Re: [xmca] perception/conception etc

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

On Sun, Jul 11, 2010 at 7:47 PM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu> wrote:

> Resending my response that seems not to have gone through.
> David
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: David H Kirshner
> Sent: Sunday, July 11, 2010 2:27 AM
> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'
> Subject: RE: [xmca] perception/conception etc
>
> Martin "certainly agree[s, with Michael] that the experience of pain is
> prior to mental representations." So if we take it that, say, a baby is
> having the experience within a culture that has reified "pain" (as
> something that can be attributed to babies under certain circumstances),
> then the baby's first person experience is not pain, because she or he
> has not yet appropriated it as such. Steve suggests we call the as yet
> unnamed experience a percept, later to become an instance of a concept.
> Andy suggests that "from the point of view of an observer, ... the fact
> that the subject cannot articulate it is not an in-principle barrier"
> (to our knowing that it is pain the child is experiencing). But of
> course it is problematic, because cultures are not static. Frames of
> reference shift, experiences get reinterpreted. Michael's point, that
> Martin grudgingly acceded to, is that SOME experiences (for example,
> perhaps, pain), are not subject to revision--perhaps because they are
> too closely related to biological imperatives (for example, "The Will To
> Live" that pretty well controls certain aspects of our activity
> structures such that "pain" always comes out as a useful concept).
>
> But this doesn't answer the hard questions, it only gets us to them.
> Consider, now, the emergent case (originally intended in my question) in
> which neither the culture nor the individual has yet organized the
> percepts into concepts. This scenario asks after either the origins of
> human culture, or perhaps just the generative character of culture. This
> question is a bit reminiscent of cosmological questions about the Big
> Bang, how can we gain insight into originary processes when all we have
> are data about conditions afterwards. (In fact, our questions are more
> difficult, because physicists can extrapolate back to billionths of a
> second after the big bang.) What we have is an unresolved dialectic
> between percepts and concepts. This is really the fault line
> sociocultural theory tries to cover over. And we never get to experience
> a sense of firm grounding in our theorizing because the fault shifts
> under us and spews lava underneath all of our theoretical efforts.
>
> David
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>  On Behalf Of Steve Gabosch
> Sent: Sunday, July 11, 2010 12:28 AM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] perception/conception etc
>
> Picking up on a possible approach to David Ki's line of questioning, I
> am thinking a solution to the problem of dialectically distinguishing
> percepts from concepts could be found in distinguishing the lower and
> higher mental functions.  If we view 'percepts' as products of the
> elementary mental functions - as directly noticed/remembered stimuli,
> as something at least all higher animals create - we can then view
> human 'concepts' as products of cultural mediation.
>
> - Steve
>
>
> On Jul 10, 2010, at 8:57 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>
> > I would have a couple of reactions to David's question, which
> > inevitably arises from critique of cultural psychology.
> >
> > Firstly David, you very pointedly pose your question in the firt
> > person. In the first person, we can talk about our own consciousness
> > as something given; but conversely we can't talk about what we can't
> > articulate or don't know we have, can we? The point is to be able to
> > articulate the experience, to put our consciousness (in the most
> > general sense of my relationship to my environment) into words or
> > images of some kind.
> >
> > So secondly, if we take it that the question is posed from the point
> > of view of an observer, then the fact that the subject cannot
> > articulate it is not an in-principle barrier.
> >
> > Artefacts are present in our consciousness whether we have conscious
> > awareness of them or not.
> >
> > That's my two-artefacts worth.
> >
> > Andy
> >
> > David H Kirshner wrote:
> >> To put it as a question, what status are we to give to experiences we
> >> have but don't know we have (i.e., can't articulate to ourselves)
> >> because those experiences are not (yet) reified in language?
> >> David
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-
> >> bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> >> On Behalf Of Martin Packer
> >> Sent: Saturday, July 10, 2010 1:42 PM
> >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >> Subject: Re: [xmca] perception/conception etc
> >> Michael,
> >> I am having some difficulty following your argument. Let me see if
> >> I can
> >> reconstruct what you are saying.
