructivist argument?
>>> Katerina Plakitsi
>>> Assistant Professor of Science Education
>>> Department of Early Childhood Education
>>> School of Education
>>> University of Ioannina
>>> 45110
>>> Greece
>>> tel.: +302651005771 office
>>> fax: +302651005842
>>> tel.: +6972898463 mobile
>>> e-mail: kplakits@cc.uoi.gr
>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits
>>> http://users.uoi.gr/5conns
>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr <http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/> 
>>> http://www.edife.gr/school/5oschool.html
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>> Sent: Tuesday, August 03, 2010 8:43 PM
>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on
>>>
>>> Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
>>>
>>> Hi Martin
>>>> This topic of "mind-reading" vs  "non-mind reading" models of young
>>>> infants
>>>> CAPACITY for attending to and ENGAGING with other "minds" [persons] is
a
>>>> fascinating topic which has been discussed previously in CHAT
>>>> conversations
>>>> on this listserve.
>>>> I recently read V. Reddy's book which recommends a 2nd person societal
>>>> interactional microgenetic model of non-mind reading. I have sympathy
> for
>>>> this particular perspective. However, I would like to read more widely
> on
>>>> this particular topic.
>>>>
>>>> Do you or others on this listserve have any recommendations for further
>>>> articles which  engage with the pros and cons of the various models in
a
>>>> spirit similar to the proposed intent of the special issue of the
Review
>>>> of
>>>> Philosophy and Psychology?
>>>>
>>>> I'm curious about the various theories of young infants capacity for
>>>> engaging with others within sociogenesis, ontogenesis, and
microgenesis.
>>>> However, I'm also interested in how the various  models of "infants
>>>> engaging
>>>> with others" become transformed in the transition to
>>>> TRANS-situational understandings  [the development of "higher" mental
>>>> functions.]
>>>>
>>>> Larry
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Aug 2, 2010 at 12:57 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Begin forwarded message:
>>>>>> From: Victoria Southgate <v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk>
>>>>>> Date: August 2, 2010 4:22:07 AM GMT-05:00
>>>>>> To: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu
>>>>>> Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on Mindreading,
>>>>> Review of Philosophy and Psychology
>>>>>> Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Guest Editors:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Daniel D Hutto, University of Hertfordshire
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Mitchell Herschbach, University of California, San Diego
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Victoria Southgate, University of London
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>           CALL FOR PAPERS
>>>>>>
>>>>>>           Deadline for submissions: 1 December 2010
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Human beings, even very young infants, exhibit remarkable capacities
>>>>>> for
>>>>> attending to, and engaging with, other minds. A prevalent account of
>> such
>>>>> abilities is that they involve "theory of mind" or "mindreading": the
>>>>> ability to represent mental states as mental states of specific kinds
>>>>> (i.e.,
>>>>> to have concepts of "belief," "desire," etc.) and the contents of such
>>>>> mental states. A number of philosophers and psychologists question the
>>>>> standard mindreading and wider representationalist framework for
>>>>> characterizing and explaining our everyday modes and methods of
>>>>> understanding other people. One possibility is that infants may be
>>>>> exhibiting sophisticated yet non-conceptual, and possibly
>>>>> non-representational, mind tracking abilities that do not equate to
any
>>>>> sort
>>>>> of mindreading.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Proponents on both sides of this debate must adequately accommodate
>>>>> recent work in developmental psychology. Experiments involving a
> variety
>>>>> of
>>>>> nonverbal tasks - e.g., the "violation of expectation" paradigm and
>>>>> anticipatory looking tasks, as well as nonverbal tasks involving more
>>>>> active
>>>>> responses -suggest that young infants can understand others' goals,
>>>>> intentions, desires, knowledge/ignorance, and beliefs. Perhaps most
>>>>> prominent are studies suggesting infants as young as 13 months of age
>> are
>>>>> selectively responsive to the false beliefs of others, well before
they
>>>>> are
>>>>> able to reliably pass standard verbal false belief tasks around 4
years
>>>>> of
>>>>> age.
>>>>>> This special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology aims to
>>>>> create a dialogue between the mindreading and non-mindreading
> approaches
>>>>> to
>>>>> basic social cognition. Contributors are asked to clarify their
>>>>> theoretical
>>>>> commitments; explain how their accounts compare with rivals; and how
>> they
>>>>> propose to handle the emerging empirical data, particularly that from
>>>>> human
>>>>> developmental psychology. Themes and questions to be addressed include
>>>>> but
>>>>> are not limited to:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> -       Infants as young as 13 months old display a systematic
>>>>> sensitivity to the beliefs of others. Does it follow that they must be
>>>>> operating with a concept of belief, or indeed, any concepts at all?
