Re: [xmca] perception/conception etc

[ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org]

Hello all:

Thank you for such an enthusiastic discussion pertaining to 
percepts/concepts/artefacts/etc.  I have thoroughly enjoyed the 
conversation, a very healthy back and forth pertaining to an extremely 
important fulcrum in understanding human development.

I would like to return to the original question and that is; what 
differentiates everyday concepts from scientific concepts?  I really liked 
Michael Glassman's original example about the glassblower and that the 
glassblower would be interested in developing a practical skill in her 
apprentice rather then one versed in the 'scientific rigor' of 
glassblowing.  So this would describe everyday concepts as being practical 
in nature and scientific concepts as being theoretical in nature.  Are 
people in agreement about this?

When thinking about the idea of a precept I do have a hard time just 
discarding it and stating that they are floating about in the ether until 
we snatch one into our brain.  There is a complexity to them but a 
complexity that falls short of a cultural artefact.  I must say I 
currently have a banana inspired brain but I can't at the moment move 
passed the thought that percepts provide the jumping off point for the 
appropriation of cultural artifacts.

what do others think?

eric



From:   Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
To:     "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date:   07/12/2010 10:31 AM
Subject:        Re: [xmca] perception/conception etc
Sent by:        xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu



David,


On Jul 11, 2010, at 2:26 AM, David H Kirshner wrote:

> So if we take it that, say, a baby is
> having the experience within a culture that has reified "pain" (as
> something that can be attributed to babies under certain circumstances),
> then the baby's first person experience is not pain, because she or he
> has not yet appropriated it as such. 

It is pain-for-others, but not yet pain-for-self. So it both is and isn't 
pain. 

>  Michael's point, that
> Martin grudgingly acceded to, is that SOME experiences (for example,
> perhaps, pain), are not subject to revision--perhaps because they are
> too closely related to biological imperatives 

Did I accede to this, David? I don't think so. I tried to suggest that 
experiences such as love and pain are mediated, organized, colonized by 
practices and technologies of romance, sexuality, eroticism, treatment, 
penance, etc.

>  how can we gain insight into originary processes when all we have
> are data about conditions afterwards.

Can you spell out a bit more the problem you see, for my 
not-yet-coffee-inspired brain?

Martin

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