Your comments, quotes and links are very helpful, Andy, thank you. I am
still struggling to comprehend all this, but now have so much more to
work with. We now have several sequences from both Vygotsky and Hegel
to consider:
1. (Vygotsky) a) concept-in-itself, b) concept-for-others, c)
concept-for-myself (Vygotsky, Thinking and Speech, 1986, pg 124).
2. (Hegel) thing-in-itself, b) thing-for-us, c) thing-for-itself.
(Where is this from?)
3. (Vygotsky) a) reaching for an object, b) reaching for an object while
another person reacts, c) pointing at an object expecting another person
to react (Vygotsky, CW, Vol 4, pg 104).
4. (Hegel) (a) animalistic action/reaction, (b) the collective
consciousness of a cultural group, (c) individual consciousness (which
is what Hegel meant by "psychology") (Where is this from?)
5. (Hegel) "§ 334: The levels of this elevation of certainty to truth
are: (a) consciousness in general, which has an object as such; (b)
self-consciousness, for which the self is the object; (c) the unity of
consciousness and self-consciousness, where the spirit sees itself as
the content of the object and as in and for itself determinate; — as
reason, the concept of the spirit." (Hegel, Philosophy of Spirit,
http://marx.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/ssconsci.htm#SS334)
I see your point about what I have listed above as item 5. 5a and 5b
seem to fit in with the others, but not 5c. I also have a question
about 4a - whether that quite fits, either.
I like your general descriptions of what LSV seems to have meant. I
have the urge to push these concepts even further, to their full
capacity. In doing, I may be going too far, or perhaps I am combining
them a little differently and incorrectly. See what you think. Allow
me to think out loud here, and take this as far as I can for the moment.
You say:
"Concept-in-itself" I take to be the unconscious use of words by a
small child as an indivisible part of an action, a "handle" for a
thing. This is close to the Hegelian idea, because the child is not
yet conscious of having a concept or thing-name at all; it is
indissolubly connected to the object itself.
Excellent point. Wanting to expand on this, perhaps we can relate this
stage to Vygotsky's emphasis on the importance of the naming stage
beginning around age two. Vygotsky explains in Thinking and Speech (ch
4) that "Stern provided the first and best description of this
extraordinarily important event in the child's mental life. He
demonstrated that a vague consciousness of the significance of language
and the will to master it is awakened in the child. The child makes what
is the most significant discovery of his life the discovery that "each
thing has its name" (Stern, 1922, p. 92)" (Vygotsky, CW, Vol 1, p.
111). Vygotsky referred to this as the "signifying function" in Ch 3.
In other words, does "concept-in-itself" refers to **naming objects**?
You say:
"Concept-for-others" I take to mean the use of a word for
communicative action, e.g. asking an adult for assistance, and it is
directed at the adult.
Another excellent observation. Perhaps we can relate this stage to the
**functional** use of language, to bring that key term in Vygotsky's
work on concept formation into this discussion. In "concept-for-others"
(and actually, the use of the term concept any of these three phrases) I
wonder if Vygotsky might be using the term "concept" not as in "true
concept" but in its generic sense, referring to any kind of conceptual
formation - syncretic, complexive, pseudoconceptual, true concepts,
etc. If so, perhaps we can expand this stage (the use of words for
communicative action) beyond just children talking to adults to include
talking to anyone - adults, other children, self, and even imaginary
entities.
In other words, does "concept-for-others" refer to **using words to
function socially**?
You say:
"Concept-for-myself" is the use of language by the child to control
its own actions, speech growing in, as they say, towards silent
speech. I don't know if I entirely concur with Kozulin in saying this,
but the idea you quote from Kozulin is certainly closely connnected,
because the use of words to achieve intelligent *control* of one's own
actions is surely closely connected with awareness of one's own
consciousness (and behaviour). And I think you can link LSV and Hegel
with (a) and (b) but I can't see it with (c).
Here, I am puzzling out the two excellent ideas pointed to here, the use
of words for 1) self-regulation and 2) self-awareness. My first
question is, how is self-regulation, consciously controlling ones own
actions and behaviors, not just another aspect of functionally using
language? For example, as Vygotsky discovered, when a child (or adult)
talks to themselves, they are regulating their behaviors and actions.
This also relates to Vygotsky's discussion and experiments regarding
auxiliary stimuli. So I wonder if 1) self-regulation belongs more in
the first category.
My second question, following your suggestions, Andy, is since
self-consciousness clearly is a common theme in many of the examples we
are considering for this third stage, what would be **different** about
this self-awareness or self-consciousness at this third "stage" of
concept formation? Furthermore, if, as Vygotsky says, the first two
stages as a rule **precede** the third stage (am using the term stage
loosely here), then what is new and different about a person's
self-awareness in the third stage?
