Re: [xmca] Subject: Verb, Object

Thanks for all of that Andy - much food for thought, and comments below.

> >Why do we need institutions as the mediators between ideas and things?
> >Why not use agency/habitus?
>
>
> Not habitus or agency because these valuable concepts do not help me
> complete an ontology with pysche and culture.
> I am using "institutions" as an example; the word "institution" brings to
> mind a thing which, when you get right down to it, is nothing more than an
> ephemeral node in an infinite network of human activity on which a certain
> construction is possible. I could have used rituals (Christmas, marriage,
> ...) or the division of labour, or any of the phenomena of activity.
> We need activity to mediate between ideas and things because how else do we
> have either ideas or things? How can you have an idea of the "automobile"
> if no-one ever made one or rode in one? Tell me.

I'm not sure of what you mean here - being born into a culture that
has automobiles affords both the concept and the thing. At some point
in time an innovation will/did define/redefine personal
transportation. At which time automobile gets defined/redefined.

>
>
> >I think Bourdieu's idea of habitus can be extended beyond tastes,
> >preferences, etc. Why can't we conceive of
> >institutions as part of the habitus? I don't need to know how a university
> >is built, legislated, etc, to be able to 'use' it, to learn. (And that's
> >not to say that other folk don't have the buildings, legislation etc, in
> >their habitus.)
>
>
> In modern society, a University is not part of habitus because it is a
> societal entity that is shared by everyone, even if everyone puts a
> different construction upon it. It is part of Objective Spirit, not
> subjective Spirit. And you will be surprised to learn that in fact you
> cannot get into University until you go through definite procedures,
> passing exam, paying fees, attending a campus, etc., which are inscribed in
> law, etc., not in the dispositions of class fractions.
>
Yes, but I'm not sure about the boundary condition 'modern society'.
Are societies that neat? The university has a very long history...
some of it 'modern'. Why is aspiring to go to university any different
from aspiring to go to belong to the Melbourne Club (for non
Melbourneites - an elitist bourgeois institution) both have entrance
requirements, financial obligations, potential benefits, etc.

And surely, class (fractions?) are is inscribed in law? (If not
statute, then rules/constitutions, dress codes, prohibitive cost, who
you barrack for, wankers, etc.)

>
>
> >I sort of agree with you regarding needing to deal with institutions
> >at a fundamental level, as concieving of human activity without them
> >is very difficult, but having said that, how would you account for
> >'primitive communism'?
>
>
> "Institutions" was just an example, I am absolutely sure that tribal people
> engaged in activity, using artefacts with a concept of what they were
> doing. "Bringing in the harvest," for example, presupposes people knowing
> their role and there being a harvest to bring in. In that sense "bringing
> in the harvest" is an "institution."
>
This seems useful. But it seems to me to reduce 'institution' to 'way'
or practice, and I'm back to habitus... Your example is a communal
practice - are all communal practices 'institutions'?

>
>
> >Re the augmentation of the human body, sure, yes, we use artifacts to
> >enhance it, but the body is a body without augmentation.
>
> Not true. The human body is the product of a 4 million year long labour
> process.

I disagree. Evolution is different from labour. (Or is it? I like to
think of culture as evolution minus D&A.)

>Without the accumulation of culture by pre-human hominids there
> would be no human beings with their complex larynx, upright gait, opposable
> thumbs, etc., etc., The human body is as much the product of labour as is
> an aeroplane. And in any case what did Bourdieu mean by "hexis"?? The body
> is shaped and reshaped by life-style every day.

I need to read up on hexis, but as I understand it, hexis is Greek for
habitus? (Can you point me to Bourdieu's rendering of hexis?)

>
>
>
> >We use culture to 'improve' it, but I don't think we need culture to create
> >it. (Although we probably do need culture for the body to be
> >considered human - socialisation of some description, but again I'm
> >not sure we need institutions to hunt and gather.) The human body is
> >as body-like as a primate, as is like a mouse, etc, etc, etc. The
> >apparatus that I was born with, including potentialities, are not the
> >same as my spectacles, etc. (I worry when the human body is treated as
> >being somehow different from that of another species - divine spark
> >and all of that.)
>
> Not a divine spark, just culture. Any other animal that produces its own
> object is human-like to just that extent. From the day you are born, you
> are engaged, with your family etc., in building a body which is suitable
> for life in the society into which you have been born, tuning your senses,
> training you reactions, focusing your attention, getting you used to the
> available food, etc., etc.
>

Yep, except it's not the body, but the self that is constructed - I'd
never have been six feet tall!

