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Re: [xmca] Consciousness: Ilyenkov Epistemology Quiz
Isn't the relationship between individual and social consciousness an example of the chicken-egg dialectic? ;)
And didn't LSV resolve it through his account of the developmental process?
Bruce
----- Original Message -----
From: "Steve Gabosch" <stevegabosch@me.com>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Monday, September 28, 2009 5:30 AM
Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness: Ilyenkov Epistemology Quiz
I think you're right, Andy. Social consciousness can't exist without
individuals. I don't see how it could. But just to be sure, I asked
EI, as you suggested.
"The ideal is nothing else than a concatenation of the general forms
of human activity realized by individuals ..." (Ilyenkov, Dialectical
Logic, Chapter 8, toward the end)
Sounds about right to me ...
- Steve
On Sep 27, 2009, at 5:48 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> But Steve, in making this very point you counterpose individual and
> social consciousness. And tell me (or maybe you can ask Ilyenkov!),
> how does social consciousness exist without individual consciousness?
>
> (There are answers to this question which go to suppositions about
> forms of life which may have existed a million years ago, but I'm
> talking about real people today.)
>
> And whenever did I deny that individual consciousness is derivative
> of social consciousness anyway?
>
> Andy
>
> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>> OK, I'm following your responses and points. Thanks.
>> So, Andy, to try to narrow this down: are you purposely bundling
>> together individual and social consciousness into this single term
>> "consciousness"?
>> The reason I ask is that Ilyenkov works very hard in the essay
>> Martin is reading, The Concept of the Ideal, to distinguish
>> individual consciousness and will from social consciousness.
>> Moreover, he argues for a very specific relationship between the
>> two - that individual consciousness is derived from social
>> consciousness, and not the other way around.
>> Just as Marx said that social being determines social
>> consciousness, Ilyenkov argues that social consciousness determines
>> individual consciousness.
>> In Ilyenkov's view, social consciousness is what humans are given,
>> or confronted with - not individual consciousness. I looked for
>> some supporting quotes and wound up with a creative post you'll see
>> in the Humans are Signs/Ideal thread. See quotes 4 - 7.
>> - Steve
>> On Sep 26, 2009, at 6:21 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>> True Steve, I can find: "experience is what is given to us ..."
>>> and "the objective world given to us in consciousness ..." but the
>>> only definition of "consciousness" around this area is its
>>> contrast with matter. I tried to clarify this in this discussion
>>> by saying that (as Martin has corrected understood) "What is given
>>> us is Cs" i.e., immediately, from the material world or anywhere
>>> else. As Hegel says though, "there is nothing in Heaven, Earth or
>>> anywhere else which is not both immediate and mediated." So to say
>>> that Cs is what is given "immediately" does not deny that it is
>>> mediated.
>>>
>>> Your suggestion to define Cs as "psychic activity of animals and
>>> humans" only shifts the problem to "psychic" - what is psychic?
>>> and throws in a far-from-basic assumption about what is going on
>>> inside my pussy cat's head. I am given my own consciousness, but
>>> figuring out what and if my cat is thinking is a problem of future
>>> scientific investigation, and hardly suitable for a definition: an
>>> outcome not a starting point.
>>>
>>> You say that I "conflate different things." Yes, I put forward the
>>> category without first listing the things which count as "forms of
>>> Cs." I think this is the right way to go, from whole to parts.
>>>
>>> A definition of Cs was what Mike asked for. I don't think it
>>> suffices to make a list of things and say "Cs is all these
>>> things, ... and maybe some I forgot to mention," not for a
>>> fundamental definition. It would be better to say "Let's not
>>> define Cs."
>>>
>>> Andy
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>>> Andy,
>>>> Thanks for looking over those statements by Ilyenkov. What
>>>> passage by Ilyenkov causes you to believe he says that
>>>> **consciousness** is what is given to humans? He says material
>>>> reality, social being and social consciousness are what are
>>>> given. He very carefully never uses a catch-all, misleading term
>>>> like "consciousness." Well, that's my reading of him.
>>>> Here is my problem with the phrase: "what is given to us is
>>>> consciousness".
>>>> The term "consciousness," as it is used in this phrase,
>>>> conflates, obscures and confuses. It conflates fundamentally
>>>> different kinds of consciousness and experience (sensation,
>>>> individual consciousness, social consciousness, social being -
>>>> not to mention dementia, animal psychic activity, sleep, etc.