Well, since we know where Vygotsky is going with his thinking about
concept formation, let's fill in the blank and see how it fits. Perhaps
at the stage of "concepts-for-myself" a person begins to **name
objects** and **functionally use words** on a new level, in a new,
**self-conscious** way.
And what would be the nature of this new, "self-conscious" way of using
words? Well, here is where we might be able to answer this, relying on
Vygotsky's theory about the scientific or academic concept, that is, the
conscious use of words to create **culturally-understood, logical
generalizations** - that is, of course, **true concepts**.
In other words, does "concept-for-myself" refer to
**self-consciously-produced true concepts**?
Well, that's as far as I'm getting, picking up from your very helpful
points and references, Andy. Thoughts?
Cheers,
~ Steve
PS. Some Hegel quotes follow.
****************************
The following is passage § 334 in Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit that you
refer to, Andy, plus the two preceding passages, § 332 and § 333, which
seem to be in the same vein. Opaque, for sure! But still an
interesting discussion of object-subject relations as well as the idea
of consciousness developing - all of which I would like to understand
better!
From http://marx.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/ssconsci.htm#SS334
§ 332
Since the self does not exist as the concept, but only as a formal
identity, the dialectical movement of consciousness does not seem to it
to be its own activity, but seems to occur in itself that is, as a
change in the object. Consciousness appears differently, therefore,
according to the differences in the given object, and the ongoing
development of consciousness appears as a development of the object. The
observation of its necessary changes, however, the concept, falls,
because it is still as such interior, within us.
[Note: the following paragraph is in a smaller font than the other
paragraphs, not clear why. - sg]
Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having conceived
of the spirit as consciousness, and as containing only determinations of
the phenomenology, not the philosophy, of spirit. Kant views the self as
the relation to a "thing in itself" lying somewhere beyond, and it is
only from this perspective that he treats the intellect and the will.
Though with the concept of reflecting judgment he does speak of the idea
of the spirit, subject-objectivity, an intuitive understanding, and so
on, and even the idea of nature, this idea is itself demoted to an
appearance again, namely, to a subjective principle. Reinhold, it may
therefore be said, correctly understood Kantianism, when he treated it
as a theory of consciousness, under the name of the faculty of
imagination. Fichtean philosophy adheres to the same point of view, for
his "not-I" is only an object of the "I," only determined as in
consciousness; it remains an infinite impulse, that is, a thing in
itself. Both philosophies show, therefore, that they have not clearly
reached the concept or the spirit as it is in and for itself but only as
it is in relation to something else.
§ 333
The aim of the spirit as consciousness is to make its appearance
identical with its essence, to raise the certainty of itself to truth.
The existence of the spirit in consciousness is formal or general as
such; because that is determined only abstractly, or it is only
self-reflected as an abstract self its existence retains a content which
is not yet its own.
§ 334
The levels of this elevation of certainty to truth are: (a)
consciousness in general, which has an object as such; (b)
self-consciousness, for which the self is the object; (c) the unity of
consciousness and self-consciousness, where the spirit sees itself as
the content of the object and as in and for itself determinate; — as
reason, the concept of the spirit.
*******************************
<end of Hegel quotes>
On Aug 6, 2009, at 5:23 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
Mmm, well I had a read of the relevant passage in Hegel again last
night, Steve, and again modified my opinion of its meaning. Here is a
link to the point which is the nearest Hegel comes to this relation:
http://marx.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/ssconsci.htm#SS334
I find this prettty opaque quite honestly, but I think if you read it
on the assumption that Hegel is talking about the differentiating out
of (c) individual consciousness (which is what Hegel meant by
"psychology") from (a) animalistic action/reaction and (b) the
collective consciousness of a cultural group, you might just get some
sense out of it.
LSV put it this way:
"All cultural development of the child passes through three basic
stages that can be described in the following way using Hegel’s
analysis." (LSV CW v. 4 p. 104) My paraphrase of the rest of the
paragraph: the development of a gesture as (1) reaching for an object,
(2) a reaction arises, but not on the part of the object, but another
person, who completes the grasping for the child, and in being
directed towards another person, the gesture becomes contracted, and
(3) becomes a gesture for oneself. And I think this is as good as any
a representation of the Hegel passage I have given the link to.
-----------
Vygotsky may have learnt about this passage secondhand from Lewin. But
everyone knew about the Hegelian phrases "thing-in-itself",
"thing-for-us" and "thing-for-itself", since these were part of the
popular discourse around Hegel in Marxist circles. So I presume
"concept-in-itself," the "concept-for-others" and the
"concept-for-myself" is a kind of play on these concepts. But
"concept-for-myself" is just not something you'd find in Hegel. The
concept is always objective for Hegel.
-----------
Now what Vygotsky meant by it:
"Concept-in-itself" I take to be the unconscious use of words by a
small child as an indivisible part of an action, a "handle" for a
thing. This is close to the Hegelian idea, because the child is not
yet conscious of having a concept or thing-name at all; it is
indissolubly connected to the object itself.