> Andy
> PS. Apologies for speaking too much. I am taking this is as part of
> "defending my thesis". I will shut up shortly. :)

Not accepted :-)
I'm doing the same - I've just not, as yet, written up my theory
chapter!!!!!!!!! Thanks so much Andy, I really appreciate it.

Geoff
>
>
>
>
>
> >Regarding the inescapability Or do you consider
> >
> >On 02/01/2008, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > > Well I admit being a little uncertain exactly how to elaborate the category
> > > of "activity", but we certainly have to have *something* mediating between
> > > things and ideas. Think of an institution (e.g. "the university" or "our
> > > club" or "the USA"); we have an idea of this, and fortunately we have
> > > buildings, laws, documents, images and so on, but unless people act
> > > according to some kind of shared meaning of these buildings, laws,
> > > document, images and so on, then we obviously simply cannot have any kind
> > > of existence for these institutions. We need people to turn up in lecture
> > > theatre ready to learn, others taking along their lecture notes and read
> > > them out or something, etc., etc. Human life is inconceivable without
> > > institutions, division of labour and so on, and that is what activity is.
> > >
> > > Just on the human body as an artefact: I don't know where you want to draw
> > > a line between your smart jacket and your new haircut. Is your haircut not
> > > an artefact just because it's part of your body? Between your running shoes
> > > and your well-developed calf muscles, developed due to many hours in the
> > > gym; between the blind man's hand and his white stick with which he
> > > "feels", between the heart patient's body and his pacemaker, between your
> > > body and that of your golden retriever hound, between your
> > > (colligen-implanted) lips and your lipstick. Obviously, from the point of
> > > view of engineering and biology, there is a difference in each case. But
> > > from the point of view of psychology, all the above artefacts are products
> > > of human labour, used in human activity because of the properties they have
> > > been given to interact with other artefacts, and meet human needs.
> > >
> > > Andy
> > >
> > >
> > > At 05:34 PM 2/01/2008 +1100, you wrote:
> > > >Andy, I 'get' the ontological categories of ideas and artifacts but
> > > >I'm not sure how activity, when it is based on a harnessing of ideas
> > > >and artifacts, would have the same ontological status - perhaps
> > > >activity should be considered a second order 'thing'?
> > > >
> > > >However, when thinking of ideas, I can not surmount the idea
> > > >(pardon...) that ideas are are subject to activity. Drawing from
> > > >'nature' there are organisms that have no idea (pardon again) but
> > > >others do. I'm not a biologist, but it seems that a lot of mammals
> > > >have some idea, and humans, perhaps have too many :-)
> > > >
> > > >Also, am I correct in interpreting Vygotsky's analysis of earliest
> > > >development as being infants reflexive action (activity) given meaning
> > > >(idea) via feedback from the world/carer? I see your definition of
> > > >consciousness as an activity system fitting with this model.
> > > >Consciousness developing (ability to comprehend the world and self) by
> > > >being learned via activity (use) of the world and self.
> > > >
> > > >I have a preference for limiting artifact to those things (material
> > > >and cognitive) that are residual - the 'leftover' of activity, i.e.
> > > >culture. To theorise the human body as an artifact seems to treat it
> > > >in a way that I can not comprehend. Also, do we 'need' artifacts to DO
> > > >- isn't afford sufficient?
> > > >
> > > >Cheers, Geoff
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >On 02/01/2008, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > > > > I think it helps a lot if we don't at this fundamental level talk about
> > > > > "signs". In the Peircean sense of course "sign" includes tools as
> > well as
> > > > > indexes in general, and icons as well as symbols, but it is easy to
> > slip
> > > > > into forgetting this, and forgetting that signs are material things in
> > > > > every case. This is not the normal meaning of the word "sign." On
> > the other
> > > > > hand, with "tool" or "sign" we think of tools having use and signs
> > having
> > > > > meaning. Signs in the Peircean sense can "do" in the same way any
> > material
> > > > > thing does something, like falling or expanding or flowing or whatever.
> > > > > Which is OK, but I think that is a slightly different take on "doing."
> > > > > Confusion without end.
> > > > >
> > > > > The thing which is important for psychology and I think the least
> > ambiguous
> > > > > is "artefact". Artefacts have meaning and use and they are material
> > things
> > > > > obedient to the laws of physics. They have by their nature the
> > capacity
> > > > > for only a certain range of uses, and afford only certain meanings (A
> > > > > Confucion poem cannot be made to mean the Highway Code).
> > > > >
> > > > > "Artefact" also is helpful in avoiding the sort of conundrums with
> > ideas
> > > > > like "reifying". I think artefacts cannot "do". I think doing in this
> > > > > context is something that people do and consciously to boot. Artefacts,
> > > > > like all material things, lend themselves to this or that use. So
> > surely
> > > > > people do things with artefacts, all kinds of things actually, without
> > > > > limit. On the other hand, the human body has to be taken as an
> > artefact,
> > > > > and that can be confusing.
> > > > >
> > > > > The view that I have come to is that we need to set out from the very
> > > > > beginning a tripartite ontology. There are three kinds of entity in the
> > > > > world: ideas (or psyche), artefacts (including the human body, as
> > well as
> > > > > signs, tools, means of production, etc., culture in other words) and
> > > > > activities. "Activity" in this sense it to be taken as very
> > general, using
> > > > > artefacts with a certain idea in mind. Artefacts are material
> > things and
