Thanks Mike,
You asked me if I was “referring to the English Language edition of
Fundamentals of Defectology?” Yes, I am. Are we "on the same page”? – I am
not sure, Mike, because you write about p. 60, whereas I refer in my
poster to pp. 30 and 66.
”Could you advise me please on what (minimal!) text we would need to
reproduce?”
Of course, Mike: Vygotsky’s critique (case: German psychology of
disability) against quantitative research designs & methodology,
especially in research done on disabilities (in Vygotskian terms –
“defect” or “handicap”), on p.30:
“A purely arithmetical conception of a handicapped condition is
characteristic of an obsolete, old-school defectology. Reaction against
this quantitative approach to all theoretical and practical problems is
the most important characteristic of modern defectology” (1993:30).
Let me add that (1) despite of the vygotskian critique of nomothetic
quantitative methodology in the study of child disabilities, and (2)
despite of many other contemporary scholars, e.g. Seamus Hegarty`s (1985)
call for more qualitative (small N-cases, single-cases) research design,
research in the field of clinical psychology, special psychology &
education is still dominated by the quantitative, experimental research
approach.
Back to my previous posters, on the p. 66, line 21, Vygotsky discuss a new
methodological approach to the study of disabilities:
“In our country, instruction and education of the blind and other
handicapped children must be seen as a problem of social education; both
psychologically and educationally this is a question of social education.
In fact, it is exceedingly easy to notice that each physical handicap (be
it blindness, deafness or mental retardation) causes, as it were, a social
aberration” (1993: 66)
P.S. One of my PhD- articles deals with these issues. I have tried to
discuss the actuality and significance of Vygotsky’s methodology for
special psychology (e. g. a social constructionist view on disability).
Should I send you my research paper for discussion?
Yours,
Katarina
On Sat, December 2, 2006 23:53, Mike Cole wrote:
> Katrina-- To allign those interested in this discussion it would help if
> we
> were
> all "on the same page." Are you referring to the English Language edition
> of
> Fundamentals of Defectology? I am a little uncertain but I think so. p.
> 60
> discusses
> Pavolv and the notion of reflex (my eye was caught by the statement that
> all
> psychological
> acts are characterized by their future-oriented directedness). p,. 66 is
> about blind children
> but focuses on social disruption.
>
> If that is correct, we can post some of the text to make it accessible to
> those interested. Could you advise me please on what (minimal!) text we
> would need to
> reproduce?
> mike
>
> On 12/2/06, Katarina Rodina <katarina.rodina@isp.uio.no> wrote:
>>
>> Andy,
>> First, my questions were referring to the significance of "modernist"
>> and
>> Darwinist/biological approaches to psychology, i.e. CHAT psychology and
>> the holistic part of the "psychology of disability" (Vygotsky's concept
>> of
>> dysontogenesis).
>>
>> I fail to see the actuality and relevance of these issues to psychology
>> and education in what might be described as a postmodern cultural
>> situation (at least in the West). So why is this so important? Why
>> should
>> we spend time, energy and intellectual faculties on these issues?
>>
>> Second, Vygotsky as a clinical psychologist is predominantly
>> anti-modernist and anti-behaviorist, possibly even anti-evolutionist.
>> We
>> can trace his ontological view on disability back to the period
>> 1924-1934.
>> Vygotsky ("Fundamentals of Defectology", 1993:30) was opposed to
>> modernist
>> positivist methodology using predominantly quantitative diagnostics as
>> an
>> "arithmetical conception of a handicapped condition". In his work
>> Defektologia, Vygotsky was clearly opposed to a biological view on
>> disability as a static condition. Vygotsky's view on the nature of
>> disability as a dialectical process - "social aberration" (1993:66) -
>> highlighted in his concept of "complex structures of disability", in the
>> understanding of "abnormal ontogenesis" and the concept of disabled
>> persons as "ingrown/rooted into culture" is essentially social
>> constructionist, possibly even "pre-postmodernist"(Neuman & Holzman
>> 1997:25). The question is: in what way was vygotskian social
>> constructionist (not constructivist) psychology, especially in regard to
>> disability, influenced by Spinoza-Descartes (modernistic
>> epistemologists)?
