Re: [xmca] motive/project

Thanks Geoff and Andy in this in following notes.
Still fussing over all this..... and lsv;s chapter 5, where David's recent
note
and pointer to a new set of texts, and the appearances of Helena's text for
discussion. And I am still back on prior distributed texts such as those
from
Harry.

No west for the reary.
mike

On Thu, Dec 18, 2008 at 7:08 PM, Geoff <geoffrey.binder@gmail.com> wrote:

> Andy, you're using culturally determined behaviour (singing, wooing)
> to strengthen a relationship. The 'truthfulness' of which is
> demonstrated by doing it in the rain, again, a socially meaning full
> act. I think that emotions, including love, can be conceived of as
> tools-to-relate. We use them all of the time and, along with habit
> and rationality make up the triadic 'nature' of humans.
>
> I haven't studied romance but I doubt it has a singular motive. Tied
> to romance is reproduction, gratification, companionship, sport (the
> chase), entrapment, power, equality, the list can go on and on.
>
> Affect provides the ties that bind. It is these multitudinous
> relationships that we are 'motivated' to act to extend/defend our
> habitual/emotional/rational umwelt.
>
> Motivation is not in your head, it's exists as a function of your
> subjectivity and your object of desire. Hence use.
>
> Geoff
>
>
> 2008/12/19 Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>:
> > The problem is that "use" carries with it a more restricted sense, Geoff.
> If
> > I sing to my beloved while standing outside in the rain, in what sense am
> I
> > "using" something? There is a school of thinking that would say, it makes
> me
> > feel nice to be wooing my beloved, therefore I am using her to make me
> feel
> > nice. But all that is really bankrupt, isn't it? We have to get into the
> > idea of romance and find in the figuring of the world according to a
> concept
> > of romance, a set of motives, which motivate the series of related
> practices
> > which make up the universe of romantic activity. "Use" applies OK only to
> a
> > resicted sense of motivation.
> >
> > Andy
> >
> > Geoff wrote:
> >>
> >> Mike, the problem that I was thinking of was that of motive and need.
> >>
> >> It seems that we're trying to shoe-horn a reductive concept into a
> >> relational phenomenon. It seems to me that Andy is searching for a
> >> locus-of-control within the 'psychology' of humans; what/why do we do?
> >> The reason I suggested 'use' was that it opens up the idea that
> >> humans are constructed socially and that why we respond is social too.
> >> To use anything requires a match between the subjective and objective
> >> realms. I'd argue that agency is such a resolution. We are
> >> historically defined proto-agents that require an opportunity to act,
> >> before we can in fact act. If motive is useful (pardon the pun) it is
> >> to alert us to the fact that our habitus predisposes us to act and
> >> react in particular ways. The things that we find useful motivate us.
> >>
> >> Geoff
> >>
> >> 2008/12/18 Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>:
> >>>
> >>> David and Geoff--- This is one of the times on XMCA where I am having
> >>> difficulty reconstructing the flow of the ideas.
> >>>
> >>> Geoff: Does "use" help what problem?
> >>> David: I will go directly to read the section of T*S you cite.
> Uznadze's
> >>> ideas
> >>> are usually translated as "set" (Russian: Ustanovka). Set = Wurzburgian
> >>> idea of "determining tendency."
> >>>
> >>> I am also puzzling over this statement: His criticism is that the
> "goal"
> >>> of
> >>> a particular experimental task (he has in mind the work of Uznadze) is
> >>> identical for the child and for the adult, so the goal/motive cannot
> >>> explain
> >>> the very different ways they conceptualize the task and carry it out.
> >>> 1. goal/motive? But I thought they were at different levels of
> >>> analysis?
> >>> 2. What warrants the claim that the goal/motive (whatever that
> means)
> >>> is
> >>> identical for child and adult?
> >>> 3. Especially because they conceptualize the task differently?
> >>> The standard definition of a task in American cog sci is "a goal and
> >>> constaints on achieving it"). So goal does not equal task, at least
> from
> >>> this perspective.
> >>>
> >>> I am not defending any particular position here, I am just plain
> puzzled.
> >>> Off to read LSV.
> >>> mike
> >>>
> >>> What it?
> >>>
> >>> On Wed, Dec 17, 2008 at 1:09 PM, Geoff <geoffrey.binder@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> Does the word "use" help resolve this problem? It evokes individual
> >>>> activity, tools, signs and meaning. It can also be used to define the
> >>>> boundaries of an activity system - those that use it and those that
> >>>> don't. (I'm thinking here of Bourdieu's Fields). It also helps to
> >>>> understand dysfunction by noting that schema that were once useful,
> >>>> perhaps as a child, are no longer useful as an adult. Referring again
> >>>> to Bourdieu, habitus can be thought of as an internalised collection
> >>>> of activities that predispose us to particular use/acts. In this
> >>>> model, agency is a means of extending habitus through use.
> >>>>
> >>>> Geoff
> >>>>
> >>>> 2008/12/18 Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> andy-- "need" is a term that I find no more or less elusive than
> >>>>
> >>>> "motive." I
> >>>>>
> >>>>> feel this need for clarity but having had lunch I don't "want" more
> to
> >>>>
> >>>> eat,
> >>>>>
> >>>>> but perhaps some sleep, perhaps to dream?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> We cannot, can we, define needs in purely biological terms for
> humans.
> >>>>> Perhaps someone has already clarified this issue in the discussion,
> but
> >>>>> I
> >>>>> missed it. In which case, just point.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> No need to reply right away. :-))
> >>>>> mike
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On Tue, Dec 16, 2008 at 6:23 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> >>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> The supposition that for ANL needs define activities is provisional.
> >>>>>> He
> >>>>>> hints at this sometimes. At other times, he says that he does not
> have
> >>>>>> a
> >>>>>> "unit of analysis" for activity. Either way, if we are to continue
> in
> >>>>
> >>>> the
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> scientific tradition of Goethe, Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky, we need a
> >>>>
> >>>> "unit of
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> analysis," i.e., a concept of, "activity."
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Andy
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> No, I don't think you have the idea quite right. The idea is not
> >>>>>>> that
> >>>>>>> needs "define" activities. The idea is that unlike other animals,
> >>>>>>> who
> >>>>
> >>>> are
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> biologically driven throughout their activities, when humans
> respond
> >>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>> their needs, they engage in activities that transform nature, their
> >>>>
> >>>> social
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> relations, social structures, cultures, and themselves
> individually,
> >>>>>>> creating new needs in the process. Human biological needs become
> at
> >>>>
> >>>> once
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> transformed into social needs, meditated by culture, history,
> tools,
> >>>>
> >>>> signs,
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> ideology, language, architecture, public works systems. Leontiev
> >>>>>>> took
> >>>>
> >>>> his
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> discoveries about the basic structure of activity in animals - the
> >>>>>>> ways
> >>>>
> >>>> they
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> engage their bodies and psyches with nature to fulfill their needs
> -
> >>>>
> >>>> and
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> came up with his activity/motive, action/goal, condition/operation
> >>>>>>> framework. He then tried to find ways to use this activity concept
> >>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>> elaborate on and extend the ideas of first generation CHAT, and
> that
> >>>>>>> is
> >>>>
> >>>> kind
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> of where we are at today.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> This unit of analysis problem has been on my mind, too. There may
> be
> >>>>>>> methodological problems with the concept 'unit of analysis' in some
> >>>>>>> of
> >>>>
> >>>> the
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> ways we have been conceptualizing it so far. Perhaps the
> 'molecule'
> >>>>
> >>>> and/or
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> 'cell' of social science does not look the molecule and cell of
> >>>>>>> natural
> >>>>>>> science.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> - Steve
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> On Dec 16, 2008, at 4:52 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> The only trouble I have with the claim that "human needs directly
> >>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> indirectly drive human activity" is that it is a truism. My
> problem,
> >>>>
> >>>> as you
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> mention, is what is the "unit of analysis" of activity, or what is
> >>>>
> >>>> *an*
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> activity, as opposed to "activity." The idea that "an activity" is
> >>>>
> >>>> defined
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> by "a need" (if this is indeed what is suggested) is that problems
> >>>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>> sociology begin from an inventory of human needs: what is x for? x
> >>>>>>>> is
> >>>>
> >>>> for
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> this. what is y for? y is for that.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Andy
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Andy, I am been puzzled by your problem with the idea that human
> >>>>
> >>>> needs
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> directly, and indirectly, drive human activity.
> >>>>>>>>> You've been bringing up this issue in recent weeks and I thought
> >>>>>>>>> that
> >>>>>>>>> maybe the problem was over an individual versus collective
> problem,
> >>>>
> >>>> or
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> perhaps over the problem of how to differentiate an activity from
> >>>>>>>>> an
> >>>>>>>>> activity system, and then from a social system, or just how to
> >>>>
> >>>> separate "an"
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> activity out of many.
> >>>>>>>>> But your message here seems to say you have a problem with the
> idea
> >>>>
> >>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> **need**. You seem to be objecting to the idea that human
> >>>>>>>>> activities
> >>>>
> >>>> are
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> essentially motivated by needs. Are you?
> >>>>>>>>> I would use the term "need" in statements like: the need for
> >>>>
> >>>> survival
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> drove pre-humans to develop social production, creating a new way
> >>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>
> >>>> meet
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> human needs, which in turn laid the basis for creating many new
> >>>>>>>>> kinds
> >>>>
> >>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> needs as society developed ... different social classes have
> >>>>
> >>>> different
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> needs, and that is the basis of social conflict, including wars
> ...
> >>>>
> >>>> human
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> need lies at the bottom of the human struggle for existence,
> >>>>>>>>> control
> >>>>
> >>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> nature, and society itself ...
> >>>>>>>>> I know you know that statements like these are Marxist sociology
> >>>>>>>>> 101,
> >>>>
> >>>> so
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> I don't mean to lecture on the obvious ... but if "need" is not
> at
> >>>>
> >>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> bottom of human motivation and activity, then what is? Is this a
> >>>>>>>>> terminological issue, or something more basic?
> >>>>>>>>> - Steve
> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 16, 2008, at 3:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Thank you for that collection of excerpts Haydi. As I read them,
> >>>>
> >>>> they
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> confirm what I said, that for ANL, a "system of activity" is
> >>>>>>>>>> defined
> >>>>
> >>>> by
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> directly or indirectly meeting a human need. ANL does say that
> >>>>
> >>>> production
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> produces not only objects, but also produces new needs, but this
> >>>>
> >>>> does not
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> resolve the matter in my view. Unless you accept that society is
> >>>>
> >>>> either
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> planned and adaministered by the central committee to meet human
> >>>>
> >>>> needs, or
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> naturally evolved to both meet and produce human needs then this
> >>>>
> >>>> cannot be
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> believed.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> The latter interpretation sounds plausible enough, in fact it's
> a
> >>>>>>>>>> truism, but I don't see that it helps. For example, take war. If
> >>>>>>>>>> we
> >>>>
> >>>> set out
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> from the idea that war is an activity meeting a human need,
> where
> >>>>
> >>>> does that
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> leave us? how does it help us with psychology? Take anything -
> the
> >>>>
> >>>> Church,
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> MacDonald's, News Limited, domestic violence, ... all we are
> going
> >>>>
> >>>> to end up
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> with is a crass funcitonalism.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> I don't deny at all that a psychology can be built on this
> >>>>
> >>>> foundation,
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> but it cannot, in my view, be taken seriously as a sociology.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Andy
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Haydi Zulfei wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Dear all,
> >>>>>>>>>>> We are being asked "What is *an* activity/*a* motive?"
> >>>>>>>>>>> I thought some of us at least need more reading than
> >>>>>>>>>>> interpretation
> >>>>
> >>>> .
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> I had to once more go from beginning to end of *A,C,P* and
> >>>>>>>>>>> collect
> >>>>>>>>>>> whatever might more or less be related to these questions .
> >>>>>>>>>>> Half the job being done now .
> >>>>>>>>>>> Delete if you don't want to share . No way but to put it in an
> >>>>>>>>>>> attachment . Hope David kellog will have time to have a glance
> at
> >>>>
> >>>> it without
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> adding to my previously-loaded task.
> >>>>>>>>>>> Best
> >>>>>>>>>>> Haydi
> >>>>>>>>>>> --- On Mon, 12/15/08, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] motive/project
> >>>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Date: Monday, December 15, 2008, 10:25 PM
> >>>>>>>>>>> I think, Monica, you hit the nail on the head here, from the
> >>>>>>>>>>> psychological point
> >>>>>>>>>>> of view. On the sociological side, the problem, as I see it,
> with
> >>>>>>>>>>> Michael's
> >>>>>>>>>>> explanation is that not only does the pupil not know the motive
> >>>>>>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>>> schooling,
> >>>>>>>>>>> but nor does the teacher or the sociologist!
> >>>>>>>>>>> In a world where people know about agency and structure and
> such
> >>>>>>>>>>> terms, does it
> >>>>>>>>>>> make any sense to ascribe a 'motive' to an institution, outside
> >>>>>>>>>>> of
> >>>>
> >>>> a
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> managed society like the USSR in which Leontyev lived?
> >>>>>>>>>>> But on the other side, Michael, I think you are right as
> against
> >>>>>>>>>>> David, because
> >>>>>>>>>>> "sleeping" is not Tätigkeit in the sense in which Leonytev
> means
> >>>>
> >>>> it.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> He explicitly means "purpose actvity", or "doing" or
> >>>>>>>>>>> "practice," as I read it. Not just physiological movement. The
> >>>>>>>>>>> activity of an individual is *participation* is *a* (social)
> >>>>
> >>>> activity.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> But what
> >>>>>>>>>>> is *an* activity, and how can it have a "motive," as Monica
> asks,
> >>>>>>>>>>> separately from the motives of individuals.
> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy
> >>>>>>>>>>> Monica Hansen wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> ...
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Using the term 'motive' for the objective, goal, or aim of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> schooling as
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> cultural reproduction (or transmission) is misplaced here.
> >>>>
> >>>> Motivation
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> has
> >>>>>>>>>>>> something to do with individual agency, doesn't it? It cannot
> be
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> forced from
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> the outside with 100% effectiveness. When trying to get an
> idea
> >>>>>>>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>>>> what
> >>>>>>>>>>>> motivates the individual to engage in or become a participant
> in
> >>>>
> >>>> an
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> activity
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> that will change the level of his or her conceptual thinking
> we
> >>>>
> >>>> have
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>> understand the individual's motivation.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Mandating the goal of learning from the outside as in defining
> >>>>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> objective
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> of schooling and trying to force participation gives us mixed
> >>>>>>>>>>>> results,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> does
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> it not? Can you really force conceptual development? Isn't
> that
> >>>>
> >>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> problem?
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> We can only use external motivations so far in pushing
> >>>>
> >>>> intellectual
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> development?
