Two very quick comments on your message, Andy, and then a question on
Davydov's interpretation of Vygotsky on complexive thinking, where I am
wondering if Davydov is getting Vygotsky right.
First - calling the **scientific** concept a **microcosm** of the
concept as a whole is an interesting idea, Andy. Is this a Vygotsky
formulation? Could you point me to it? Or what Vygotsky says that
leads you to believe he was thinking along these lines?
Second, my reference to rationality the other day was to Davydov (not
Vygotsky). Davydov, interestingly, characterizes both empirical and
scientific concepts as rational. Clearly, Vygotsky would not limit
rational thinking to just science per se, either. But here is where it
gets very interesting.
Davydov seems to be dividing rational thinking into **two** divisions,
or genera: empirical and scientific (general conceptualizations and
theoretical concepts). Vygotsky, for his part, apparently maintained
the existence of only **one** genus of rational conceptualization (true
concepts), to which he counterposed its developmental precedent -
spontaneous (everyday) child thinking. In turn, as we know, Vygotsky
subdivided spontaneous child thinking into syncretic formations and
complexive thinking. (He never discussed or researched in very much
detail how these categories psychologically apply to adults,
unfortunately ...)
As for what Vygotsky said and might have thought about the question of
various **species** of concepts, I'd be very interested in that. Any
references come to mind?
************************
Now to my question about an interesting passage in the Davydov Types of
Generalization, Ch 6, in the section "The Problem of Generalization in
the Works of L. S. Vygotskii". You quote from this passage in your
essay, Andy.
I might briefly mention the critical stance from where I am coming
from: I am really liking Davydov a **lot** - his grasp of sign
mediation theory (Vygotsky), activity theory (Leontiev), and the concept
of the ideal (llyenkov), for example, is very enlightening for me, and
very useful. But so far, I am stumbling a bit over his theory of
concepts in general, as well as his theory of concept formation in
psychology - and in particular, how he fits in, or perhaps doesn't fit
in, Vygotsky's concept of complexive thinking into his system.
The passage below **seems** to me to be interpreting Vygotsky's concept
of the complex to mean the **opposite** of what Vygotsky means - which
is **very** uncharacteristic of Davydov. Am I reading the Davydov and
the Vygotsky correctly? If this is the case, it might shed some light
on how Davydov understands what Vygotsky calls complexive thinking, and
perhaps his role in the history of that concept, which seems to have
been set aside somewhat (and one of the reasons Paula's efforts are so
welcome).
********************
Davydov:
"Thus, having previously established the identical nature of
pseudoconcepts and concepts in their object attribution, Vygotskii then
indicates the objective basis for this phenomenon – ****a generalization
of a single type underlies both of them**** [emphasis added by sg] . It
is obtained in different ways (different intellectual operations), takes
on a different form (merging with the real object in the complex, and an
abstracted nature in the concept), but, in principle, reflects the same
content." (Types of Generalization in Instruction, pg 87 - in Chapter
6, The Problem of Generalization in the Works of L.S. Vygotskii).
**********************
[Vygotsky next seems to be saying just the opposite. See what you
think. -sg]
**********************
Vygotsky:
"A complex, like a concept, is a generalization or blend of various real
heterogeneous themes. But the association with whose help this
generalization is formed, can be of many different types. Any
association can result in the inclusion in the complex of a certain
element, as long as it is available, and this is the most characteristic
feature of the complex building process. Whilst associations of a
single type which are logically identical to one another form the
foundation of concepts, the ones found at the root of complexes include
many varied factual associations, which frequently have nothing at all
to do with one another. ****In a concept, the objects are generalized
according to one feature, but in a complex they are based on various
factual grounds.**** [emphasis added by sg] Therefore, material and
uniform associations and affiliations between objects are reflected in
concepts, whilst complexes present factual, random and concrete ones."
p 220, Thinking and Concept Formation in Adolescents, (originally from
Ch 10 Pedology of the Adolescent (Russian) published 1930), in The
Vygotsky Reader (1994)
*********************
Comment by Steve: Davydov seems to be saying that Vygotsky's complex
and concept indeed generalize objects in "different ways" and in
different forms - but do so, in Vygotsky's theory, with only one "single
type" of generalization. So, consequently, according to Davydov,
Vygotsky's complex and concept reflect the same **content**. Vygotsky,
however, seems to explain just the opposite - that the forms of
generalizations of the complex and concept - **and** their **contents**
- are vastly different between the complex and the concept.
Am I reading something wrong? (It certainly wouldn't be the first time
...)
- Steve
On Sep 13, 2009, at 5:34 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
Steve, I think Vygotsky is neither clear nor consistent, but making
all due allowances, he was right; Davydov is clear and consistent, but
he is wrong on occasions. Pity Vyvogotsky did not live longer. But it
means we have to put a consistent and tenable understanding together
ourselves.
Firstly I believe Vygtosky took the "scientific concept" only as a
microcosm of the concept, and recognised that the everyday life of an
adult is full of concepts (i.e. proper concepts). He gives "dog" as an
example. In general concepts originate out of "expert systems" of some
kind, i.e., institutions, but not necessarily science: e.g. sport, the
Church, literature, ... This will not be the first occasion that LSV's
use of a micrcosm has caused people to think that he thinks the
micrcosm is the whole.
So Vygotsky reognizes many types of concept, and I don't think
Vygotsky limited "rationality" to science. He began life as a literary
critic after all.
On how individuals acquire knowledge, you are right of course, that
whatever form a child's knowledge takes, it is acquired through
artefact-mediated collaboration with adults, at least until the age of
~7 when interaction with peers starts to rival interaction with adults.