>>
>> P.S. May I remind you that I have previously tried to highlight similar
>> perspectives:
>>
>> > I have some difficulties seeing LSV as a Marxist, more than a
>> > social-constructionist, inspired by the French sociological school,
>> German
>> > idealism etc (which was not unusual in the Russian "underground"
>> > intellectual culture at the beginning of the 20th century in the
>> fields
>> of
>> > literature, arts etc). Vygotsky's work (from his "Psychology of Art",
>> > 1915, to the very last writings of 1934 in the field of
>> psychopathology
>> > and defectology) is constructionist (Gergen 1995; 2001) as well as
>> > non-constructivist (see Karpov, 2005). From my point of view,
>> Vygotsky's
>> > social constructionist views do not represent the same view on the
>> social
>> > construction of mind as in the social constructionist theory by
>> Bergman
>> &
>> > Luckman (1966), which explain human socialisation from an evolutionist
>> > perspective. I would rather say that Vygotsky's social constructionism
>> is
>> > an historical (not evolutionist) situated approach to the
>> understanding
>> of
>> > human cultural development.
>>
>> http://www.lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/xmcamail.2006_10.dir/0279.html
>>
>> Yours,
>> Katarina
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, December 1, 2006 23:58, Andy Blunden wrote:
>> > I think that's too big a question for me, Katarina. What is your
>> specific
>> > issue in relation to the psychology of disability?
>> > Andy
>> > At 10:50 PM 1/12/2006 +0100, you wrote:
>> >
>> >>Hi Andy, Sasha and everybody else interested in these issues,
>> >>
>> >>Could you kindly explain the significance of this developmental
>> >>Spinoza-Descartes-Hegel-Marx-Ilyenkov point of view in relation to
>> >>Vygotsky's early works and clinical research in the field of special
>> >>psychology & education? What ideas were important for Vygotsky`s
>> >>theoretical foundation for the psychology of disability?
>> >>
>> >>Yours,
>> >>Katarina
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>On Thu, November 30, 2006 08:57, Andy Blunden wrote:
>> >> > Firstly, Sasha I recommended Lektorsky's book purely and simply
>> >> because it
>> >> > is a book-length treatment of this very complex subject from within
>> >> our
>> >> > shared tradition. I recognise the kinship of my ideas with both
>> >> Lektorsky
>> >> > and AN Leontyev but nothing in what I have said was intended as a
>> >> > representation of the ideas of these two writers. It is all my own
>> >> view. I
>> >> > have no bone to pick with Lektorsky, Leontyev or anyone else in
>> this
>> >> broad
>> >> > tradition of enquiry.
>> >> >
>> >> > Secondly, we are surely talking at cross purposes. Yes, a "subject"
>> is
>> >> *by
>> >> > definition* self-conscious and yes I do exclude plant life from
>> >> > participation in the subject-object relation in the role of
>> subject.
>> I
>> >> am
>> >> > aware of the relation between any organism and "its" object and how
>> >> this
>> >> > state of being can be seen as part of the biological evolution
>> towards
>> >> > human life. But I am not giving lessons in Darwinism. I will leave
>> >> > speculations about the dialectics of nature for the biologists.
>> (BTW,
>> >> I
>> >> > have no time for the application of the notion of "emergence"
>> outside
>> >> of
>> >> > the narrow domain for which it is applicable. I don't know why you
>> >> mention
>> >> > this.)
>> >> >
>> >> > Thirdly, not even a human individual is a subject actually, let
>> alone
>> >> a
>> >> > sea
>> >> > cucumber. It is also wrong to describe the working class as a
>> subject,
>> >> > though for different reasons. If you want to label every form of
>> life
>> >> as a
>> >> > subject because it is active, then that's fine. The word 'active',
>> in
>> >> > English at least, can be used that way, and may be useful for the
>> >> study of
>> >> > biology. But such a notion contributes absolutely nothing to
>> resolving
>> >> the
>> >> > problem of the place of the individual in modern capitalist
>> society,
>> >> the
>> >> > design of experiments into learning, understanding the
>> persuasiveness
>> >> of
>> >> > neo-conservative scaremongering, the reasons for low levels of
>> >> literacy
>> >> > among immigrant populations, etc., etc., etc..