> > > > > the laws of natural science deal with them.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Andy
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > At 03:57 PM 2/01/2008 +1100, you wrote:
> > > > > >Hi Tony, doesn't DO run the risk of reifying concepts (or if you
> > > > > >prefer, signs)? Surely people DO with signs? What people do depends on
> > > > > >how they can use the sign. I agree with you that words do not have
> > > > > >meaning, but to know what meaning a sign has is to be able to use it.
> > > > > >I don't think signs generate interpretants, unless the perceiver has a
> > > > > >use for it.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Cheers, Geoff
> > > > > >
> > > > > >On 02/01/2008, Tony Whitson <twhitson@udel.edu> wrote:
> > > > > > > How about this: Words (or, more generally, signs) don't HAVE
> > meaning --
> > > > > > > meaning is not something that they HAVE or CONTAIN or CONVEY,
> > but what
> > > > > > > they DO -- words and signs MEAN, in the interpretants that they
> > > > generate.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On Wed, 2 Jan 2008, Geoff wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > I'd like to add to Andy's explanation by referring to
> > Wittgenstein's
> > > > > > > > take on meaning - it's about use. I'd argue that words and
> > artifacts
> > > > > > > > derive their meaning by their usage as defined by the users.
> > > > (Those in
> > > > > > > > the language game in Wittgensteinian terms.) One of the nice
> > things
> > > > > > > > about Wittgenstein's definition is that it sets up a fluid
> > boundary,
> > > > > > > > leaving scope for changing habitus.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Cheers, Geoff
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > On 02/01/2008, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > > > > > > >> I plead guilty to all charges of misuse of the names of
> > > > parts/types of
> > > > > > > >> psychology.
> > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > >> Re culture as both material and ideal. Let's take an
> > example, the
> > > > > > American
> > > > > > > >> gun culture. Now, it's true as the NRA always say "It is
> > people that
> > > > > > commit
> > > > > > > >> murder, not guns". But, nonetheless, the presence of 500 million
> > > > guns
> > > > > > > >> scattered around suburban America is a danger, isn't it? because
> > > > people
> > > > > > > >> *can* use them to murder .... and do. So culture, being made
> > up of
> > > > > > material
> > > > > > > >> things, has properties which are relatively independent of the
> > > > > > activities
> > > > > > > >> in which they are used. But if the country was populated
> > solely by
> > > > > > > >> pacifists they would not be a danger. Clearing land makes for
> > > > > > consequences
> > > > > > > >> which were not intended by the people who cleared the land.
> > > > > > (land=artefact,
> > > > > > > >> erosion and farming=meaning).
> > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > >> Conversely, a library full of book written in the Gothic
> > script is
> > > > > > no use
> > > > > > > >> when Germans can no longer read the old fashioned script.
> > > > > > "Affordances" is
> > > > > > > >> a word which is relevant here I guess.
> > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > >> Jim Wertsch's article on narrative tools which was circulated
> > > > > > earlier this
> > > > > > > >> week, was full of observations about the fact that cultural
> > > > tools are
> > > > > > > >> involved in shaping action, but never determine it. (Great
> > article
> > > > > > BTW. I
> > > > > > > >> am now an admirer of Jim W.)
> > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > >> Because activity, thought and artefacts (culture) have different
> > > > > > material
> > > > > > > >> bases, they are never perfectly identified. A word may have
> > > > different
> > > > > > > >> meanings in different contexts and among different people, but
> > > > > > acquaintance
> > > > > > > >> with the word both conditions and affords certain kinds of
> > > > activity and
> > > > > > > >> consciousness.
> > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > >> So an artefact and its use (meaning) necessarily coincide at a
> > > > certain
> > > > > > > >> point, but the artefact may have existed before people found
> > that it
> > > > > > could
> > > > > > > >> have a certain use and later on, the artefact may find different
> > > > > > uses. Like
> > > > > > > >> words and meanings and "intelligent speech".
> > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > >> Meaning is, I would say, the place of an artefact in some
> > specific
> > > > > > > >> activity. Meaning is particular, artefact is universal. So
> > one and
> > > > > > the same
> > > > > > > >> artefact may have different meanings because it will play a
> > part in
> > > > > > > >> different systems of activity. And actually, it can mean
> > different
> > > > > > things
> > > > > > > >> in one and the same system of activity because I have skated
> > over
> > > > > > the role
> > > > > > > >> of consciousness in this explanation. "Christmas" means
> > something
> > > > > > different
> > > > > > > >> to a housewife, a child, a parent, a moslem, etc., etc. even
> > > > though the
> > > > > > > >> festival is the self-same one. Different people see it and
> > > > > > participate in
> > > > > > > >> it differently.
> > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > >> Does that help?
> > > > > > > >> Andy
> > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > >> At 06:24 PM 1/01/2008 -0800, you wrote:
> > > > > > > >>> Andy,
> > > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > > >>> This definition of culture as mediating artefcts given in
> > your
> > > > > > message:
> > > > > > > >>> "an artefact is what it is only in connection with its use
> > in a
> > > > > > certain
> > > > > > > >>> range of activities with a certain meaning."
> > > > > > > >>> simply moves the problem onto "a certain meaning".
> > > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > > >>> Coud you explain how to distinguish meaning from
