Re: [xmca] Subject: Verb, Object

At 06:57 PM 2/01/2008 +1100, you wrote:
>Why do we need institutions as the mediators between ideas and things?
>Why not use agency/habitus?

Not habitus or agency because these valuable concepts do not help me
complete an ontology with pysche and culture.
I am using "institutions" as an example; the word "institution" brings to
mind a thing which, when you get right down to it, is nothing more than an
ephemeral node in an infinite network of human activity on which a certain
construction is possible. I could have used rituals (Christmas, marriage,
...) or the division of labour, or any of the phenomena of activity.
We need activity to mediate between ideas and things because how else do we
have either ideas or things? How can you have an idea of the "automobile"
if no-one ever made one or rode in one? Tell me.

>I think Bourdieu's idea of habitus can be extended beyond tastes,
>preferences, etc. Why can't we conceive of
>institutions as part of the habitus? I don't need to know how a university
>is built, legislated, etc, to be able to 'use' it, to learn. (And that's
>not to say that other folk don't have the buildings, legislation etc, in
>their habitus.)

In modern society, a University is not part of habitus because it is a
societal entity that is shared by everyone, even if everyone puts a
different construction upon it. It is part of Objective Spirit, not
subjective Spirit. And you will be surprised to learn that in fact you
cannot get into University until you go through definite procedures,
passing exam, paying fees, attending a campus, etc., which are inscribed in
law, etc., not in the dispositions of class fractions.

>I sort of agree with you regarding needing to deal with institutions
>at a fundamental level, as concieving of human activity without them
>is very difficult, but having said that, how would you account for
>'primitive communism'?

"Institutions" was just an example, I am absolutely sure that tribal people
engaged in activity, using artefacts with a concept of what they were
doing. "Bringing in the harvest," for example, presupposes people knowing
their role and there being a harvest to bring in. In that sense "bringing
in the harvest" is an "institution."

>Re the augmentation of the human body, sure, yes, we use artifacts to
>enhance it, but the body is a body without augmentation.

Not true. The human body is the product of a 4 million year long labour
process. Without the accumulation of culture by pre-human hominids there
would be no human beings with their complex larynx, upright gait, opposable
thumbs, etc., etc., The human body is as much the product of labour as is
an aeroplane. And in any case what did Bourdieu mean by "hexis"?? The body
is shaped and reshaped by life-style every day.

>We use culture to 'improve' it, but I don't think we need culture to create
>it. (Although we probably do need culture for the body to be
>considered human - socialisation of some description, but again I'm
>not sure we need institutions to hunt and gather.) The human body is
>as body-like as a primate, as is like a mouse, etc, etc, etc. The
>apparatus that I was born with, including potentialities, are not the
>same as my spectacles, etc. (I worry when the human body is treated as
>being somehow different from that of another species - divine spark
>and all of that.)

Not a divine spark, just culture. Any other animal that produces its own
object is human-like to just that extent. From the day you are born, you
are engaged, with your family etc., in building a body which is suitable
for life in the society into which you have been born, tuning your senses,
training you reactions, focusing your attention, getting you used to the
available food, etc., etc.

Andy
PS. Apologies for speaking too much. I am taking this is as part of
"defending my thesis". I will shut up shortly. :)

>Regarding the inescapability Or do you consider
>
>On 02/01/2008, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > Well I admit being a little uncertain exactly how to elaborate the category
> > of "activity", but we certainly have to have *something* mediating between
> > things and ideas. Think of an institution (e.g. "the university" or "our
> > club" or "the USA"); we have an idea of this, and fortunately we have
> > buildings, laws, documents, images and so on, but unless people act
> > according to some kind of shared meaning of these buildings, laws,
> > document, images and so on, then we obviously simply cannot have any kind
> > of existence for these institutions. We need people to turn up in lecture
> > theatre ready to learn, others taking along their lecture notes and read
> > them out or something, etc., etc. Human life is inconceivable without
> > institutions, division of labour and so on, and that is what activity is.
