Andy,I have read chapter 1 of Capital, and with an interest in Marx's methodology. Here's something I've written about this - any reactions and corrections are welcome.
Martin ==============Much has been written about the method of analysis that Marx employed, especially in Capital (e.g., Bologh, 1979; Ollman, 1990, 2003; Sayer, 1987). Marx’s analyses began not with concrete things but with relationships. Even the commodity form turns out to be a process of circulation. Although it might seem obvious to begin with “activities, things and people as they appear to the ordinary observer” (Marx, 1867/1977, p. 35) these are really just empty abstractions. They appear to be ‘just there,’ but in fact they are grounded in relations and presuppositions. These objects, events, and individuals are embedded in, and are products of, a complex whole, a totality of relationships. The proper aim of analysis is to articulate this totality.
Marx’s method was to take a single but central unit of the society of his time, the commodity-form, and trace its movements through that society, through the “cycles” of economic production, exchange, and consumption. Every entity – money; a commodity; a laborer – is what it is only because it participates in the system of organization of material production. Marx undertook a holistic analysis in which he traced entities as they had developed historically (barter becomes cash exchanges, the gold standard, etc.) and circulated through the contemporary economy. Looked at this way one small part can tell us about the whole.
Analysis is, of course, an activity of thought, an activity which leads to the formation of theoretical abstractions. It is only by thinking that we can figure out which relations exist. Concepts (or “categories”) are the way these relations are represented theoretically. When Marx criticized traditional (“bourgeois”) economics his criticism took the form of an examination of its concepts and a diagnosis of their inadequacies. Traditional concepts are usually one-sided. But Marx didn’t simply show that traditional thinking is wrong, he aimed to show how this thinking is possible, itself the product of a specific form of life, and so always has some validity, albeit limited.
The totality of relations that makes up the concrete whole is a form of life – for Marx, more specifically a form of production. This form of life is historically specific: that is to say, it has changed over history, and a current form should not be read back into the past, or forward into the future. Thus the concepts – both traditional and dialectical – with which we think about these relations are also historically specific. The concept of ‘wealth’ in modern capitalist society differs from the concept of ‘well-being’ in medieval times. ‘Money’ now is not ‘money’ of 500 years ago. Modern terms such as mortgage and credit show only traces of their original usage as ‘dead pledge’ and ‘trust.’ Marx explored how economic concepts are grounded in concrete social relations, relations which the concepts either obscure (traditional economic theory) or illuminate (dialectical analysis). Even abstract concepts – such as “abstract labor” (the common quality of labor in general that can be abstracted from weaving, tailoring, etc.) – have their basis in specific concrete forms of life. Abstract labor is grounded in a form of life “in which labor in reality has become the means of creating wealth in general, and has ceased to be organically linked with particular individuals in any specific form” (Marx, 1857-1858/1973, p. 104). Modern capitalism is a highly developed economic system which can create wealth from any kind of productive labor, rather than from a few specific kinds, such as agriculture. The concept of abstract labor does have some validity for thinking about other periods in history, precisely because it is abstract. But it possesses full validity only for the form of life of which it is a product.
An historical analysis needs to avoid forcing abstract concepts onto past forms of life. Imposing such concepts amounts to treating them as natural instead of historical, and obliterates both their history and the specific social relations that produced them. The result is “eternal natural laws independent of history” (1857-58, p. 87), economic laws which present as natural, and so as unchangeable, arrangements which are in fact arbitrary and problematic. Traditional economic theory does this, and serves to bolster the status quo. Theory in the traditional social sciences does the same.
Marx suggested that we must understand the present before we can explore the past (as “Human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape,” p. 105). The historical conditions in which a form of life originally became possible were generally different from the current conditions in which that form of life reproduces itself. The first Marx calls the “history of formation,” the second “contemporary history” (Marx, 1857-58/1973, p. 459; cf. Bologh, 1979, p. 44). The analysis of contemporary history also offers “foreshadowings of the future” (p. 461, cf. Bologh, 1979, p. 46). Historical analysis doesn’t consist in merely tracing the origins of current arrangements, but in viewing the contemporary form of life as itself an ongoing historical process, a process in which it must continually renew and reproduce itself, but in which it is also engaged in “suspending” itself and preparing the conditions for a new form of life.