> > > > meaninglessness and
> > > > > > > >>> how it is possible to separate the meanings from the
> > activities in
> > > > > > which
> > > > > > > >>> ?it? is inscribed.
> > > > > > > >>> .
> > > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > > >>> Paul
> > > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > > >>> Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > > > > > > >>> Paul,
> > > > > > > >>> my understanding is that in the CHAT tradition, "culture" has a
> > > > > > specific
> > > > > > > >>> meaning, being the sum of artefacts produced and consumed by a
> > > > group of
> > > > > > > >>> people, inclusive of the understanding that an artefact is
> > what it
> > > > > > is only
> > > > > > > >>> in connection with its use in a certain range of activities
> > with a
> > > > > > certain
> > > > > > > >>> meaning.
> > > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > > >>> Nevertheless, the use of the word to indicate the *society*
> > (as a
> > > > > > > >>> continuing self-reproducing collectivity of communities) which
> > > > > > produces and
> > > > > > > >>> consumes the given collection of artefacts is so deeply
> > embedded, I
> > > > > > think
> > > > > > > >>> that we have to accept that as a legitimate usage of the
> > word. Mike
> > > > > > is the
> > > > > > > >>> person who has defined "cultural psychology" so maybe Mike will
> > > > tell us
> > > > > > > >>> what he means?
> > > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > > >>> Andy
> > > > > > > >>> At 04:35 PM 1/01/2008 -0800, you wrote:
> > > > > > > >>>> great, but would someone please tell me exactly what "culture"
> > > > means.
> > > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > > >>>> Paul
> > > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > > >>>> Andy Blunden wrote:
> > > > > > > >>>> Sure.
> > > > > > > >>>> Andy
> > > > > > > >>>> At 10:43 PM 1/01/2008 +0000, you wrote:
> > > > > > > >>>>> Andy
> > > > > > > >>>>> ... why not "cultural psychology"?
> > > > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>> Luísa Aires
> > > > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>> Good question Mike. I never thought about that, and it is
> > > > > > certainly in
> > > > > > > >>>>>> ignorance of how these terms are used in academia generally.
> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>> I suppose by 'social psychology' I mean a current of
> > psychology
> > > > > > which
> > > > > > > >>>>>> utilises a concept of 'extended mind' as its foundational
> > > > principle.
> > > > > > > >>>> It is
> > > > > > > >>>>>> always the case that other currents contribute insights
> > > > which are
> > > > > > > >>> not so
> > > > > > > >>>>>> easily accessible from one's own (so to speak) - even if you
> > > > don't
> > > > > > > >>> accept
> > > > > > > >>>>>> the principles of Psychoanalysis, there are still things to
> > > > learn
> > > > > > > >>>> from it;
> > > > > > > >>>>>> and the same goes for all currents and schools of
> > > > psychology. But by
> > > > > > > >>>>>> 'social psychology' I mean a real psychology, that is
> > > > practical and
> > > > > > > >>>> useful
> > > > > > > >>>>>> in dealing with psychological problems and copes with the
> > > > reality of
> > > > > > > >>>>>> individual difference and so on. A 'social psychology' which
> > > > sees
> > > > > > > >>>>>> individuals as purely and simply instances of their social
> > > > position
> > > > > > > >>> does
> > > > > > > >>>>>> not warrant the name in my opinion. And 'social psychology'
> > > > in the
> > > > > > > >>> sense
> > > > > > > >>>>>> that Max Horkheimer (I think) used it, which deal only
> > with the
> > > > > > > >>> phenomena
> > > > > > > >>>>>> of crowds and so on, is also 'not worthy' of the name.
> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>> So I am looking for a tool which can give me a way of
> > > > > > understanding how
> > > > > > > >>>>>> the
> > > > > > > >>>>>> Zeitgeist is formed, how it is changed, practically how to
> > > > > > intervene in
> > > > > > > >>>>>> it.
> > > > > > > >>>>>> I do not expect a 'social psychology' to go further and
> > > > provide me
> > > > > > > >>> with a
> > > > > > > >>>>>> social or political theory as such, but it need to be
> > able to
> > > > > > > >>> bridge the
> > > > > > > >>>>>> gap, so to speak. Let's face it! If we can change the
> > Zeitgeist
> > > > > > which
> > > > > > > >>>> gets
> > > > > > > >>>>>> people like George W Bush and John Howard elected in
> > democratic
> > > > > > > >>>> countries,
> > > > > > > >>>>>> into one in which genuinely good people get elected,
> > then the
> > > > > > rest will
> > > > > > > >>>>>> look after itself and I can enjoy my retirement.
> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>> Why not a meta-psychology? Apart form my idiosyncratic
> > > > dislike of
> > > > > > > >>>> "meta" I
> > > > > > > >>>>>> don't want a metapsychology, I want a psychology which has a
> > > > > > > >>>>>> metapsychology
> > > > > > > >>>>>> which is sound and able to cope with the sociality of
> > > > consciousness.
> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>> Why not a "science of human nature"? "Human nature" is
> > such a
> > > > > > > >>> problematic
> > > > > > > >>>>>> term, it carries such a lot of unwanted 19th century
> > baggage.
> > > > > > And I am
> > > > > > > >>>>>> interested in consciousness, not "nature" in general.
> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>> Sure, social psychology is a sub-discipline within
> > psychology.
> > > > > > > >>> There are
> > > > > > > >>>>>> things which belong to psychology which are not centre-stage
> > > > for me.
> > > > > > > >>>> Sure,
> > > > > > > >>>>>> brain injury or other defects are a serious topic, as is
> > child
> > > > > > > >>>>>> development,
> > > > > > > >>>>>> etc., etc.. I guess I am talking about a psychology whose
> > > > central
> > > > > > > >>> thread
> > > > > > > >>>>>> is
> > > > > > > >>>>>> a social psychology rather than a neurobiology, for example.
> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>> I need a social psychology which recognises that social
> > > > movements
> > > > > > > >>> are not
> > > > > > > >>>>>> just large numbers of people with the same feeling, but
> > > > > > subjects, and
> > > > > > > >>>>>> individuals are neither passive victims of social
> > processes nor
> > > > > > > >>>> absolutely
> > > > > > > >>>>>> free agents. But a *real*, practical, living school of
> > > > > > psychology, with
> > > > > > > >>>>>> people using it in designing curricula, healing depressed
> > > > people,
> > > > > > > >>> running
> > > > > > > >>>>>> half-way houses, training teachers, organising self-help
> > groups,
> > > > > > etc.,
> > > > > > > >>>>>> etc.
> > > > > > > >>>>>> and doing real, experimental science with it, critiquing and
> > > > > > > >>>> improving its
> > > > > > > >>>>>> concepts down the years.
> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>> Does that make sense?
> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>> Andy
> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>> At 05:14 PM 30/12/2007 -0800, you wrote:
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Andy-- This is the second time you have declared your goal
> > > > to be
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> answering
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> questions within the framework of social psychology. Why do
> > > > you use
> > > > > > > >>> this
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> term? Why not a
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> meta-psychology? Why not a "science of human nature"?
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> I ask because I am used to social psychology being
> > viewed as a
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> sub-discipline within psychology.
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> The only dept of social psych I know of that takes on your
> > > > > > questions
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> seriously is at the LSE. One branch of cultural
> > psychology in
> > > > > > the US
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> comes
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> out of experimental social
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> psychology here, but I do not think you have that in mind.
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> This query is not to distract from the main line of
> > > > discussion, but
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> rather
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to locate what you are striving for better.
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> mike
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> On Dec 30, 2007 4:34 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> I think David and Peg's messages were out of sync., yes?
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> This all raises that most difficult of questions for a
> > social
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> psychology
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> that wants to deal with the tasks I am asking it to
> > deal with,
> > > > > > > >>> how do
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> you
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> deal with the knock-on effect of an action, which is
> > > > predictable
> > > > > > > >>> from
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> on-high, but unknown to the actors themselves? We rely
> > on the
> > > > > > basic
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> insight
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> that what goes on in the head first went on between
> > people -
> > > > > > whether
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> in
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> the
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> form given to it by Fichte, Hegel, Marx, CS Peirce or
> > > > > > Vygotsky. What
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> is
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Hegel's Logic about? About the underlying "logic of
> > > > events", how
> > > > > > > >>> this
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> or
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> that policy or statement or whatever ultimately leads to
> > > > this or
> > > > > > > >>> that
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> problem which was at first invisible. Life experience will
> > > > > > tell you
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> this,
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> but if you don't have life experience, it will happen
> > > > according
> > > > > > > >>> to the
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> logic of events anyways and you should learn. Basically, I
> > > > > > think we
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> can
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> only make sense of this if we get right away from the idea
> > > > of the
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> "individual-as-subject" but remember that no subject
> > exists
> > > > > > > >>> other than
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> in
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> and through individual human beings.
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> With the ANL example of the child and the father, I have
> > > > > > always had
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> trouble
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> with "examples" and methods which presuppose a leader or a
> > > > > > > >>> father or a
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> facilitator, a person who knows what the experimental
> > > > subject or
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> student
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> or
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> self-help group really needs to do, and organises things
> > > > > > > >>> accordingly.