> >
> > Just on the human body as an artefact: I don't know where you want to draw
> > a line between your smart jacket and your new haircut. Is your haircut not
> > an artefact just because it's part of your body? Between your running shoes
> > and your well-developed calf muscles, developed due to many hours in the
> > gym; between the blind man's hand and his white stick with which he
> > "feels", between the heart patient's body and his pacemaker, between your
> > body and that of your golden retriever hound, between your
> > (colligen-implanted) lips and your lipstick. Obviously, from the point of
> > view of engineering and biology, there is a difference in each case. But
> > from the point of view of psychology, all the above artefacts are products
> > of human labour, used in human activity because of the properties they have
> > been given to interact with other artefacts, and meet human needs.
> >
> > Andy
> >
> >
> > At 05:34 PM 2/01/2008 +1100, you wrote:
> > >Andy, I 'get' the ontological categories of ideas and artifacts but
> > >I'm not sure how activity, when it is based on a harnessing of ideas
> > >and artifacts, would have the same ontological status - perhaps
> > >activity should be considered a second order 'thing'?
> > >
> > >However, when thinking of ideas, I can not surmount the idea
> > >(pardon...) that ideas are are subject to activity. Drawing from
> > >'nature' there are organisms that have no idea (pardon again) but
> > >others do. I'm not a biologist, but it seems that a lot of mammals
> > >have some idea, and humans, perhaps have too many :-)
> > >
> > >Also, am I correct in interpreting Vygotsky's analysis of earliest
> > >development as being infants reflexive action (activity) given meaning
> > >(idea) via feedback from the world/carer? I see your definition of
> > >consciousness as an activity system fitting with this model.
> > >Consciousness developing (ability to comprehend the world and self) by
> > >being learned via activity (use) of the world and self.
> > >
> > >I have a preference for limiting artifact to those things (material
> > >and cognitive) that are residual - the 'leftover' of activity, i.e.
> > >culture. To theorise the human body as an artifact seems to treat it
> > >in a way that I can not comprehend. Also, do we 'need' artifacts to DO
> > >- isn't afford sufficient?
> > >
> > >Cheers, Geoff
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >On 02/01/2008, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > > > I think it helps a lot if we don't at this fundamental level talk about
> > > > "signs". In the Peircean sense of course "sign" includes tools as
> well as
> > > > indexes in general, and icons as well as symbols, but it is easy to
> slip
> > > > into forgetting this, and forgetting that signs are material things in
> > > > every case. This is not the normal meaning of the word "sign." On
> the other
> > > > hand, with "tool" or "sign" we think of tools having use and signs
> having
> > > > meaning. Signs in the Peircean sense can "do" in the same way any
> material
> > > > thing does something, like falling or expanding or flowing or whatever.
> > > > Which is OK, but I think that is a slightly different take on "doing."
> > > > Confusion without end.
> > > >
> > > > The thing which is important for psychology and I think the least
> ambiguous
> > > > is "artefact". Artefacts have meaning and use and they are material
> things
> > > > obedient to the laws of physics. They have by their nature the
> capacity
> > > > for only a certain range of uses, and afford only certain meanings (A
> > > > Confucion poem cannot be made to mean the Highway Code).
> > > >
> > > > "Artefact" also is helpful in avoiding the sort of conundrums with
> ideas
> > > > like "reifying". I think artefacts cannot "do". I think doing in this
> > > > context is something that people do and consciously to boot. Artefacts,
> > > > like all material things, lend themselves to this or that use. So
> surely
> > > > people do things with artefacts, all kinds of things actually, without
> > > > limit. On the other hand, the human body has to be taken as an
> artefact,
> > > > and that can be confusing.
> > > >
> > > > The view that I have come to is that we need to set out from the very
> > > > beginning a tripartite ontology. There are three kinds of entity in the
> > > > world: ideas (or psyche), artefacts (including the human body, as
> well as
> > > > signs, tools, means of production, etc., culture in other words) and
> > > > activities. "Activity" in this sense it to be taken as very
> general, using
> > > > artefacts with a certain idea in mind. Artefacts are material
> things and
> > > > the laws of natural science deal with them.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Andy
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > At 03:57 PM 2/01/2008 +1100, you wrote:
> > > > >Hi Tony, doesn't DO run the risk of reifying concepts (or if you
> > > > >prefer, signs)? Surely people DO with signs? What people do depends on
> > > > >how they can use the sign. I agree with you that words do not have
> > > > >meaning, but to know what meaning a sign has is to be able to use it.