>>>> etc.) It obscures the material basis of these forms of
>>>> consciousness. And it confuses their relationships with each
>>>> other.
>>>> It might help to ask: what **is** given to humans? (at birth, and
>>>> thenceforth ...)
>>>> Here is the beginning of an answer, helped a bit by Ilyenkov.
>>>> From birth the human is confronted by reality on multiple levels:
>>>> material reality (their body, objects, gravity), sensation
>>>> (hunger, hearing), social being (a system of social and material
>>>> relations), and social consciousness (ideality, historical
>>>> culture). Soon, another kind of reality emerges: individual
>>>> human consciousness. These processes and realities, in their
>>>> simultaneously material and ideal forms, reappear every moment of
>>>> a human's life.
>>>> The phrase "what is given to us is consciousness" seems to
>>>> obscure far more than it reveals. What benefits are obtained
>>>> from making such a one-sided statement that excludes referencing
>>>> the material foundations and relations underlying this
>>>> "consciousness"?
>>>> I want to emphasize that neither Lenin nor Ilyenkov ever made
>>>> such a claim. (In my humble reading, anyway). You may be able
>>>> to get Hegel's solidarity with that phrase, but the classical
>>>> dialectical materialists argued quite the opposite.
>>>> As for a general definition of the term "consciousness", given
>>>> the scope of phenomena that would have to be included, I might
>>>> venture something like "the psychic activity of animals and
>>>> humans."
>>>> Sometime when the time is right we might revisit the dialectics
>>>> of nature discussion (including problems with the Stalinized
>>>> "diamat" version). There are some significant issues there.
>>>> Best,
>>>> - Steve
>>>> On Sep 25, 2009, at 9:43 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>> OK, Steve I've read through your quiz, and evaluated each claim
>>>>> attributed to Ilyenkov by asking myself: "Is there are a context
>>>>> in which I would agree with this?"
>>>>>
>>>>> The only one where I have reservations is the "dialectics of
>>>>> nature" one:
>>>>>
>>>>> 28. These laws [dialectics] are understood as the objective laws
>>>>> of development of the material world, of both the natural and
>>>>> socio-historical world, of objective reality in general.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I remain of the view that this claim is unclear and has, over
>>>>> the 120 years since Engels' Dialectics of Nature was published
>>>>> in the 1920s, been the source of a lot of confusion and also
>>>>> reasons to not think. In general I am always wary of claims that
>>>>> have the form: "human society is like this because nature is
>>>>> like this," such as social Darwinism. It basically adds up to
>>>>> "God made man in His own image."
>>>>>
>>>>> There is an element of truth in the claim, but only by making a
>>>>> drastic reduction to the meaning of "dialectics" which is
>>>>> already verging on meaninglessness anyway.
>>>>>
>>>>> But I do NOT want to change the subject to dianat!! I want to
>>>>> keep focussed on:
>>>>>
>>>>> 1. How do we define consciousness?
>>>>> 2. What's wrong with my suggestion (21/9/2009) based on the
>>>>> categorical distinction referred to in the early questions in
>>>>> your quiz, which Ilyenkov obviously agrees with:
>>>>>
>>>>> "Consciousness is what is given to us; matter is what exists
>>>>> outside and independently of consciousness."
>>>>>
>>>>> Andy
>>>>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>>>>> Ain't no answer sheet! LOL This "quiz" is nothing more than
>>>>>> comparing Ilyenkov's actual answers to one's own views.
>>>>>> I've simplified this thing. It did need streamlining. There
>>>>>> are now 25 Ilyenkov propositions.
>>>>>> If my editing is accurate, Ilyenkov's points are preserved in
>>>>>> each numbered sentence below. I kept the numbers from the
>>>>>> previous version.
>>>>>> Martin's very helpful reading of these passages confirms and
>>>>>> clarifies my interpretations. Thank you, Martin. I've added
>>>>>> headlines (in my words) to clarify Ilyenkov's key themes. As
>>>>>> can be seen, I've also used some of Martin's nicely worded
>>>>>> summaries for this task (and could have used more - I'm kind of
>>>>>> duplicating what he did).