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Of
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> course, I understand that all you teachers and
> > > > teacher-trainers,
> > > > > > > >>> child
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> psychologists, etc., work and have a responsibility to
> > work in
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> precisely
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> that circumstance. But I do not think this is the
> > paradigmatic
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> relationship. The father can only do his bit in
> > "leading" the
> > > > > > child
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> into
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> an
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> activity where its "best interests" will be served if the
> > > > > > father can
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> act
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> as
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> a kind of transmitter of life experience, and kind of
> > > > > > short-cut the
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> process
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> for the child. So it is not the father's technique which
> > > > is the
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> paradigm,
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> but the bitter life experience which the child may or
> > may not
> > > > > > > >>> have as
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> a
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> result of choosing to do this or that.
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Andy
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> At 07:54 AM 30/12/2007 -0800, you wrote:
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Dear Andy and Peg:
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Here's some stuff from my notes; I happen to know that
> > > > Andy can't
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> get
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> ahold of a copy of ANL's Problems of the Development
> > of the
> > > > > > > >>> Mind. I
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> hope
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> I don't get those funny marks that always show up when I
> > > > paste
> > > > > > > >>> in...
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> p. 402 ANL points out how 'only understandable'
> > motives for
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> homework
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> such as wanting to get a good mark can be replaced by
> > 'really
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> effective'
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> motives such as doing it so you can go out to play.
> > However,
> > > > > > after
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> some
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> weeks of really effective motives, it is also possible
> > > > that the
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> child
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> will find that the only understandable motives become
> > really
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> effective,
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> e.g. the child will leave off doing homework because
> > > > it¡¯s untidy
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> and
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> the
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> child is now afraid of getting a bad mark.
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> p. 403: ANL writes: 'It is a matter of an action¡¯s
> > > > result being
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> more
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> significant in certain conditions than the motive that
> > > > actually
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> induces
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> it. The child begins doing its homework conscientiously
> > > > > > because it
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> wants
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> to go out quickly and play. In the end this leads to much
> > > > > > more not
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> simply
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> that it will get the chance to go and play but also
> > that it
> > > > > > > >>> will get
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> a
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> good mark. A new "objectivation" of its needs come about
> > > > which
> > > > > > > >>> means
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> they
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> are understood at a higher level.'
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> 'The transition to a new leading activity differs
> > from the
> > > > > > process
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> described simply in the really effective motives becoming
> > > > in the
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> case of
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> a change of leading activity, those understandable
> > > > motives that
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> exist in
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the sphere of relations characterizing the place the
> > > > child can
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> occupy
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> only in the next higher stage of development rather than
> > > > in the
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> sphere
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> of
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> relations in which it still actually is. The preparation
> > > > of these
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> transitions therefore takes a long time because it is