>> >> >
>> >> > My interest in a notion of subjectivity is for the purpose and only
>> >> for
>> >> > the
>> >> > purpose of resolving these kinds of questions.
>> >> >
>> >> > The problem of freedom is in fact posed at two distinct levels: (1)
>> at
>> >> the
>> >> > level of free-will vs Laplacian determinism. This was the problem
>> >> which
>> >> > bothered Spinoza and still bothers people like John R Searle, for
>> >> example,
>> >> > who are interested in finding the key to consciousness in neurons
>> and
>> >> > electrons; and (2) the problem of humanism vs structuralism, or
>> >> > culturalism
>> >> > vs constructivism, liberalism vs communitarianism, etc., the
>> problems
>> >> > raised by Anna Stetsenko and Stephen Billett about agency and
>> >> > individuality, all those questions about whether human beings
>> really
>> >> can
>> >> > determine their own lives, or on the contrary they are prisoners
>> (not
>> >> of
>> >> > biological or molecular forces, but) of social structures and
>> >> historical
>> >> > forces.
>> >> >
>> >> > Andy
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > At 03:30 AM 30/11/2006 +0300, you wrote:
>> >> >>Hi, Andy
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>I'm afraid but I think that just in this issue we have better to
>> base
>> >> our
>> >> >>analysis on Marx and Il'enkov themselves than on Lektorsky. If you
>> are
>> >> >>retelling him correctly he doesn't gives us an insight into the
>> >> problem
>> >> >> of
>> >> >>Subject and Object (Predmet) relation but simply shares the old
>> >> mistake
>> >> >> with
>> >> >>A.N.Leont'ev.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>If subject is "some self-conscious system of activity" it means
>> that
>> >> both
>> >> >>animals and plants can't be estimated as subjects, surely, if we
>> don't
>> >> >>ascribe them some form of self-consciousness :-). So it means that
>> all
>> >> >>living creatures (except the self-conscious humans) are mere
>> objects
>> >> >> (here
>> >> >>it doesn't mean "predmet" but something passive). This is nothing
>> but
>> >> >>ancient Cartesian formula.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>Let's go ahead. You write: "subject arises out of some definite,
>> >> >> objective
>> >> >>system of activity when it becomes self-conscious". I will agree
>> with
>> >> >> this
>> >> >>statement if you (or Lektorsky) will explain us what makes your
>> >> >> "definite,
>> >> >>objective system of activity" turn into self-conscious being? The
>> >> >>possibility of such a magical transmutation of something
>> mechanical,
>> >> >> passive
>> >> >>("objective") into self-conscious is looking like the popular among
>> >> some
>> >> >>psychologists idea of emerging. According to this point of view we
>> >> >> explain
>> >> >>something if we say that it suddenly emerges, or in old Soviet
>> >> >> ideological
>> >> >>style if something appears as a result of transition of quantity
>> into
>> >> >>quality. You probably know that Vygotsky scoffed at the very idea
>> of
>> >> >>emergentism in his "Emotions teaching".
>> >> >>
>> >> >>The main (Cartesian) mistake of CHAT classics was in their
>> >> theoretically
>> >> >>fruitful attempts to jump from mechanic S==>R level to the level of
>> >> >>consciousness leaving out three necessary stages. It is clear that
>> >> such
>> >> >>transition is possible only in fair tales where the fairy godmother
>> >> gives
>> >> >> a
>> >> >>soul to the ugly nutcracker.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>In reality to pass from mechanical to the consciousness level we
>> have
>> >> to
>> >> >>ascend to the levels of chemism and organism and only here on the
>> >> stage
>> >> >> of
>> >> >>organic life we will meet the real subject-object (predmetnoe)
>> >> relation.
>> >> >> The
>> >> >>birth of subjectness takes place here on the level of abstract
>> life.