>>>>>> Some of these statements by Ilyenkov seem to me to be in
>>>>>> conflict with some of the points you have been recently making,
>>>>>> Andy. See what you think.
>>>>>> This is an 'open book' quiz, by the way - you are welcome to
>>>>>> consult any texts ... :-))
>>>>>> from **Leninist Dialectics and the Metaphysics of Positivism**,
>>>>>> Chapter One, by EV Ilyenkov, 1979, New Park, material below
>>>>>> edited by Steve Gabosch, Sept 2009, downloaded from http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/positive/positi.htm
>>>>>> Ilyenkov is addressing the epistemological question: What is
>>>>>> the relationship between consciousness and the world itself?
>>>>>> **********
>>>>>> A. << No middle path is possible.>>
>>>>>> **********
>>>>>> 1. … there is no middle here … [no] middle path …
>>>>>> **********
>>>>>> B. << Consciousness is derived from, produced from, and
>>>>>> secondary to matter.>>
>>>>>> **********
>>>>>> 3. These concepts [that is, the two general concepts which
>>>>>> must be clearly differentiated] are matter and consciousness.
>>>>>> 4. [By consciousness we are referring to the] psyche, the
>>>>>> ideal, spirit, soul, will, etc. etc.
>>>>>> 6. ‘Consciousness’ [in its most general sense] can only be
>>>>>> defined by clearly contrasting it with ‘matter’ [in its most
>>>>>> general sense.]
>>>>>> 7. [Moreover, consciousness can only be contrasted with
>>>>>> matter] as something that is secondary, produced and derived.
>>>>>> 9. … [Matter] can only be defined through its opposite, and
>>>>>> only if one of the opposites is fixed as primary, and the other
>>>>>> arises from it.
>>>>>> **********
>>>>>> C. <<For materialists, matter is the basis of epistemology.
>>>>>> For idealists, the basis is consciousness.>>
>>>>>> **********
>>>>>> 12. Lenin's position … [is as follows]: for materialism …
>>>>>> matter – the objective reality given to us in sensation … is
>>>>>> the basis of the theory of knowledge (epistemology) …
>>>>>> 13. … for idealism of any type, the basis of epistemology is
>>>>>> consciousness ...
>>>>>> **********
>>>>>> D. <<Just as social being, (that is, material and economic
>>>>>> relations) precedes and exists independently of social
>>>>>> consciousness, social consciousness (as does matter) precedes
>>>>>> and exists independently of individual consciousness.>> <<Btw,
>>>>>> Martin has an interesting objection to Ilyenkov's claim that
>>>>>> 'primary' things exist independently of 'secondary' things
>>>>>> insofar as humans are concerned.>>
>>>>>> **********
>>>>>> 15. [Social consciousness is sometimes described as] …
>>>>>> 'collectively-organised' … experience …
>>>>>> 16. … the relationship of matter to consciousness is
>>>>>> complicated by the fact that social consciousness … from the
>>>>>> very beginning precedes individual consciousness as something
>>>>>> already given, and existing before, outside, and independent of
>>>>>> individual consciousness.
>>>>>> 17. Just as matter does.
>>>>>> **********
>>>>>> E. <<Individual consciousness is formed to a greater degree by
>>>>>> social consciousness than it is by the material world. At the
>>>>>> same time, as explained by Marx, social consciousness is
>>>>>> derived from social being, the system of material and economic
>>>>>> relations between people.>>
>>>>>> **********
>>>>>> 20. ... social consciousness ... forms ... [the individual’s]
>>>>>> consciousness to a much greater degree than the 'material
>>>>>> world' [does].
>>>>>> 22. But social consciousness, according to Marx, is not
>>>>>> 'primary', but secondary, derived from social being, i.e. the
>>>>>> system of material and economic relations between people.
>>>>>> **********
>>>>>> F. Martin summarized the next sentences very nicely as
>>>>>> follows: "<We are *given* the world in sensation. But it is in
>>>>>> thought that the world is *cognised.*>"
>>>>>> **********
>>>>>> 24. It is … not true that the world is cognised in our
>>>>>> sensations.
>>>>>> 25. In sensations the external world is only given to us, just
>>>>>> as it is given to a dog.
>>>>>> 26. ... [The external world] is cognised not in sensations,
>>>>>> but in the activity of thought ...
