Re: [xmca] Vygotsky, Saussure, and Wolves with different dreams

[Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

I have raised this issue before and somone (Anna Stetsenko) said that
current evidence contradicted me, but i could not find the contradiction in
the sources provided, so since it is so central an argument, it may well be
worth repeating.

The claim is this:

the development of a gesture [into a word (mc)] as (1) reaching for an
object, (2) a reaction arises, but not on the part of the object, but
another person, who completes the grasping for the child, and in being
directed towards another person, the gesture becomes contracted, and (3)
becomes a gesture for oneself. And I think this is as good as any a
representation of the Hegel passage I have given the link to.

One relevant article is at the following accessible url.
http://mindblog.dericbownds.net/2007/06/human-infant-pointing-precursor-to.html

The work of Butterworth on infant pointing, which implicates an important
maturational ("natural line of development") component also needs to be
considered. Easy access to this can be found via google
using
The child in the world: embodiment, time, and language in early ... - Google
Books Result<http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=4&url=http%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DiZLu3UZxV-cC%26pg%3DPA170%26lpg%3DPA170%26dq%3Dinfant%2Bpointing%2Bbutterworth%26source%3Dbl%26ots%3DdNw6epggkB%26sig%3D7rQYEZwltjSF9IAB839enjx3Y8w%26hl%3Den%26ei%3DxwV_SvWLIJKKMe_ogPgC%26sa%3DX%26oi%3Dbook_result%26ct%3Dresult%26resnum%3D4&ei=xwV_SvWLIJKKMe_ogPgC&usg=AFQjCNFQMb2V9y3zehUm62ppY1RZg6zW6g&sig2=tS1cMjgVt_poz1Jq52wZmw>These
results do not negate the role of adult interpretation in the development of
early words, or gestures, but they do complicate the picture I think. Easy
and repeated repitetation of LSV on this point is not going to be taken
serious without us taking seriously contemporary evidence and theoretical
claims.

mike

On Thu, Aug 6, 2009 at 5:23 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