>> >> But
>> >> >> on
>> >> >>the first stage (including unicellulars and plants) we have only
>> >> >>subjectness, not subjectivness. We have no reasons to search here
>> >> >>self-consciousness because on this level we haven't even psyche.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>Only on the next level when a living subject starts to relate to
>> >> itself
>> >> >> or
>> >> >>the predmet activity of living subject is realizing by means of
>> self
>> >> >>directed, reflecsive activity we are coming to the level of psyche
>> >> (zoo
>> >> >>psyche) or self-sensation (still now not self-consciousness).
>> >> >>
>> >> >>Thus we can go to the next level the level of consciousness and
>> self
>> >> >>consciousness only standing on the level of zoo psyche.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>Only basing on such intermediate evolutionary levels separating the
>> >> >>mechanical (Cartesian) S==>R robot and still Cartesian bodiless
>> soul
>> >> with
>> >> >>free will we can acquire the rational, not magical understanding of
>> >> free
>> >> >>bodily human being. On the contrary, if we will insist on our
>> >> Cartesian
>> >> >>attempts we will at best have a chance to repeat after LSV the
>> >> >> questionable
>> >> >>metaphor of triangle and sign mediation or after ANL the idea of
>> >> activity
>> >> >>mediating the relation of stimulus and reaction.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>We entirely agree with Vygotsky's declaration that "the problem of
>> >> >> freedom
>> >> >>is a central problem of psychology" (it was recently published in
>> >> Russian
>> >> >>among other materials for Vygotsky's archive). We insist that both
>> >> >> Vygotsky
>> >> >>and Leont'ev belonged to one and the same theoretic school (you
>> know
>> >> some
>> >> >> of
>> >> >>our colleges are denying this fact) because both they were trying
>> to
>> >> >> solve
>> >> >>the one and the same problem the problem of freedom. How a human
>> can
>> >> be
>> >> >>free from the mechanical S==>R causation of its body?
>> >> >>
>> >> >>So if we want not only repeat both true and erroneous words of
>> >> Vygotsky
>> >> >> and
>> >> >>Leont'ev being said long ago, but to do our part for development of
>> >> CHAT
>> >> >> we
>> >> >>have to go further than they in solving the same problem which was
>> in
>> >> the
>> >> >>focus of their theoretic interest, the problem of freedom. And we
>> can
>> >> do
>> >> >> it
>> >> >>only abandoning the false Cartesian position identifying animals
>> with
>> >> >>mechanical (exclusive of subjectness) S==>R causality, doesn't
>> >> >> understanding
>> >> >>them as a subjects, (not to say about subjectivness) but as a
>> soulless
>> >> >>mechanical toys. We are stressing that transition from Cartesian
>> >> tubes,
>> >> >>threads and valves to the modern conception of living body as a
>> >> >>biomechanical S==>R robot left us entirely inside Cartesian
>> mechanism
>> >> as
>> >> >> a
>> >> >>specific logic.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>I realize that all this is hardly acceptable for those
>> investigators
>> >> who
>> >> >> are
>> >> >>trying to develop the semiotic approach appreciating LSV's idea of
>> >> sign
>> >> >>mediation as his central and the most fruitful idea. It can't be
>> >> helped.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>We have to choose the way: are we going to share Vygotsky's way
>> based
>> >> on
>> >> >>ideas of sign mediation, or we are going to share Vygotsky's way
>> based
>> >> on
>> >> >>ideas of Spinoza. Vygotsky had too little time to realize that two
>> >> these
>> >> >>ways led him to the opposite sides, split the very logic of his
>> >> >>investigation. I am sure, and I share this position with Il'enkov
>> who
>> >> >>fundamentally argued the absolute incompatibility, of semiotic and
>> >> >> activity
>> >> >>approaches, that the semiotic way leads us to the dead end, while
>> >> >> activity
>> >> >>approach gives us a chance to build a new dialectical psychology.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>And we have to realize finally that Vygotsky was not a God, so if
>> we
>> >> are
>> >> >>investigators, not believers we have to cease the protracted
>> >> >> interpretation
>> >> >>of his "sacred" texts and start, or better to say continue after
>> him
>> >> >>investigation of problems he formulated for himself and for all of
>> us.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>Sasha
>> >> >>
>> >> >>-----Original Message-----
>> >> >>From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>> [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>> ]
>> >> On
>> >> >>Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>> >> >>Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2006 12:22 AM
>> >> >>To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> >> >>Subject: RE: [xmca] Empirical Evidence for ZPD
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>Big question Michael.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>See
>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/lektorsky/subject-object/index.htm
>> >> >> for
>> >> >>
>> >> >>a book-length answer from Lektorsky.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>Subject and object are always two distinct entities, but the
>> subject
>> >> >> (some
>> >> >>