"Concept-for-others" I take to mean the use of a word for
communicative action, e.g. asking an adult for assistance, and it is
directed at the adult.
"Concept-for-myself" is the use of language by the child to control
its own actions, speech growing in, as they say, towards silent
speech. I don't know if I entirely concur with Kozulin in saying this,
but the idea you quote from Kozulin is certainly closely connnected,
because the use of words to achieve intelligent *control* of one's own
actions is surely closely connected with awareness of one's own
consciousness (and behaviour). And I think you can link LSV and Hegel
with (a) and (b) but I can't see it with (c).
That's where I'm at with all this Steve.
Andy
Steve Gabosch wrote:
Thanks, Andy. I think I am being a little dense here, because now I
am uncertain of both what Vygotsky meant, and what Hegel meant as
well! LOL
I get the **sense** of these distinctions, of course, but I don't
think they are yet registering for me as clear **concepts**. I might
even be able to more or less correctly answer a question or two about
what Vygotsky said on a school quiz, but I can tell I would only be
doing so on the basis of pseudoconceptual reasoning, because I can
memorize the genetic order that Vygotsky says that the
concept-in-itself, the concept-for-others and the concept-for-myself
appear in the child - but not because I really understand **why**
they appear in that order, or because I understand just **what**
these kinds of concepts actually are. I couldn't, offhand, give you
clear examples of these three kinds of concepts. Your quote from
Hegel is helpful, but I have not fully conceptualized Hegel's
treatment of these ideas, either. I'm not so sure how I'd get very
far on a school quiz on that! LOL
So let me refine my questions regarding Vygotsky's points. First,
what did Vygotsky mean by the terms "concept-in-itself,"
"concept-for-others" and "concept-for-myself"? Second, what are some
examples of these kinds of concepts? Third, why does he claim that
the first two, as a rule, precede the latter in a child's
intellectual development?
For further thought, here are some relevant quotes from the paper, from
Vygotsky, and from Kozulin.
Here is what Paula and Carol said (pg 236 in Wolves):
"It is in this respect that Vygotsky notes that the genetic
preconditions of the “concept-for-myself” are already present in the
pseudoconcept in the form of the “concept-in-itself” and the
“concept-for-others”, because these occur earlier in the child than
the “concept-for-myself”: he further asserts that this sequence is
not restricted to conceptual development because it occurs as a “rule
rather than the exception in the intellectual development of the
child” (p. 124)."
Here is the passage by Vygotsky from Alex Kozulin's translation of
Thought and Language they refer to (pg 124):
"The concept-in-itself and the concept-for-others are developed in
the child earlier than the concept-for-myself. The concept-in-itself
and the concept-for-others, which are already present in the
pseudoconcept, are the basic genetic precondition for the development
of real concepts. This peculiar genetic situation is not limited to
the attainment of concepts; it is the rule rather the exception in
the intellectual development of the child." (7)
In Footnote (7) to the above passage in Thought and Language (on page
268), Kozulin comments:
"7. Vygotsky's discussion of the phenomenon of pseudoconcepts has
far-reaching philosophical implications. First of all, if the
conscious awareness of one's own intellectual operations
("concept-for-me") is only a secondary achievement, which follows the
practical use of these operations, then the individual cannot be
considered a self-conscious center of activity. [Note from Steve: I
don't grasp what Alex just said.] The individual appears rather as a
"construction" built at the crossroads of the inner and outer
realities. Second, the phenomenon of functional equivalence between
real and pseudoconcepts warns us against taking the functional
appearance of communication for its ultimate content. The usage of
"one and the same" words and subsequent "understanding" may be
illusory. Such illusion of understanding, based on the confusion
between functional and essential characteristics, constantly emerges
in child-adult communication, in the dialogue between different
social groups, and in contacts between different cultures. For
further discussion of this point, see Alex Kozulin, "Psychology and
Philosophical Anthropology: The Problem of Their Interaction," *The
Philosophical Forum*, 1984, 15(4):443-458."
<end>
On Aug 4, 2009, at 7:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
Steve Gabosch wrote:
What did LSV mean by a "concept-for-myself," (a phrase, I
understand, is derived from Hegel)?
Hegel would never have used quite the phrase, "concept-for-myself",
but the way Vygotsky is using the idea: first concept in-itself,
then for-others, and only last for-myself - i.e.,
self-consciousness, is quite consistent with Hegel's idea. It's
really a play on Hegel.
For example from Hegel's Introduction to the History of Philosophy:
"But consciousness really implies that for myself, I am object to
myself. In forming this absolute division between what is mine and
myself, Mind constitutes its existence and establishes itself as
external to itself. It postulates itself in the externality."
Andy
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