> > > > >I don't think signs generate interpretants, unless the perceiver has a
> > > > >use for it.
> > > > >
> > > > >Cheers, Geoff
> > > > >
> > > > >On 02/01/2008, Tony Whitson <twhitson@udel.edu> wrote:
> > > > > > How about this: Words (or, more generally, signs) don't HAVE
> meaning --
> > > > > > meaning is not something that they HAVE or CONTAIN or CONVEY,
> but what
> > > > > > they DO -- words and signs MEAN, in the interpretants that they
> > > generate.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Wed, 2 Jan 2008, Geoff wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > I'd like to add to Andy's explanation by referring to
> Wittgenstein's
> > > > > > > take on meaning - it's about use. I'd argue that words and
> artifacts
> > > > > > > derive their meaning by their usage as defined by the users.
> > > (Those in
> > > > > > > the language game in Wittgensteinian terms.) One of the nice
> things
> > > > > > > about Wittgenstein's definition is that it sets up a fluid
> boundary,
> > > > > > > leaving scope for changing habitus.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Cheers, Geoff
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On 02/01/2008, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > > > > > >> I plead guilty to all charges of misuse of the names of
> > > parts/types of
> > > > > > >> psychology.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Re culture as both material and ideal. Let's take an
> example, the
> > > > > American
> > > > > > >> gun culture. Now, it's true as the NRA always say "It is
> people that
> > > > > commit
> > > > > > >> murder, not guns". But, nonetheless, the presence of 500 million
> > > guns
> > > > > > >> scattered around suburban America is a danger, isn't it? because
> > > people
> > > > > > >> *can* use them to murder .... and do. So culture, being made
> up of
> > > > > material
> > > > > > >> things, has properties which are relatively independent of the
> > > > > activities
> > > > > > >> in which they are used. But if the country was populated
> solely by
> > > > > > >> pacifists they would not be a danger. Clearing land makes for
> > > > > consequences
> > > > > > >> which were not intended by the people who cleared the land.
> > > > > (land=artefact,
> > > > > > >> erosion and farming=meaning).
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Conversely, a library full of book written in the Gothic
> script is
> > > > > no use
> > > > > > >> when Germans can no longer read the old fashioned script.
> > > > > "Affordances" is
> > > > > > >> a word which is relevant here I guess.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Jim Wertsch's article on narrative tools which was circulated
> > > > > earlier this
> > > > > > >> week, was full of observations about the fact that cultural
> > > tools are
> > > > > > >> involved in shaping action, but never determine it. (Great
> article
> > > > > BTW. I
> > > > > > >> am now an admirer of Jim W.)
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Because activity, thought and artefacts (culture) have different
> > > > > material
> > > > > > >> bases, they are never perfectly identified. A word may have
> > > different
> > > > > > >> meanings in different contexts and among different people, but
> > > > > acquaintance
> > > > > > >> with the word both conditions and affords certain kinds of
> > > activity and
> > > > > > >> consciousness.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> So an artefact and its use (meaning) necessarily coincide at a
> > > certain
> > > > > > >> point, but the artefact may have existed before people found
> that it
> > > > > could
> > > > > > >> have a certain use and later on, the artefact may find different
> > > > > uses. Like
> > > > > > >> words and meanings and "intelligent speech".
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Meaning is, I would say, the place of an artefact in some
> specific
> > > > > > >> activity. Meaning is particular, artefact is universal. So
> one and
> > > > > the same
> > > > > > >> artefact may have different meanings because it will play a
> part in
> > > > > > >> different systems of activity. And actually, it can mean
> different
> > > > > things
> > > > > > >> in one and the same system of activity because I have skated
> over
> > > > > the role
> > > > > > >> of consciousness in this explanation. "Christmas" means
> something
> > > > > different
> > > > > > >> to a housewife, a child, a parent, a moslem, etc., etc. even
> > > though the
> > > > > > >> festival is the self-same one. Different people see it and
> > > > > participate in
> > > > > > >> it differently.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Does that help?