> >> First, you say I am presupposing my conceptions. Yes, I suppose I
> >> am. Is
> >> there a way of engaging in debate that does not presuppose
> >> conceptions?
> >> Or perhaps your point is that I should be critiquing my conceptions,
> >> albeit necessarily from within? But isn't that what I am doing? I am
> >> critiquing our common assumption that emotion is somehow prior to
> >> culture. Second, you say that one does not know what pain is before
> >> one
> >> experiences it. I suppose that is true too, in a narrow sense.
> >> Would you
> >> say I do not know what Australia is before I visit it? We need to
> >> draw
> >> distinctions between different kinds of knowledge, don't we? But do
> >> I "know" what Australia is after I have experienced it? Surely
> >> yes, but there are many ways to know a continent, and there are many
> >> ways to know pain. If you are trying to draw a distinction between
> >> theoretical knowledge
> >> and practical knowledge, I would certainly agree with you. To call
> >> only
> >> the latter "real" knowledge is problematic, however. Even Heidegger,
> >> who, as you know, emphasized the ready-to-hand mode of engagement in
> >> practical activity and was critical of what he called the
> >> pure-present-at-hand of detached contemplation, granted a place for
> >> deliberation and articulation. We could hardly view the book Being &
> >> Time as a practical manual, could we?! Bourdieu himself wrote text
> >> upon
> >> text in which he demonstrated his symbolic mastery, albeit with an
> >> ambivalence (especially clear in Homo Academicus) that shows the
> >> problems that come from attributing the status of "real knowledge"
> >> only
> >> to practical know-how.
> >> In an earlier message you wrote "we know pain in and through the
> >> experience of pain not because of cultural-historical concepts." It
> >> is
> >> not clear to me whether you want to say that we don't know pain
> >> because
> >> of culture, or because of concepts. If it is the former, I disagree
> >> with
> >> you, as I explained in my last message. But if it is the latter, my
> >> response has to be that it all depends on
> >> what one means by 'concepts,' and this is where we came in, isn't it?
> >> None of us seems to sure what we mean by a concept. The standard
> >> psychological definition is that a concept is a mental
> >> representation,
> >> and I certainly agree that the experience of pain is prior to mental
> >> representations. But I presume that a sociocultural approach is
> >> aiming
> >> to develop a different conception of concepts. One approach would
> >> be to
> >> argue that concepts exist precisely in practical activities, as a
> >> mode
> >> of human engagement in the world. (You mentioned Merleau-Ponty, who
> >> has
> >> explored this. For M-P, the 'invisible' that is in 'the visible' is
> >> the
> >> conception that is always in perception, to put it briefly.) My point
> >> was that what counts as pain, and the way pain is experienced (or
> >> love)
> >> is always the consequence of our participation in cultural
> >> practices. I
> >> would not rule out the possibility of conceiving of this
> >> participation
> >> in terms of concepts, suitably rethought.
> >> Martin
> >> On Jul 10, 2010, at 12:57 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
> >>> Martin,
> >>> your way of thinking is cultural-historical unsustainable, because
> >>> you
> >> did not have cultural concepts prior to culture. It is completely
> >> inconsistent of all phenomenological analyses I am aware off that
> >> ----
> >> similar to CHAT (Leontyev, Holzkamp) ---- show how anything like
> >> intention, cognition can come about in the first place. You seem to
> >> reason from after the fact but presuppose your conceptions.
> >>> And, I beg your pardon, you do not know what pain is before you
> >> experienced it; you do not know what flow is until you experienced
> >> it. A
> >> physicist who has never played football may be able to calculate an
> >> approximate trajectory for a ball but never throw a ball
> >> himself/herself. If you were claiming such things, then you are in
> >> the
> >> same position as Catholic priests who know what it means to feel
> >> things
> >> that they inherently, because of their commitments, never can feel.
