Re: [xmca] motive/project

David and Geoff--- This is one of the times on XMCA where I am having
difficulty reconstructing the flow of the ideas.

Geoff: Does "use" help what problem?
David: I will go directly to read the section of T*S you cite. Uznadze's
ideas
are usually translated as "set" (Russian: Ustanovka). Set = Wurzburgian
idea of "determining tendency."

I am also puzzling over this statement: His criticism is that the "goal" of
a particular experimental task (he has in mind the work of Uznadze) is
identical for the child and for the adult, so the goal/motive cannot explain
the very different ways they conceptualize the task and carry it out.
     1. goal/motive? But I thought they were at different levels of
analysis?
      2. What warrants the claim that the goal/motive (whatever that means)
is
         identical for child and adult?
     3. Especially because they conceptualize the task differently?
The standard definition of a task in American cog sci is "a goal and
constaints on achieving it"). So goal does not equal task, at least from
this perspective.

I am not defending any particular position here, I am just plain puzzled.
Off to read LSV.
mike

What it?

On Wed, Dec 17, 2008 at 1:09 PM, Geoff <geoffrey.binder@gmail.com> wrote:

> Does the word "use" help resolve this problem? It evokes individual
> activity, tools, signs and meaning. It can also be used to define the
> boundaries of an activity system - those that use it and those that
> don't. (I'm thinking here of Bourdieu's Fields). It also helps to
> understand dysfunction by noting that schema that were once useful,
> perhaps as a child, are no longer useful as an adult. Referring again
> to Bourdieu, habitus can be thought of as an internalised collection
> of activities that predispose us to particular use/acts. In this
> model, agency is a means of extending habitus through use.
>
> Geoff
>
> 2008/12/18 Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>:
> > andy-- "need" is a term that I find no more or less elusive than
> "motive." I
> > feel this need for clarity but having had lunch I don't "want" more to
> eat,
> > but perhaps some sleep, perhaps to dream?
> >
> > We cannot, can we, define needs in purely biological terms for humans.
> > Perhaps someone has already clarified this issue in the discussion, but I
> > missed it. In which case, just point.
> >
> > No need to reply right away. :-))
> > mike
> >
> > On Tue, Dec 16, 2008 at 6:23 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> >
> >> The supposition that for ANL needs define activities is provisional. He
> >> hints at this sometimes. At other times, he says that he does not have a
> >> "unit of analysis" for activity. Either way, if we are to continue in
> the
> >> scientific tradition of Goethe, Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky, we need a
> "unit of
> >> analysis," i.e., a concept of, "activity."
> >>
> >> Andy
> >>
> >>
> >> Steve Gabosch wrote:
> >>
> >>> No, I don't think you have the idea quite right. The idea is not that
> >>> needs "define" activities. The idea is that unlike other animals, who
> are
> >>> biologically driven throughout their activities, when humans respond to
> >>> their needs, they engage in activities that transform nature, their
> social
> >>> relations, social structures, cultures, and themselves individually,
> >>> creating new needs in the process. Human biological needs become at
> once
> >>> transformed into social needs, meditated by culture, history, tools,
> signs,
> >>> ideology, language, architecture, public works systems. Leontiev took
> his
> >>> discoveries about the basic structure of activity in animals - the ways
> they
> >>> engage their bodies and psyches with nature to fulfill their needs -
> and
> >>> came up with his activity/motive, action/goal, condition/operation
> >>> framework. He then tried to find ways to use this activity concept to
> >>> elaborate on and extend the ideas of first generation CHAT, and that is
> kind
> >>> of where we are at today.
> >>>
> >>> This unit of analysis problem has been on my mind, too. There may be
> >>> methodological problems with the concept 'unit of analysis' in some of
> the
> >>> ways we have been conceptualizing it so far. Perhaps the 'molecule'
> and/or
> >>> 'cell' of social science does not look the molecule and cell of natural
> >>> science.