>>>>>> **********
>>>>>> G. <<Lenin explained that dialectical logic is the science of
>>>>>> discovering the universal laws of human and natural
>>>>>> development. These are the objective laws of development of
>>>>>> the material world, which includes the natural world, the socio-
>>>>>> historical world, and objective reality in general. These laws
>>>>>> are reflected in the historical consciousness of humanity.>>
>>>>>> **********
>>>>>> 27. [Dialectical] Logic is defined by Lenin … as the science
>>>>>> of those universal laws … to which the development of the
>>>>>> entire aggregate knowledge of mankind is objectively
>>>>>> subordinated.
>>>>>> 28. These laws are understood [by dialectical materialism] as
>>>>>> the objective laws of development of the material world, of
>>>>>> both the natural and socio-historical world, of objective
>>>>>> reality in general.
>>>>>> 29. ... [These laws] are reflected in the consciousness of
>>>>>> mankind and verified by thousands of years of human practice.
>>>>>> **********
>>>>>> H. <<Martin: "<Thought arises in material activity, even in
>>>>>> animals. In humans it takes a more advanced form, in which
>>>>>> activity is adjusted to signs.>" I continue: However, if one
>>>>>> proceeds from the perspective of individual experience, the
>>>>>> sign will be taken as the starting point in the theory of
>>>>>> knowledge, which will lead to idealist-leaning errors.">>
>>>>>> **********
>>>>>> 35. Thought arises within and during the process of material
>>>>>> action as one of its features, one of its aspects, and only
>>>>>> later is divided into a special activity (isolated in space and
>>>>>> time), finding [the] 'sign' form only in man.
>>>>>> 36. A completely different picture arises when, proceeding
>>>>>> from individual experience, it is precisely the verbally formed
>>>>>> world which is taken as the starting point in the theory of
>>>>>> knowledge.
>>>>>> 37. It is all the more easy to yield to such an illusion,
>>>>>> since in individual experience, words (and signs in general)
>>>>>> are in actual fact just as much given to sensual contemplation
>>>>>> as are the sun, rivers and mountains, statues and paintings,
>>>>>> etc. etc.
>>>>>> 38. Here are the roots of idealism in its 'sign-symbolic'
>>>>>> variation.
>>>>>> **********
>>>>>> I. Martin again: "<It is a mistake to try to understand human
>>>>>> knowledge in terms of individual consciousness or experience.
>>>>>> But it is also a mistake to try to understand knowledge in
>>>>>> terms of *social* consciousness.>"
>>>>>> **********
>>>>>> 39. If one proceeds from individual experience, making it the
>>>>>> point of departure and basis of the theory of knowledge, then
>>>>>> idealism is inevitable.
>>>>>> 40. But it is also inevitable if one relies on 'collective
>>>>>> experience', if the latter is interpreted as something
>>>>>> independent of being, as something existing independently, as
>>>>>> something primary.
>>>>>> ************
>>>>>> <end of 'quiz'>
>>>>>> ************
>>>>>> - Steve
>>>>>> On Sep 25, 2009, at 5:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>> I can't understand your quiz, Steve. Could you perhaps make us
>>>>>>> a shorter version with answers at the end of the post?
>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>>>>>>> I have something fun, entertaining and educational for
>>>>>>>> everyone on xmca!
>>>>>>>> It just so happens that I took a close look at the Ilyenkov
>>>>>>>> passages following Andy's quotes, did a little tinkering with
>>>>>>>> the text, and came up with something fun: the Ilyenkov
>>>>>>>> Epistemology Quiz, which anyone can take right on their own
>>>>>>>> personal computer!
>>>>>>>> Ilyenkov asks some fundamental questions regarding
>>>>>>>> epistemology: "Where is the clear-cut dividing line between
>>>>>>>> … philosophical idealism and … philosophical materialism? …
>>>>>>>> which of these two points of departure is determining the
>>>>>>>> direction of all your thought, regardless of the subject of
>>>>>>>> your reflection … ? Here … is the question: take your
>>>>>>>> thought, your consciousness of the world, and the world
>>>>>>>> itself ... what is the relationship between them?"
>>>>>>>> This can also be called: The How Much Do You Agree With
>>>>>>>> Ilyenkov on Consciousness? Test ...