> > > > > > >> Andy
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> At 06:24 PM 1/01/2008 -0800, you wrote:
> > > > > > >>> Andy,
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>> This definition of culture as mediating artefcts given in
> your
> > > > > message:
> > > > > > >>> "an artefact is what it is only in connection with its use
> in a
> > > > > certain
> > > > > > >>> range of activities with a certain meaning."
> > > > > > >>> simply moves the problem onto "a certain meaning".
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>> Coud you explain how to distinguish meaning from
> > > meaninglessness and
> > > > > > >>> how it is possible to separate the meanings from the
> activities in
> > > > > which
> > > > > > >>> ?it? is inscribed.
> > > > > > >>> .
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>> Paul
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>> Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > > > > > >>> Paul,
> > > > > > >>> my understanding is that in the CHAT tradition, "culture" has a
> > > > > specific
> > > > > > >>> meaning, being the sum of artefacts produced and consumed by a
> > > group of
> > > > > > >>> people, inclusive of the understanding that an artefact is
> what it
> > > > > is only
> > > > > > >>> in connection with its use in a certain range of activities
> with a
> > > > > certain
> > > > > > >>> meaning.
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>> Nevertheless, the use of the word to indicate the *society*
> (as a
> > > > > > >>> continuing self-reproducing collectivity of communities) which
> > > > > produces and
> > > > > > >>> consumes the given collection of artefacts is so deeply
> embedded, I
> > > > > think
> > > > > > >>> that we have to accept that as a legitimate usage of the
> word. Mike
> > > > > is the
> > > > > > >>> person who has defined "cultural psychology" so maybe Mike will
> > > tell us
> > > > > > >>> what he means?
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>> Andy
> > > > > > >>> At 04:35 PM 1/01/2008 -0800, you wrote:
> > > > > > >>>> great, but would someone please tell me exactly what "culture"
> > > means.
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>> Paul
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>> Andy Blunden wrote:
> > > > > > >>>> Sure.
> > > > > > >>>> Andy
> > > > > > >>>> At 10:43 PM 1/01/2008 +0000, you wrote:
> > > > > > >>>>> Andy
> > > > > > >>>>> ... why not "cultural psychology"?
> > > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>> Luísa Aires
> > > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>> Good question Mike. I never thought about that, and it is
> > > > > certainly in
> > > > > > >>>>>> ignorance of how these terms are used in academia generally.
> > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>> I suppose by 'social psychology' I mean a current of
> psychology
> > > > > which
> > > > > > >>>>>> utilises a concept of 'extended mind' as its foundational
> > > principle.
> > > > > > >>>> It is
> > > > > > >>>>>> always the case that other currents contribute insights
> > > which are
> > > > > > >>> not so
> > > > > > >>>>>> easily accessible from one's own (so to speak) - even if you
> > > don't
> > > > > > >>> accept
> > > > > > >>>>>> the principles of Psychoanalysis, there are still things to
> > > learn
> > > > > > >>>> from it;
> > > > > > >>>>>> and the same goes for all currents and schools of
> > > psychology. But by
> > > > > > >>>>>> 'social psychology' I mean a real psychology, that is
> > > practical and
> > > > > > >>>> useful
> > > > > > >>>>>> in dealing with psychological problems and copes with the
> > > reality of
> > > > > > >>>>>> individual difference and so on. A 'social psychology' which
> > > sees
> > > > > > >>>>>> individuals as purely and simply instances of their social
> > > position
> > > > > > >>> does
> > > > > > >>>>>> not warrant the name in my opinion. And 'social psychology'
> > > in the
> > > > > > >>> sense
> > > > > > >>>>>> that Max Horkheimer (I think) used it, which deal only
> with the
> > > > > > >>> phenomena
> > > > > > >>>>>> of crowds and so on, is also 'not worthy' of the name.
> > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>> So I am looking for a tool which can give me a way of
> > > > > understanding how
> > > > > > >>>>>> the
> > > > > > >>>>>> Zeitgeist is formed, how it is changed, practically how to
> > > > > intervene in
> > > > > > >>>>>> it.
> > > > > > >>>>>> I do not expect a 'social psychology' to go further and
> > > provide me
> > > > > > >>> with a
> > > > > > >>>>>> social or political theory as such, but it need to be
> able to
> > > > > > >>> bridge the
> > > > > > >>>>>> gap, so to speak. Let's face it! If we can change the
> Zeitgeist
> > > > > which
> > > > > > >>>> gets
> > > > > > >>>>>> people like George W Bush and John Howard elected in
> democratic
> > > > > > >>>> countries,
> > > > > > >>>>>> into one in which genuinely good people get elected,
> then the
> > > > > rest will
> > > > > > >>>>>> look after itself and I can enjoy my retirement.
> > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>> Why not a meta-psychology? Apart form my idiosyncratic
> > > dislike of
> > > > > > >>>> "meta" I
> > > > > > >>>>>> don't want a metapsychology, I want a psychology which has a
> > > > > > >>>>>> metapsychology
> > > > > > >>>>>> which is sound and able to cope with the sociality of
> > > consciousness.
> > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>> Why not a "science of human nature"? "Human nature" is
> such a
> > > > > > >>> problematic
> > > > > > >>>>>> term, it carries such a lot of unwanted 19th century
> baggage.
> > > > > And I am
> > > > > > >>>>>> interested in consciousness, not "nature" in general.
> > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>> Sure, social psychology is a sub-discipline within
> psychology.
> > > > > > >>> There are
> > > > > > >>>>>> things which belong to psychology which are not centre-stage
> > > for me.
> > > > > > >>>> Sure,
> > > > > > >>>>>> brain injury or other defects are a serious topic, as is
> child
> > > > > > >>>>>> development,
> > > > > > >>>>>> etc., etc.. I guess I am talking about a psychology whose
> > > central
> > > > > > >>> thread
> > > > > > >>>>>> is
> > > > > > >>>>>> a social psychology rather than a neurobiology, for example.
> > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>> I need a social psychology which recognises that social
> > > movements
> > > > > > >>> are not
> > > > > > >>>>>> just large numbers of people with the same feeling, but
> > > > > subjects, and
> > > > > > >>>>>> individuals are neither passive victims of social
> processes nor
> > > > > > >>>> absolutely
> > > > > > >>>>>> free agents. But a *real*, practical, living school of
> > > > > psychology, with
> > > > > > >>>>>> people using it in designing curricula, healing depressed
> > > people,
> > > > > > >>> running
> > > > > > >>>>>> half-way houses, training teachers, organising self-help
> groups,
> > > > > etc.,
> > > > > > >>>>>> etc.
> > > > > > >>>>>> and doing real, experimental science with it, critiquing and
> > > > > > >>>> improving its
> > > > > > >>>>>> concepts down the years.
> > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>> Does that make sense?
> > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>> Andy
> > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>> At 05:14 PM 30/12/2007 -0800, you wrote:
> > > > > > >>>>>>> Andy-- This is the second time you have declared your goal
> > > to be
> > > > > > >>>>>>> answering
> > > > > > >>>>>>> questions within the framework of social psychology. Why do
> > > you use
> > > > > > >>> this
> > > > > > >>>>>>> term? Why not a
> > > > > > >>>>>>> meta-psychology? Why not a "science of human nature"?
> > > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>> I ask because I am used to social psychology being
> viewed as a
> > > > > > >>>>>>> sub-discipline within psychology.
> > > > > > >>>>>>> The only dept of social psych I know of that takes on your
> > > > > questions
> > > > > > >>>>>>> seriously is at the LSE. One branch of cultural
> psychology in
> > > > > the US
> > > > > > >>>>>>> comes
> > > > > > >>>>>>> out of experimental social
> > > > > > >>>>>>> psychology here, but I do not think you have that in mind.
> > > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>> This query is not to distract from the main line of
> > > discussion, but
> > > > > > >>>>>>> rather
> > > > > > >>>>>>> to locate what you are striving for better.
> > > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>> mike
> > > > > > >>>>>>> On Dec 30, 2007 4:34 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> > > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> I think David and Peg's messages were out of sync., yes?
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> This all raises that most difficult of questions for a
> social
> > > > > > >>>>>>> psychology
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> that wants to deal with the tasks I am asking it to
> deal with,
> > > > > > >>> how do
> > > > > > >>>>>>> you
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> deal with the knock-on effect of an action, which is
> > > predictable
> > > > > > >>> from
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> on-high, but unknown to the actors themselves? We rely
> on the
> > > > > basic
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> insight
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> that what goes on in the head first went on between
> people -
> > > > > whether
> > > > > > >>>>>>> in
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> the
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> form given to it by Fichte, Hegel, Marx, CS Peirce or
> > > > > Vygotsky. What
> > > > > > >>>>>>> is
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> Hegel's Logic about? About the underlying "logic of
> > > events", how
> > > > > > >>> this
> > > > > > >>>>>>> or
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> that policy or statement or whatever ultimately leads to
> > > this or
> > > > > > >>> that
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> problem which was at first invisible. Life experience will
> > > > > tell you
> > > > > > >>>>>>> this,
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> but if you don't have life experience, it will happen
> > > according
> > > > > > >>> to the
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> logic of events anyways and you should learn. Basically, I
> > > > > think we
> > > > > > >>>>>>> can
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> only make sense of this if we get right away from the idea
> > > of the
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> "individual-as-subject" but remember that no subject
> exists
> > > > > > >>> other than
> > > > > > >>>>>>> in
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> and through individual human beings.
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> With the ANL example of the child and the father, I have
> > > > > always had
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> trouble
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> with "examples" and methods which presuppose a leader or a
> > > > > > >>> father or a
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> facilitator, a person who knows what the experimental
> > > subject or
> > > > > > >>>>>>> student
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> or
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> self-help group really needs to do, and organises things
> > > > > > >>> accordingly.
> > > > > > >>>>>>> Of
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> course, I understand that all you teachers and
> > > teacher-trainers,
> > > > > > >>> child
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> psychologists, etc., work and have a responsibility to
> work in
> > > > > > >>>>>>> precisely
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> that circumstance. But I do not think this is the
> paradigmatic
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> relationship. The father can only do his bit in
> "leading" the
> > > > > child
> > > > > > >>>>>>> into
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> an
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> activity where its "best interests" will be served if the
> > > > > father can
> > > > > > >>>>>>> act
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> as
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> a kind of transmitter of life experience, and kind of
> > > > > short-cut the
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> process
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> for the child. So it is not the father's technique which
> > > is the
> > > > > > >>>>>>> paradigm,
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> but the bitter life experience which the child may or
> may not
> > > > > > >>> have as
> > > > > > >>>>>>> a
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> result of choosing to do this or that.
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> Andy
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> At 07:54 AM 30/12/2007 -0800, you wrote:
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Dear Andy and Peg:
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Here's some stuff from my notes; I happen to know that
> > > Andy can't
> > > > > > >>>>>>> get
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> ahold of a copy of ANL's Problems of the Development
> of the
> > > > > > >>> Mind. I
> > > > > > >>>>>>> hope
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> I don't get those funny marks that always show up when I
> > > paste
> > > > > > >>> in...
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> p. 402 ANL points out how 'only understandable'
> motives for
> > > > > > >>>>>>> homework
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> such as wanting to get a good mark can be replaced by
> 'really
> > > > > > >>>>>>> effective'
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> motives such as doing it so you can go out to play.
> However,
> > > > > after
> > > > > > >>>>>>> some
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> weeks of really effective motives, it is also possible
> > > that the
> > > > > > >>>>>>> child
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> will find that the only understandable motives become
> really
> > > > > > >>>>>>> effective,
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> e.g. the child will leave off doing homework because
> > > it¡¯s untidy
> > > > > > >>>>>>> and
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> the
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> child is now afraid of getting a bad mark.
