Re: [xmca] perception/conception etc

[ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org]

Martin:

I will throw out an example that may work or may just need to be thrown 
away.  In the PBS show "the human spark"  there were experiments conducted 
comparing 3 year old humans to chimps.  What they found was the 3 year 
olds were invariably prone to provide assistance to those they perceive as 
not knowing how to do a task.  This was not the case in the chimpanzee who 
were always inclined to be selfish, not share or not perceive that 
assistance was needed.  Now is it possible that this perception of helping 
out is a percept? 

Of course it could be stated that the culture the 3-year old as been 
reared in provides the 'spark' for this helping out but it could just as 
easily be theorized that helping out is an innate percept for which humans 
are inclined to behave.  Perhaps I could be so bold (i might as well at 
this point for I started by saying this idea could just as easily be 
discarded) that humans have it within their genetic code a 'helping out' 
percept.  Just as female cardinals (the bird) have a genetic code for 
searching out red cardinals (like my keeping with your cardinal theme?) 
humans have a genetic code for searching out ways to be helpful.  Let's 
call these genetic predispositions in humans: percepts.  Who hasn't looked 
in the sky to see silhouettes of faces or seen faces outlined in the sides 
of cliffs?
eric 



From:   Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
To:     "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date:   07/12/2010 11:29 AM
Subject:        Re: [xmca] perception/conception etc
Sent by:        xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu



Eric,

I think the difficulty that I am having with the proposals that people 
have been making about percepts and concepts is that, if my understanding 
is correct, these have been proposed as entities that belong (in some 
sense) to an individual, and more than this that they are internal to the 
individual - internal mental entities, distinct from the world in which 
that individual lives.

I would say that we have learned from the work of Gibson and others that 
perception is an active interaction with and in the world. If 'forms' 
emerge in perception, these forms are not within the individual, they are 
forms of active attunement in practical activity. I would propose that we 
think of conception, too, as an active and interactive process.

And a social process too. We won't understand the ontogenesis of any of 
this if we leave out the social moment. To return to pain, for example, 
the first thing a toddler does when they fall over and skin their knees is 
check to see how their parents are reacting. Only then will they cry, or 
laugh, or jump up and keep playing. Whether it is a painful experience or 
not is from the start a social matter.

Martin


On Jul 12, 2010, at 11:19 AM, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:

> When thinking about the idea of a precept I do have a hard time just 
> discarding it and stating that they are floating about in the ether 
until 
> we snatch one into our brain.  There is a complexity to them but a 
> complexity that falls short of a cultural artefact.  I must say I 
> currently have a banana inspired brain but I can't at the moment move 
> passed the thought that percepts provide the jumping off point for the 
> appropriation of cultural artifacts.

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