> >>>
> >>> - Steve
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On Dec 16, 2008, at 4:52 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> >>>
> >>> The only trouble I have with the claim that "human needs directly and
> >>>> indirectly drive human activity" is that it is a truism. My problem,
> as you
> >>>> mention, is what is the "unit of analysis" of activity, or what is
> *an*
> >>>> activity, as opposed to "activity." The idea that "an activity" is
> defined
> >>>> by "a need" (if this is indeed what is suggested) is that problems of
> >>>> sociology begin from an inventory of human needs: what is x for? x is
> for
> >>>> this. what is y for? y is for that.
> >>>>
> >>>> Andy
> >>>>
> >>>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> Andy, I am been puzzled by your problem with the idea that human
> needs
> >>>>> directly, and indirectly, drive human activity.
> >>>>> You've been bringing up this issue in recent weeks and I thought that
> >>>>> maybe the problem was over an individual versus collective problem,
> or
> >>>>> perhaps over the problem of how to differentiate an activity from an
> >>>>> activity system, and then from a social system, or just how to
> separate "an"
> >>>>> activity out of many.
> >>>>> But your message here seems to say you have a problem with the idea
> of
> >>>>> **need**. You seem to be objecting to the idea that human activities
> are
> >>>>> essentially motivated by needs. Are you?
> >>>>> I would use the term "need" in statements like: the need for
> survival
> >>>>> drove pre-humans to develop social production, creating a new way to
> meet
> >>>>> human needs, which in turn laid the basis for creating many new kinds
> of
> >>>>> needs as society developed ... different social classes have
> different
> >>>>> needs, and that is the basis of social conflict, including wars ...
> human
> >>>>> need lies at the bottom of the human struggle for existence, control
> of
> >>>>> nature, and society itself ...
> >>>>> I know you know that statements like these are Marxist sociology 101,
> so
> >>>>> I don't mean to lecture on the obvious ... but if "need" is not at
> the
> >>>>> bottom of human motivation and activity, then what is? Is this a
> >>>>> terminological issue, or something more basic?
> >>>>> - Steve
> >>>>> On Dec 16, 2008, at 3:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> Thank you for that collection of excerpts Haydi. As I read them,
> they
> >>>>>> confirm what I said, that for ANL, a "system of activity" is defined
> by
> >>>>>> directly or indirectly meeting a human need. ANL does say that
> production
> >>>>>> produces not only objects, but also produces new needs, but this
> does not
> >>>>>> resolve the matter in my view. Unless you accept that society is
> either
> >>>>>> planned and adaministered by the central committee to meet human
> needs, or
> >>>>>> naturally evolved to both meet and produce human needs then this
> cannot be
> >>>>>> believed.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> The latter interpretation sounds plausible enough, in fact it's a
> >>>>>> truism, but I don't see that it helps. For example, take war. If we
> set out
> >>>>>> from the idea that war is an activity meeting a human need, where
> does that
> >>>>>> leave us? how does it help us with psychology? Take anything - the
> Church,
> >>>>>> MacDonald's, News Limited, domestic violence, ... all we are going
> to end up
> >>>>>> with is a crass funcitonalism.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I don't deny at all that a psychology can be built on this
> foundation,
> >>>>>> but it cannot, in my view, be taken seriously as a sociology.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Andy
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Haydi Zulfei wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Dear all,
> >>>>>>> We are being asked "What is *an* activity/*a* motive?"
> >>>>>>> I thought some of us at least need more reading than interpretation
> .
> >>>>>>> I had to once more go from beginning to end of *A,C,P* and collect
> >>>>>>> whatever might more or less be related to these questions .
> >>>>>>> Half the job being done now .
> >>>>>>> Delete if you don't want to share . No way but to put it in an
> >>>>>>> attachment . Hope David kellog will have time to have a glance at
> it without
> >>>>>>> adding to my previously-loaded task.