> >> As
> >> said, you are talking about what Bourdieu calls SYMBOLIC mastery, not
> >> real mastery.
> >>> Michael
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On 2010-07-10, at 10:42 AM, Martin Packer wrote:
> >>>
> >>> Michael,
> >>>
> >>> I'm afraid that just don't agree with your claim. There is already a
> >> lot of research to show that culture mediates what is taken to be
> >> pain,
> >> and how pain is experienced. I will mention again Hoschchild's
> >> work. I
> >> recently read a fascinating ethnography of the Jayne, an Indian
> >> religious group that practices extreme practices of self denial.
> >> Think
> >> of self flagellation in the Middle Ages. Think of Micky Rourke
> >> stapling
> >> himself in the wrestling ring.  Or think of the experience of
> >> undergoing
> >> eye surgery. When a doctor inserts a needle into the eye one's
> >> reaction
> >> is definitely influenced by the interpretation that the procedure is
> >> intended to be beneficial.
> >>> Or on a more positive note, would you claim that the passion of love
> >> is not today mediated, organized, colonized by technologies of
> >> romance,
> >> sexuality, eroticism, etc.?
> >>> Martin
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On Jul 10, 2010, at 11:48 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> HI Martin,
> >>>> we know pain in and through the experience of pain not because of
> >> cultural-historical concepts. Same with suffering and other passions.
> >> "Only suffering permits us to know what suffering is" (Henry, 2003,
> >> p.
> >> 167, my translation). And passions are not intended, they come upon
> >> us,
> >> we receive them . . .
> >>>> We may subsequently talk about them, which means employ cultural
> >> concepts. We may even talk about passions we have not experienced
> >> (like
> >> Catholic priests, possibly) but we don't KNOW these passions, we only
> >> have, in the words of Bourdieu, symbolic mastery thereof, not real
> >> mastery.
> >>>> All of this to say that there is no primacy of cultural
> >> concept(ion)s, and that is what the history of the phenomenology of
> >> perception would reveal to you. (I am not saying the reverse, that
> >> "raw
> >> experience" underlies anything). But you know that Marx talks about
> >> consciousness being the result of life rather than its origin.
> >>>> Cheers,
> >>>> Michael
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> On 2010-07-09, at 6:46 PM, Martin Packer wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> Sorry, Michael - what precisely is your point?
> >>>> Martin
> >>>>
> >>>> On Jul 9, 2010, at 7:56 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> Martin,
> >>>>> PRECISELY my point. What';s the difference between a Japanese (or
> >> Albertan, where I get my chicks from) and Martin Packer? They see a
> >> difference what is the same to Martin. What is different? Well, there
> >> are different gestalts.
> >>>>> I have been watching you all running in circle wondering by myself
> >> why nobody was suggesting to go back to Heidegger and his notion of
> >> apophansis (in Being and Time), and its relation to logos, which, for
> >> the Greeks according to Heidegger, have the same origin. From there I
> >> would go to the phenomenology of perception (Merleau-Ponty, 1945) to
> >> Crossing of the Visible (Jean-Luc Marion, 2004) and Michel Henry
> >> (Seeing
> >> the invisible).
> >>>>> Then you would have some answers to the questions raised, thought
> >> through by some interesting philosophers.
> >>>>> :-)
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Michael
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On 2010-07-09, at 5:04 PM, Martin Packer wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Michael,
> >>>>>
> >>>>> This is the famous and familiar 'chicken-sexing' phenomenon.
> >>>>> Experts
> >> are able to tell the sex of day-old chickens, and can't explain
> >> why. The
> >> best chicken sexers come from Japan, where the  Zen-Nippon Chick
> >> Sexing
> >> School has 2-year long courses.
> >>>>> But I don't follow your argument. You seem to be saying, since
> >>>>> they
> >> can't explain what they do in words, they have no concepts. But they
> >> must have something, so they have percepts.
