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Re: [xmca] perception/conception etc
Michael,
I'm afraid that just don't agree with your claim. There is already a lot of research to show that culture mediates what is taken to be pain, and how pain is experienced. I will mention again Hoschchild's work. I recently read a fascinating ethnography of the Jayne, an Indian religious group that practices extreme practices of self denial. Think of self flagellation in the Middle Ages. Think of Micky Rourke stapling himself in the wrestling ring. Or think of the experience of undergoing eye surgery. When a doctor inserts a needle into the eye one's reaction is definitely influenced by the interpretation that the procedure is intended to be beneficial.
Or on a more positive note, would you claim that the passion of love is not today mediated, organized, colonized by technologies of romance, sexuality, eroticism, etc.?
Martin
On Jul 10, 2010, at 11:48 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
> HI Martin,
> we know pain in and through the experience of pain not because of cultural-historical concepts. Same with suffering and other passions. "Only suffering permits us to know what suffering is" (Henry, 2003, p. 167, my translation). And passions are not intended, they come upon us, we receive them . . .
>
> We may subsequently talk about them, which means employ cultural concepts. We may even talk about passions we have not experienced (like Catholic priests, possibly) but we don't KNOW these passions, we only have, in the words of Bourdieu, symbolic mastery thereof, not real mastery.
>
> All of this to say that there is no primacy of cultural concept(ion)s, and that is what the history of the phenomenology of perception would reveal to you. (I am not saying the reverse, that "raw experience" underlies anything). But you know that Marx talks about consciousness being the result of life rather than its origin.
>
> Cheers,
> Michael
>
>
> On 2010-07-09, at 6:46 PM, Martin Packer wrote:
>
> Sorry, Michael - what precisely is your point?
>
> Martin
>
> On Jul 9, 2010, at 7:56 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>
>> Martin,
>> PRECISELY my point. What';s the difference between a Japanese (or Albertan, where I get my chicks from) and Martin Packer? They see a difference what is the same to Martin. What is different? Well, there are different gestalts.
>>
>> I have been watching you all running in circle wondering by myself why nobody was suggesting to go back to Heidegger and his notion of apophansis (in Being and Time), and its relation to logos, which, for the Greeks according to Heidegger, have the same origin. From there I would go to the phenomenology of perception (Merleau-Ponty, 1945) to Crossing of the Visible (Jean-Luc Marion, 2004) and Michel Henry (Seeing the invisible).
>>
>> Then you would have some answers to the questions raised, thought through by some interesting philosophers.
>>
>> :-)
>>
>> Michael
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 2010-07-09, at 5:04 PM, Martin Packer wrote:
>>
>> Michael,
>>
>> This is the famous and familiar 'chicken-sexing' phenomenon. Experts are able to tell the sex of day-old chickens, and can't explain why. The best chicken sexers come from Japan, where the Zen-Nippon Chick Sexing School has 2-year long courses.
>>
>> But I don't follow your argument. You seem to be saying, since they can't explain what they do in words, they have no concepts. But they must have something, so they have percepts.
>>
>> You are apparently equating a concept with a 'cultural label' that is 'stuck' on an object, as though we could only recognize a barrel if it were labelled 'barrel,' if not literally then metaphorically. That seems a rather simplistic view of what concepts do. And actually the chicken sexers do employ cultural labels - as do your fish sorters, I presume. The chicken sexers say to themselves, 'male chick,' 'female chick.' They simply can't introspect the characteristics they have identified which have enabled them to attach the label. Your fish sorters are saying, 'good fish, 'bad fish,' or something similar. Obviously these are cultural-historical distinctions, right?
>>
>> Martin
>>
>> On Jul 9, 2010, at 6:14 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>
>>> See, even without the notion of "barrel", you perceive a shape and do not run into it. This shape, prior to all cultural labels you might stick to it or recognize it as part of cultural-historical activity, is some shape that exists for you in your practices. In two papers, one in Journal of Pragmatics and the other in Social Studies of Science, I describe phenomena for which there are no words or concepts and yet people act toward it. For example, fish culturists sort fish. They can't tell you the difference between the ones that go to the right, down into the bucket, or into the left channel. They ask you to "just look." So they can see it, but not tell it. Similarly, in ecological field work, the participants could see differences but not tell them, that is see that something is not a rock pile even though the definition of a rock pile said it was one.
>>>
>>>
>>> How do you describe or name what they see as difference but for which there is no concept, no "notion" to name and tell the difference? In such cases, "percept" may well do the trick. There are two percepts, they are different, yet there are no cultural-historical concepts to name, theorize, conceptualize . . .
