Hi,
I always wondered why "inside" in its strictest interpretation, that
of the brain/mind that is not accessible to unmediated eye sight
should be such a pervasive metaphor.Now, the "inner" is becoming
more accessible with CAT scans, X-ray, imaging, etc, should it
still be called "inside?" Theories are not immune to technological
change, and this which is so loaded an issue, we are stuck in an
old dichotomy. Why is stone the best example for matter? Why not
blood that also changes with environmental, physiological and
pathological variables? It changes as does the brain/mind through
action, through aging, through education, through the increasing,
sophisticated understanding of meanings. All of these changes take
place with people, or by and through their uses of signs and
symbols, which are the consequences of their prior, collective
actions? Is material only that which we can touch, but not what we
create, including our minds which we create in.interaction with
others?
The categorical distinction between Cs and matter baffles me, The
discussion is still governed, I believe on both sides, by the old
difference between in here, that voice in my head, or those images,
which are no longer inaccessible, no longer "inner" in the old
sense of the word when approached with material tools and the grass
outside. But, it seems we cannot help but be snared by its
pervasive, metaphoric power..
Vera
----- Original Message ----- From: "Martin Packer" <packer@duq.edu>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Saturday, September 26, 2009 6:40 AM
Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness"only a part of the material
quality of the man-sign"
Andy,
You're misrepresenting what I wrote, and why I wrote it. I am
indeed arguing that all representational systems are material. Yet
I find myself dealing constantly with colleagues who believe that
psychology must study non-material representational systems. That
to understand children's development, for example, requires
studying their 'internal,' 'mental' representations. I was citing
Donald's work as an example that does a good job of explaining
human cognitive development (historical rather than ontogenetic,
but that's not an important difference in this context) with
reference only to representational systems that are material. Plus
brain functioning, construed in non- representational ways. No
tautology here, and no problem.
Martin
On Sep 26, 2009, at 7:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
Martin referred to a series of "representational systems" being
all "material"; I pointed out that Martin had already said that
*everything*, even consciousness, was material so the statement
that these representational systems were material was a
"motherhood statement", i.e., a tautology.
So I responded "show me a representational system which is *not*
material" which is a problem for Martin because he says that
everything is material.
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca