Re: [xmca] motive/project

Andy, you're using culturally determined behaviour (singing, wooing)
to strengthen a relationship. The 'truthfulness' of which is
demonstrated by doing it in the rain, again, a socially meaning full
act. I think that emotions, including love, can be conceived of as
tools-to-relate. We use them all of the time and, along with habit
and rationality make up the triadic 'nature' of humans.

I haven't studied romance but I doubt it has a singular motive. Tied
to romance is reproduction, gratification, companionship, sport (the
chase), entrapment, power, equality, the list can go on and on.

Affect provides the ties that bind. It is these multitudinous
relationships that we are 'motivated' to act to extend/defend our
habitual/emotional/rational umwelt.

Motivation is not in your head, it's exists as a function of your
subjectivity and your object of desire. Hence use.

Geoff

2008/12/19 Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>:
> The problem is that "use" carries with it a more restricted sense, Geoff. If
> I sing to my beloved while standing outside in the rain, in what sense am I
> "using" something? There is a school of thinking that would say, it makes me
> feel nice to be wooing my beloved, therefore I am using her to make me feel
> nice. But all that is really bankrupt, isn't it? We have to get into the
> idea of romance and find in the figuring of the world according to a concept
> of romance, a set of motives, which motivate the series of related practices
> which make up the universe of romantic activity. "Use" applies OK only to a
> resicted sense of motivation.
>
> Andy
>
> Geoff wrote:
>>
>> Mike, the problem that I was thinking of was that of motive and need.
>>
>> It seems that we're trying to shoe-horn a reductive concept into a
>> relational phenomenon. It seems to me that Andy is searching for a
>> locus-of-control within the 'psychology' of humans; what/why do we do?
>> The reason I suggested 'use' was that it opens up the idea that
>> humans are constructed socially and that why we respond is social too.
>> To use anything requires a match between the subjective and objective
>> realms. I'd argue that agency is such a resolution. We are
>> historically defined proto-agents that require an opportunity to act,
>> before we can in fact act. If motive is useful (pardon the pun) it is
>> to alert us to the fact that our habitus predisposes us to act and
>> react in particular ways. The things that we find useful motivate us.
>>
>> Geoff
>>
>> 2008/12/18 Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>:
>>>
>>> David and Geoff--- This is one of the times on XMCA where I am having
>>> difficulty reconstructing the flow of the ideas.
>>>
>>> Geoff: Does "use" help what problem?
>>> David: I will go directly to read the section of T*S you cite. Uznadze's
>>> ideas
>>> are usually translated as "set" (Russian: Ustanovka). Set = Wurzburgian
>>> idea of "determining tendency."
>>>
>>> I am also puzzling over this statement: His criticism is that the "goal"
>>> of
>>> a particular experimental task (he has in mind the work of Uznadze) is
>>> identical for the child and for the adult, so the goal/motive cannot
>>> explain
>>> the very different ways they conceptualize the task and carry it out.
>>> 1. goal/motive? But I thought they were at different levels of
>>> analysis?
>>> 2. What warrants the claim that the goal/motive (whatever that means)
>>> is
>>> identical for child and adult?
>>> 3. Especially because they conceptualize the task differently?
>>> The standard definition of a task in American cog sci is "a goal and
>>> constaints on achieving it"). So goal does not equal task, at least from
>>> this perspective.
>>>
>>> I am not defending any particular position here, I am just plain puzzled.
>>> Off to read LSV.
>>> mike
>>>
>>> What it?
>>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 17, 2008 at 1:09 PM, Geoff <geoffrey.binder@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Does the word "use" help resolve this problem? It evokes individual
>>>> activity, tools, signs and meaning. It can also be used to define the
>>>> boundaries of an activity system - those that use it and those that
>>>> don't. (I'm thinking here of Bourdieu's Fields). It also helps to
>>>> understand dysfunction by noting that schema that were once useful,
>>>> perhaps as a child, are no longer useful as an adult. Referring again
>>>> to Bourdieu, habitus can be thought of as an internalised collection
>>>> of activities that predispose us to particular use/acts. In this
>>>> model, agency is a means of extending habitus through use.
>>>>
>>>> Geoff
>>>>
>>>> 2008/12/18 Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>:
>>>>>
>>>>> andy-- "need" is a term that I find no more or less elusive than
>>>>
>>>> "motive." I
>>>>>
>>>>> feel this need for clarity but having had lunch I don't "want" more to
>>>>
>>>> eat,
>>>>>
>>>>> but perhaps some sleep, perhaps to dream?
>>>>>
>>>>> We cannot, can we, define needs in purely biological terms for humans.
>>>>> Perhaps someone has already clarified this issue in the discussion, but
>>>>> I
>>>>> missed it. In which case, just point.
>>>>>
>>>>> No need to reply right away. :-))
>>>>> mike
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Dec 16, 2008 at 6:23 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> The supposition that for ANL needs define activities is provisional.
>>>>>> He
>>>>>> hints at this sometimes. At other times, he says that he does not have
>>>>>> a
>>>>>> "unit of analysis" for activity. Either way, if we are to continue in
>>>>
>>>> the
>>>>>>
>>>>>> scientific tradition of Goethe, Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky, we need a
>>>>
>>>> "unit of
>>>>>>
>>>>>> analysis," i.e., a concept of, "activity."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> No, I don't think you have the idea quite right. The idea is not
>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>> needs "define" activities. The idea is that unlike other animals,
>>>>>>> who
>>>>
>>>> are
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> biologically driven throughout their activities, when humans respond
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> their needs, they engage in activities that transform nature, their
>>>>
>>>> social
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> relations, social structures, cultures, and themselves individually,
>>>>>>> creating new needs in the process. Human biological needs become at
>>>>
>>>> once
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> transformed into social needs, meditated by culture, history, tools,
>>>>
>>>> signs,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ideology, language, architecture, public works systems. Leontiev
>>>>>>> took
>>>>
>>>> his
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> discoveries about the basic structure of activity in animals - the
>>>>>>> ways
>>>>
>>>> they
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> engage their bodies and psyches with nature to fulfill their needs -
>>>>
>>>> and
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> came up with his activity/motive, action/goal, condition/operation
>>>>>>> framework. He then tried to find ways to use this activity concept
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> elaborate on and extend the ideas of first generation CHAT, and that
>>>>>>> is
>>>>
>>>> kind
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> of where we are at today.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This unit of analysis problem has been on my mind, too. There may be
>>>>>>> methodological problems with the concept 'unit of analysis' in some
>>>>>>> of
>>>>
>>>> the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ways we have been conceptualizing it so far. Perhaps the 'molecule'
>>>>
>>>> and/or
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 'cell' of social science does not look the molecule and cell of
>>>>>>> natural
>>>>>>> science.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> - Steve
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Dec 16, 2008, at 4:52 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The only trouble I have with the claim that "human needs directly
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> indirectly drive human activity" is that it is a truism. My problem,
>>>>
>>>> as you
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> mention, is what is the "unit of analysis" of activity, or what is
>>>>
>>>> *an*
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> activity, as opposed to "activity." The idea that "an activity" is
>>>>
>>>> defined
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> by "a need" (if this is indeed what is suggested) is that problems
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> sociology begin from an inventory of human needs: what is x for? x
>>>>>>>> is
>>>>
>>>> for
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> this. what is y for? y is for that.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Andy, I am been puzzled by your problem with the idea that human
>>>>
>>>> needs
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> directly, and indirectly, drive human activity.
>>>>>>>>> You've been bringing up this issue in recent weeks and I thought
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> maybe the problem was over an individual versus collective problem,
>>>>
>>>> or
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> perhaps over the problem of how to differentiate an activity from
>>>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>>> activity system, and then from a social system, or just how to
>>>>
>>>> separate "an"
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> activity out of many.
>>>>>>>>> But your message here seems to say you have a problem with the idea
>>>>
>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> **need**. You seem to be objecting to the idea that human
>>>>>>>>> activities
>>>>
>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> essentially motivated by needs. Are you?