> >>>>>>> Best
> >>>>>>> Haydi
> >>>>>>> --- On Mon, 12/15/08, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> >>>>>>> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> >>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] motive/project
> >>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>>>>>> Date: Monday, December 15, 2008, 10:25 PM
> >>>>>>> I think, Monica, you hit the nail on the head here, from the
> >>>>>>> psychological point
> >>>>>>> of view. On the sociological side, the problem, as I see it, with
> >>>>>>> Michael's
> >>>>>>> explanation is that not only does the pupil not know the motive of
> >>>>>>> schooling,
> >>>>>>> but nor does the teacher or the sociologist!
> >>>>>>> In a world where people know about agency and structure and such
> >>>>>>> terms, does it
> >>>>>>> make any sense to ascribe a 'motive' to an institution, outside of
> a
> >>>>>>> managed society like the USSR in which Leontyev lived?
> >>>>>>> But on the other side, Michael, I think you are right as against
> >>>>>>> David, because
> >>>>>>> "sleeping" is not Tätigkeit in the sense in which Leonytev means
> it.
> >>>>>>> He explicitly means "purpose actvity", or "doing" or
> >>>>>>> "practice," as I read it. Not just physiological movement. The
> >>>>>>> activity of an individual is *participation* is *a* (social)
> activity.
> >>>>>>> But what
> >>>>>>> is *an* activity, and how can it have a "motive," as Monica asks,
> >>>>>>> separately from the motives of individuals.
> >>>>>>> Andy
> >>>>>>> Monica Hansen wrote:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> ...
> >>>>>>>> Using the term 'motive' for the objective, goal, or aim of
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> schooling as
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> cultural reproduction (or transmission) is misplaced here.
> Motivation
> >>>>>>>> has
> >>>>>>>> something to do with individual agency, doesn't it? It cannot be
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> forced from
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> the outside with 100% effectiveness. When trying to get an idea of
> >>>>>>>> what
> >>>>>>>> motivates the individual to engage in or become a participant in
> an
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> activity
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> that will change the level of his or her conceptual thinking we
> have
> >>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>> understand the individual's motivation.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Mandating the goal of learning from the outside as in defining the
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> objective
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> of schooling and trying to force participation gives us mixed
> >>>>>>>> results,
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> does
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> it not? Can you really force conceptual development? Isn't that
> the
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> problem?
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> We can only use external motivations so far in pushing
> intellectual
> >>>>>>>> development?
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Monica
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>>>>>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> >>>>>>>> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> >>>>>>>> Behalf Of Wolff-Michael Roth
> >>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 15, 2008 8:08 AM
> >>>>>>>> To: vaughndogblack@yahoo.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>>>>> Cc: mcole@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] motive/project
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> HI David and others,
> >>>>>>>> I have repeatedly emphasized in my writings that the problem lies
> in
> >>>>>>>> part
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> in the English term 'activity', which collapses the German
> Tätigkeit
> >>>>>>> and Aktivität into one, unfortunately, because it also gives rise
> to
> >>>>>>> problems
> >>>>>>> with motives. I think if you think about what children do as
> 'tasks'
> >>>>>>> and that these tasks are completed as part of the activity
> >>>>>>> 'schooling',
> >>>>>>> which has as motive the reproduction (transmission...) of
> collective
> >>>>>>> knowledge
> >>>>>>> then you are getting closer.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> But children often don't even know the goals, in fact, because of
> the
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> 'learning paradox', cannot know the goals of the task. This is no
> >>>>>>> more
> >>>>>>> clear than in the frequent student question, 'teacher, am I write
> so
> >>>>>>> far?' Students CANNOT intend the very thing that they are asked
> to,
> >>>>>>> namely
> >>>>>>> learn a concept. To be able to orient themselves intentionally to
> the
> >>>>>>> concept,
> >>>>>>> they need to know it, but if they already know it, they don't have
> to
> >>>>>>> orient toward learning it.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Holzkamp has a lot to say about this, and he describes those
> things
> >>>>>>>> in
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> "Lernen: Subkjektwissenschaftliche Grundlegung" (Frankfurt:
> Campus).