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Monica
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> >>>>>>>>>>>> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Behalf Of Wolff-Michael Roth
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 15, 2008 8:08 AM
> >>>>>>>>>>>> To: vaughndogblack@yahoo.com; eXtended Mind, Culture,
> Activity
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Cc: mcole@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] motive/project
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> HI David and others,
> >>>>>>>>>>>> I have repeatedly emphasized in my writings that the problem
> >>>>>>>>>>>> lies
> >>>>
> >>>> in
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> part
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> in the English term 'activity', which collapses the German
> >>>>
> >>>> Tätigkeit
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> and Aktivität into one, unfortunately, because it also gives
> >>>>>>>>>>> rise
> >>>>
> >>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> problems
> >>>>>>>>>>> with motives. I think if you think about what children do as
> >>>>
> >>>> 'tasks'
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> and that these tasks are completed as part of the activity
> >>>>>>>>>>> 'schooling',
> >>>>>>>>>>> which has as motive the reproduction (transmission...) of
> >>>>
> >>>> collective
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> knowledge
> >>>>>>>>>>> then you are getting closer.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> But children often don't even know the goals, in fact, because
> >>>>>>>>>>>> of
> >>>>
> >>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> 'learning paradox', cannot know the goals of the task. This is
> no
> >>>>>>>>>>> more
> >>>>>>>>>>> clear than in the frequent student question, 'teacher, am I
> >>>>>>>>>>> write
> >>>>
> >>>> so
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> far?' Students CANNOT intend the very thing that they are
> asked
> >>>>
> >>>> to,
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> namely
> >>>>>>>>>>> learn a concept. To be able to orient themselves intentionally
> >>>>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>
> >>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> concept,
> >>>>>>>>>>> they need to know it, but if they already know it, they don't
> >>>>>>>>>>> have
> >>>>
> >>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> orient toward learning it.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Holzkamp has a lot to say about this, and he describes those
> >>>>
> >>>> things
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> in
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> "Lernen: Subkjektwissenschaftliche Grundlegung" (Frankfurt:
> >>>>
> >>>> Campus).
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone has implemented Leont'ev's program, it certainly is
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Holzkamp.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> By the way, further to motive, the German edition of Activity,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Consciousness, Personality has an additional chapter where
> >>>>>>>>>>> Leont'ev
> >>>>>>>>>>> explicitly addresses questions of learning in schools, motives,
> >>>>
> >>>> etc.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 15-Dec-08, at 7:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Mike, Steve:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Like you, I am thoroughly befuddled by the word "motive", and
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> I've decided that applied to children in general and to child
> >>>>>>>>>>> play
> >>>>
> >>>> in
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> particular it is anachronistic; children do not yet have
> >>>>>>>>>>> "motives"
> >>>>
> >>>> in the
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> sense that Leontiev is talking about here. Last week we had
> >>>>>>>>>>> thesis
> >>>>>>>>>>> defenses, and I took mild exception to a thesis which tried to
> >>>>>>>>>>> ascertain
> >>>>>>>>>>> changes in "motives" for learning English in children by the
> use
> >>>>
> >>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Likert-style questionnaires. (My mild exception to these
> theses
> >>>>>>>>>>> is
> >>>>>>>>>>> really
> >>>>>>>>>>> pro-forma, and a matter of tradition in our department; nobody
> >>>>
> >>>> ever
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> fails as a
> >>>>>>>>>>> result.)
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> I notice that LSV (at the beginnning of Chapter Seven of Mind
> in
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Society,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> which I don't have with me just now) talks about the child's
> >>>>
> >>>> "needs"
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> and "desires". These he defines "broadly"
> >>>>>>>>>>> as "whatever induces the child to act". If he were going to
> >>>>
> >>>> proceed
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> to construct a Leontiev-like tristratal theory of activity,
> this
> >>>>>>>>>>> would lead to something circular: a motive is what drives the
> >>>>>>>>>>> child
> >>>>
> >>>> to act,
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> and action is
> >>>>>>>>>>> defined by its motive.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Let me first take a look at Leontiev, A.N. (1979, 1981). The
> >>>>
> >>>> problem
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> activity in psychology. In Wertsch, J.V. (ed.) The concept of
> >>>>>>>>>>> activity in
> >>>>>>>>>>> Soviet psychology. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> On p. 48, ANL's got this:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> "The basic characteristic of activity is its object
> orientation.
> >>>>
> >>>> The
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> expression 'nonobjective activity' is devoid of sense. Activity
> >>>>>>>>>>> may
> >>>>>>>>>>> seem to be without object orientation, but scientific
> >>>>>>>>>>> investigation
> >>>>
> >>>> of it
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> necessarily requires discovery of its object."
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Already I'm in trouble. Scientific investigation is sometimes
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> required to discover the object orientation of an activity
> (e.g.
> >>>>>>>>>>> sleep, whose
> >>>>>>>>>>> object orientation we still do not really understand but which
> >>>>
> >>>> will
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> presumably
> >>>>>>>>>>> be discovered some day).
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> But people who do not have the training or the time or the
> >>>>>>>>>>>> inclination
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> can and do conceptualize activities such as sleep or language
> >>>>>>>>>>> play
> >>>>
> >>>> or
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> daydreaming. They conceptualize these activities as being
> >>>>>>>>>>> without
> >>>>
> >>>> any
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> tangible
> >>>>>>>>>>> object. Why would an expression that refers to this everyday
> >>>>>>>>>>> non-scientific
> >>>>>>>>>>> conception be devoid of sense? Are non-scientific expressions
> >>>>
> >>>> devoid
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> of sense?
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> OK, then ANL argues that the object of an activity emerges "in
> >>>>>>>>>>>> two
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> ways: first and foremost in its dependent existence as
> >>>>
> >>>> subordinating
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>>> transforming the subject's activity, and secondly as the mental
> >>>>
> >>>> image
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> of the
> >>>>>>>>>>> object, as the product of the subject's detecting its
> >>>>>>>>>>> properties.
> >>>>>>>>>>> This
> >>>>>>>>>>> detection can take place only through the subject's activity."
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Presumably he's talking about the way in which scientific
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> investigation determines the object orientation of an activity,
> >>>>>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>>> not the
> >>>>>>>>>>> everyday non-scientific detection of the object (which I think
> >>>>>>>>>>> of
> >>>>
> >>>> as
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>> ethnomethodological motive, the one that participants are
> >>>>
> >>>> conscious
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> of). But
> >>>>>>>>>>> empirically both methods are the same: they take place through
> >>>>>>>>>>> examining the
> >>>>>>>>>>> activity of the subject with the detectionof an object in
> mind.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> On p. 49 he's got this: "All activity has a looplike
> structure:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> afferentationàeffector processes, which make contact with the
> >>>>
> >>>> object
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> environmentàcorrection and enrichment, with the help of
> feedback
> >>>>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>
> >>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> initial afferent image."
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> This suggests to me that PERCEPTION is in some sense the
> >>>>
> >>>> archetypical
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> activity. That would explain the OBJECT orientation! But it is
> >>>>
> >>>> going
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> to mean
> >>>>>>>>>>> big problems when Leontiev tries to explain play, because as
> LSV
> >>>>>>>>>>> remarks, play
> >>>>>>>>>>> is precisely the moment when children tear their meaningful
> >>>>>>>>>>> orientation away
> >>>>>>>>>>> from the perception of tangible objects. (Yes, Lewin and
> Lewin's
> >>>>>>>>>>> "field of action" is a big part of this, and with respect to
> the
> >>>>>>>>>>> child and the stone LSV is clearly closer to Lewin than to
> >>>>>>>>>>> ANL!).
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Maybe there's a way out, though. ANL then argues that the
> >>>>>>>>>>>> crucial
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> problem here is not the loop itself but rather that mental
> images
> >>>>
> >>>> are
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> not
> >>>>>>>>>>> produced directly but rather through practical activity in the
> >>>>
> >>>> world:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> "This means that the 'afferent agent' that directs activity
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> is primarily the object itself and only secondarily its image
> as
> >>>>>>>>>>> a
> >>>>>>>>>>> subjective
> >>>>>>>>>>> product of activity that fixes, stabilizes and assimilates its
> >>>>
> >>>> object
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> content.