> >>>>> You are apparently equating a concept with a 'cultural label' that
> >> is 'stuck' on an object, as though we could only recognize a barrel
> >> if
> >> it were labelled 'barrel,' if not literally then metaphorically.
> >> That
> >> seems a rather simplistic view of what concepts do. And actually the
> >> chicken sexers do employ cultural labels - as do your fish sorters, I
> >> presume. The chicken sexers say to themselves, 'male chick,' 'female
> >> chick.' They simply can't introspect the characteristics they have
> >> identified which have enabled them to attach the label. Your fish
> >> sorters are saying, 'good fish, 'bad fish,' or something similar.
> >> Obviously these are cultural-historical distinctions, right?
> >>>>> Martin
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On Jul 9, 2010, at 6:14 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> See, even without the notion of "barrel", you perceive a shape
> >>>>>> and
> >> do not run into it. This shape, prior to all cultural labels you
> >> might
> >> stick to it or recognize it as part of cultural-historical
> >> activity, is
> >> some shape that exists for you in your practices. In two papers,
> >> one in
> >> Journal of Pragmatics and the other in Social Studies of Science, I
> >> describe phenomena for which there are no words or concepts and yet
> >> people act toward it. For example, fish culturists sort fish. They
> >> can't
> >> tell you the difference between the ones that go to the right, down
> >> into
> >> the bucket, or into the left channel. They ask you to "just look." So
> >> they can see it, but not tell it. Similarly, in ecological field
> >> work,
> >> the participants could see differences but not tell them, that is see
> >> that something is not a rock pile even though the definition of a
> >> rock
> >> pile said it was one.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> How do you describe or name what they see as difference but for
> >> which there is no concept, no "notion" to name and tell the
> >> difference?
> >> In such cases, "percept" may well do the trick. There are two
> >> percepts,
> >> they are different, yet there are no cultural-historical concepts to
> >> name, theorize, conceptualize . . .
> >>>>>> As you see from the title of one paper, I used the term
> >>>>>> "perceptual
> >> gestalts" . . . . Don't know whether that resolves your problem,
> >> but was
> >> useful and the best solution for me.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Roth, W.-M. (2005). Making classifications (at) work: Ordering
> >> practices in science. Social Studies of Science, 35, 581-621.
> >>>>>> Roth, W.-M. (2004). Perceptual gestalts in workplace
> >>>>>> communication.
> >> Journal of Pragmatics, 36(6), 1037-1069.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Cheers,
> >>>>>> Michael
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> On 2010-07-09, at 3:43 PM, Martin Packer wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> "Describe" in what respect, Michael?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> On Jul 9, 2010, at 4:01 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Martin, the percept might describe the forms that appear in
> >> perception? What do you think? Michael
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> On 2010-07-09, at 9:46 AM, Martin Packer wrote:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Eric,
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> For me, the question that needs to be answered is why we need to
> >> introduce a new term, "percept." We can all talk about
> >> 'perception,' as
> >> an active process of interaction with the world, right? What is
> >> gained
> >> when we start to talk about 'percepts,' as though there are some
> >> little
> >> entities floating around somewhere? Haven't we turned a process
> >> into an
> >> entity?
> >>>>>>> The university has a good selection of DVDs, and I recently
> >> checked out the first season of the cable TV channel Showtime's
> >> series
> >> The Tudors, which recounts how Henry VIII's need for a male heir
> >> led to
> >> the rupture between England and the Catholic Church. It's not exactly
> >> aiming for historical accuracy, but I was then motivated to check out
> >> Elton's history of the period and it turns out the series does a
> >> pretty
> >> good job of touching on most of the important events.
> >>>>>>> Everyone in the show is a fashion statement, including Cardinal
> >> Wolsey who, as played by Sam Neil, is both cunning and likable. He
> >> shows
> >> up each time in a different outfit, wearing a variety of official
> >> headgear, each in that rich cardinal red.