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> If anyone has implemented Leont'ev's program, it certainly is
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Holzkamp.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> By the way, further to motive, the German edition of Activity,
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Consciousness, Personality has an additional chapter where Leont'ev
> >>>>>>> explicitly addresses questions of learning in schools, motives,
> etc.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Cheers,
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Michael
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> On 15-Dec-08, at 7:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Mike, Steve:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Like you, I am thoroughly befuddled by the word "motive", and
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> I've decided that applied to children in general and to child play
> in
> >>>>>>> particular it is anachronistic; children do not yet have "motives"
> in the
> >>>>>>> sense that Leontiev is talking about here. Last week we had thesis
> >>>>>>> defenses, and I took mild exception to a thesis which tried to
> >>>>>>> ascertain
> >>>>>>> changes in "motives" for learning English in children by the use
> of
> >>>>>>> Likert-style questionnaires. (My mild exception to these theses is
> >>>>>>> really
> >>>>>>> pro-forma, and a matter of tradition in our department; nobody
> ever
> >>>>>>> fails as a
> >>>>>>> result.)
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> I notice that LSV (at the beginnning of Chapter Seven of Mind in
> >>>>>>>> Society,
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> which I don't have with me just now) talks about the child's
> "needs"
> >>>>>>> and "desires". These he defines "broadly"
> >>>>>>> as "whatever induces the child to act". If he were going to
> proceed
> >>>>>>> to construct a Leontiev-like tristratal theory of activity, this
> >>>>>>> would lead to something circular: a motive is what drives the child
> to act,
> >>>>>>> and action is
> >>>>>>> defined by its motive.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Let me first take a look at Leontiev, A.N. (1979, 1981). The
> problem
> >>>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> activity in psychology. In Wertsch, J.V. (ed.) The concept of
> >>>>>>> activity in
> >>>>>>> Soviet psychology. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> On p. 48, ANL's got this:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> "The basic characteristic of activity is its object orientation.
> The
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> expression 'nonobjective activity' is devoid of sense. Activity may
> >>>>>>> seem to be without object orientation, but scientific investigation
> of it
> >>>>>>> necessarily requires discovery of its object."
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Already I'm in trouble. Scientific investigation is sometimes
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> required to discover the object orientation of an activity (e.g.
> >>>>>>> sleep, whose
> >>>>>>> object orientation we still do not really understand but which
> will
> >>>>>>> presumably
> >>>>>>> be discovered some day).
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> But people who do not have the training or the time or the
> >>>>>>>> inclination
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> can and do conceptualize activities such as sleep or language play
> or
> >>>>>>> daydreaming. They conceptualize these activities as being without
> any
> >>>>>>> tangible
> >>>>>>> object. Why would an expression that refers to this everyday
> >>>>>>> non-scientific
> >>>>>>> conception be devoid of sense? Are non-scientific expressions
> devoid
> >>>>>>> of sense?
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> OK, then ANL argues that the object of an activity emerges "in two
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> ways: first and foremost in its dependent existence as
> subordinating
> >>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>> transforming the subject's activity, and secondly as the mental
> image
> >>>>>>> of the
> >>>>>>> object, as the product of the subject's detecting its properties.
> >>>>>>> This
> >>>>>>> detection can take place only through the subject's activity."
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Presumably he's talking about the way in which scientific
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> investigation determines the object orientation of an activity, and
> >>>>>>> not the
> >>>>>>> everyday non-scientific detection of the object (which I think of
> as
> >>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>> ethnomethodological motive, the one that participants are
> conscious
> >>>>>>> of). But
> >>>>>>> empirically both methods are the same: they take place through
> >>>>>>> examining the
> >>>>>>> activity of the subject with the detectionof an object in mind.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> On p. 49 he's got this: "All activity has a looplike structure:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> afferentationàeffector processes, which make contact with the
> object
> >>>>>>> environmentàcorrection and enrichment, with the help of feedback to
> the
> >>>>>>> initial afferent image."