>>>>>> -       Normally developing children become able to attribute false
>>>>> beliefs to others between the ages of 3 and 5. Does it follow that
they
>>>>> must
>>>>> be operating with a "theory of mind" or the equivalent?
>>>>>> -       What does mental attribution minimally involve? What exactly
>>>>> distinguishes mindreading from non-mindreading approaches to early
>> social
>>>>> cognition? Are there theoretical reasons to prefer one over the other?
>>>>>> -       What exact roles are mental representations thought to play
in
>>>>> mindreading approaches? What kind of mental representations might be
>>>>> involved? Can a principled dividing line be drawn between
>>>>> representational
>>>>> and non-representational approaches?
>>>>>> -       How precisely should we understand the explicit/implicit
>>>>> distinction as invoked by certain theorists?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Invited contributors
>>>>>>
>>>>>> -       José Luis Bermúdez, Texas A&M University
>>>>>>
>>>>>> -       Pierre Jacob, Institut Jean Nicod
>>>>>>
>>>>>> -       Andrew Meltzoff, University of Washington
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Important dates
>>>>>>
>>>>>> -       Submission deadline: 1 December 2010
>>>>>>
>>>>>> -       Target publication date: July 2011
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> How to submit
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Prospective authors should register at:
>>>>> https://www.editorialmanager.com/ropp to obtain a login and select
>>>>> "Social
>>>>> Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives" as an article type to submit
a
>>>>> manuscript. Manuscripts should be no longer than 8,000 words.
>> Submissions
>>>>> should follow the author guidelines available on the journal's
website:
>>>>> http://www.springer.com/13164  Any questions? Please email the guest
>>>>> editors: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk, mherschb@ucsd.edu,
> v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk
>>>>>>
>>>>>> About the journal
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN: 1878-5158; eISSN:
>>>>> 1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published quarterly by Springer
>> and
>>>>> focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive
science.
>>>>> The
>>>>> aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics of
>>>>> mutual
>>>>> interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster
>>>>> interdisciplinary
>>>>> research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the mind,
>>>>> including the neural, behavioural and social sciences.
>>>>>>  The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical
>> research
>>>>> as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical relevance. It
>>>>> includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from leading
>>>>> authors together with articles answering a call for paper.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Editorial board
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Editor-in-Chief: Dario Taraborelli, Surrey. Executive Editors:
Roberto
>>>>> Casati, CNRS; Paul Egré, CNRS, Christophe Heintz, CEU.
>>>>>> Scientific advisors: Clark Barrett, UCLA; Cristina Bicchieri, Penn;
>> Ned
>>>>> Block, NYU; Paul Bloom, Yale; John Campbell, Berkeley; Richard
Breheny,
>>>>> UCL;
>>>>> Susan Carey, Harvard; David Chalmers, ANU; Martin Davies, ANU;
Vittorio
>>>>> Girotto, IUAV; Alvin Goldman, Rutgers; Daniel Hutto, Hertfordshire;
Ray
>>>>> Jackendoff, Tufts; Marc Jeannerod, CNRS; Alan Leslie, Rutgers; Diego
>>>>> Marconi, Turin; Kevin Mulligan, Geneva; Alva Noë, Berkeley;
Christopher
>>>>> Peacocke, Columbia; John Perry, Stanford; Daniel Povinelli,
>>>>> Louisiana-Lafayette; Jesse Prinz, CUNY; Zenon Pylyshyn, Rutgers; Brian
>>>>> Scholl, Yale; Natalie Sebanz, Nijmegen; Corrado Sinigaglia, Milan;
> Barry
>>>>> C.
>>>>> Smith, Birkbeck; Elizabeth Spelke, Harvard; Achille Varzi, Columbia;
>>>>> Timothy
>>>>> Williamson, Oxford; Deirdre Wilson, UCL
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Dr. Victoria Southgate
>>>>>> Wellcome Trust Research Career Development Fellow
>>>>>> Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development
>>>>>> Henry Wellcome Building
>>>>>> Birkbeck, University of London
>>>>>> Malet Street
>>>>>> London, WC1E 7HX.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
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> 
> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos
> Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss
> 
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-- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos
Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss


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