>> >> >>self-conscious system of activity) arises out of some definite,
>> >> objective
>> >> >>
>> >> >>system of activity when it becomes self-conscious, and the activity
>> >> then
>> >> >>
>> >> >>constitutes (in AN Leontyev's words) the "intertraffic" between
>> >> subject
>> >> >> and
>> >> >>
>> >> >>object. The activity of the subject then is to objectify itself in
>> the
>> >> >>
>> >> >>object, giving its activities material forms deposited in the
>> >> objective
>> >> >>
>> >> >>world around it, vested with meanings by which the subject
>> >> >>
>> >> >>"institutionalises" itself.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>So in the beginning there is no distinction, because the relevant
>> >> system
>> >> >> of
>> >> >>
>> >> >>activity has not yet become self-conscious, and in the end there is
>> no
>> >> >>
>> >> >>distinction because the subject has "naturalised" its activity and
>> >> become
>> >> >>
>> >> >>indistinguishable from the object. These are of course both
>> >> tendencies,
>> >> >> and
>> >> >>
>> >> >>not absolute truths, and the whole life of a subject exists between
>> >> these
>> >> >>
>> >> >>two poles.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>Andy
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>At 02:03 PM 28/11/2006 -0500, you wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >Andy and Paul,
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >What is the argument that a dialectical approach, even
>> dialectical
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >materialism, dissolves the difference between subject and
>> object? I
>> >> >> guess
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >we are all influenced by what we have been reading lately, but it
>> >> seems
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >that it is difficult for a dialectic based perspective to escape
>> the
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >idealism trap.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >Thanks,
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >Michael
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >-----Original Message-----
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>> >> [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>> >> >> On
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2006 5:09 AM
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >Subject: Re: [xmca] Empirical Evidence for ZPD (was= Does
>> >> >> VygotskyAccept
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >the "Assistance Assumption"?)
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >Paul, surely you overstate the matter.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >ZPD is, like all scientific concepts, a theory-laden object. To
>> say
>> >> >> that it
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >exists says that certain more or less well-defined procedures
>> >> >> understood
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >within the Vygotskyan theory, will produce this or that
>> verifiable
>> >> >> result.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >Otherwise what is the useof the concept and the theory of which
>> it
>> >> is a
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >part? While there are lots of concepts within the Vygotskyan
>> theory
>> >> >> which
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >are new and unique, or have a Marxist genealogy, there are also
>> >> plenty
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >which are shared with all pedagogical theories and common sense.
>> In
>> >> >> fact,
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >all scientific theories must incorporate "common sense" concepts
>> >> into
>> >> >> their
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >framework in order to be truly scientific. "Empiricism" denies
>> that
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >scientific objects are "theory laden" and that there is anything
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >problematic in the idea of a purely factual test for the
>> existence
>> >> of
>> >> >> some
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >object. But to deny Empiricism is not to deny the validity and
>> >> >> necessity of
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >empirical evidence.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >And surely it is wrong to say that in Marxism or Vygotsky "the
>> >> subject
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >object distinction is dissolved". The absolute independence and
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >separateness of subject and object is certainly denied by Marx
>> and
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >Vygotsky, but neither claim that "subject" and "object" are
>> invalid
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >concepts, or concepts between which no distinction can be made.
>> For
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >example, Marx does not claim that an object (e.g. ZPD) exists
>> >> insofar
>> >> >> as a
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >subject (Vygotskyan psychology) incorporates the concept in its
>> >> >> activity,
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >so that empirical refutation of the concept is ruled out in
>> >> principle.