One of LSV's strentghs v-a-v Davydov is that LSV really concerns
himself with the transition - this is where wolves in sheeps clothing
comes from. But Davydov simply regards everyday non-conceptual
thinking as a barrier to learning scientific conceptual thought. He
doesn't really see a transition at all.
Andy
Steve Gabosch wrote:
It seems as though Vygotsky's theory recognized only one kind of
adult, rational concept, which he called at various times the "true
concept," the "scientific concept," etc. In Ch 6 of T&S Vygotsky
contrasted his theory of the true concept with the "spontaneous" or
"everyday" concept, which he seems to have associated with various
forms of complexive thinking, including the pseudoconcept, the
potential concept, the preconcept, etc.
On the other hand, Davydov's theory, appreciative of the
accomplishments and critical of the shortcomings of Vygotsky's work
on concept formation, recognizes not just one but **two** kinds of
rational concepts, which he calls the empirical concept (more
precisely, the "general conceptualization") and the theoretical
concept (the "content-based generalization"). I find his general
arguments for this persuasive, and consistent with a philosophical
book I have found influential on my thinking about concepts - as did
Davydov - Ilyenkov's The Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete
in Marx's Capital (1960).
However, so far as I can tell, while Davydov discusses Vygotsky's
work on complexes, he did not fully incorporate this work into his
theory. Why not? Or has he? More on this below.
*************
Andy, in speaking of an "absolutely non-empirical social factor" in
human activity I take it you are affirming the CHAT principle that
cultural knowledge is, for a large part, derived by the individual
**indirectly** through the words, artifacts and actions of other
people, through **cultural** interaction, and not just **directly**
through individual **sensory** experience. Is this what you mean?
Also, Andy, you suggest that for you or me, a 'rook' is a concept,
but for a child, it is probably a potential concept (or might be, may
I add, a pre-concept, or a pseudo-concept). How is that different
from suggesting that for concept-trained adults, cev, bik, mur and
lag are concepts, even though for a child they might be a
pseudo-concepts? Not quite understanding your argument ...
***************
The problem may lie in whether we are using the term "concept" in the
one-rational-concept-system theory of Vygotsky or the
two-rational-concept-system theory of Davydov. I was using
Vygotsky's system. One reason I am having trouble easily jumping
from LSV's system to VVD's is some confusion I am having over
terminology, along with Davydov's (for me, so far) unsatisfying
account of complexive thinking.
Interestingly, Davydov seems to only employ the term "true concept"
twice in Types of Generalizations. Once as part of a quote from
Bruner et al, and once in the section in Chapter 6 on Vygotsky's work
on concept formation, nearby some of the quotes you cite. Here is
what Davydov says about true concepts:
"From the standpoint of dialectical logic, concepts, as they are
encountered in our everyday speech, are not concepts in the proper
sense of the word. They are, rather, general conceptions of things.
But it is indisputable that they are a transitional stage from
complexes and pseudo-concepts to true concepts in the dialectical
sense of the word [65, pp. 196-197]."
In a sense, this may be the same problem that you point to in your
essay, Andy, where Vygotsky was using the generic term "concept" to
refer to both all concept formations at all developmental levels as
well as to their most highly developed forms. Davydov, and perhaps
you, may sometimes be doing something similar - "concepts," "true
concepts," "concepts in the proper sense of the word," etc. Maybe a
clearer taxonomic nomenclature is needed. Or maybe there is
something I am not yet quite getting.
Davydov's suggestion that general conceptualizations are
**transitional** between "everyday" speech, that is, "complexes and
pseudo-concepts," seems very important to me. Is there a place where
he specifically develops this idea, or perhaps, where someone else
does? Understanding how to fully incorporate what we know about
complexive thinking into a general theory of concept formation might
help me to make the leap from Vygotsky to Davydov.
- Steve
On Sep 12, 2009, at 8:33 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
Steve Gabosch wrote:
One, what do you mean by "an absolutely non-empirical social factor"
One. When I say "absolutely non-empirical" I do not try to deny that
all knowledge begins from the senses. For example, if I drive on the
left because the law requires me to, I still have to be able to read
signs, understand speech etc. to know and obey that law. But you
wouldn't call that "empirical" would you? Concepts come to us
through using artefacts in joint actions with other people, i.e.,
activity, not passive contemplation. See "Theses on Feuerbach."
Conceptual knowledge presupposes all the senses, but is not thereby
"empirical."
any game. In chess, for example, rooks and pawns are "concepts" -
yes?
Two. I thought about exactly this one as well. So if playing a good
game of chess, knowing the moves for Kings and Knights etc., and how
to play a good strategy, implies *conceptual* thought, then all the
primary school children who participate in chess championships are
alredy masters of true concepts. And it doesn't stop there, does it?
The implication is that *logical thinking* is ipso facto, conceptual
thought. But primary school kids in general use logical argument,
apply strategies in games, learn arithmetic and grammatical rules,
etc, etc.
So why is LSV so insistent that conceptual thought is possible only
for adolescents? I couldn't find the reference, maybe someone can,
but I am sure LSV believes that logical thinking and argument by
giving reasons "belongs" to the 7-11 age group, not 15+ - like with
LSV's example of a "dog", "rook" may be a concept for you, but for a
child "rook" is a potential concept.
The point is that "machine-like" logical thought is not conceptual
thought. It relies on pre-concepts, or what Davydov calls
(charitably in my view) "empirical concepts" or on one occasion
"general notions."
Does that help?
Andy
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden
http://www.erythrospress.com/ Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel,
Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea
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Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov
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