On Jul 29, 2009, at 10:14 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
Martin,"Cell" is a wonderful idea, but the relevant people use the idea a little inconsistently. It is really only a metaphor.I know how totally vast your reading is Martin, but you really should try to squeeze in Chapter 1, Vol I of Capital some time. Believe me. About 50 pages or something will do.Yes, there are two methods in science; one uncritically analyses the subject matter into phenomenal bits (attributes) and adds them up into the whole. The other begins with a conception of the whole and approaches the parts. This latter method recieves a lot of praise but is practised by few.For the method to begin from the whole, finding the starting point is absolutely crucial. The whole = the unit. So it means finding this identity between even the smallest unit and the whole. Possible, because it begins with the concept of the whole.But on top of this division into two types of science, there is a perfectly valid principle of science which is contained in the idea of "microcosm."The microcosm is not the most *primitive* unit, but one particular unit or element which is the highest development of a unit or element, which contains all the phenomena which are to be found in the whole. EG Pavlov's salivary reflex. Ilyenkov takes value as a microcosm of the ideal. The French Revolution is studied as a microcosm of history. Luria studied one person for decades.Andy Martin Packer wrote:Andy,Yes, I think I misunderstood the point you were trying to make. If it's about methodology, then it may indeed be helpful to compare the passage in Problems (p. 271) with LSV's discussion about analysis in T&S. In both cases he distinguishes two types of analysis. I'll focus here on the passage in Problems, where he writes that the first kind of analysis separates a phenomenon into elements and in doing so loses the properties of that phenomenon. The second "is a breakdown of the whole into indivisible units and the study of the cell that has retained all the properties of the whole." In this kind of analysis one needs to identify "a certain unit that has a primary property [of the whole] to a minimal degree." So for Marx the commodity has the division between surplus value and use value that is a contradiction in capitalism as a whole. The commodity was the unit he analyzed, by tracing the movements of its genesis (production) and climax (consumption). To be honest, I can't see any systematic differences in LSV's usage of unit - cell - microcosm. What are you seeing that I don't?Martin On Jul 28, 2009, at 9:33 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:Martin,Believe me, I don't need to be convinced of the importance of language. My interest is exclusively methodological. And I love linguists and would never dream of besmirching their trade.Marx was a revolutionary, so he wrote a book on capital, and titled it "Capital", and he had multiple attempts at the job from 1844 to 1859 before he hit upon the idea of beginning his book from the Commodity.The difference between artefact-mediated action and word meaning is much the same as the difference between commodity and (actually not Capital, but) money. And as it happens word meaning is an example, a special case of "artefact-mediated action."Hegel was interested in the State, because of the stateless character of the Germany he grew up in. He wrote his book on the state, but it began not with State, or Right, but Possession. The relations are the same.Here is the passage from the LSVCW translation of T&S I use about "microcosm":“Consciousness is reflected in the word like the sun is reflected in a droplet of water. The word is a microcosm of consciousness, related to consciousness like a living cell is related to an organism, like an atom is related to the cosmos. The meaningful word is a microcosm of human consciousness.”That's why the psychologist (not linguist) VYgotsky wrote a book about thinking and speaking. I am concerned with the difference between microcosm and unit, that's all. The atom is not the unit of analysis of the cosmos, or the individual person the unit of analysis of society. In praising Pavlov he also says:"When our Marxists explain the Hegelian principle in Marxist methodology they rightly claim that each thing can be examined as a microcosm, as a universal measure in which the whole big world is reflected. On this basis they say that to study one single thing, one subject, one phenomenon until the end, exhaustively, means to know the world in all its connections. In this sense it can be said that each person is to some degree a measure of the society, or rather class, to which he belongs, for the whole totality of social relationships is reflected in him."I won't deny that these quotes contain plenty of room for methodological confusion and ambiguity! They are not at all clear. So I have to go on Marx. The Marx of "Theses on Feuerbach" which says not a word about language, and the Marx who said (somewhat oversimplistically):"The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam- mill society with the industrial capitalist."Andy Martin Packer wrote:Andy,In Problems of Child Development LSV writes that language shatters the unity of infant and world. Your examples of the painter and gymnast help us recognize that this rupture cannot be complete or final. Both are kinds of work in which successful practice depends on an embodied embeddedness in concrete reality. But at the same time I think LSV is right to write of rupture, and of the importance of language. First, he's right to insist that the child is born embedded, and so he rejects the built-in mind/world dualism that is presupposed by cognitive science. But, second, he's right to say that in development this immediacy is disrupted so that a mind is formed. The preschool age child is a dynamic part of their situation and responds without pause to its demands. The school age child, he writes, has lost this spontaneity. Language changes the child's relationship to the world in large part by picking out aspects of the situation as a distinct (kind of) 'thing.' It comes 'between' person and world, is an important part of the child's differentiation from other people, and soon will be the basis for a division between 'inner' and 'outer' aspects of the child's personality, dividing her from herself. A good gymnast or painter finds ways to suspend or overcome or forget these divisions. But equally an adult without language would not be able to be a painter or gymnast, even if they could put paint on canvas or spin on a beam, because 'painter' and 'gymnast' are positions in a social reality which someone without language would be unable to adopt.still dancing Martin On Jul 27, 2009, at 11:23 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:Martin,We've been round this mulberry bush before, so I suspect David might agree with you, but