>>>>>>>> (Hmm. Somehow, it doesn't seem likely that this will become
>>>>>>>> the rage on Facebook ... does it? ... LOL ...)
>>>>>>>> Taking this "quiz" is very simple. It is comprised of 40
>>>>>>>> propositional statements by Ilyenkov, which I edited for
>>>>>>>> clarity, about the relationship of consciousness and
>>>>>>>> materiality, from the first chapter of his short book
>>>>>>>> "Leninist Dialectics and the Metaphysics of
>>>>>>>> Positivism" (1979, New Park). To take the quiz, simply list
>>>>>>>> the propositions that you agree with, and those you don't
>>>>>>>> agree with, count them all up, and give Ilyenkov a score.
>>>>>>>> Read critically like this, sentence by sentence, Ilyenkov is
>>>>>>>> surprisingly clear. But one still has to think pretty hard
>>>>>>>> about what he is saying. Hopefully, people will find it
>>>>>>>> worthwhile to do so.
>>>>>>>> Here is a little explanation of the editing I did to create
>>>>>>>> this (this is the fine print part - can be skipped). What I
>>>>>>>> have done is edit 15 of Ilyenkov's paragraphs (starting where
>>>>>>>> Andy's quotes began) into what wound up becoming 40
>>>>>>>> propositional statements. They read quite coherently. This
>>>>>>>> material makes for a decent introduction to both Ilyenkov and
>>>>>>>> dialectical materialism. I eliminated his references to the
>>>>>>>> Machists to keep things focused on his propositional
>>>>>>>> statements about epistemological issues, and took out various
>>>>>>>> other (for this purpose) secondary passages for the same
>>>>>>>> reason. This makes him a little easier to grasp - he has a
>>>>>>>> tendency to make a lot of side points as he goes. Also, I
>>>>>>>> did some sentence rearranging to help clarify the specific
>>>>>>>> proposition that is being made. There are a couple sentences
>>>>>>>> which could be interpreted in different ways if they are not
>>>>>>>> read very closely, so I included my interpretations below
>>>>>>>> them. And I spelled out one or two important implications
>>>>>>>> that Ilyenkov makes but does not explicitly state. (He makes
>>>>>>>> these points in many other places in his writings, so they
>>>>>>>> are supportable.)
>>>>>>>> Everyone will see what I did - I am trying to be completely
>>>>>>>> transparent. If I have misinterpreted or muddled Ilyenkov in
>>>>>>>> any way, please let me know!
>>>>>>>> I would be very interesting to compare notes on what
>>>>>>>> propositions, formulations, ideas etc. people agree and
>>>>>>>> disagree on. Some may disagree quite sharply on some points,
>>>>>>>> and others may find themselves surprisingly in agreement with
>>>>>>>> Ilyenkov on some issues but didn't know it. Some might find
>>>>>>>> this stimulating ideawise. Others who are bored by
>>>>>>>> philosophical discourse might save this for later if they
>>>>>>>> need something to put them to sleep tonight! LOL This little
>>>>>>>> quiz might even help clarify aspects of this interesting
>>>>>>>> discussion on consciousness. Fun for the whole family! :-))
>>>>>>>> Andy, after carefully reading your posts about the how
>>>>>>>> "consciousness is what is given to us" and "the idea of
>>>>>>>> matter is derived from consciousness" - as well as other
>>>>>>>> things you have said from time to time - it will be very
>>>>>>>> interesting to see how you "score" Ilyenkov's positions on
>>>>>>>> epistemology. I would actually be quite interested in
>>>>>>>> everyone's thoughts ...
>>>>>>>> **********************
>>>>>>>> The Internet Ilyenkov Epistemology Quiz also known as The
>>>>>>>> How Much Do You Agree With Ilyenkov on Consciousness? Test
>>>>>>>> from **Leninist Dialectics and the Metaphysics of
>>>>>>>> Positivism** by EV Ilyenkov, edited by Steve Gabosch, Sept 2009
>>>>>>>> downloaded from http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/positive/positi.htm
>>>>>>>> ***********************
>>>>>>>> a. Where is the clear-cut dividing line between …
>>>>>>>> philosophical idealism and … philosophical materialism? …
>>>>>>>> b. … which of these two points of departure is determining
>>>>>>>> the direction of all your thought, regardless of the subject
>>>>>>>> of your reflection … ?
