Re: [xmca] Compatible

Mike,

I'm basing my interpretation on statements like these:

"when 12-months-old infants point for an adult they are in some sense trying
to influence her mental states" (705)

"they are attempting to get the other person to orient mentally to some
nonperceptible entity that they have in mind" (712)

"clearly an understanding of the mental states of others... they are
operating on a mental level" (715)

Tomasello et al. come closest to what I would consider a more appropriate
view here:
"it is possible that infants operate with some kind of primordial,
undifferentiated communicative intention that contains the basic structure,
but not all of the adult details" (715)

For a position that sees intentionality-in-action as always primary, there's
Merleau-Ponty:

"The mental, as we have said, is reducible to the structure of behavior.
Since this structure it is visible from the outside and for the spectator at
the same time as from within and for the actor, another person is in
principle accessible to me as I am to myself"

(Interesting use here of 'inside' and 'outside' too!)

Martin

On 11/7/07 4:58 PM, "Mike Cole" <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:

> The following seems critical, Martin:
>
> If we recognize that action itself has intrinsic
> intentionality, then certainly the child can live in a social, interpersonal
> unity without forming (yet) *representations* of it.
>
> The work on perception of intentional motion in early infancy is very
> relevant here and argues against the explicit representational pov. I am not
> sure that Mike T is adopting the latter position but will have to re-read.
> mike
> On Nov 7, 2007 12:02 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
>
>> I haven't yet read all of Tomasello's paper, and so I haven't got to his
>> discussion of ontogenesis. But it's clear that he is assuming what the
>> majority of cognitive scientists assume, that recognition of
>> intentionality
>> in another's actions requires a mental representation of their mental
>> representations. 'Theory of mind' is just this: the child must have a
>> theory
>> - an explicit representation - of the mental states - themselves
>> representational - of the other, in order to understand their actions.
>>
>> Even Searle (on whose speech act theory a lot of this paper is based)
>> recognized that there are 2 kinds of intention: prior intention (in mind,
>> in
>> his view), and intention-in-action. If we attribute all intentionality to
>> mental representation then the child must be a little psychologist,
>> shortly
>> after or even at birth. If we recognize that action itself has intrinsic
>> intentionality, then certainly the child can live in a social,
>> interpersonal
>> unity without forming (yet) *representations* of it.
>>
>> I have other questions too, but this will suffice for now.
>>
>>
>> On 11/7/07 1:27 PM, "Carol Macdonald" <carolmacdon@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> A theory of mind is essentially interested in how soon young children
>>> realise that other people have minds. Instrumentality is not part of
>> *their
>>> * theory, but Mike you are of course right, and we might say that
>> getting
>>> attention is the primary act of instrumentality and getting the adult
>> (maybe
>>> a willing sibling) to do something would be the secondary level/kind of
>>> instrumentality.
>>>
>>> It's such an interesting topic that maybe one of our lurkers would want
>> to
>>> do a study for a graduate study? How about that?
>>>
>>> Carol
>>>
>>>
>>> On 07/11/2007, Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Carol-- I found this comment interesting: "However, a theory of mind
>>>> would
>>>> not
>>>>> get as far as instrumentality." What do you have in mind here? Isn't
>>>> pointing to get the attention of another an instrumental act?
>>>>
>>>> Presumably, what Tomasello and a LOT of others seem to arguing is that
>>>> there
>>>> is a primal, ready at birth, inter-personal/social unity of self and
>> other
>>>> that serves as the grounding for all forms of further development.
>>>> Development from this already and always there foundation involves
>> forms
>>>> of
>>>> differentiation and incorporation/appropriation that are also mutually
>>>> accomplished.
>>>>
>>>> A huge subject.
>>>> mike
>>>>
>>>> On Nov 7, 2007 9:35 AM, Carol Macdonald <carolmacdon@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Nov 7, 2007 8:45 AM, Carol Macdonald <carolmacdon@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Hello Mike
>>>>>> Yes, this is definitely compatible. However, a theory of mind would
>>>> not
>>>>>> get as far as instrumentality. The research is certainly very
>>>>> interesting,
>>>>>> but I think that it could go further by testing the instrumentality
>>>> and
>>>>> may
>>>>>> give some kind of rating of the infant's pleasure. This may be for
>>>> other
>>>>>> people to try.
>>>>>> Regards
>>>>>> Carol
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> "Pax Te Cum"
>>>>>> 6 Andover Road
>>>>>> Westdene
>>>>>> 2092 Johannesburg
>>>>>> 011 673 9265 082 562 1050
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> "Pax Te Cum"
>>>>> 6 Andover Road
>>>>> Westdene
>>>>> 2092 Johannesburg
>>>>> 011 673 9265 082 562 1050
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>>
>>
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Received on Wed Nov 7 14:23 PST 2007