I differ.As I recall, LSV claims that word-meaning is the unit of analaysis for intelligent speech and therefore the "microcosm" of consciousness.So LSV agreed with Marx, as do I, that practice, or artefact mediated action is the unit of analysis of consciousness.all linguists of course disagree. But I wonder if a painter would agree, or a gymnast?Andy Martin Packer wrote:David, ...meaningful-sound is a concrete phenomenon, located in place and time. And he promises that we will thereby find the unity of thinking and speech, of generalization and social interaction, of thinking and communication, of intellect and affect. In short, of consciousness.No? Yes? Martin On Jul 25, 2009, at 3:25 PM, David Kellogg wrote:Martin:Yes, definitely! If you read pp. 49-50 in the Minick translation of Thinking and Speech, we get Vygotsky's remarks on Saussure's phonology in pure form. Of course, he rejects (again and again) the Saussurean view of semantics; it's nothing but associationism. But since he rejects associationism on the basis of its arbitrariness, its lack of an intelligent link, and its lack of system, he has to reject Saussurean phonemes too, no?No! As you say, there are two points here for Vygotsky to appropriate. The first is that the phoneme is part of a gestalt, specifically, a contrast with some other word (e.g. "back" and "bag"). But the second is that that gestalt is defined by MEANING and not by sound.Here is where Vygosky really parts company, not only with Saussure and structuralism but also with Gestaltism. For Saussure, the relationship between phoneme and meaning is entirely arbitrary; but for Vygotsky it is fully determined by the social situation of development.For Gestaltism, the structural relationship is not unique to language; it's shared with perception. But for Vygotsky the consciousness that is created by thought is never reducible to the consciousness that is created by perception.The question I have is what Saussure would have made of all this. Saussure was actually quite skeptical about his own system; he had good reason to instruct his wife and students not to publish any of his work. And as the article Mike sent around (on the Mandelshtam poem) makes clear, he had big big problems with precisely the concepts at issue: the arbitrariness and linearity of language.Notice that Vygotsky doesn't really use the word "phonetic" very much. The word which is usually translated as "phonetic" is actually "phasal". But in the example Vygotsky gives about the psychological vs. grammatical predicate/subject, where he talks about psychological/grammatical gender, and number, and even tense, it is very clear that for Vygotsky ALL the linear aspects of language, the aspects which (unlike thought) include TIME in their compositionality, are to be considered "phasal", not just phonetics.David Kellogg Seoul National University of Education --- On Fri, 7/24/09, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote: From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>Subject: Re: [xmca] Intensions in context and speech complexity ; From 2-?To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> Date: Friday, July 24, 2009, 8:03 AM On Jul 23, 2009, at 2:46 PM, David Kellogg wrote:I think Vygotsky actually finds the single kernel of truth in Saussure's course when he argues that a science of phonetics needs to be founded on MEANING MAKING and not on the physical description of noises people make with their mouths. However, his ability to find this kernel in a mountain of structuralist chaff should not deceive you; he is no uncritical consumer of Saussureanism.David,Coincidentally I was reading yesterday the section in Problems of Child Psychology (vol 5 of the Collected Works) where Vygotsky again makes this point. It is evidently Saussurian linguistics that V is enthusiastic about: he refers to it as phonology and contrasts it with an older phonetics which focused solely on articulatory definitions. Phonology has the advantage of seeing the sounds of language as a system, and so the child never learns a single sound in isolation but always one sound against the background of the others. V points out that this is a basic law of perception: figure/ground, and also that the ground in the case of oral language is provided by the speech of adults (so the 'ideal' endpoint of development is present and available from the start, as emphasized in the passage that Lois quoted a few days ago).V is critical once again of analyses that divide a phenomenon into elements and in doing so lose the properties of the whole. Phonology, he says, has the advantage that in studying the sounds of a language as a system it doesn't divide it into separate elements, nor does it lose the central property of language, namely that it has meaning. V adds that sounds always have meaning: "the phoneme," he writes "is not just a sound, it is a sound that has meaning, a sound that has not lost meaning, a certain unit that has a primary property to a minimal degree, which belongs to speech as a whole" (271).V's analysis makes a good deal of sense to me. But my own limited knowledge of Saussure - guided in part by Roy Harris' writing - has indeed included the dogma that the sound level of language carries no meaning. You are saying, I think, that V has a reasonable reading of Saussure, if not the canonical one. Can you say more about this way of reading Saussure? V seems to be suggesting that the child does not learn first sounds, then words, but always acquires the sounds of language in the context of the use of words in communicative settings, and this has the consequece that the sounds would be aquired as aspects of a meaningful unit. Am I on the right track here?Martin_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmcaMartin Packer, Ph.D. Associate Professor Psychology Department Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA 15282 (412) 396-4852 www.mathcs.duq.edu/~packer/ _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden (Erythrós Press and Media) http://www.erythrospress.com/ Orders: http://www.erythrospress.com/store/main.html#books _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmcaMartin Packer, Ph.D. Associate Professor Psychology Department Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA 15282 (412) 396-4852 www.mathcs.duq.edu/~packer/-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------Andy Blunden (Erythrós Press and Media) http:// www.erythrospress.com/Orders: http://www.erythrospress.com/store/main.html#booksMartin Packer, Ph.D. Associate Professor Psychology Department Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA 15282 (412) 396-4852 www.mathcs.duq.edu/~packer/-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden (Erythrós Press and Media) http://www.erythrospress.com/ Orders: http://www.erythrospress.com/store/main.html#books
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