> Mmm, well I had a read of the relevant passage in Hegel again last night,
> Steve, and again modified my opinion of its meaning. Here is a link to the
> point which is the nearest Hegel comes to this relation:
>
> http://marx.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/ssconsci.htm#SS334
>
> I find this prettty opaque quite honestly, but I think if you read it on
> the assumption that Hegel is talking about the differentiating out of (c)
> individual consciousness (which is what Hegel meant by "psychology") from
> (a) animalistic action/reaction and (b) the collective consciousness of a
> cultural group, you might just get some sense out of it.
>
> LSV put it this way:
>
> "All cultural development of the child passes through three basic stages
> that can be described in the following way using Hegel’s analysis." (LSV CW
> v. 4 p. 104) My paraphrase of the rest of the paragraph: the development of
> a gesture as (1) reaching for an object, (2) a reaction arises, but not on
> the part of the object, but another person, who completes the grasping for
> the child, and in being directed towards another person, the gesture becomes
> contracted, and (3) becomes a gesture for oneself. And I think this is as
> good as any a representation of the Hegel passage I have given the link to.
>
> -----------
>
> Vygotsky may have learnt about this passage secondhand from Lewin. But
> everyone knew about the Hegelian phrases "thing-in-itself", "thing-for-us"
> and "thing-for-itself", since these were part of the popular discourse
> around Hegel in Marxist circles. So I presume "concept-in-itself," the
> "concept-for-others" and the "concept-for-myself" is a kind of play on these
> concepts. But "concept-for-myself" is just not something you'd find in
> Hegel. The concept is always objective for Hegel.
>
> -----------
>
> Now what Vygotsky meant by it:
>
> "Concept-in-itself" I take to be the unconscious use of words by a small
> child as an indivisible part of an action, a "handle" for a thing. This is
> close to the Hegelian idea, because the child is not yet conscious of having
> a concept or thing-name at all; it is indissolubly connected to the object
> itself.
>
> "Concept-for-others" I take to mean the use of a word for communicative
> action, e.g. asking an adult for assistance, and it is directed at the
> adult.
>
> "Concept-for-myself" is the use of language by the child to control its own
> actions, speech growing in, as they say, towards silent speech. I don't know
> if I entirely concur with Kozulin in saying this, but the idea you quote
> from Kozulin is certainly closely connnected, because the use of words to
> achieve intelligent *control* of one's own actions is surely closely
> connected with awareness of one's own consciousness (and behaviour). And I
> think you can link LSV and Hegel with (a) and (b) but I can't see it with
> (c).
>
> That's where I'm at with all this Steve.
>
> Andy
>
>
>
> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>
>> Thanks, Andy.  I think I am being a little dense here, because now I am
>> uncertain of both what Vygotsky meant, and what Hegel meant as well!  LOL
>>
>> I get the **sense** of these distinctions, of course, but I don't think
>> they are yet registering for me as clear **concepts**.  I might even be able
>> to more or less correctly answer a question or two about what Vygotsky said
>> on a school quiz, but I can tell I would only be doing so on the basis of
>> pseudoconceptual reasoning, because I can memorize the genetic order that
>> Vygotsky says that the concept-in-itself, the concept-for-others and the
>> concept-for-myself appear in the child - but not because I really understand
>> **why** they appear in that order, or because I understand just **what**
>> these kinds of concepts actually are.  I couldn't, offhand, give you clear
>> examples of these three kinds of concepts.  Your quote from Hegel is
>> helpful, but I have not fully conceptualized Hegel's treatment of these
>> ideas, either.  I'm not so sure how I'd get very far on a school quiz on
>> that!  LOL
>>
>> So let me refine my questions regarding Vygotsky's points.  First, what
>> did Vygotsky mean by the terms "concept-in-itself," "concept-for-others" and
>> "concept-for-myself"?  Second, what are some examples of these kinds of
>> concepts?  Third, why does he claim that the first two, as a rule, precede
>> the latter in a child's intellectual development?
>>
>> For further thought, here are some relevant quotes from the paper, from
>> Vygotsky, and from Kozulin.
>>
>> Here is what Paula and Carol said (pg 236 in Wolves):
>>
>> "It is in this respect that Vygotsky notes that the genetic preconditions
>> of the “concept-for-myself” are already present in the pseudoconcept in the
>> form of the “concept-in-itself” and the “concept-for-others”, because these
>> occur earlier in the child than the “concept-for-myself”: he further asserts
>> that this sequence is not restricted to conceptual development because it
>> occurs as a “rule rather than the exception in the intellectual development
>> of the child” (p. 124)."
>>
>> Here is the passage by Vygotsky from Alex Kozulin's translation of Thought
>> and Language they refer to (pg 124):
>>
>> "The concept-in-itself and the concept-for-others are developed in the
>> child earlier than the concept-for-myself.  The concept-in-itself and the
>> concept-for-others, which are already present in the pseudoconcept, are the
>> basic genetic precondition for the development of real concepts.  This
>> peculiar genetic situation is not limited to the attainment of concepts; it
>> is the rule rather the exception in the intellectual development of the
>> child." (7)
>>
>> In Footnote (7) to the above passage in Thought and Language (on page
>> 268),  Kozulin comments:
>>
>> "7. Vygotsky's discussion of the phenomenon of pseudoconcepts has
>> far-reaching philosophical implications.  First of all, if the conscious
>> awareness of one's own intellectual operations ("concept-for-me") is only a
>> secondary achievement, which follows the practical use of these operations,
>> then the individual cannot be considered a self-conscious center of
>> activity.  [Note from Steve:  I don't grasp what Alex just said.]  The
>> individual appears rather as a "construction" built at the crossroads of the
>> inner and outer realities.  Second, the phenomenon of functional equivalence
>> between real and pseudoconcepts warns us against taking the functional
>> appearance of communication for its ultimate content.  The usage of "one and
>> the same" words and subsequent "understanding" may be illusory.  Such
>> illusion of understanding, based on the confusion between functional and
>> essential characteristics, constantly emerges in child-adult communication,
>> in the dialogue between different social groups, and in contacts between
>> different cultures.  For further discussion of this point, see Alex Kozulin,
>> "Psychology and Philosophical Anthropology: The Problem of Their
>> Interaction," *The Philosophical Forum*, 1984, 15(4):443-458."
>>
>> <end>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Aug 4, 2009, at 7:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>
>>  Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>>
>>>> What did LSV mean by a "concept-for-myself," (a phrase, I understand, is
>>>> derived from Hegel)?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Hegel would never have used quite the phrase, "concept-for-myself", but
>>> the way Vygotsky is using the idea: first concept in-itself, then
>>> for-others, and only last for-myself - i.e., self-consciousness, is quite
>>> consistent with Hegel's idea. It's really a play on Hegel.
>>>
>>> For example from Hegel's Introduction to the History of Philosophy:
>>>
>>> "But consciousness really implies that for myself, I am object to myself.
>>> In forming this absolute division between what is mine and myself, Mind
>>> constitutes its existence and establishes itself as external to itself. It
>>> postulates itself in the externality."
>>>
>>> Andy
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>>
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