> >>>>>>>>>>> In other words, a twofold transition takes place: the
> transition
> >>>>
> >>>> from
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> object to
> >>>>>>>>>>> the process of activity and the transition from activity to
> >>>>>>>>>>> subjective product
> >>>>>>>>>>> of activity. But the transition of the process into a product
> >>>>
> >>>> takes
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> place not
> >>>>>>>>>>> just form the subject's point of view; it occurs more clearly
> >>>>>>>>>>> from
> >>>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>> point of view of the object that is transformed by human
> >>>>
> >>>> activity."
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hmmm. When a child picks up a stick and decides to play horsie
> >>>>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> transformation occurs more clearly from the point of view of
> the
> >>>>>>>>>>> stick (or from
> >>>>>>>>>>> the point of view of the horse-play) than from the point of
> view
> >>>>
> >>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> the child.
> >>>>>>>>>>> This does look a little sticky.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> On p. 50, ANL explicitly goes against LSV's portrayal of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> "needs" and "desires" as "anything that motivates the
> >>>>>>>>>>> child to act". He differentiates between desire as a
> >>>>>>>>>>> precondition
> >>>>
> >>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> activity and "desire as a factor that guides and regulates the
> >>>>>>>>>>> agent's
> >>>>>>>>>>> concrete activity in the object environment". Only the latter
> is
> >>>>
> >>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> object of psychology.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> OK, now let me turn to the only text I can find where ANL
> really
> >>>>
> >>>> goes
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> into play, which is a later chapter of his book "Problems of
> the
> >>>>>>>>>>> Development of Mind".
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> On p. 366 he begins with the rather startling statement that
> >>>>>>>>>>>> play
> >>>>
> >>>> has
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> no
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> object (and thus by his previous account does not constitute an
> >>>>>>>>>>> activity). He
> >>>>>>>>>>> says:
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> "Satisfaction of its vital needs is actually still distinct
> from
> >>>>
> >>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> results of its activity: a child's activity does not determine
> >>>>>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>>> essentially cannot determine satisfaction of its need for food
> >>>>
> >>>> warmth etc.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Characteristic of it, therefore is a wide range of activity
> that
> >>>>>>>>>>> satisfies
> >>>>>>>>>>> needs which are unrelated to its objective result."
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Curiously, he then uses "object" activity to differentiate
> human
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> from animal play!
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> "Where does the specific difference between animals' play
> >>>>>>>>>>>> activity
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> and play, the rudimentary forms of which we first observe in
> >>>>>>>>>>> preschool
> >>>>>>>>>>> children, consist in? It lies in the fact that it is not
> >>>>
> >>>> instinctive
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> activity
> >>>>>>>>>>> but it is precisely human, object activity which by
> constituting
> >>>>
> >>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> basis of
> >>>>>>>>>>> the child's awareness of the world of human objects,
> determines
> >>>>
> >>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> content
> >>>>>>>>>>> of its play."
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Now this is starting to look suspiciously like the thesis I
> >>>>>>>>>>>> mildly
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> objected to last week, where the adult's attitudes are simply
> >>>>>>>>>>> projected
> >>>>>>>>>>> onto the child and then "detected" using Likert scales. On pp.
> >>>>>>>>>>> 367-368, ANL develops his thesis that play is a substitute for
> >>>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>> handling of
> >>>>>>>>>>> adult objects. So for example on p. 368 ANL speaks of "let me"
> >>>>>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>>> "don't", the struggle between the adult who wants to protect
> the
> >>>>>>>>>>> child from himself and the child who wants to drive a car and
> >>>>>>>>>>> row
> >>>>
> >>>> a
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> boat. This
> >>>>>>>>>>> leads, on p. 369, to the idea of a leading activity which is
> >>>>
> >>>> indeed
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> equivalent
> >>>>>>>>>>> to a
> >
> > ...
> >
> > [Message clipped]
>
>
>
> --
> Geoffrey Binder
> BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
> PhD Candidate
> Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
> Ph B. 9925 9951
> M. 0422 968 567
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
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Received on Fri Dec 19 06:30:06 2008