>>>>>>>>> I would use the term "need" in statements like: the need for
>>>>
>>>> survival
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> drove pre-humans to develop social production, creating a new way
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>
>>>> meet
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> human needs, which in turn laid the basis for creating many new
>>>>>>>>> kinds
>>>>
>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> needs as society developed ... different social classes have
>>>>
>>>> different
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> needs, and that is the basis of social conflict, including wars ...
>>>>
>>>> human
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> need lies at the bottom of the human struggle for existence,
>>>>>>>>> control
>>>>
>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> nature, and society itself ...
>>>>>>>>> I know you know that statements like these are Marxist sociology
>>>>>>>>> 101,
>>>>
>>>> so
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I don't mean to lecture on the obvious ... but if "need" is not at
>>>>
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> bottom of human motivation and activity, then what is? Is this a
>>>>>>>>> terminological issue, or something more basic?
>>>>>>>>> - Steve
>>>>>>>>> On Dec 16, 2008, at 3:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Thank you for that collection of excerpts Haydi. As I read them,
>>>>
>>>> they
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> confirm what I said, that for ANL, a "system of activity" is
>>>>>>>>>> defined
>>>>
>>>> by
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> directly or indirectly meeting a human need. ANL does say that
>>>>
>>>> production
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> produces not only objects, but also produces new needs, but this
>>>>
>>>> does not
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> resolve the matter in my view. Unless you accept that society is
>>>>
>>>> either
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> planned and adaministered by the central committee to meet human
>>>>
>>>> needs, or
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> naturally evolved to both meet and produce human needs then this
>>>>
>>>> cannot be
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> believed.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The latter interpretation sounds plausible enough, in fact it's a
>>>>>>>>>> truism, but I don't see that it helps. For example, take war. If
>>>>>>>>>> we
>>>>
>>>> set out
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> from the idea that war is an activity meeting a human need, where
>>>>
>>>> does that
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> leave us? how does it help us with psychology? Take anything - the
>>>>
>>>> Church,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> MacDonald's, News Limited, domestic violence, ... all we are going
>>>>
>>>> to end up
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> with is a crass funcitonalism.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I don't deny at all that a psychology can be built on this
>>>>
>>>> foundation,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> but it cannot, in my view, be taken seriously as a sociology.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Haydi Zulfei wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Dear all,
>>>>>>>>>>> We are being asked "What is *an* activity/*a* motive?"
>>>>>>>>>>> I thought some of us at least need more reading than
>>>>>>>>>>> interpretation
>>>>
>>>> .
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I had to once more go from beginning to end of *A,C,P* and
>>>>>>>>>>> collect
>>>>>>>>>>> whatever might more or less be related to these questions .
>>>>>>>>>>> Half the job being done now .
>>>>>>>>>>> Delete if you don't want to share . No way but to put it in an
>>>>>>>>>>> attachment . Hope David kellog will have time to have a glance at
>>>>
>>>> it without
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> adding to my previously-loaded task.
>>>>>>>>>>> Best
>>>>>>>>>>> Haydi
>>>>>>>>>>> --- On Mon, 12/15/08, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] motive/project
>>>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>>>>>>> Date: Monday, December 15, 2008, 10:25 PM
>>>>>>>>>>> I think, Monica, you hit the nail on the head here, from the
>>>>>>>>>>> psychological point
>>>>>>>>>>> of view. On the sociological side, the problem, as I see it, with
>>>>>>>>>>> Michael's
>>>>>>>>>>> explanation is that not only does the pupil not know the motive
>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>> schooling,
>>>>>>>>>>> but nor does the teacher or the sociologist!
>>>>>>>>>>> In a world where people know about agency and structure and such
>>>>>>>>>>> terms, does it
>>>>>>>>>>> make any sense to ascribe a 'motive' to an institution, outside
>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>
>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> managed society like the USSR in which Leontyev lived?
>>>>>>>>>>> But on the other side, Michael, I think you are right as against
>>>>>>>>>>> David, because
>>>>>>>>>>> "sleeping" is not Tätigkeit in the sense in which Leonytev means
>>>>
>>>> it.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> He explicitly means "purpose actvity", or "doing" or
>>>>>>>>>>> "practice," as I read it. Not just physiological movement. The
>>>>>>>>>>> activity of an individual is *participation* is *a* (social)
>>>>
>>>> activity.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> But what
>>>>>>>>>>> is *an* activity, and how can it have a "motive," as Monica asks,
>>>>>>>>>>> separately from the motives of individuals.