> > > > > > > >>> necessary for
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> child to become quite fully aware of a sphere of
> > relations
> > > > > > > >>> that are
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> new
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> for it.¡±
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> ANL compares a child¡¯s performance in a school play
> > with the
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> child¡¯s
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> learning of study as an independent activity. The child
> > > > > > begins the
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> school
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> play as an assignment, and later continues for the
> > > > > > approbation the
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> child
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> receives during a successful performance. As with
> > learning to
> > > > > > > >>> study
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> for
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> a
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> good mark instead of just studying for the
> > opportunity to go
> > > > > > > >>> out and
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> play, a ¡°merely understandable¡± motive has now become
> > > > ¡°really
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> effective¡± and a new activity is established.
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> But only in the case of independent study (according to
> > > > ANL) is
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> new
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> activity developmentally significant (¡°objectively¡±)
> > > > > > because the
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> child
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> is not going to become a professional dramatist (if
> > the child
> > > > > > > >>> were,
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> then
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the performance in the play would be study). Thus
> > only in the
> > > > > > > >>> latter
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> case
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> can we say there is a new leading activity.
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Here's what I make of this:
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> a) ANL really does NOT interrogate the subject as to the
> > > > object
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> orientation of the activity: the object (study, the
> > completed
> > > > > > > >>> play)
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> is
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> indeed given in advance. As far as ANL is concerned, ONLY
> > > > > > > >>> Chaiklin's
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> "objective" ZPD exists, and there is NO subjective
> > ZPD. But
> > > > > > Andy's
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> idea
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of "immanent critique" is NOT an objective critique; it
> > > > has to do
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> with
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> following up (just like Sarah's) the subject's way of
> > seeing
> > > > > > > >>> things
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> and
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> seeing where it leads.
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> b) In the development discussion (San Diego-Helsinki) Dr.
> > > > Olga
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Vasquez
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> raised the question of whether "leading activity" is the
> > > > same as
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> "neoformation", and Dr. Pentti Harakarainnen really
> > did not
> > > > > > answer
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> it
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> and
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> instead talked about Dr. Engestrom's even more general
> > > > concept of
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> activity. But here we can see that "leading activity" and
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> "neoformation"
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> are quite different: LSV used "neoformation" to talk
> > about
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> transitional
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> structures during crisis periods that COMPLETELY
> > > > disappear (for
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> example,
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the child's autonomous speech at one and the child's
> > > > > > > >>> "negativism" at
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> three) as well as neoformations which become the leading
> > > > activity
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> during
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> normal growth. Only the latter is a "leading activity"
> > > > for ANL.
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> c) There is still a STRONG behaviorist streak in ANL's
> > > > reasoning:
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> difference between the "really effective" and "merely
> > > > understood"
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> reasoning can very easily be described, in ALL of ANL's
> > > > > > > >>> examples, as
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> a
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> simple lengthening of the time distance between the
> > behavior
> > > > > > > >>> and the
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> positive reinforcement. Bruner, in a quote that I have
> > > > long since
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> lost,
