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Re: [xmca] conservation

I think you put Descartes' position pretty fairly, Michael, which is unusual actually. But from Hegel onwards (ie Marx, ...) the current we are part of *sublated* Descartes' Gordian Knot by stepping aside from the consciousness/matter dichotomy (and it is a dichotomy in my opinion) as the starting point for understanding the human condition, and began instead from the *subject-object relation* (which is not dichotomous by its own nature. Hegel and Marx were not (in my opinion) able to resolve the ontological problem so bypassed, but Vygotsky was. His famous 1924 speech and section 13 of the later "Crisis of Psychology" show how he saw consciousness as a category fitting in between human physiology (inside) and human behaviour (outside) while being identical to neither. His work on the "problem of age" which Mike referred to, shows how Vygotsky was able to turn these insights into really fruitful research directions. 

Andy

Michael Glassman wrote:

Hi Andy,
But if we say that being primarily concerned with human functioning is not restricted by a dualism then don't we sort of have to say that everybody who is approaching a philosophical, or social, or psychological problem from an Aristotelian perspective is not restricted by a dualism. I think DesCasrtes proposed something of a Gordian knot. If we know what is out there in the world, how do we know what is out there in the world? In other words how does individual knowledge exist? If you know there is something inside of the head (metaphorically) that is in some way controlling or understanding, or organizing outside of the head. I think humans have a general bias towards believing this about humans - and it is one of the reasons we are so quick to establish something like a central processing unit inside of the head. The next question of course is how did that knowledge actually get there (and education - at least in the West - has had a bias towards this second question). But the first question of how individual knowledge exists is many times taken as a given, so a dualism is taken as a given. It seems to me in reading Vygotsky that he does take this first question as a given, that he does establish an inside of the head where there is knowledge 
, and an outside of the head world where this knowledge has an impact (by the way what do you mean by possible third realm in this discussion).  Nowhere does he go out of his way to dispute this idea, or explain why human activity should not be approached in this way.  It seems to me he very much concentrates on the second question.
How do you make the argument then that he was trying to actually break this Gordian knot - one that he found it so difficult (what is the argument against dualism?), and two how he felt it needed to be overcome. Michael 

________________________________

From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden
Sent: Sat 2/27/2010 11:39 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] conservation



Well Michael, I agree with Martin and even though I never
liked these terms of Vygotsky's "inter- and
intra-psychological," I think it is quite wrong to conclude
from the use of them that LSV was a dualist.

But what do we mean by "dualist"? Really?

As I see it, Vygotsky was concerned with modes of human
functioning, and functioning is essentially functioning with
other people using artefacts, even when, say, learning to
walk, for example, seems to be stretching the point. But to
recognize that human functioning essentially involves
processes of consciousness, interactions with other people
and artefacts (including the human body), is not to divide
with world into 2 or even 3 realms. Each mediates and
constitutes the other two and nothing in human life is
conceivable that does not entail all three.

Yes?

Andy

Michael Glassman wrote:

Hi Martin,

I'm not sure what you mean.  I think the idea of organizing principles being inside the head (appropriated through the culture for sure) runs through Vygotsky.

I suppose James Wertsch has the best summation of this, quoting from Chapter 6 in Vygotsky and the Social Formation of Mind.

"According to Vygotsky's general genetic law of cultural development, all higher mental functions appear first on the interpsychological plane and then on the intrapsychological plane.  This claim is central to Vygotsky's approach but the processes it entails have not been examined in any great detail.  Vygotsky was most specific about it in connection with his account of egocentric and inner speech where he analyzed the forms of semiotic mediation that make possible the transition from interpsychological to intrapsychological functioning.  In that analysis, however, he focused almost exclusively on the latter."  (emphasis mine).

Sorry for any mistakes, I transcribed this from another page and my short term memory is possible.

But I agree with Wertsch here, there are intrapsychological functionings, and once you posit intrapsychological functionings, especially in terms of mediation (which I would say in its essence is an organizing principle) that there is pretty much no way you can escape some form of dualism.  Wertsch goes on to talk about the relationship between say the adult and the child with the child thinking differently about the situation than the adult.  What allows for development I guess is intersubjectivity, but intersubjectivity does not mean that there is no dualism - partly because it does not seem to be a natural state but a negotiation - and once the child has appropriated what is important from the situation will move to the next situation with important mediating principles on the intrapsychological plane.
I'm actually not sure how you make the argument that Vygotsky was not dealing with dualism, the idea of individual development (even if socially driven) seems to me to be too important to him. 
Michael



________________________________

From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin Packer
Sent: Sat 2/27/2010 10:18 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] conservation



Can you give some textual evidence for this statement, Michael?

Martin


On Feb 26, 2010, at 1:09 PM, Michael Glassman wrote:


Martin, David, Jorge, all

.But
these organizational structures are definitely inside of the head for
Vygotsky so there really is no way for him to escape dualism.



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--
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Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
Ilyenkov $20 ea

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--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea 

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