>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>> Monica Hansen wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>>>> Using the term 'motive' for the objective, goal, or aim of
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> schooling as
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> cultural reproduction (or transmission) is misplaced here.
>>>>
>>>> Motivation
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> has
>>>>>>>>>>>> something to do with individual agency, doesn't it? It cannot be
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> forced from
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> the outside with 100% effectiveness. When trying to get an idea
>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>>>>>>> motivates the individual to engage in or become a participant in
>>>>
>>>> an
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> activity
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> that will change the level of his or her conceptual thinking we
>>>>
>>>> have
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>> understand the individual's motivation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Mandating the goal of learning from the outside as in defining
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> objective
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> of schooling and trying to force participation gives us mixed
>>>>>>>>>>>> results,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> does
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> it not? Can you really force conceptual development? Isn't that
>>>>
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> problem?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> We can only use external motivations so far in pushing
>>>>
>>>> intellectual
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> development?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Monica
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:
>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
>>>>>>>>>>>> Behalf Of Wolff-Michael Roth
>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 15, 2008 8:08 AM
>>>>>>>>>>>> To: vaughndogblack@yahoo.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>>>>>>> Cc: mcole@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] motive/project
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> HI David and others,
>>>>>>>>>>>> I have repeatedly emphasized in my writings that the problem
>>>>>>>>>>>> lies
>>>>
>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> part
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> in the English term 'activity', which collapses the German
>>>>
>>>> Tätigkeit
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> and Aktivität into one, unfortunately, because it also gives
>>>>>>>>>>> rise
>>>>
>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> problems
>>>>>>>>>>> with motives. I think if you think about what children do as
>>>>
>>>> 'tasks'
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> and that these tasks are completed as part of the activity
>>>>>>>>>>> 'schooling',
>>>>>>>>>>> which has as motive the reproduction (transmission...) of
>>>>
>>>> collective
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge
>>>>>>>>>>> then you are getting closer.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> But children often don't even know the goals, in fact, because
>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> 'learning paradox', cannot know the goals of the task. This is no
>>>>>>>>>>> more
>>>>>>>>>>> clear than in the frequent student question, 'teacher, am I
>>>>>>>>>>> write
>>>>
>>>> so
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> far?' Students CANNOT intend the very thing that they are asked
>>>>
>>>> to,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> namely
>>>>>>>>>>> learn a concept. To be able to orient themselves intentionally
>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> concept,
>>>>>>>>>>> they need to know it, but if they already know it, they don't
>>>>>>>>>>> have
>>>>
>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> orient toward learning it.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Holzkamp has a lot to say about this, and he describes those
>>>>
>>>> things
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> "Lernen: Subkjektwissenschaftliche Grundlegung" (Frankfurt:
>>>>
>>>> Campus).
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone has implemented Leont'ev's program, it certainly is
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Holzkamp.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> By the way, further to motive, the German edition of Activity,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Consciousness, Personality has an additional chapter where
>>>>>>>>>>> Leont'ev
>>>>>>>>>>> explicitly addresses questions of learning in schools, motives,
>>>>
>>>> etc.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 15-Dec-08, at 7:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike, Steve:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Like you, I am thoroughly befuddled by the word "motive", and
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I've decided that applied to children in general and to child
>>>>>>>>>>> play
>>>>
>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> particular it is anachronistic; children do not yet have
>>>>>>>>>>> "motives"
>>>>
>>>> in the
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> sense that Leontiev is talking about here. Last week we had
>>>>>>>>>>> thesis
>>>>>>>>>>> defenses, and I took mild exception to a thesis which tried to
>>>>>>>>>>> ascertain
>>>>>>>>>>> changes in "motives" for learning English in children by the use
>>>>
>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Likert-style questionnaires. (My mild exception to these theses
>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>> really
>>>>>>>>>>> pro-forma, and a matter of tradition in our department; nobody
>>>>
>>>> ever
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> fails as a
>>>>>>>>>>> result.)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I notice that LSV (at the beginnning of Chapter Seven of Mind in
>>>>>>>>>>>> Society,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> which I don't have with me just now) talks about the child's
>>>>
>>>> "needs"
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> and "desires". These he defines "broadly"
>>>>>>>>>>> as "whatever induces the child to act". If he were going to
>>>>
>>>> proceed
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> to construct a Leontiev-like tristratal theory of activity, this
>>>>>>>>>>> would lead to something circular: a motive is what drives the
>>>>>>>>>>> child
>>>>
>>>> to act,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> and action is
>>>>>>>>>>> defined by its motive.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Let me first take a look at Leontiev, A.N. (1979, 1981). The
>>>>
>>>> problem
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> activity in psychology. In Wertsch, J.V. (ed.) The concept of
>>>>>>>>>>> activity in
>>>>>>>>>>> Soviet psychology. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On p. 48, ANL's got this:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> "The basic characteristic of activity is its object orientation.