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> suggests that development can be described this way, but
> > > > I don't
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> think
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> LSV ever would have done so: for LSV the key thing about
> > > > > > humans is
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> that
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> they are dogs that can ring their own bells.
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Seoul National University of Education
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> ---------------------------------
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Looking for last minute shopping deals? Find them
> > fast with
> > > > > > Yahoo!
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Search.
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden :
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy/tel (H) +61 3
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> 9380 9435,
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> mobile 0409 358 651
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > > >>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3
> > > > 9380 9435,
> > > > > > > >>>>>> mobile 0409 358 651
> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > >>>>>> xmca mailing list
> > > > > > > >>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > > >>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > >>>>> xmca mailing list
> > > > > > > >>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > > >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > > >>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380
> > > > 9435,
> > > > > > > >>>> mobile 0409 358 651
> > > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > > >>>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > >>>> xmca mailing list
> > > > > > > >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > > >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > > >>>> ---------------------------------
> > > > > > > >>>> Never miss a thing. Make Yahoo your homepage.
> > > > > > > >>>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > >>>> xmca mailing list
> > > > > > > >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > > >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > > >>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3
> > 9380 9435,
> > > > > > > >>> mobile 0409 358 651
> > > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > > >>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > >>> xmca mailing list
> > > > > > > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > > >>> ---------------------------------
> > > > > > > >>> Never miss a thing. Make Yahoo your homepage.
> > > > > > > >>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > >>> xmca mailing list
> > > > > > > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > >> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380
> > > > 9435,
> > > > > > > >> mobile 0409 358 651
> > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > >> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > >> xmca mailing list
> > > > > > > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > --
> > > > > > > > Geoffrey Binder
> > > > > > > > BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
> > > > > > > > PhD Candidate
> > > > > > > > Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
> > > > > > > > Ph B. 9925 9951
> > > > > > > > M. 0422 968 567
> > > > > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > > xmca mailing list
> > > > > > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Tony Whitson
> > > > > > > UD School of Education
> > > > > > > NEWARK DE 19716
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > twhitson@udel.edu
> > > > > > > _______________________________
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > "those who fail to reread
> > > > > > > are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
> > > > > > > -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
> > > > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > xmca mailing list
> > > > > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >--
> > > > > >Geoffrey Binder
> > > > > >BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
> > > > > >PhD Candidate
> > > > > >Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
> > > > > >Ph B. 9925 9951
> > > > > >M. 0422 968 567
> > > > > >_______________________________________________
> > > > > >xmca mailing list
> > > > > >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > >
> > > > > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> > > > > mobile 0409 358 651
> > > > >
> > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > xmca mailing list
> > > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >--
> > > >Geoffrey Binder
> > > >BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
> > > >PhD Candidate
> > > >Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
> > > >Ph B. 9925 9951
> > > >M. 0422 968 567
> > > >_______________________________________________
> > > >xmca mailing list
> > > >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >
> > > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> > > mobile 0409 358 651
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > xmca mailing list
> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >
> >
> >
> >--
> >Geoffrey Binder
> >BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
> >PhD Candidate
> >Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
> >Ph B. 9925 9951
> >M. 0422 968 567
> >_______________________________________________
> >xmca mailing list
> >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> mobile 0409 358 651
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>

-- 
Geoffrey Binder
BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
PhD Candidate
Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
Ph B. 9925 9951
M. 0422 968 567
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
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