>>>
>>> As you see from the title of one paper, I used the term "perceptual gestalts" . . . . Don't know whether that resolves your problem, but was useful and the best solution for me.
>>>
>>>
>>> Roth, W.-M. (2005). Making classifications (at) work: Ordering practices in science. Social Studies of Science, 35, 581-621.
>>> Roth, W.-M. (2004). Perceptual gestalts in workplace communication. Journal of Pragmatics, 36(6), 1037-1069.
>>>
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> Michael
>>>
>>> On 2010-07-09, at 3:43 PM, Martin Packer wrote:
>>>
>>> "Describe" in what respect, Michael?
>>>
>>> On Jul 9, 2010, at 4:01 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>>
>>>> Martin, the percept might describe the forms that appear in perception? What do you think? Michael
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 2010-07-09, at 9:46 AM, Martin Packer wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Eric,
>>>>
>>>> For me, the question that needs to be answered is why we need to introduce a new term, "percept." We can all talk about 'perception,' as an active process of interaction with the world, right? What is gained when we start to talk about 'percepts,' as though there are some little entities floating around somewhere? Haven't we turned a process into an entity?
>>>>
>>>> The university has a good selection of DVDs, and I recently checked out the first season of the cable TV channel Showtime's series The Tudors, which recounts how Henry VIII's need for a male heir led to the rupture between England and the Catholic Church. It's not exactly aiming for historical accuracy, but I was then motivated to check out Elton's history of the period and it turns out the series does a pretty good job of touching on most of the important events.
>>>>
>>>> Everyone in the show is a fashion statement, including Cardinal Wolsey who, as played by Sam Neil, is both cunning and likable. He shows up each time in a different outfit, wearing a variety of official headgear, each in that rich cardinal red.
>>>>
>>>> One morning I was fixing breakfast and reached out for the salt shaker. It's made of transparent plastic with a lid, something we picked up at the supermarket. But the lid is bright red, and (and here's the point; thanks for your patience!) as I picked it up, for a second or two what I saw was a little cardinal.
>>>>
>>>> That seems to me a nice example of what Mike has been exploring, the active and ongoing character of perception, in which conceiving and perceiving are intimately linked. I see the object *through* and *in terms* of a concept (though we're still none to sure what that is!), in this case the concept of cardinal that had been enriched by watching the TV show. The process is not entirely within me as an individual, because the salt shaker did its part.
>>>>
>>>> To me, saying that I "have" a "percept" doesn't help me understand this process. The percept would be - what, a little red cardinal? or is the percept the salt shaker, and I impose a concept of cardinal on it? but isn't 'salt shaker' a concept too?? Putting all of this stuff inside the individual leads to an infinite regress, not a satisfactory explanation (or even description) of what is going on.
>>>>
>>>> Martin
>>>>
>>>> On Jul 9, 2010, at 10:43 AM, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Percept would be preference? I don't know exactly but people do not
>>>>> operate upon appropriated concepts 100% of the time. Do they? Certainly
>>>>> children do not. Currently I am not exactly sure what the question is
>>>>> that needs to be answered.
>>>>>
>>>>> Perhaps the percept in the 'not-wanting-to-listen-to-dylan" for me would
>>>>> be I would prefer listening to the radio seeing as he never gets any air
>>>>> time or perhaps it would be that I am stuck inside of mobile with the
>>>>> memphis blues again?
>>>>>
>>>>> That certainly is a great question. Others with
>>>>> thoughts/percepts/concepts?
>>>>>
>>>>> eric
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> Date: 07/09/2010 09:14 AM
>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] perception/conception etc
>>>>> Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> OK, Eric let's suppose you woke up this morning not wanting to listen to
>>>>> Dylan. What is the percept in that situation? Dylan? His music? Your
>>>>> temporary dislike? The fact that yesterday you felt differently?
>>>>>
>>>>> Martin
>>>>>
>>>>> On Jul 9, 2010, at 8:04 AM, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Martin:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I understand your misgivings about placing construction within but
>>>>> perhaps
>>>>>> this makes sense: concepts are appropriated from the social/cultural
>>>>>> arena but percepts are individually based. My percepts about music may
>>>>>> run counter to yours and there are even days I don't want to listen to
>>>>> Bob
>>>>>> Dylan. However, I have an appropriated concept of music that is
>>>>> probably
>>>>>> extremely similar to yours. Does this make sense? I know this
>>>>>> internal/exteranl debate has raged for years and won't end anytime soon
>>>>>> but some things do indeed happen within. I still have to think though
>>>>>> that cracking this code between everyday and scietific could assist in
>>>>>> understanding human development.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> eric
>>>>>>
>>>>>
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