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> p. 403: ANL writes: 'It is a matter of an action¡¯s
> > > result being
> > > > > > >>>>>>> more
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> significant in certain conditions than the motive that
> > > actually
> > > > > > >>>>>>> induces
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> it. The child begins doing its homework conscientiously
> > > > > because it
> > > > > > >>>>>>> wants
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> to go out quickly and play. In the end this leads to much
> > > > > more not
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> simply
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> that it will get the chance to go and play but also
> that it
> > > > > > >>> will get
> > > > > > >>>>>>> a
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> good mark. A new "objectivation" of its needs come about
> > > which
> > > > > > >>> means
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> they
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> are understood at a higher level.'
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> 'The transition to a new leading activity differs
> from the
> > > > > process
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> described simply in the really effective motives becoming
> > > in the
> > > > > > >>>>>>> case of
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> a change of leading activity, those understandable
> > > motives that
> > > > > > >>>>>>> exist in
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the sphere of relations characterizing the place the
> > > child can
> > > > > > >>>>>>> occupy
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> only in the next higher stage of development rather than
> > > in the
> > > > > > >>>>>>> sphere
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> of
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> relations in which it still actually is. The preparation
> > > of these
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> transitions therefore takes a long time because it is
> > > > > > >>> necessary for
> > > > > > >>>>>>> the
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> child to become quite fully aware of a sphere of
> relations
> > > > > > >>> that are
> > > > > > >>>>>>> new
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> for it.¡±
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> ANL compares a child¡¯s performance in a school play
> with the
> > > > > > >>>>>>> child¡¯s
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> learning of study as an independent activity. The child
> > > > > begins the
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> school
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> play as an assignment, and later continues for the
> > > > > approbation the
> > > > > > >>>>>>> child
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> receives during a successful performance. As with
> learning to
> > > > > > >>> study
> > > > > > >>>>>>> for
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> a
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> good mark instead of just studying for the
> opportunity to go
> > > > > > >>> out and
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> play, a ¡°merely understandable¡± motive has now become
> > > ¡°really
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> effective¡± and a new activity is established.
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> But only in the case of independent study (according to
> > > ANL) is
> > > > > > >>>>>>> the
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> new
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> activity developmentally significant (¡°objectively¡±)
> > > > > because the
> > > > > > >>>>>>> child
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> is not going to become a professional dramatist (if
> the child
> > > > > > >>> were,
> > > > > > >>>>>>> then
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the performance in the play would be study). Thus
> only in the
> > > > > > >>> latter
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> case
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> can we say there is a new leading activity.
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Here's what I make of this:
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> a) ANL really does NOT interrogate the subject as to the
> > > object
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> orientation of the activity: the object (study, the
> completed
> > > > > > >>> play)
> > > > > > >>>>>>> is
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> indeed given in advance. As far as ANL is concerned, ONLY
> > > > > > >>> Chaiklin's
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> "objective" ZPD exists, and there is NO subjective
> ZPD. But
> > > > > Andy's
> > > > > > >>>>>>> idea
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of "immanent critique" is NOT an objective critique; it
> > > has to do
> > > > > > >>>>>>> with
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> following up (just like Sarah's) the subject's way of
> seeing
> > > > > > >>> things
> > > > > > >>>>>>> and
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> seeing where it leads.
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> b) In the development discussion (San Diego-Helsinki) Dr.
> > > Olga
> > > > > > >>>>>>> Vasquez
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> raised the question of whether "leading activity" is the
> > > same as
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> "neoformation", and Dr. Pentti Harakarainnen really
> did not
> > > > > answer
> > > > > > >>>>>>> it
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> and
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> instead talked about Dr. Engestrom's even more general
> > > concept of
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> activity. But here we can see that "leading activity" and
> > > > > > >>>>>>> "neoformation"
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> are quite different: LSV used "neoformation" to talk
> about
> > > > > > >>>>>>> transitional
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> structures during crisis periods that COMPLETELY
> > > disappear (for
> > > > > > >>>>>>> example,
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the child's autonomous speech at one and the child's
> > > > > > >>> "negativism" at
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> three) as well as neoformations which become the leading
> > > activity
> > > > > > >>>>>>> during
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> normal growth. Only the latter is a "leading activity"
> > > for ANL.