>>>>
>>>> The
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> expression 'nonobjective activity' is devoid of sense. Activity
>>>>>>>>>>> may
>>>>>>>>>>> seem to be without object orientation, but scientific
>>>>>>>>>>> investigation
>>>>
>>>> of it
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> necessarily requires discovery of its object."
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Already I'm in trouble. Scientific investigation is sometimes
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> required to discover the object orientation of an activity (e.g.
>>>>>>>>>>> sleep, whose
>>>>>>>>>>> object orientation we still do not really understand but which
>>>>
>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> presumably
>>>>>>>>>>> be discovered some day).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> But people who do not have the training or the time or the
>>>>>>>>>>>> inclination
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> can and do conceptualize activities such as sleep or language
>>>>>>>>>>> play
>>>>
>>>> or
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> daydreaming. They conceptualize these activities as being
>>>>>>>>>>> without
>>>>
>>>> any
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> tangible
>>>>>>>>>>> object. Why would an expression that refers to this everyday
>>>>>>>>>>> non-scientific
>>>>>>>>>>> conception be devoid of sense? Are non-scientific expressions
>>>>
>>>> devoid
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> of sense?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> OK, then ANL argues that the object of an activity emerges "in
>>>>>>>>>>>> two
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> ways: first and foremost in its dependent existence as
>>>>
>>>> subordinating
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>> transforming the subject's activity, and secondly as the mental
>>>>
>>>> image
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>>>>> object, as the product of the subject's detecting its
>>>>>>>>>>> properties.
>>>>>>>>>>> This
>>>>>>>>>>> detection can take place only through the subject's activity."
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Presumably he's talking about the way in which scientific
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> investigation determines the object orientation of an activity,
>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>> not the
>>>>>>>>>>> everyday non-scientific detection of the object (which I think
>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>
>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> ethnomethodological motive, the one that participants are
>>>>
>>>> conscious
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> of). But
>>>>>>>>>>> empirically both methods are the same: they take place through
>>>>>>>>>>> examining the
>>>>>>>>>>> activity of the subject with the detectionof an object in mind.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On p. 49 he's got this: "All activity has a looplike structure:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> afferentationàeffector processes, which make contact with the
>>>>
>>>> object
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> environmentàcorrection and enrichment, with the help of feedback
>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> initial afferent image."
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> This suggests to me that PERCEPTION is in some sense the
>>>>
>>>> archetypical
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> activity. That would explain the OBJECT orientation! But it is
>>>>
>>>> going
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> to mean
>>>>>>>>>>> big problems when Leontiev tries to explain play, because as LSV
>>>>>>>>>>> remarks, play
>>>>>>>>>>> is precisely the moment when children tear their meaningful
>>>>>>>>>>> orientation away
>>>>>>>>>>> from the perception of tangible objects. (Yes, Lewin and Lewin's
>>>>>>>>>>> "field of action" is a big part of this, and with respect to the
>>>>>>>>>>> child and the stone LSV is clearly closer to Lewin than to
>>>>>>>>>>> ANL!).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Maybe there's a way out, though. ANL then argues that the
>>>>>>>>>>>> crucial
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> problem here is not the loop itself but rather that mental images
>>>>
>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>>> produced directly but rather through practical activity in the
>>>>
>>>> world:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> "This means that the 'afferent agent' that directs activity
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> is primarily the object itself and only secondarily its image as
>>>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>> subjective
>>>>>>>>>>> product of activity that fixes, stabilizes and assimilates its
>>>>
>>>> object
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> content.