>>>>>>>> c. Here … is the question: take your thought, your
>>>>>>>> consciousness of the world, and the world itself ... what is
>>>>>>>> the relationship between them?
>>>>>>>> 1. … there is no middle here … [no] middle path …
>>>>>>>> 2. In philosophy the 'party of the golden mean' is the
>>>>>>>> 'party of the brainless', [that is, those that attempt the
>>>>>>>> middle path are destined to fail if they] ... try to unite
>>>>>>>> materialism with idealism in an eclectic way, by means of
>>>>>>>> smoothing out the basic contradictions, and by means of
>>>>>>>> muddling the most general ... and clear concepts.
>>>>>>>> 3. These concepts [the two general concepts which must be
>>>>>>>> clearly differentiated] are matter and consciousness.
>>>>>>>> 4. [By consciousness we are referring to the] psyche, the
>>>>>>>> ideal, spirit, soul, will, etc. etc.
>>>>>>>> 5. 'Consciousness' – let us take this term as Lenin did – is
>>>>>>>> the most general concept which can only be defined by clearly
>>>>>>>> contrasting it with the most general concept of 'matter', as
>>>>>>>> something secondary, produced and derived.
>>>>>>>> 6. [[sg interpretation: ‘Consciousness’ [in its most general
>>>>>>>> sense] can only be defined by clearly contrasting it with
>>>>>>>> ‘matter’ [in its most general sense.]]]
>>>>>>>> 7. [[sg interpretation: …moreover … [consciousness can only
>>>>>>>> be contrasted with matter] as something that is secondary,
>>>>>>>> produced and derived.]]
>>>>>>>> 8. Dialectics consists in not being able to define matter
>>>>>>>> as such …
>>>>>>>> 9. … it [matter] can only be defined through its opposite,
>>>>>>>> and only if one of the opposites is fixed as primary, and the
>>>>>>>> other arises from it.
>>>>>>>> 10. [[sg interpretation: Dialectics can only define things
>>>>>>>> through their opposites, and furthermore can only do so if
>>>>>>>> one of these opposites is fixed as primary and the other as
>>>>>>>> arising from it.]]
>>>>>>>> 11. [[sg interpretation of an implication made above: In
>>>>>>>> dialectical materialism, the material is primary; and
>>>>>>>> consciousness, its opposite, arises from it.]]
>>>>>>>> 12. Lenin's position … [is as follows]: for materialism …
>>>>>>>> matter – the objective reality given to us in sensation … is
>>>>>>>> the basis of the theory of knowledge (epistemology) …
>>>>>>>> 13. … for idealism of any type, the basis of epistemology is
>>>>>>>> consciousness ...
>>>>>>>> 14. [Consciousness for the idealist can take a multitude of
>>>>>>>> forms and can appear] under one or another of its pseudonyms
>>>>>>>> (be it the 'psychical', 'conscious' or 'unconscious', be it
>>>>>>>> the 'system of forms of collectively-organised experience' or
>>>>>>>> 'objective spirit', the individual or collective psyche,
>>>>>>>> individual or social consciousness).]
>>>>>>>> 15. [Social consciousness is sometimes described as] …
>>>>>>>> 'collectively-organised' … experience …
>>>>>>>> 16. … the relationship of matter to consciousness is
>>>>>>>> complicated by the fact that social consciousness … from the
>>>>>>>> very beginning precedes individual consciousness as something
>>>>>>>> already given, and existing before, outside, and independent
>>>>>>>> of individual consciousness.
>>>>>>>> 17. Just as matter does.
>>>>>>>> 18. [[sg interpretation: Just as social consciousness does,
>>>>>>>> matter, from the very beginning, precedes individual
>>>>>>>> consciousness as something already given.]]
>>>>>>>> 19. [There is] … even more [to it] than that.
>>>>>>>> 20. This social consciousness – forms ... [the individual’s]
>>>>>>>> consciousness to a much greater degree than [does] the
>>>>>>>> 'material world'.
>>>>>>>> 21. [Social consciousness] of course, in its individualised
>>>>>>>> form, [takes] … the form of the consciousness of one's
>>>>>>>> closest teachers, and after that, of the entire circle of
>>>>>>>> people who appear in the field of vision of a person …
>>>>>>>> 22. But social consciousness, according to Marx, is not
>>>>>>>> 'primary', but secondary, derived from social being, i.e. the
>>>>>>>> system of material and economic relations between people.