> >>>>>>> One morning I was fixing breakfast and reached out for the salt
> >> shaker. It's made of transparent plastic with a lid, something we
> >> picked
> >> up at the supermarket. But the lid is bright red, and (and here's the
> >> point; thanks for your patience!) as I picked it up, for a second
> >> or two
> >> what I saw was a little cardinal.
> >>>>>>> That seems to me a nice example of what Mike has been exploring,
> >> the active and ongoing character of perception, in which conceiving
> >> and
> >> perceiving are intimately linked. I see the object *through* and *in
> >> terms* of a concept (though we're still none to sure what that
> >> is!), in
> >> this case the concept of cardinal that had been enriched by
> >> watching the
> >> TV show. The process is not entirely within me as an individual,
> >> because
> >> the salt shaker did its part.
> >>>>>>> To me, saying that I "have" a "percept" doesn't help me
> >>>>>>> understand
> >> this process. The percept would be -  what, a little red cardinal?
> >> or is
> >> the percept the salt shaker, and I impose a concept of cardinal on
> >> it?
> >> but isn't 'salt shaker' a concept too?? Putting all of this stuff
> >> inside
> >> the individual leads to an infinite regress, not a satisfactory
> >> explanation (or even description) of what is going on.
> >>>>>>> Martin
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> On Jul 9, 2010, at 10:43 AM, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Percept would be preference?  I don't know exactly but people
> >>>>>>>> do
> >> not
> >>>>>>>> operate upon appropriated concepts 100% of the time.  Do they?
> >> Certainly
> >>>>>>>> children do not.  Currently I am not exactly sure what the
> >> question is
> >>>>>>>> that needs to be answered.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Perhaps the percept in the 'not-wanting-to-listen-to-dylan" for
> >> me would
> >>>>>>>> be I would prefer listening to the radio seeing as he never
> >>>>>>>> gets
> >> any air
> >>>>>>>> time or perhaps it would be that I am stuck inside of mobile
> >>>>>>>> with
> >> the
> >>>>>>>> memphis blues again?
> >>>>>>>> That certainly is a great question.  Others with thoughts/
> >>>>>>>> percepts/concepts?
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> eric
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> From:   Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
> >>>>>>>> To:     "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> >>>>>>>> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>>>>>>> Date:   07/09/2010 09:14 AM
> >>>>>>>> Subject:        Re: [xmca] perception/conception etc
> >>>>>>>> Sent by:        xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> OK, Eric let's suppose you woke up this morning not wanting to
> >> listen to
> >>>>>>>> Dylan. What is the percept in that situation? Dylan? His music?
> >> Your
> >>>>>>>> temporary dislike? The fact that yesterday you felt
> >>>>>>>> differently?
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Martin
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> On Jul 9, 2010, at 8:04 AM, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Martin:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> I understand your misgivings about placing construction within
> >> but
> >>>>>>>> perhaps
> >>>>>>>>> this makes sense:  concepts are appropriated from the
> >> social/cultural
> >>>>>>>>> arena but percepts are individually based.  My percepts about
> >> music may
> >>>>>>>>> run counter to yours and there are even days I don't want to
> >> listen to
> >>>>>>>> Bob
> >>>>>>>>> Dylan.  However, I have an appropriated concept of music
> >>>>>>>>> that is
> >>>>>>>> probably
> >>>>>>>>> extremely similar to yours.  Does this make sense?  I know
> >>>>>>>>> this internal/exteranl debate has raged for years and won't
> >>>>>>>>> end
> >> anytime soon
> >>>>>>>>> but some things do indeed happen within.  I still have to
> >>>>>>>>> think
> >> though
> >>>>>>>>> that cracking this code between everyday and scietific could
> >> assist in
> >>>>>>>>> understanding human development.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> eric
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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> > --
> >
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > *Andy Blunden*
> > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> > Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos
> > Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss
> >
> >
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