>>>>>>>>>>> In other words, a twofold transition takes place: the transition
>>>>
>>>> from
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> object to
>>>>>>>>>>> the process of activity and the transition from activity to
>>>>>>>>>>> subjective product
>>>>>>>>>>> of activity. But the transition of the process into a product
>>>>
>>>> takes
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> place not
>>>>>>>>>>> just form the subject's point of view; it occurs more clearly
>>>>>>>>>>> from
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> point of view of the object that is transformed by human
>>>>
>>>> activity."
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hmmm. When a child picks up a stick and decides to play horsie
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> transformation occurs more clearly from the point of view of the
>>>>>>>>>>> stick (or from
>>>>>>>>>>> the point of view of the horse-play) than from the point of view
>>>>
>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> the child.
>>>>>>>>>>> This does look a little sticky.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On p. 50, ANL explicitly goes against LSV's portrayal of
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> "needs" and "desires" as "anything that motivates the
>>>>>>>>>>> child to act". He differentiates between desire as a
>>>>>>>>>>> precondition
>>>>
>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> activity and "desire as a factor that guides and regulates the
>>>>>>>>>>> agent's
>>>>>>>>>>> concrete activity in the object environment". Only the latter is
>>>>
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> object of psychology.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> OK, now let me turn to the only text I can find where ANL really
>>>>
>>>> goes
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> into play, which is a later chapter of his book "Problems of the
>>>>>>>>>>> Development of Mind".
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On p. 366 he begins with the rather startling statement that
>>>>>>>>>>>> play
>>>>
>>>> has
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> no
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> object (and thus by his previous account does not constitute an
>>>>>>>>>>> activity). He
>>>>>>>>>>> says:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> "Satisfaction of its vital needs is actually still distinct from
>>>>
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> results of its activity: a child's activity does not determine
>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>> essentially cannot determine satisfaction of its need for food
>>>>
>>>> warmth etc.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Characteristic of it, therefore is a wide range of activity that
>>>>>>>>>>> satisfies
>>>>>>>>>>> needs which are unrelated to its objective result."
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Curiously, he then uses "object" activity to differentiate human
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> from animal play!
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> "Where does the specific difference between animals' play
>>>>>>>>>>>> activity
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> and play, the rudimentary forms of which we first observe in
>>>>>>>>>>> preschool
>>>>>>>>>>> children, consist in? It lies in the fact that it is not
>>>>
>>>> instinctive
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> activity
>>>>>>>>>>> but it is precisely human, object activity which by constituting
>>>>
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> basis of
>>>>>>>>>>> the child's awareness of the world of human objects, determines
>>>>
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> content
>>>>>>>>>>> of its play."
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Now this is starting to look suspiciously like the thesis I
>>>>>>>>>>>> mildly
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> objected to last week, where the adult's attitudes are simply
>>>>>>>>>>> projected
>>>>>>>>>>> onto the child and then "detected" using Likert scales. On pp.
>>>>>>>>>>> 367-368, ANL develops his thesis that play is a substitute for
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> handling of
>>>>>>>>>>> adult objects. So for example on p. 368 ANL speaks of "let me"
>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>> "don't", the struggle between the adult who wants to protect the
>>>>>>>>>>> child from himself and the child who wants to drive a car and
>>>>>>>>>>> row
>>>>
>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> boat. This
>>>>>>>>>>> leads, on p. 369, to the idea of a leading activity which is
>>>>
>>>> indeed
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> equivalent
>>>>>>>>>>> to a
>
> ...
>
> [Message clipped]

-- 
Geoffrey Binder
BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
PhD Candidate
Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
Ph B. 9925 9951
M. 0422 968 567
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