>>>>>>>> 23. [[sg interpretation: According to Marx, social
>>>>>>>> consciousness, which is secondary, is derived from social
>>>>>>>> being, which is the system of material and economic relations
>>>>>>>> between people.]]
>>>>>>>> 24. It is … not true that the world is cognised in our
>>>>>>>> sensations.
>>>>>>>> 25. In sensations the external world is only given to us,
>>>>>>>> just as it is given to a dog.
>>>>>>>> 26. ... [The external world] is cognised not in sensations,
>>>>>>>> but in the activity of thought ...
>>>>>>>> 27. [Dialectical] Logic is defined by Lenin … as the science
>>>>>>>> of those universal laws … to which the development of the
>>>>>>>> entire aggregate knowledge of mankind is objectively
>>>>>>>> subordinated.
>>>>>>>> 28. These laws are understood [by dialectical materialism]
>>>>>>>> as the objective laws of development of the material world,
>>>>>>>> of both the natural and socio-historical world, of objective
>>>>>>>> reality in general.
>>>>>>>> 29. ... [These laws] are reflected in the consciousness of
>>>>>>>> mankind and verified by thousands of years of human practice.
>>>>>>>> d. What is … 'thought'?
>>>>>>>> 30. … [A materialist] line of thought [about what thought is]
>>>>>>>> proceeds from Spinoza. He understands thinking to be an
>>>>>>>> inherent capability, characteristic not of all bodies, but
>>>>>>>> only of thinking material bodies.
>>>>>>>> 31. With the help of this capability, a body can construct
>>>>>>>> its activities in the spatially determined world, in
>>>>>>>> conformity with the 'form and disposition' of all other
>>>>>>>> bodies external to it, both 'thinking' and 'non-thinking'.
>>>>>>>> 32. Spinoza therefore includes thinking among the categories
>>>>>>>> of the attributes of substance, such as extension.
>>>>>>>> 33. In this form ... [thinking] is, according to Spinoza,
>>>>>>>> characteristic also of animals.
>>>>>>>> 34. For him [Spinoza] even an animal possesses a soul, and
>>>>>>>> this view distinguishes Spinoza from Descartes, who
>>>>>>>> considered that an animal is simply an 'automaton', a very
>>>>>>>> complex 'machine'.
>>>>>>>> 35. Thought arises within and during the process of material
>>>>>>>> action as one of its features, one of its aspects, and only
>>>>>>>> later is divided into a special activity (isolated in space
>>>>>>>> and time), finding [the] 'sign' form only in man.
>>>>>>>> 36. A completely different picture arises when, proceeding
>>>>>>>> from individual experience, it is precisely the verbally
>>>>>>>> formed world which is taken as the starting point in the
>>>>>>>> theory of knowledge.
>>>>>>>> 37. It is all the more easy to yield to such an illusion,
>>>>>>>> since in individual experience, words (and signs in general)
>>>>>>>> are in actual fact just as much given to sensual
>>>>>>>> contemplation as are the sun, rivers and mountains, statues
>>>>>>>> and paintings, etc. etc.
>>>>>>>> 38. Here are the roots of idealism in its 'sign-symbolic'
>>>>>>>> variation.
>>>>>>>> 39. If one proceeds from individual experience, making it
>>>>>>>> the point of departure and basis of the theory of knowledge,
>>>>>>>> then idealism is inevitable.
>>>>>>>> 40. But it is also inevitable if one relies on 'collective
>>>>>>>> experience', if the latter is interpreted as something
>>>>>>>> independent of being, as something existing independently, as
>>>>>>>> something primary.
>>>>>>>> <Ilyenkov moves on to other questions at this point in the
>>>>>>>> text.>
>>>>>>>> <End of quiz.>
>>>>>>>> So how did you score Ilyenkov?
>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>> - Steve_______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
>>>>>>> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
>>>>>>> Ilyenkov $20 ea
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
>>>>> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
>>>>> Ilyenkov $20 ea
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>> --
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
>>> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
>>> Ilyenkov $20 ea
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> xmca mailing list
>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> _______________________________________________
>> xmca mailing list
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
> Ilyenkov $20 ea
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
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http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
_______________________________________________
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