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> This suggests to me that PERCEPTION is in some sense the
> archetypical
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> activity. That would explain the OBJECT orientation! But it is
> going
> >>>>>>> to mean
> >>>>>>> big problems when Leontiev tries to explain play, because as LSV
> >>>>>>> remarks, play
> >>>>>>> is precisely the moment when children tear their meaningful
> >>>>>>> orientation away
> >>>>>>> from the perception of tangible objects. (Yes, Lewin and Lewin's
> >>>>>>> "field of action" is a big part of this, and with respect to the
> >>>>>>> child and the stone LSV is clearly closer to Lewin than to ANL!).
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Maybe there's a way out, though. ANL then argues that the crucial
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> problem here is not the loop itself but rather that mental images
> are
> >>>>>>> not
> >>>>>>> produced directly but rather through practical activity in the
> world:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> "This means that the 'afferent agent' that directs activity
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> is primarily the object itself and only secondarily its image as a
> >>>>>>> subjective
> >>>>>>> product of activity that fixes, stabilizes and assimilates its
> object
> >>>>>>> content.
> >>>>>>> In other words, a twofold transition takes place: the transition
> from
> >>>>>>> object to
> >>>>>>> the process of activity and the transition from activity to
> >>>>>>> subjective product
> >>>>>>> of activity. But the transition of the process into a product
> takes
> >>>>>>> place not
> >>>>>>> just form the subject's point of view; it occurs more clearly from
> >>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>> point of view of the object that is transformed by human
> activity."
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Hmmm. When a child picks up a stick and decides to play horsie the
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> transformation occurs more clearly from the point of view of the
> >>>>>>> stick (or from
> >>>>>>> the point of view of the horse-play) than from the point of view
> of
> >>>>>>> the child.
> >>>>>>> This does look a little sticky.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> On p. 50, ANL explicitly goes against LSV's portrayal of
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> "needs" and "desires" as "anything that motivates the
> >>>>>>> child to act". He differentiates between desire as a precondition
> of
> >>>>>>> activity and "desire as a factor that guides and regulates the
> >>>>>>> agent's
> >>>>>>> concrete activity in the object environment". Only the latter is
> the
> >>>>>>> object of psychology.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> OK, now let me turn to the only text I can find where ANL really
> goes
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> into play, which is a later chapter of his book "Problems of the
> >>>>>>> Development of Mind".
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> On p. 366 he begins with the rather startling statement that play
> has
> >>>>>>>> no
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> object (and thus by his previous account does not constitute an
> >>>>>>> activity). He
> >>>>>>> says:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> "Satisfaction of its vital needs is actually still distinct from
> the
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> results of its activity: a child's activity does not determine and
> >>>>>>> essentially cannot determine satisfaction of its need for food
> warmth etc.
> >>>>>>> Characteristic of it, therefore is a wide range of activity that
> >>>>>>> satisfies
> >>>>>>> needs which are unrelated to its objective result."
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Curiously, he then uses "object" activity to differentiate human
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> from animal play!
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> "Where does the specific difference between animals' play activity
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> and play, the rudimentary forms of which we first observe in
> >>>>>>> preschool
> >>>>>>> children, consist in? It lies in the fact that it is not
> instinctive
> >>>>>>> activity
> >>>>>>> but it is precisely human, object activity which by constituting
> the
> >>>>>>> basis of
> >>>>>>> the child's awareness of the world of human objects, determines
> the
> >>>>>>> content
> >>>>>>> of its play."
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Now this is starting to look suspiciously like the thesis I mildly
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> objected to last week, where the adult's attitudes are simply
> >>>>>>> projected
> >>>>>>> onto the child and then "detected" using Likert scales. On pp.
