Hi,
I always wondered why "inside" in its strictest interpretation, that of
the brain/mind that is not accessible to unmediated eye sight should be
such a pervasive metaphor. Now, the "inner" is becoming more accessible
with CAT scans, X-ray, imaging, etc, should it still be called "inside?"
Theories are not immune to technological change, and this which is so
loaded an issue, we are stuck in an old dichotomy. Why is stone the best
example for matter? Why not blood that also changes with environmental,
physiological and pathological variables? It changes as does the
brain/mind through action, through aging, through education, through the
increasing, sophisticated understanding of meanings. All of these
changes take place with people, or by and through their uses of signs
and symbols, which are the consequences of their prior, collective
actions? Is material only that which we can touch, but not what we
create, including our minds which we create in.interaction with others?
The categorical distinction between Cs and matter baffles me, The
discussion is still governed, I believe on both sides, by the old
difference between in here, that voice in my head, or those images,
which are no longer inaccessible, no longer "inner" in the old sense of
the word when approached with material tools and the grass outside.
But, it seems we cannot help but be snared by its pervasive, metaphoric
power..
Vera
----- Original Message ----- From: "Martin Packer" <packer@duq.edu>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Saturday, September 26, 2009 6:40 AM
Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness"only a part of the material quality of
the man-sign"
Andy,
You're misrepresenting what I wrote, and why I wrote it. I am indeed
arguing that all representational systems are material. Yet I find
myself dealing constantly with colleagues who believe that psychology
must study non-material representational systems. That to understand
children's development, for example, requires studying their
'internal,' 'mental' representations. I was citing Donald's work as
an example that does a good job of explaining human cognitive
development (historical rather than ontogenetic, but that's not an
important difference in this context) with reference only to
representational systems that are material. Plus brain functioning,
construed in non- representational ways. No tautology here, and no
problem.
Martin
On Sep 26, 2009, at 7:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
Martin referred to a series of "representational systems" being all
"material"; I pointed out that Martin had already said that
*everything*, even consciousness, was material so the statement that
these representational systems were material was a "motherhood
statement", i.e., a tautology.
So I responded "show me a representational system which is *not*
material" which is a problem for Martin because he says that
everything is material.
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