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> c) There is still a STRONG behaviorist streak in ANL's
> > > reasoning:
> > > > > > >>>>>>> the
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> difference between the "really effective" and "merely
> > > understood"
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> reasoning can very easily be described, in ALL of ANL's
> > > > > > >>> examples, as
> > > > > > >>>>>>> a
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> simple lengthening of the time distance between the
> behavior
> > > > > > >>> and the
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> positive reinforcement. Bruner, in a quote that I have
> > > long since
> > > > > > >>>>>>> lost,
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> suggests that development can be described this way, but
> > > I don't
> > > > > > >>>>>>> think
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> LSV ever would have done so: for LSV the key thing about
> > > > > humans is
> > > > > > >>>>>>> that
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> they are dogs that can ring their own bells.
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Seoul National University of Education
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> ---------------------------------
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Looking for last minute shopping deals? Find them
> fast with
> > > > > Yahoo!
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> Search.
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden :
> > > > > > >>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy/tel (H) +61 3
> > > > > > >>>>>>> 9380 9435,
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> mobile 0409 358 651
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > >>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > >>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> > > > > > >>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > >>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3
> > > 9380 9435,
> > > > > > >>>>>> mobile 0409 358 651
> > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > >>>>>> xmca mailing list
> > > > > > >>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > >>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > >>>>> xmca mailing list
> > > > > > >>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380
> > > 9435,
> > > > > > >>>> mobile 0409 358 651
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > >>>> xmca mailing list
> > > > > > >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>> ---------------------------------
> > > > > > >>>> Never miss a thing. Make Yahoo your homepage.
> > > > > > >>>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > >>>> xmca mailing list
> > > > > > >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3
> 9380 9435,
> > > > > > >>> mobile 0409 358 651
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > >>> xmca mailing list
> > > > > > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>> ---------------------------------
> > > > > > >>> Never miss a thing. Make Yahoo your homepage.
> > > > > > >>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > >>> xmca mailing list
> > > > > > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380
> > > 9435,
> > > > > > >> mobile 0409 358 651
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > >> xmca mailing list
> > > > > > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > --
> > > > > > > Geoffrey Binder
> > > > > > > BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
> > > > > > > PhD Candidate
> > > > > > > Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
> > > > > > > Ph B. 9925 9951
> > > > > > > M. 0422 968 567
> > > > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > xmca mailing list
> > > > > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Tony Whitson
> > > > > > UD School of Education
> > > > > > NEWARK DE 19716
> > > > > >
> > > > > > twhitson@udel.edu
> > > > > > _______________________________
> > > > > >
> > > > > > "those who fail to reread
> > > > > > are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
> > > > > > -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
> > > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > > xmca mailing list
> > > > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >--
> > > > >Geoffrey Binder
> > > > >BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
> > > > >PhD Candidate
> > > > >Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
> > > > >Ph B. 9925 9951
> > > > >M. 0422 968 567
> > > > >_______________________________________________
> > > > >xmca mailing list
> > > > >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > >
> > > > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> > > > mobile 0409 358 651
> > > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > xmca mailing list
> > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >--
> > >Geoffrey Binder
> > >BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
> > >PhD Candidate
> > >Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
> > >Ph B. 9925 9951
> > >M. 0422 968 567
> > >_______________________________________________
> > >xmca mailing list
> > >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> > mobile 0409 358 651
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
>
>
>--
>Geoffrey Binder
>BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
>PhD Candidate
>Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
>Ph B. 9925 9951
>M. 0422 968 567
>_______________________________________________
>xmca mailing list
>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca

  Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
mobile 0409 358 651

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Received on Wed Jan 2 01:18 PST 2008