> >>>>>>> 367-368, ANL develops his thesis that play is a substitute for the
> >>>>>>> handling of
> >>>>>>> adult objects. So for example on p. 368 ANL speaks of "let me" and
> >>>>>>> "don't", the struggle between the adult who wants to protect the
> >>>>>>> child from himself and the child who wants to drive a car and row
> a
> >>>>>>> boat. This
> >>>>>>> leads, on p. 369, to the idea of a leading activity which is
> indeed
> >>>>>>> equivalent
> >>>>>>> to a neoformation without the crisis. He then returns
> uncomfortably
> >>>>>>> to his
> >>>>>>> nagging suspicion that that play is an activity without an object,
> >>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>> therefore not an activity at all.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> On p. 370, he's got this: "As we have already said, play is
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> characerized by its motive's lying in the process itself rather
> than
> >>>>>>> in the
> >>>>>>> result of the action. For a child playing with wooden bricks, for
> >>>>>>> example, the
> >>>>>>> motive for the play does not lie in building a structure, but in
> the
> >>>>>>> doing,
> >>>>>>> i.e. in the content of the action. That is true not only of the
> >>>>>>> preschool
> >>>>>>> child's play but also of any real game in general. 'Not to win but
> to
> >>>>>>> play' is the general formula of the motivation of play. In adult's
> >>>>>>> games, therefore in which winning rather than playing becomes the
> >>>>>>> inner motive,
> >>>>>>> the game as such ceased to be play."
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Contrast that with LSV's observation in Chapter Seven that
> children
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> do NOT like running around without any rules or goal, and in games
> >>>>>>> the meaning
> >>>>>>> of the game is entirely to win. Of course, we might be talking
> about
> >>>>>>> different
> >>>>>>> children: Leontiev might be talking about pre- schoolers, and LSV
> is
> >>>>>>> certainly
> >>>>>>> talking about school-age kids. But the gap is remarkable;
> something
> >>>>>>> rather
> >>>>>>> important is getting lept over.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> OK—so then ANL says that in play there is a mismatch between
> >>>>>>>> operation
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> and action, in that the operation is performed with the meaning of
> >>>>>>> the stick
> >>>>>>> and the action is performed with its sense. He says that this
> split
> >>>>>>> is not
> >>>>>>> given in advance but only arises in play action and that children
> do
> >>>>>>> not
> >>>>>>> imagine play without actually playing. If this were true, of
> course,
> >>>>>>> it would
> >>>>>>> be very hard to see how children are able to plan play, read about
> >>>>>>> it, or
> >>>>>>> reflect upon it, much less day-dream or indulge in language play.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> No, this isn't going to work. And it gets worse. Look at this,
> from
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> p. 381:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> "Games 'with rules' i.e. like hide and seek, table games,
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> etc. differ sharply from such 'role' games as playing doctor,
> polar
> >>>>>>> explorer, etc. They do not seem to be related to one another by
> any
> >>>>>>> genetic succession and seem to constitute different lines in the
> devleopment
> >>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>> children's play, but in fact the one form develops from other
> (sic)
> >>>>>>> by virtue
> >>>>>>> of a need inherent in the child's play activity itself (?),
> whereby
> >>>>>>> games
> >>>>>>> 'with rules' arise at a later stage."
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> So ANL explicitly denies that whole discussion (in Vygotsky's
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Leningrad lecture) about the intrinsic link between games with
> roles
> >>>>>>> and games
> >>>>>>> with rules. (There's a pretty good account of this lecture, which
> I
> >>>>>>> have
> >>>>>>> always seen as the starting point for his elaboration of the zone
> of
> >>>>>>> proximal
> >>>>>>> development, in Chapter Seven, but it's well worth reading the
> >>>>>>> original
> >>>>>>> lecture, which is at
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1933/play.htm
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> ANL then has to explain why there appears to be a developmental
> >>>>>>>> sequence
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> linking role based play and rule-based games. For LSV this is no
> >>>>>>> problem: they
> >>>>>>> ARE genetically linked and in fact the child creates rule based
> games
> >>>>>>> iteratively, by varying the roles in systematic ways. But for ANL,
> >>>>>>> who denies
> >>>>>>> the genetic link, this is rather harder to explain:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> "Why do games with rules only arise at a certain stage of
> >>>>>>>> development,
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> and not simultaneously with the genesis of the first role games?