>> >> >> No
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >subject exists in absolute separateness from every other subject,
>> >> all
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >subjects exist in a material and therefore infinitely
>> >> interconnected,
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >world. So the identity of subject and object can only be
>> relative,
>> >> not
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >absolute.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >Andy
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >At 12:26 AM 28/11/2006 -0800, you wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> > > Isn´'t the idea of "empirical" evidence for the ZPD
>> something
>> >> of
>> >> >> an
>> >> >>
>> >> >> > > oxymoron in itself? Didn{t Vygotsky develop his thinking
>> within
>> >> the
>> >> >>
>> >> >> > > framework of dialetical materialism, something that many north
>> >> >> americans
>> >> >>
>> >> >> > > and others seem all too ready to forget? Isn't the concept of
>> a
>> >> ZPD
>> >> >> a
>> >> >>
>> >> >> > > dialectical model in itself, which is to say, a model in which
>> >> the
>> >> >>
>> >> >> > > subject object distinction is dissolved, a dissolution which
>> >> defies
>> >> >> the
>> >> >>
>> >> >> > > concept of empirical?
>> >> >>
>> >> >> > > Paul Dillon
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >> > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380
>> >> 9435,
>> >> >> AIM
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >_______________________________________________
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >xmca mailing list
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >_______________________________________________
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >xmca mailing list
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380
>> 9435,
>> >> >> AIM
>> >> >>
>> >> >>identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>_______________________________________________
>> >> >>
>> >> >>xmca mailing list
>> >> >>
>> >> >>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> >> >>
>> >> >>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >> >>
>> >> >>_______________________________________________
>> >> >>xmca mailing list
>> >> >>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> >> >>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >> >
>> >> > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380
>> 9435,
>> >> AIM
>> >> > identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>> >> >
>> >> > _______________________________________________
>> >> > xmca mailing list
>> >> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> >> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>--
>> >>Katarina A. Rodina
>> >>MSc in Speech-Language Therapy,
>> >>PhD-Research Fellow,
>> >>Department of Special Needs Education
>> >>University of Oslo
>> >>P.O.Box 1140 Blindern
>> >>NO-0318 OSLO,Norway
>> >>Phone: +47 22 85 81 38
>> >>Fax: +47 22 85 80 21
>> >>E-mail: katarina.rodina@isp.uio.no
>> >>
>> >>Head of Russo-Norwegian Academic Cooperation,
>> >>Herzen State Pedagogical University
>> >>St.Petersburg, Russia
>> >>E-mail: ro-dina@mail.ru
>> >>tlf: +47 41 108 408
>> >>http://www.herzen.spb.ru
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>_______________________________________________
>> >>xmca mailing list
>> >>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> >>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >
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>>
>> --
>> Katarina A. Rodina
>> MSc in Speech-Language Therapy,
>> PhD-Research Fellow,
>> Department of Special Needs Education
>> University of Oslo
>> P.O.Box 1140 Blindern
>> NO-0318 OSLO,Norway
>> Phone: +47 22 85 81 38
>> Fax: +47 22 85 80 21
>> E-mail: katarina.rodina@isp.uio.no
>>
>> Head of Russo-Norwegian Academic Cooperation,
>> Herzen State Pedagogical University
>> St.Petersburg, Russia
>> E-mail: ro-dina@mail.ru
>> tlf: +47 41 108 408
>> http://www.herzen.spb.ru
>>
>>
>>
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-- Katarina A. Rodina MSc in Speech-Language Therapy, PhD-Research Fellow, Department of Special Needs Education University of Oslo P.O.Box 1140 Blindern NO-0318 OSLO,Norway Phone: +47 22 85 81 38 Fax: +47 22 85 80 21 E-mail: katarina.rodina@isp.uio.noHead of Russo-Norwegian Academic Cooperation, Herzen State Pedagogical University St.Petersburg, Russia E-mail: ro-dina@mail.ru tlf: +47 41 108 408 http://www.herzen.spb.ru
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