> It
> >>>>>>> depends on
> >>>>>>> the difference in their motivation. Initially the first play
> actions
> >>>>>>> arise on
> >>>>>>> the basis of the child's growing need to master the world of human
> >>>>>>> objects.
> >>>>>>> The motive contained in this action itself is fixed in a thing,
> >>>>>>> directly in its
> >>>>>>> object content. The action here is the path for the child that
> leads
> >>>>>>> it first
> >>>>>>> of all to the discovery of objective reality; the human still
> emerges
> >>>>>>> for the
> >>>>>>> child in its objectified form. The role of the horseman, the play
> >>>>>>> action of
> >>>>>>> riding, is playing at horses, the action with a block of wood that
> >>>>>>> the child
> >>>>>>> 'drives' from one chair to another is playing cars.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> And MORE:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> "But during the development of these games the human relation
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> included in their object content itself comes out ever more clearly
> >>>>>>> in them.
> >>>>>>> The tram driver not only 'acts with a tram' but is obliged at the
> >>>>>>> same
> >>>>>>> time to enter into certain relations with other people— with the
> >>>>>>> conductor,
> >>>>>>> the passengers, and so on. Therefore, at relatively early stages
> of
> >>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>> development of play activity, a child finds not only man's
> relation
> >>>>>>> to it
> >>>>>>> in the object but also people's relations with one another. Group
> >>>>>>> games
> >>>>>>> become possible not only alongside one another but also together.
> >>>>>>> Social
> >>>>>>> relations already come out in these games in overt form, in the
> form
> >>>>>>> of the
> >>>>>>> players' relations with one another. At the same time the play
> 'role'
> >>>>>>> is also altered. Its content now determines not only the child's
> >>>>>>> actions in regard to the object but also its actions in regard to
> the other
> >>>>>>> players in the
> >>>>>>> game. The latter also become content of the play activity, for
> which
> >>>>>>> its motive
> >>>>>>> is
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> fixed. Games are distinguished in which actions in regard to other
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> people become the main thing."
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> OK--so the reason why there is no genetic link is that the child
> goes
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> from focussing on material objects in role play to focussing on
> human
> >>>>>>> relations
> >>>>>>> in rule play? No, that's not right either, because:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> p. 372: "We already know how play arises in the preschool child.
> It
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> arises from its need to act in relation not only to the object
> world
> >>>>>>> directly
> >>>>>>> accessible to itself but also to the wider world of adults."
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Mike--it looks like we're not the only ones befuddled by
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Leontiev's "motive" applied to children; he appears to have
> >>>>>>> thoroughly befuddled himself. Leontiev's "motive" applied to
> >>>>>>> children is a little like the clocks that keep going off in
> >>>>>>> Shakespeare's
> >>>>>>> Julius Caesar, a thousand years before they were invented.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> This is yet another reason for prefering Andy's term
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> "project" in describing play: unlike "activity" or
> >>>>>>> "motive", it's a real Gestalt, in that a "project" can
> >>>>>>> be, for the child, action/meaning, and for the adult,
> meaning/action,
> >>>>>>> whence
> >>>>>>> the possiblity of transforming, outside in, the one into the
> other!
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg
> >>>>>>>> Seoul Natoinal University of Education
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> --
> >>>>>>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>
> <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
> >>>>>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
> >>>>>>> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
> >>>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> --
> >>>>>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>
> <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
> >>>>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
> >>>>>> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>>
> >>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> --
> >>>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/><
> http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
> >>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
> >>>> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
> >>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> xmca mailing list
> >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>
> >>>
> >> --
> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/><
> http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
> >> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
> >> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> xmca mailing list
> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
>
>
>
> --
> Geoffrey Binder
> BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
> PhD Candidate
> Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
> Ph B. 9925 9951
> M. 0422 968 567
>
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
Received on Wed Dec 17 15:33:46 2008